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Abstract 
The well-worn paradox of the resource curse has not yet been thoroughly examined through 
the lens of international law principles governing state sovereignty over mineral resources, 
and how these principles have been operationalized in developing African states. Africa is 
richly endowed with an array of mineral resources but the development of the continent as a 
whole and of individual states has not been concomitant with this resource endowment. 
Although international law provides African states with the mandate to regulate and derive 
benefits from exploitation of their mineral resources, they do not appear to be working within 
this mandate in a manner that ensures the flow of benefits in a sustainable and equitable way. 
The international law mandate to regulate and derive benefits from mineral resources is 
however multi-faceted. The thesis identifies three key international law principles which 
support state sovereignty over mineral resources; namely, self-determination, non-interference 
(non-intervention) and permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR). Along with the 
right to development, these principles provide a solid basis in international law for African 
states to capitalize on their mineral resources in a developmental way. The realpolitik of 
mineral extraction, however, requires that African states court investment and establish trade 
relations. This expands the mandate to regulate and derive benefits from mineral resources to 
include principles of international investment and trade law, which relate to state sovereignty 
over mineral resources in ambiguous ways. Additionally, various overarching issues and 
threats such as corruption, illegal mining and conflict situations arise and host states have to 
navigate them in order to assert their mandate and sovereignty over mineral resources for self-
determination and development. How states navigate this complex space through their 
authority to determine and implement domestic mineral laws is a question worthy of 
consideration. Two case studies, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) illustrate the multi-faceted ways in which African states use (and fail to use) their 
domestic laws in a manner that allows them to benefit from the international law mandate in 
support of self-determination and development.    
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview of Thesis 
 
The geographical location and uneven distribution of mineral resources across the world, and 
their finite character, as well as their industrial demand makes competition to access them 
amongst foreign mining investors very competitive.1 Fortunately, Africa is richly endowed 
with an array of mineral resources.2 The economic value of minerals makes them one of the 
most treasured natural resources on the African continent and has been one of the major 
drivers of colonization.3 Regardless of being home to various mineral resources, however, the 
development of Africa as a whole and of individual states has not been concomitant with this 
endowment, a paradox captured as the “resource curse”.4 
 
The paradox of the resource curse is yet to be thoroughly examined through the lens of 
international law principles governing state sovereignty over mineral resources, and the 
manner in which these principles have been operationalized in domestic mining laws of 
states. Although international law provides states with the mandate to regulate and derive 
benefits from exploitation of their mineral resources,5 however, the operationalization of the 
principles does not appear to be working to promote the mandate in a manner that ensures the 
flow of benefits in a sustainable and equitable way. One of the contributions of this thesis is 
to provide a conceptual framework to view the resource curse paradox through the lens of 
international law. 
  
                                                          
1
 See generally the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, International Study Group Report on 
Africa’s Mineral Regimes ‘The Minerals and Africa’s Development’ 2011 at 2 & 21 – 27, available at 
http://www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/ISG%20Report_eng.pdf (accessed 3 March 2015). 
2
 Examples of minerals found in African are; bauxite, cobalt, diamonds, phosphate rock, platinum group metals 
(PGMs), vermiculite, gold, chrome, copper, iron ore, coltan, manganese, titanium, zinc, asbestos, nickel, 
limestone, tin, tantalum, tungsten, uranium, malachites, aegirine, azurite, barite, calcite, carrollite, cassiterite, 
celestine, chrysocolla, columbite, cuprite, epidote, fluorite, malachite, malachite, rhodizite, emerald, sapphirine, 
scapolite, spinel, sturmanite, thorianite, topaz, torbernite, willemite and zircon. 
3
 The Minerals and Africa’s Development, supra note 1 at 12 – 13. 
4
 See generally Michael L Ross ‘The politics of the resource curse: A review’ 2013; Ichumile Gqada ‘Mining 
and minerals for development: Making the case for Africa’ 2012, available at http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-
analysis/mining-and-minerals-for-development-making-the-case-for-africa (accessed 3 April 2015). 
5
 See generally the UNGA Resolution 1803(XVIII): Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of 14 
December 1962. 
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The thesis identifies three key international law principles which support state sovereignty 
over mineral resources, namely, self-determination, non-interference (non-intervention) and 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR). Along with the right to development, 
these principles provide a solid basis in international law for developing states to capitalize 
on the regulation and exploitation of their mineral resources in a developmental way.  
 
The realpolitik of mineral exploitation, however, requires that developing states court 
investment and establish reliable trade relations.6 This expands the mandate to control and 
regulate mineral resources to include benefits derived from principles of international 
investment and trade law, which relate to state sovereignty over minerals in unclear ways. In 
addition, various overarching issues and threats; namely, corruption, illegal mining, 
conditionality policies of the World bank and the IMF, and conflict situations arise and host 
states have to navigate them in order to assert control over domestic mineral resources.7 The 
manner in which developing states, in particular African states, navigate this complex space 
through their authority to determine and implement domestic mining laws is a question 
worthy of consideration.  
 
Two case studies, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) illustrate the 
multi-faceted ways in which developing states use or fail to use their domestic laws in a 
manner that allows them to derive benefits from the international law mandate supporting 
self-determination and development. Both case studies provide and illustrate threats to the 
outworking of sovereignty over mineral resources and the mandate to develop through 
exploitation of the resources. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement and Questions 
 
The problem is that many African states endowed with mineral resources have not benefited 
to the extent concomitant with their endowment despite the international law principles 
highlighted above, which give host states the mandate to assert sovereignty over domestic 
mineral resources and regulation. This mandate potentially has no meaning in the absence of 
effective legal protections that give effect to indigenous conceptions of development.  
                                                          
6
 See generally Gavin Wright & Jesse Czelusta ‘Mineral resources and economic development’, a paper 
prepared for the Conference on Sector Reform in Latin America, Stanford Center for International 
Development,  13 – 15 November 2003. 
7
 See generally Richard J Lazarus ‘Changing conceptions of property and sovereignty in natural resources: 
Questioning the public trust doctrine’ (1986) 71 Iowa Law Review 631 at 631 – 632. 
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As reflected earlier, one would assume that since colonialism ended, African states have 
gained sovereignty, political and economic self-determination, as well as full control over 
their mineral resources. One of the issues considered is the strengths and limitations of 
international law regarding the ability of African states to benefit from exploitation of their 
mineral resources. Although international law principles are intended to regulate and address 
various legal issues that affect relations among states, challenges exist on how to effectively 
take advantage of the international principles which support state sovereignty against the 
tensions and threats that affect the exercise of the mandate. The thesis considers some of 
these principles arguing, among other things, that they place rights and obligations on African 
states to exploit and benefit from their mineral resources. Against this background, there is a 
need to establish whether African states are taking full advantage of the mandate given by 
international law principles over their mineral resources and the relevant rights enshrined in 
the various international treaties on ownership and control of domestic mineral resources.8 
 
The question for consideration is how Zimbabwe and the DRC use domestic law and policy 
as a strategic arena within the frame established by international law principles. There is a 
gap in research about the appropriate global legal response to the domestic regulation of, and 
safeguards for mineral resources, as well as the need for policy or institutions to counteract 
particular illegal activities (criminality) that disadvantage African states and prevent them 
from benefitting from exploitation of their resources.   
 
This thesis therefore examines the inverse relationship between mineral wealth and 
development in Africa (the “resource curse” problem) from the perspective of how 
international law principles potentially frame host states’ regulatory response to mineral 
resources, both in terms of how they capitalize on the mandate provided by international law, 
how they navigate the tensions between different categories of international law principles, 
and how they deal with key threats to sovereignty. The focus of the thesis is on the strategic 
                                                          
8
 See generally international legal instruments such as the UN GA Resolution 1803 (XVII); Article 2(1) of the 
UN Charter, 1945; Article 1 – 2(2)(a)-(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States; Article 1(2) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; Article 1(2) of the Article 1(1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, hereafter the ICESCR; See Principle 2 
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992; here after the Rio Declaration; Principle 21 of 
the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972; hereafter the Stockholm 
Declaration; Article 3 of the CBD. See also Lord McNair The Law of Treaties (1961) at 100. 
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arena of domestic law and policy. This serves as a novel approach to the resource curse 
problem.  
 
The research adds to existing knowledge of the resource curse through analysis of domestic 
aspects of the mining laws of the DRC and Zimbabwe. Both of these states exhibit the 
resource curse problem. The inability of both states to navigate the various threats to an 
internationally-conferred mandate to exploit and benefit from mineral resources using 
domestic mining law is a cause of concern. The gap highlights further the contribution of this 
thesis and the importance of the case studies. 
 
The realpolitik of mineral resource exploitation requires investment and trade, which is 
governed by distinct set of international law principles that may clash with the internationally 
recognized mandate of states over their resources and their domestic regulation. Some 
African states endowed with mineral resources are not capable of exploiting them without 
capital which comes with foreign investment. The investments in turn come with conditions 
that may interfere with the exercise of sovereignty over mineral resources for self-
determination. 
  
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
The study has been motivated by the need to assess how African states use domestic law and 
policy, within the frame provided by international law, to benefit from the exploitation of 
their mineral resources. The study has five main aims which are: 
(i) To identify the general international law principles which support state 
sovereignty over domestic mineral resources.  
(ii) To critically assess and analyze the effectiveness of aspects of the principles of 
international law which supports sovereignty as they manifest in domestic law. 
(iii) To identify threats to the exercise of sovereignty in pursuit of self-determination 
and whether these constitute interference. 
(iv) To examine the extent to which domestic mining law and policy assist host states 
to assert sovereignty over mineral resources and navigate the threats and 
interferences. 
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(v) To investigate the potential for applying domestic law and polices to curb the 
interferences and threats which disadvantage host countries, such as the DRC and 
Zimbabwe, to regulate and benefit from their domestic mineral resources. 
 
1.4 Background to the Study 
  
It is an indisputable fact that Africa is richly endowed with an array of mineral resources, 
which are the backbone of many economies on the continent. With such a highly treasured 
endowment, ideally, Africa should take advantage to exploit and export the resources, as well 
as use the proceeds for development.9 Despite this endowment, however, the continent is 
poor and underdeveloped. To determine the extent of development, indicators take into 
account factors such as human capital,10 income distribution, critical infrastructure (example, 
financial services, electricity generation, public health and clean water supply), inter-regional 
competitiveness, transportation systems and telecommunication. In light of these indicators, 
however, ‘[a] sustained improvement in African human development […] falls, nonetheless, 
short of those experienced in other developing [or developed] regions.’11  
 
Many African states characteristically fall towards the lowest ranking of most lists measuring 
the extent of development activities, such as income per capita or gross domestic product 
(GDP), in spite of the continent being rich in mineral resources.12 In many African states, the 
GDP per capita is less than US$5000 per year, with the majority of the population living 
below US$1.50 per day.13 In addition, the extent of Africa's share of global income has been 
consistently declining over the past decades. 
                                                          
9
 L C Stilwell ‘Mineral endowments and developing economies’ The Southern African Institute of Mining and 
Metallurgy Base Metals Conference, 2009 at 153. 
10
 Human capital can be considered as the stock of knowledge, habits, social and personality attributes, 
including the creativity embodied in the ability to perform labour so as to produce economic value. 
11
 See generally United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ‘Human development reports,’ available at 
http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/data  (accessed 3 December 2014); Leandro Prados de la Escosura ‘Human 
Development in Africa: A long-run perspective’ (2011) 8 European Historical Economics Society, Working 
Papers in economic History 1.  
12
 See generally United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Sustainable 
Development ‘Finance for sustainable development: Testing new policy approaches’ 2002, Proceedings of the 
Fifth Expert Group Meeting on Finance for Sustainable Development, Nairobi, Kenya, 1- 4 December 1999. 
13
 Ibid.  See generally International Monetary Fund (IMF) ‘Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Initiative’ 2014, available at  https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (accessed 3 
December 2014); Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion ‘The changing profile of poverty in the world’ 2020 
FOCUS BRIEF ‘World’s Poor and Hungry People’ (2007); Punam Chuhan-Pole, Luc Christiaensen, Allen 
Dennis, Gerard Kambou, Manka Angwafo, Mapi Buitano, Vijdan Korman, Camila Galindo Pardo, Aly Sanoh 
Africa’s Pulse (2013) at http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Report/Africas-
Pulse-brochure_Vol8.pdf (accessed 4 December 2013); Morton Jerven Poor Numbers – How We are 
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The causes of the paradoxical relationship between mineral wealth and underdevelopment 
drew my attention. The major explanations for Africa’s underdevelopment typically focus on 
the influence of colonialism and the removal of approximately 20 million slaves, who were 
forcibly exported from the African continent.14 Once considered as “no man’s land”, Africa 
was a source of cheap labour. The geographical location of the continent was ideal for 
commercial market access, which was highly strategic and integral to sustain convenient 
trade routes from Europe to Asia and the Americas.15 Apart from these factors, the natural 
endowment of the continent was one of the major, central and inherent causes of the scramble 
for Africa and rapid colonization by the European powers.16 The rush into Africa mainly in 
the 19th century was in search for various natural resources, including minerals that were 
required for industrial purposes and economic development, as well as military evolution in 
Europe.17  
 
Having established their colonies in many parts of Africa, the colonial governments used 
gunboat diplomacy18 in order to exploit resources. While one may argue that colonialism 
paved the way for the settlers to bring technological innovation in the colonies, the scramble 
for Africa also fundamentally obstructed internal processes of state formation and indigenous 
conceptions of development.19 It could be argued that the vestiges of colonialism include 
corruption, greed, political instability, injustice and underdevelopment, phenomena still 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It (2013); The World Bank ‘Poverty Overview’ 
2014 at http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview (accessed 4 December 2014).  
14
 See generally Simon Johnson & James A Robinson ‘The colonial origins of comparative development: An 
empirical investigation’ (2001) 91 American Economic Review 1369; Nathan Nunn ‘The long-run term effects 
of Africa’s stave trade’ (2008) 123 Quarterly Journal of Economics 139; Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias 
Papaioannou The long-run effects of the scramble for Africa (2011) at 1.    
15
 J D Hargreaves ‘The making of boundaries: Focus on West Africa’ in A I Asiwaju (ed) Partitioned Africans: 
Ethnic Relations Across Africa’s International Boundaries 1884 – 1984 (1985) 19 at 21.  
16
 Thomas Pakenham The Scramble for Africa: White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent 1876 – 1912 
(1991) at 2; Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila (2002) at 227; Abiodun Alao 
Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment (2007) at 10 – 11.  
17
 See generally Ruth W Arad & Arad U B ‘East-West: The scramble for the world’s resources’ in Ruth W 
Arad, Arad U B, McCulloch R, Pinera J & Hollick A L (eds) Sharing Global Resources (1979) 25; James Otto 
& John Cordes The Regulation of Mineral Enterprises: A Global Perspective on Economics, Law and Policy 
(2002) at 11-13; Linda Frederisksen, Margaret Bean & Heidi Nance Global Resource Sharing (2012). 
18
 Military force was used to establish and maintain political control over the colonies.   
19
 See generally Fouad Makki ‘Post-colonial Africa and the world economy: The long waves of uneven 
development’ (2015) 2 Journal of World-Systems Research 124 at 125 – 126. See also Joe Duke II ‘The impact 
of colonialism on the development of management in Nigeria’ (2010) 5 International Journal of Business and 
Management 64. 
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observed in many parts of Africa.20 The predatory manner in which colonial governments 
illegally controlled Africa’s mineral resources, and insatiably exploited and looted the 
resources, intrinsically prejudiced Africa against using its resources for economic growth and 
development.  
 
The wave of decolonization that swept Africa after World War II was underpinned by 
complex processes that varied widely from one African country to another.21 As the process 
continued to spread, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a landmark 
instrument, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples of 1960.22 Unswervingly, the Declaration confirmed the rights of all peoples to self-
determination and declared colonialism be brought to a quick and unconditional end. To 
further show commitment to end colonialism in 1962, a Special Committee on 
Decolonization was established to monitor the implementation of the Declaration in order to 
speed up the decolonization process. Various international law instruments, including 
resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR), were enacted in order 
to unequivocally spell out and resolve the controversy relating to resource control in 
international law.23 Concomitant with the resolution on PSNR, was a relative consensus 
which stressed the need to promote economic development in order to achieve universal 
peace. Without international peace, however, it would have been impossible to control 
mineral resources, as well as to exploit them for self-determination. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that the decolonization period marked a new international order which recognized and 
gave effect to the principles of self-determination, PSNR and non-intervention (non-
interference) in domestic affairs of states.  
 
                                                          
20
 Tangie Nsoh Fonchingong ‘The state and development in Africa’ (2006) 8 African Journal of International 
Affairs 1 at 4. 
21
 The Map as History ‘Decolonization after 1945’ available at http://www.the-map-as-history.com/maps/11-
decolonization_independence.php (accessed 3 December 2014). 
22
 UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV) - Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples of 14 December 1960. 
23
 Some of the instruments include UNGA Resolution 626(VII) – Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, 2 December 1952; UNGA Resolution 1314(XIII) - Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 
12 December 1958; UNGA Resolution 1803(XVII) - Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 14 
December 1962. See also Bilder R B ‘International law and natural resources policies’ (1980) 20 Natural 
Resources Journal 451; Jonathan I Charney ‘Transnational corporations and developing public international 
law’ (1983) 4 Duke Law Journal 748; Tyler S R Co-management of Natural Resources (2006). 
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Following the granting of political independence, the new states had to shape their political 
and economic status. Some worked against the challenges of continued political hegemony,24 
while others worked with former colonial powers or other powers in order to protect their 
interests and maintain control over economic resources.25 Apparently, the ultimate goal was 
to promote development through exploitation of domestic mineral resources, amongst other 
natural resources.26 One may give credit to the UN and international law for supporting 
African states’ sovereignty and the mandate to control their mineral resources. As highlighted 
above, however, many African states rich in natural resources have not enjoyed substantial 
economic growth and development.27 In particular, there have been diverging interests in the 
control of mineral resources, and varying conditions, threats and interferences that have 
negatively affected the sovereignty of African states over mineral resources. 
 
Although international law is legally binding over the allocation and control of natural 
resources,28 the international law principles that are in place do not operate in isolation. 
Municipal laws are used to implement the international order. At the domestic level, control 
of mineral resources is achieved through the relevant laws and state institutions. Therefore, it 
is inherently the right and duty of host states to set out the ways in which exploitation of 
minerals resources takes place, by enacting provisions in mining laws that set out the manner 
in which sovereignty over mineral resources can still be protected, even whilst exploitation of 
the resource takes place at the hand of third parties with the requisite technical and financial 
resources. However, it is disappointing that many African states appear to be unable to 
control their resources for self-determination.29 As such, one of the critical issues presently is 
the inability of many African countries to convert their mineral endowment into economic 
growth and development.30 Many academic commentators see this problem as a ‘resource 
                                                          
24
 Benjamin Talton ‘The challenge of decolonisation in Africa’ 2011, available at 
http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-challenge-of-decolonization-africa.html (accessed 15 April 2015). 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Abiodun Alao, op cit note 16 at 1 -7. See generally Rita Abrahamsen (ed) Conflict and Security in Africa 
(2013).   
28
 See generally Bilder R B, op cit note 23.  
29
 See generally the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), was adopted in Abuja, Nigeria on 23 
October 2001, available at http://www.nepad.org (accessed 3 December 2014). 
30
 Emeka Duruigbo ‘Permanent sovereignty and people’s ownership of natural resources in international law’ 
(2006) 38 George Washington International Law Review 33. See also Lila B ‘Sovereignty over natural 
resources under examination: The inter-American system for human rights and natural resources allocation’ 
(2006) 12 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 43; Fawcett J E S & Parry A Law and 
International Resource Conflicts (1981) at 3; Gulland J A ‘World fisheries and fish stocks’ (1977) 1 Marine 
Policy 179. See further Crowson P ‘British foreign policy: Dependence on non-fuel minerals’ (1978) 
International Affairs 1. 
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curse’,31 denoting an inverse relationship between the state’s mineral resource endowment 
and economic growth, and development.32  
 
In addition to poverty, many African states have experienced, and indeed, they are currently 
experiencing conflicts associated with mineral resources. For example, resource conflicts 
have been experienced in the DRC (including the deadly conflict of 1998-2004), which was 
labelled ‘Africa’s First World War’.33 Apart from the DRC, conflicts have also been 
experienced in Zimbabwe, Sierra-Leone, Nigeria, Liberia, and Angola, amongst others.34 At 
the core of the conflicts is the element of control over the resources,35 caused by uneven 
distribution of the benefits or proceeds to all levels of society. Conflicts further weaken 
fragile state institutions, which raises concern about the appropriate locus of mineral resource 
regulation in the face of threats and inferences.36 Some prominent academics including 
Nzongola-Ntalaja equate mineral resource conflicts to the ‘scramble for Africa’.37 The reason 
for the equation could be that tensions in mineral resource regulation restrict and weaken 
sovereignty of host states.38 In short, the origin of protracted conflicts in many parts of Africa 
lies in past colonial policies that caused divisions, prejudice, manipulation and uneven 
distribution of wealth, and infrastructure and development exclusions. It is therefore critical 
to understand intractable mineral resource control conflicts and their causes in the context of 
the state’s capacity to exercise control over exploitation of domestic mineral resources as 
well as the negative lingering and destructive effects of colonialism.39 
 
In a nutshell, there is an interdependent relationship between international law, domestic law 
and state sovereign control over domestic minerals, as well as economic growth and 
                                                          
31
 For discussion on the concept of the resource curse, see Michael L Ross, op cit note 4. Also, see section 1.5 
below. 
32
 Marta Reynal-Querol ‘The curse of acid’ (2008) 13 Journal of Economic Growth 169. See generally Richard 
M Auty Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (1993). 
33
 Abiodun Alao, op cit note 16 at 10 – 11. See also Holpe H ‘The Great Lakes crisis: An American view’ 
(2000) 7 SAJIA 2; Willie Breytenbach, Dalitso Chilemba, Thomas A Brown & Charlotte Plantive ‘Conflict in 
the Congo: From Kivu to Kabila’ (1999) 8 African Security Review 33. 
34
 Abiodun Alao, op cit note 16 at 9 - 10. See also Ross, op cit note 4. See further Jorge Viñuales ‘The resource 
curse: A legal perspective’ (2011) 17 Global Governance 197. 
35
 Charles Kenneth Leith ‘The political control of mineral resources’ (1925) 3 Council on Foreign Affairs 541.  
36
 Abiodun Alao, op cit note 16 at ix. 
37
 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History (2002) at 227. See 
generally Abiodun Alao, op cit note 16. 
38
 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs & Joseph E Stiglitz ‘Introduction: What is the problem with natural 
resource wealth?’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs & Joseph E Stiglitz (eds) Escaping the Resource 
Curse (2007) 1 at 2. 
39
 Sandra Marker ‘Effects of colonization’ 2003 at http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/post-colonial  
(accessed 3 December 2014). 
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development.40 Fundamentally, how this relationship can be effectively utilized and 
transformed in order to ensure the control of mineral resources for self-determination and 
development is a significant problem.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, there are a number of key international law principles that 
support state sovereignty over domestic mineral resources. The principles fall into two broad 
categories; namely, those that give states the mandate to control their mineral resources, and 
those that facilitate access to investment and trade of the resources. By taking advantage of 
both sets of principles, states would be exercising sovereignty. However, in so doing, African 
states face a number of difficulties. There are two kinds of difficulties; namely, (i) to secure 
foreign investment and market share, which often come with conditions that have a 
problematic and (ii) unclear relationships with the mandate to control mineral resources. 
There is thus an inherent tension between the categories of international law principles 
necessary for a state to fully benefit from their mineral endowment, with the principles 
supporting the mandate to control mineral resources frequently being undermined by 
international law principles facilitating access to investment and trade. The other set of 
difficulties are the threats to sovereignty41 posed by corruption, illegal mining and smuggling, 
and conflicts associated with control over mineral resources. These challenges potentially 
restrict the state’s exercise of sovereignty over mineral resources in a manner that would lead 
to self-determination and development. Within the space provided by the order established by 
the two categories of international law principles alluded to above, domestic policies and 
laws on mining provide an arena for the state to manoeuvre, to attempt to hold the diverse 
tensions swirling around the exploitation of mineral resources.42  
 
                                                          
40
 After lying dormant in the post-decolonization era, the conditions inserted into the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, which inter alia, directs 
sovereign nations to use resources for the benefit of their citizens, have found its way back to the fore and has 
taken a new shape. See Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, supra note 8. The same principle has been 
contemplated in Article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992; hereafter the CBD.   
41
 See generally Pring G & Siegele L ‘International law and mineral resources development’ in Bastida 
Elizabeth, Walde Thomas & Warden-Fernandez Janeth (eds) International & Comparative Mineral Law and 
Policy, Trends and Prospects (2005) 129. See also Sturchler N & Elsig M ‘Spoiling the party? Multilateralism, 
participation and international cooperation’ paper delivered at the Conference on the New International Law, 
Oslo, 15 – 18 March 2007, available at http://phase1.nccr-
trade.org/images/stories/publications/IP2/SturchlerElsig_spoilingtheparty.pdf (accessed 29 November 2012). 
42
 Article 2(2)(a)-(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 1974. See also Bonita Meyersfeld 
‘Institutional investment, human rights and international regulation’ a paper presented at the Global and 
Governance Conference, 14 -16 October 2010, Mandela Institute, Chalsty Teaching and Conference Centre, 
School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.    
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Accordingly, the manner in which international law principles manifest in domestic mining 
laws, and as a way not only to give effect to the mandate to control mineral resources but also 
to navigate the difficulties which come with other principles, such as investment and trade 
principles, and the threats of corruption, illegal mining and mineral resource conflicts, is an 
area of investigation that responded to my curiosity regarding the inverse relationship 
between Africa’s mineral wealth and her development. 
  
1.5 The Concept of the “Resource Curse” 
 
Before introducing the categories of international law principles pertinent to this study, it is 
appropriate to dwell for a moment on the concept of the resource curse, because this concept, 
perhaps more than any other, has been used to capture the idea of an inverse relationship 
between mineral wealth and development and self-determination. To what extent has the 
resource curse been contextualized by relevant international law principles? 
 
The origins of the resource curse theory lie in the work of Richard Auty43 who set forth 
empirical evidence to prove that ‘[…] not only may resource-rich countries fail to benefit 
from a favourable endowment; they may actually perform worse than less well-endowed 
countries’.44 From the surveyed literature, however, explanations for the inverse relationship 
vary, focusing on issues such as economic and political factors, with much emphasis on the 
economic distortions that success in natural resource exports can induce.45  
 
                                                          
43
 See generally Richard M Auty Resource-based Industrialization: Sowing the Oil in Eight Developing 
Countries (1990). See also See generally Jeffrey D Sachs & Andrew M Warner ‘Natural resource abundance 
and economic growth’ Center for International Development and Harvard Institute for International 
Development, 1997. Alan Gelb & Associates Windfall Gains: Blessing or Curse? (1988), Thorvaldur Gylfason, 
Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson & Gylfi Zoega ‘A mixed blessing: Natural resources and economic growth’ (1999) 3 
Macroeconomic Dynamics 204; Paul Stevens & Evelyn Dietsche ‘Resource curse: An analysis of the causes, 
experiences and possible ways forward’ (2008) 36 Energy Policy 56; Chris Ballard & Glenn Banks ‘Resource 
wars: The anthropology of mining’ (2003) 32 Annual Review Anthropology 287; Miguel Urrutia ‘The politics of 
economic development policies in resource rich states’ in Miguel Urrutia & Setsuko Yukawa (eds) Economic 
Development Policies in Resource Rich Countries (1988) 154. 
44
 Ibid, (Chris Ballard & Glenn Banks) at 295. See also Richard M Auty, op cit note 32 at 1. See also George 
Soros ‘Foreword’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs & Joseph E Stiglitz (eds) Escaping the Resource 
Curse (2007) xi; Kym Anderson ‘Are resource-abundant economies disadvantaged?’ CIES Seminar paper 
1997-03, Department of Economics and Centre for International Economic Studies, University of Adelaide, 
paper presented at the 41st Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, 
Gold Coast, Australia, 22 – 24 January 1997. 
45
 Chris Ballard & Glenn Banks, note 43 at 295. See also Jeffrey D Sachs & Andrew M Warner, op cit note 43; 
Alan Gelb & Associates, op cit note 43; Paul Stevens & Evelyn Dietsche, op cit note 43.  
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Following on from Auty, the literature on the resource curse46 has confirmed that being 
endowed with natural resources does not automatically translate into long-term economic 
development.47 However, there is no uniform agreement on what the causes of the resource 
curse might be. Academic commentators put forward various explanations to justify the 
problem,48 a landscape that Rosser has grouped into seven categories:  
(i) economistic perspectives that emphasize economic mechanisms; (ii) behaviouralist  
perspectives that emphasize emotional or irrational behaviour on the part of political actors; 
(iii) rational actor perspectives that emphasize self-interested behaviour on the part of political 
actors; (iv) state-centered perspectives that emphasize the nature of the state; (v) social-capital 
perspectives that emphasize the degree of social cohesion in countries; (vi) structuralist 
perspectives that emphasize the role of social groups or socio-economic structure; and (vii) 
radical perspectives that emphasize the role of foreign actors and structures of power at a 
global level.49     
These categories are based on different ideologies and methodologies, however, Rosser is of 
the view that resource curse commentators have been asking wrong questions without 
focusing on why natural resource endowment has nurtured several “political pathologies” and 
in turn promoted poor and weak economic development performance.50 Instead, he argues 
that the commentators should focus on ‘[…] asking what political and social factors enable 
some resource abundant countries to utilize their natural resources to promote development 
and prevent other resource abundant countries from doing the same’.51   
 
                                                          
46
 Chris Ballard & Glenn Banks, op cit note 43 at 295. See generally Michael L Ross, op cit note 4; Jeffrey D 
Sachs & Andrew M Warner ‘The curse of natural resources’ (2001) 45 European Economic Review 827; 
Michael L Ross ‘The political economy of the resource curse’ (1999) 51 World Politics 297; Maiju Perälä 
‘Persistence of underdevelopment: Does the type of natural resource endowment matter?’ 2003 United Nations 
University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, discussion paper No. 2003/37; Ainsley D 
Elbra ‘The forgotten resource curse: South Africa’s poor experience with mineral extraction’ (2013) 38 
Resources Policy 549. 
47
 Ainsley D Elbra ‘The forgotten resource curse: South Africa’s poor experience with mineral extraction’ 
(2013) 38 Resources Policy 549. See also Auty, op cit note 32 at 1 – 3 & 6; Michael L Ross, op cit note 4. 
48
 F example, see Jeffrey D Sachs & Andrew M Warner, op cit note 43; Auty, op cit note 32; Graham A Davis 
‘Learning to love Dutch disease: Evidence from minerals economies’ (1995) 23 World Development 1765; 
Christa N Brunneschweiler & Erwin H Bulte ‘The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and 
red herring’ (2008) 55 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 248; Frederick Van der Ploeg & 
Steven Poelhekke ‘The pungent smell of red herrings: Subsoil assets, rents, volatility and resource curse’ (2010) 
60 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44; Giles Atkinson & Kirk Hamilton ‘Savings, 
growth and the resource curse hypothesis’ (2003) 31 World Development 1793; Sam Jones ‘Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the “resource curse”: Limitations of the conventional wisdom’ 2008 Danish Institute for International 
Studies (DIIS) Working paper 2008/14. 
49
 Andrew Rosser ‘The political economy of the resource curse: A literature survey’ 2006 IDS Working Paper 
No. 268 at 13, available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/WP268.pdf (accessed 2 August 2014). For the discussion 
of each category, see same source at 13 – 21. See further Richard M Auty, op cit note 32 at 5 – 6 & 13 – 23; 
Leonard Wantchekon ‘Why do resource dependent countries have authoritarian governments?’ (2002) 5 Journal 
of African Finance and Economic Development 57. 
50
 Ibid, (Andrew Rosser) at 3. 
51
 Ibid. 
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For purposes of this thesis, the political and economic causes of the resource curse are 
important. Political factors include the mismanagement and inappropriate regulation of the 
domestic mineral endowment that can have negative effects on the economic boom.52 With 
regard to economic factors, Collier and Hoeffler argue that economic causes are constituted 
by bad intentions directed toward, and threats experienced by the state, due to its mineral 
endowment. They argue that this is one of the causes of the resource curse in that the 
economically sinister motive to rely on natural resource endowment, especially mineral 
resources, is inherently linked with conflict and threats. Thus, the motive debases good 
intentions and the sovereignty of the host state over the resources.53 The aspect which links 
the resources to conflict can also be traced back to colonialism. From the literature, it is 
submitted that ‘[i]ncreased government revenue can lead to myopic policy formulation, 
greater rent-seeking behaviour by individuals, classes, sectors, or interest groups, and general 
weakening of state institutions, with less emphasis on accountability and transparent systems 
of governance’.54 Reference shall be made to this in this thesis through the lens of domestic 
mining laws.  
 
Of further relevance to this thesis is Ross’ argument that the inherent cause of the resource 
curse can be based on failure by host states to enforce and protect property rights, including 
those embedded in mineral resource licences, as well as  the apparent failure to curb threats 
such as illegal mining and smuggling. Illegal mining and smuggling unlawfully compromise 
the sovereignty afforded to host states over their natural resources by international law.55 
Ascher, on the other hand, argues that the causes of the resource curse include poor mineral 
resource governance due to state officials who abuse their position for private economic 
gain.56  
                                                          
52
 Chris Ballard & Glenn Banks, op cit note 43 at 295. See also Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs & Joseph 
E Stiglitz, op cit note 38 at 1. 
53
 See generally Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler ‘Greed and grievance in civil war’ CSAE WPS/2002-01 Policy 
Research paper 2355, World Bank, Washington DC. See also Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development 
Project Breaking New Ground: Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (2002) at 192 – 193; Chris 
Ballard & Glenn Banks, op cit note 43 at 295. 
54
 Chris Ballard & Glenn Banks, op cit note 43 at 295.  
55
 Ibid. See also Michael L Ross, op cit note 46 at 319 – 320.  
56
 Michael Ross, op cit note 46 at 319 - 320. See generally William Ascher Why Governments Waste Natural 
Resources: Policy Failures in Developing Countries (1999).  
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Although the literature on the resource curse provides substantial evidence that mineral 
resource endowment is associated with various negative development outcomes,57 this 
evidence is by no means conclusive that the role of international law to protect African states 
endowed with mineral resources is not fundamental. However, the literature does not account 
for the role of international law in the regulation of mineral resources in developing states. 
This is a strategic area, and the responsibility of each African state to enact laws and policies 
in order to domesticate the international law principles, and to regulate domestic mineral 
resources for self-determination. 
 
Taking into account the resource curse problem, considered through the lens of international 
law and the mandate derived from international law principles, how has the resource curse 
been addressed in the DRC and Zimbabwe? One of the ways is how international law 
principles governing state sovereignty over mineral resources have been operationalized in 
order to uphold the mandate to exploit the resources for self-determination and development. 
 
Using a case study approach, the thesis investigates whether African states are taking 
advantage of international law principles that underlie state sovereignty to develop, through 
the exploitation of domestic mineral resources. Taking advantage, in this instance, should be 
taken to mean using the resources of domestic law and policy so as to capitalize on a mandate 
to control mineral resource; to navigate the difficulties posed by the inherent tensions 
between the principles of international law that affirm sovereignty over natural resources, and 
those that facilitate trade and investment; and to prevent, or manage threats to sovereignty in 
the form of corruption, illegal mining, and mineral resource conflicts.  
 
1.6 International Law Principles Relevant to Host States Benefiting from their 
Mineral Resources 
 
States’ positioning over mineral resources in terms of international law is embedded in an 
interlocking set of principles that give host states a mandate to exploit domestic minerals for 
self-determination. Three international law principles are considered for the purposes of this 
thesis, namely, the principles of self-determination, non-intervention (non-interference) and 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR). These principles have been revitalized 
and were given a seemingly democratic content through the joint efforts of the international 
                                                          
57
 Andrew Rosser, op cit note 49 at 3. See generally Jeffrey D Sachs & Andrew M Warner, op cit note 43; Eric 
Neumayer ‘Does the resource curse hold for growth in genuine income as well?’ (2004) 32 World Development 
1627. 
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community through the UNGA. In addition to the three principles, the right to development is 
considered as the final goal that the regulation and exploitation of mineral resources is 
intended to achieve and with a view that African states ought to economically benefit and 
develop from their natural endowment. These principles are briefly introduced here for 
purposes of framing the thesis, and are considered in greater detail in Chapter 2.  
 
1.6.1 Self-determination 
 
The principle of self-determination refers to the right of states and their peoples to determine 
their own political and economic destiny, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.58 
The principle was initially proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter – the Declaration of Principles 
of 1941.59 Provisions of the Atlantic Charter considerably influenced the work of the San 
Francisco Conference of 1945 where the notion of self-determination was fashioned and 
firmly incorporated in the United Nations Charter.60 Article 1(2) of the UN Charter sets out 
the founding purposes of the UN, which is to ‘[…] develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, […]’.61 
Also, the Charter outlines various goals of the UN, which include the need to promote ‘[…] 
the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination’.62 Further the principle of self-determination was implicitly referred to in 
Article 73 of the Charter, and with specific reference to former colonies and other dependent 
territories. Accordingly, the principle of self-determination becomes a binding conventional 
international law principle that supports the sovereignty of states, as well as the host state’s 
control over domestic mineral resources.63  
                                                          
58
 Articles 1(2) & 55 of the Charter of the United Nations, 1945. See also Article 1(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, hereafter ICCPR; Article 1(1) of the ICESCR, supra note 8; 
UNGA Resolution 637 (VII): The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-determination, 1952. 
59
 See Principles 2 & 3 of the Atlantic Charter – the Declaration of Principles of 14 August 1941; hereafter the 
Atlantic Charter. See generally Castellino J ‘Conceptual Difficulties and the Right to Indigenous Self-
Determination’ in Ghanea N & Xanthaki A (eds) Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination: Essays in Honour 
of Patrick Thornberry (2005) 55 at 74; Eagleton C ‘The Excesses of Self-Determination’ (1953) 31 (4) Foreign 
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 See also Article 55 of the UN Charter, 1945. 
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1.6.2 Non-intervention (non-interference) 
 
The principle of non-intervention is an international law norm whose violation is often 
declared under entirely varying circumstances. In common practice, international legal 
commentators define “intervention” as the interference by state(s) in the internal or external 
affairs of another state. Accordingly, the precise scope and meaning of the principle remains 
unclear.64 However, interference is ‘[…] only prohibited when it occurs in fields of State 
affairs which are solely the responsibility of inner state actors, takes place though forcible or 
dictatorial means, and aims to impose a certain conduct of consequence on a sovereign state 
[…]’.65 In defining non-intervention as in the case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that 
intervention is unlawful on issues in which the host state is legitimately permitted by the 
principle of state sovereignty, to decide freely. The Court further stated that  
[O]ne of these is the choice of a political, economic, […] and formulation of policy. Intervention is 
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones. The 
element of coercion, […] defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention […].66  
 
The definition restates precisely the customary international law position; however, this has 
not been uncontested.67 The same principle has been summarized in the UN Charter,68 and in 
essence is a restatement of the customary rule.69 Some academic commentators argue that 
there are exceptions to the principle; for example, interference on humanitarian grounds.70 
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Although the definition of non-intervention is not well-settled internationally, however, there 
is a degree of consensus that the original narrow scope of the definition is gradually changing 
to embrace a broader outlook. According to Kunig, ‘[t]he new and broader definition of 
intervention forbids not only direct military force but also indirect interference through 
economic, political and diplomatic means’.71 However, this makes it difficult to distinguish 
between non-intervention and non-interference. For the purposes of the thesis, the term “non-
interference or interference” is preferred as it fits the context of the study more directly. 
    
1.6.3 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR) 
 
The PSNR principle embodies the right of states and peoples to freely dispose of their 
domestic natural resources. The principle was adopted through the landmark Declaration on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the UN General Assembly Resolution 
1803(XVIII) of 14 December 1962. The Declaration lays down the basic canons upon which 
host states should exercise the mandate derived from the PSNR principle.72 The PSNR 
principle was affirmed in a number of international legal instruments, including the most 
recent ICJ decision in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda).73   
 
The PSNR principle is grounded on two key concerns; namely, economic development and 
self-determination of developing states.74 However, the PSNR is not a stand-alone principle. 
It is reinforced by the principles of non-intervention (non-interference) and self-determination 
highlighted above. However, the PSNR is a cardinal principle which is central to the thesis as 
it gives host states a mandate to regulate their mineral resources for self-determination. The 
thesis argues that there have to be strong regulatory institutions, as well as the ability to 
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uphold the mandate derived from the three international law principles in order to regulate 
domestic mineral resources for economic development.  
1.6.4 Right to Development 
The UNGA Declaration on the Right to Development of 1986 defines the “right to 
development” as ‘an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all 
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic […] development, in 
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realised’.75 Therefore, 
development is considered to include a comprehensive economic, social and political process, 
intended as the constant enhancement of the welfare of the citizens of host states as provided 
for in the UN Commission on Human Rights or the UN Human Rights Council.76 Marong 
also argues that the development process should entail complete and meaningful participation 
of all citizens of a state and equitable distribution of the benefits of development.77  
 
Generally, the exploitation of mineral resources in Africa is driven by economic interests and 
the need to use the proceeds for development as well as to enhance standards of living. In 
order to contribute to a legitimate, indigenous conception of development through 
exploitation of domestic mineral resources, the three international law principles highlighted 
above are important pillars, which support the right to development. Accordingly, the 
cumulative effect of the three principles is an important driver to realize the right to 
development.  
 
1.7 International Economic Principles Relevant to the Study  
 
The three international principles highlighted above, and the right to development, are not 
sufficient to ensure that African states benefit from their mineral resource endowment. Whilst 
many African states once sponsored state-owned mining companies,78 today most African 
states are reliant on private investment to exploit their mineral resources. Private investment 
allows for technical and financial resources to be applied to win the minerals from the 
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ground, and refine them to a point where they can find a market. Principles of international 
law dealing with investment and trade are accordingly also relevant for purposes of the study.  
 
1.7.1 Principles of Foreign Investment and Investment Liberalization  
The Havana Charter and the OECD79 lay down the lowest common international 
denominators for investment protection and will be further considered in chapter 2.80 The 
OECD Guidelines for Multilateral Enterprises, though not binding, are be considered, in 
particular, the extent to which the Guidelines encroach on state sovereignty in order to protect 
the interests of foreign investors. There are no international minimum conditions on bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) and the content of these depend on the intentions of the contracting 
states. Two non-discrimination principles, namely, the most favoured nation (MFN) and 
national treatment are relevant to international trade and investment law81 and will be 
discussed in chapter 2. Also, compensation for expropriation and repatriation of profits will 
be considered as far as they affects sovereignty.  
 
Host states want foreign investment for economic development but simultaneously fear 
losing sovereignty over natural resources.82 Balancing these two competing interests can be 
challenging.83 Conflict of interests may arise, for example, Zimbabwe’s indigenization 
policy84 (and the South African Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment).85 These 
problems are among those associated with foreign investment and sovereignty,86 and it could 
be difficult to balance host state and investors’ interests, as well as navigate interferences and 
threats.87  
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1.7.2 International Trade Principles  
Two non-discrimination trade principles; namely, MFN88 and national treatment89 are 
important for purposes of this study, as they affect sovereignty over the choice of trade (or 
investment) partners in the mineral value chain.90 According to the MFN principle, each 
trading state treats other states as equally as “most-favoured” trading members. If a state 
improves the benefits that it gives to one trading state, it has to give the same “best” treatment 
to all other members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) so that they all remain “most-
favoured”.91 With regard to the national treatment principle, it compels host states to accord 
the same treatment to foreign products as accorded to domestic products. The two principles 
prohibit unfair discriminatory treatment in international trade by providing that any trade 
concessions extended to any GATT/WTO member state should unconditionally be extended 
to all member states. Regardless of what BITs may say, however, the thesis will argue that 
the two principles restrict sovereignty of the host state to freely choose with whom it wishes 
to trade its mineral resources.  
 
However, host states cannot do without international trade, which includes market access of 
domestic minerals and mineral products. Most African economies are too small and 
international trade can stimulate revenue inflow, economic growth and development. The 
pursuit for better access to international markets and access on better terms is an important 
component of Africa’s development strategy92 but strategic access remains a concern.93 
Therefore market access conditions are most likely to be a barrier for African states.94  
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1.8 Threats to the Exercise of Sovereignty over Mineral Resources 
 
The criteria for identifying and selecting threats to sovereignty over mineral resources over 
others were based on the significance and salience of the threats in restricting PSNR. The 
thesis identified the three most notable threats as corruption, illegal mining, and mineral 
resource conflicts. Apart from these, however, interferences such as World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities potentially compromise sovereignty over 
mineral resources in the DRC and Zimbabwe.95 Regardless of the mandate given to host 
states by international law to regulate domestic mineral resources, the question is; are African 
states endowed with the resources able to navigate the threats and interferences?  
 
Threats to PSNR also interfere with the objectives of the Africa Mining Vision (AMV).96 In 
terms of AMV, factors such as transparency and accountability, as well as equitable and 
optimal exploitation of Africa’s mineral resources are the springboard for economic growth 
and development.97 The threats interfere with the central premise of the AMV, which hinges 
on the structural transformation of the economies of Africa as a whole and of individual 
states through sound mineral resource exploitation and utilization.    
 
1.9 The Strategic Arena of Domestic Law and Policy  
The inception of international law limited itself wholly to the international arena and 
developing alongside municipal laws. The tensions between the two systems of law were thus 
likely.98 The aftermath of World War I and World War II, the League of Nations and its 
succession by the UN, and the granting of political independence to former colonies marked 
an end to colonialism: The emergence of multiple political independent states, the increased 
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recognition and demand for mineral resources for industrial development all contributed to 
complexities in the application of international law in the modern-day community of states.99 
The manner in which aspects of international law become part of municipal law is always 
important. The need to always domesticate these aspects is an important factor to determine 
how state sovereignty can be exercised in order to navigate tensions and threats over control 
and regulation of mineral resources. 
 
To understand how international law principles become part of a domestic legal system, there 
are two key theories or schools of law, namely, dualism and monism.100 These theories 
provide contrasting views regarding the relationship between international law and domestic 
law, and how aspects of international law become part of municipal law.101 The monist 
approach maintains that international law and municipal law are far from being essentially 
different but should be considered as manifestations of a single conception of law.102 This 
theory considers ‘[…] all law as part of the same universal normative order,’103 regarding 
international and domestic law as part of the corpus of rules.104 Further this theory submits 
that domestic courts should apply rules of international law directly in their municipal legal 
systems without acts of adoption, parliamentary or judicial incorporation.105 For this reason, 
this theory can be described as lending support to the “doctrine of incorporation”.106 
Furthermore, the theory acknowledges that international law binds states, but cannot be 
directly applied by municipal courts where it is in conflict with domestic law.107 This is also 
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the view of the dualism (positivist) theory which maintains that international law cannot be 
applied directly in the municipal system unless it has been domesticated.108  
 
While the monist theory favours an automatic adoption of international law, the dualists 
supports the necessity to transform international law into domestic law.109 The dualists 
maintains that while it is the state which has sovereignty, international law is a manifestation 
of sovereign will, and the two systems are separate, not only in origin but in their purpose as 
well.110 Both schools represent two distinct systems with a different intrinsic character.111 It is 
not my focus to discuss in detail the jurisprudence of the two theories except to make brief 
comments as stated. Regardless of this, however, there are complexities and conflicts 
between international law and state sovereignty,112 which potentially restrict the latter and 
deprive it of its original logic, which is characterized by non-derivability, originality, and 
indivisibility of its exercise. What is more important is the manner in which domestic law and 
policy can be used by states to benefit from aspects of the international law principles that 
govern state sovereignty over mineral resources and to navigate tensions and threats, as well 
as the mandate to exploit the resources for self-determination and development.  
 
Irrespective of which theory a state may use, both nonetheless fall short in facilitating 
thinking about domestic law and policy as a strategic arena in which host states navigate 
tensions and threats toward sovereignty over mineral resources. The manner in which a state 
can navigate the tensions and threats is fundamental in order to assert sovereignty over 
domestic mineral resources and the mandate to derive benefits from the exploitation of the 
resources. It can be argued that, 
[e]fforts to regulate domestic problems need to address international affairs in order to be 
comprehensive and effective. Correspondingly, policy solutions have come to rely upon new 
types of international agreements that include multiple parties, [often from different legal 
systems] that create independent international organizations, and that pierce the veil of the 
nation-state and seek to regulate [or impose conditions]. While perhaps necessary to meet 
international goals, these novel arrangements and institutions create difficulties because they 
intrude into what was once controlled by the domestic political and legal system.113     
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The assumption is that when a state domesticates aspects of international law principles, it 
intends to be consistent with,114 and the extent that international law permits.115 The question 
is how African states can use international law principles to their advantage in order to 
strengthen their sovereignty over mineral resources?116 
 
1.10 A Case Study Approach  
 
Case study is an inquiry that investigates an experience within a real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident.117  
 
Taking into account the threats identified above, the DRC and Zimbabwe were chosen as the 
two case studies.118 The reason for choosing both countries is that they are richly endowed 
with various mineral resources but are poor, and have experienced or are experiencing 
mineral resource associated problems. The DRC had been in the spotlight for recurrent 
conflict associated with the control of domestic mineral resources. Zimbabwe has also stood 
out on the basis of its economic indigenization policy. Since both countries are endowed with 
mineral resources, ideally, the prospects for economic development are very high. Sadly, both 
countries are poor, seemingly unable to translate their mineral endowment into economic 
prosperity. Accordingly, the choice of both countries meets the requirements that make them 
ideal to study for the purposes of this thesis.   
 
Zimbabwe’s sovereignty claims over domestic natural resources, including minerals has 
potentially stirred controversies and divisions among states. In the DRC, conflicts over the 
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control and regulation of mineral resources between government and the militants have 
contributed to instability and poverty. 
 
1.10.1 The Case of Zimbabwe 
 
The Zimbabwe case illustrates how international law principles governing state sovereignty 
over mineral resources have been operationalized. Two issues are of concern; namely, how 
Zimbabwe asserts sovereignty over domestic mineral resources, on the one hand, and the 
manner in which the threats discussed in chapter 3 are navigated. Further this apparent clash 
can be inferred from the manner in which Zimbabwe exercises the mandate through 
implementing conditions provided for in mining laws and its indigenization policy. A key 
assumption is the manner and extent to which Zimbabwe is capable to navigate the threats 
against the background of its colonial history. These issues are among those considered, 
including whether Zimbabwe has managed to exercise the mandate in order to derive 
maximum benefits from exploitation of its mineral resources. The case is an experience that 
resembles the struggle African states endowed with mineral resources are facing.119 
1.10.2 The Case of the DRC  
Just like the Zimbabwe case highlighted above, the study of the DRC is a microcosm in order 
to investigate the extent to which African states can use the strategic arena of domestic law 
and policy to benefit from international law principles relating to their mandate to control 
mineral resources, and to navigate tensions and threats. The DRC is endowed with an array of 
mineral resources. On the assumption that the endowment is exploited for economic benefit, 
it is capable of being translated into economic development. Regardless of this, however, it is 
well-known that the DRC is one of the poorest states in Africa.120 The case study investigates 
the manner in which the DRC exercises the mandate it derives from the PSNR principle and 
also how it navigates tensions and threats as it regulates domestic mineral resources with a 
view to derive economic benefits and ultimately mining revenues into development.  
 
                                                          
119
 Global Witness Limited ‘Return the blood diamond: The deadly race to control Zimbabwe’s new-found 
wealth’ 2010 at http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/return_of_blood_diamond.pdf  (accessed 23 
September 2012). 
120
 African Development Bank ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: 2013 – 2017 country strategy paper’ 2013 
available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-
Operations/Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo%20-%202013-2017%20-
%20Country%20Strategy%20Paper.pdf (accessed 2 October 2014). 
   26 
Like Zimbabwe, the DRC domestic mining laws are considered with a view to determine the 
manner in which assertion of sovereignty over domestic mineral resources is effected. Also, 
the tensions and threats involved in the assertion of sovereignty over domestic mineral 
resources are considered. The manner in which the DRC exercises it mandate in terms of the 
PSNR principle for self-determination will be considered to ensure whether the country is 
capable of navigating the tensions and threats in the regulation of domestic mineral resources. 
Whether the DRC takes advantage of the mandate it derives from international law, the focus 
is on how sovereignty manifests in domestic mining laws and policies. Here, the focus is to 
determine whether the DRC is making use of the good intentions of the international law 
principles, highlighted above, to derive economic benefits from exploitation of domestic 
mineral resources, which can transform the country to achieve the indigenous conception of 
development. 
 
1.11 Methodology  
 
The research involved desktop study and where possible primary sources were used. The 
relevant international instruments such as treaties, declarations, conventions, agreements, UN 
Resolutions, Protocols and major domestic mining statutes as well as other legal materials 
were used. Westlaw was used and other secondary sources in the fields of international law, 
as well as international investment and trade law. Some reliance was placed on print and 
electronic media reports, and news releases albeit in factual matters only. These sources were 
not used in as far as they attempt to draw conclusions in law, or give legal opinions on the 
basis of the information they would have gathered.121  
 
The study adopts the country study approach.122 Yin defines this as involving a qualitative 
enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in-depth and in its real-life context.123  
As a research technique, case study enables the researcher to examine mining regimes of the 
DRC and Zimbabwe at the micro level.124 Notwithstanding criticism of this method,125 it has 
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 Stark S & Torrance H ‘Case study’ in Somekh B & Lewin C (eds) Research Methods in the Social Sciences 
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 Ibid. 
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been used for this research because it gives the reader easy understanding of the issues and 
problems in the operationalization of PSNR. Also, this method is a preferred strategy when 
'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the researcher has little control over events, 
and when the focus is on present-day regulation of mineral resources for self-
determination.126 Further, the case study method has distinct advantages, which enable the 
researcher to investigate and challenge aspects of theoretical assumptions in international law 
principles governing state sovereignty over mineral resources. It is also an appropriate 
technique for generating innovative ideas about the conduct of, and insights on the states 
being investigated.127    
 
Finally, where appropriate, comparative legal scholarship was applied to compare and 
contrast legal structures, jurisprudence and outcomes of different legal regimes.128 The 
comparative law methodology focuses on similarities and the differences129 in the manner in 
which the DRC and Zimbabwe assert sovereignty and operationalize the international law 
principles framing this research. To a certain extent, this research method was used in order 
to assess how PSNR is operationalized as well as how it breaks down in the DRC and 
Zimbabwe’s mineral value chain.  The methodology also plays a role in assessing which 
mining laws are better in providing for protection of property rights, the ease of doing 
business and creating a sound investment environment.130 As such, the importance of 
comparative research is vital not only for the purposes of this thesis (where the focus is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
generalize on the basis of relatively few empirical cases; (ii) the problem of selection bias; common problems 
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usually on methodology), but also for Africa as a continent in order to have robust and 
unified ways of operationalizing PSNR.131  
 
1.12 Limitations 
 
Due to bureaucracy during the research and withholding of primary information, secondary 
sources were used as a last resort. Also reasonable inferences were used to come to certain 
conclusions. The absence of actual detail such as the budgets of the Ministry of Mines, the 
total number of inspectors employed by the DRC and Zimbabwe’s mines Ministry, adversely  
affects my ability to assess the enforcement and monitoring capacity. For example, in the 
absence of primary information, it was difficult to adequately answer these questions; 
reliance was placed on reasonable inferences. However, the limitations affect the outcome or 
the conclusion to the study to a certain extent. 
 
1.13 Structure of the Thesis (Chapter outline) 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the study and the overview of the entire thesis. The chapter sets out the 
basis of the study, the problem formulation and the objectives, as well as the methodological 
approaches. Chapter 2 examines three core international law principles relevant to the 
regulation of mineral resources and the right to development, as well as principles relating to 
investment and trade. The chapter gives a brief overview of the historical origin of each 
principle and its legal status, as well as the interrelationship of the principles. The chapter 
also discusses the right development and its relevance to the study. Chapter 3 discusses 
threats to the outworking of sovereignty over mineral resources. Four categories of threat are 
considered, namely, conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank, illegal mining, 
corruption and mineral resource conflicts.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 contain the main thrust of the thesis. Chapter 4 focuses on Zimbabwe’s 
potential to develop through exploitation of mineral resources. In the process, the chapter 
discusses the ways in which Zimbabwe asserts sovereignty over its minerals resources and 
the nature of the threats it faces which restrict sovereignty and the realization of the right to 
development through exploitation of mineral resources. Chapter 5 discusses the DRC and the 
mineral resources landscape against the background of the scramble for the resources and 
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 See generally Geoffrey Samuel ‘Epistemology of comparative law: Contributions from the sciences and 
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resultant conflicts. The chapter examines the extent to which international law has helped to 
stop the threats. The chapter also provides the way in which the DRC asserts sovereignty and 
the threats to that sovereignty. The extent of the problems affecting or weakening the 
regulation of the DRC’s mineral resources is exacerbated by institutional failure.  
 
Chapter 6 analysis the overarching issues raised in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. The problems 
affecting regulation of mineral resources and the sectoral implications for mineral resource 
development are analyzed. The chapter uses inter-country comparison between the DRC and 
Zimbabwe to determine whether the two states are benefiting their operationalizing of 
international law principles governing state sovereignty over mineral resources discussed in 
chapter 2. Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of the thesis. A summary of the 
recommendations for Zimbabwe and the DRC are broadly couched with a view to curb and 
navigate threats to PSNR, by strengthening the central authority and, regulatory institutions 
and their structures. Both states a need to guard jealously the mandate to exploit mineral 
resources for self-determination and development, by operationalizing international law 
principles governing state sovereignty over mineral resources through proactive regulatory 
measures and strategic planning. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING THE 
EXPLOITATION OF MINERALS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
International law recognizes the rights of states to benefit from their mineral resources and 
provides a legal framework to control the resources but leaves domestic implementation and 
enforcement to host states. The objectives are to ensure that host states have the opportunity 
to work out how they can exercise the mandate and sovereignty over their mineral resources.  
 
The chapter discusses key international law principles that support sovereignty of developing 
states to control and derive benefits from their mineral resources. As highlighted in chapter 1, 
there are essentially two categories of principles: Those that give states the mandate to 
control their mineral resources and those that facilitate access to investment and trade of the 
resources. In addition to an introductory section on the concept of sovereignty, this chapter 
considers the principles of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR), self-
determination, non-intervention (non-interference), the right to development, and salient 
principles governing investment and trade. The principles are interrelated in their support of 
states’ mandate to exploit domestic mineral resources for self-determination. The extent to 
which sovereignty is worked out at the domestic level and how these principles promote or 
affect sovereignty is also considered.  
 
2.2 The Concept of Sovereignty  
 
The principle of sovereignty is a supreme authority within a state as defined in the Charter of 
the United Nations, it is a fundamental norm of contemporary international law.1 Also, 
sovereignty could mean ultimate authority within a country.2 Another conception of 
sovereignty refers to absolute independence or freedom and takes into account aspects of 
                                                          
1
 Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, 1945; hereafter the UN Charter. See also Jens Bartelson ‘The 
concept of sovereignty revisited’ (2006) 17 The European Journal of International Law 463; Janice E Thomson 
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2
 Case Concerning Customs Regime between Germany and Austria (Protocol of 31 March 1931) (Advisory 
Opinion) Judgment of 5 September 1931 (Individual Opinion of Judge Dionisio Anilotti – former President of 
the International Court of Justice) 55 at 57. See generally Jose Maria Ruda ‘The Opinions of Judge Dionisio 
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internal and external sovereignty (discussed further below).3 The definitions refer to different 
facets of sovereignty, which also correspond to various practical dimensions of the principle. 
Accordingly, the concept of sovereignty cannot be absolutely or freely independent but 
expresses and integrates values that it seeks to implement in practice, and against which 
political situations have to be evaluated.4 It therefore means sovereignty can, essentially, be 
distinguished based on the values it entails and various discussions that prevail around it, and 
from the values that make for a good country including the manner in which a state controls 
its mineral resources. Since the values underpinning sovereignty are many, the concept of 
sovereignty is multi-dimensional, and includes self-determination, non-interference, the right 
to development and state control over mineral resources. These values are important in as 
much as they enhance state control over domestic mineral resources for development.  
 
As a principle, sovereignty is a founding aspect and fountainhead of the international law 
order, the continued existence of which is largely dependent upon international law subjects’ 
general approach to its validity, legitimacy and reciprocity. Thus, ‘[…] the discourse and 
practice of sovereignty are as a result closely intertwined, an accurate and complete 
presentation of the legal institution of sovereignty requires including some international law 
theory.’5 Consequently, sovereignty is a central principle of international law, which gives 
states legal competence to exercise supreme authority and most institutions, if not all, as well 
as international law principles depend on sovereignty, whether directly or indirectly, in their 
functions and implementation.6 Although the thesis is not about the concept of sovereignty 
per se, the principle is nevertheless central to the core-aspects of the arguments which 
support African states’ control of domestic mineral resources.  
 
Ideally, states cannot be legally equal without the principle of sovereignty and international 
law giving effect.7 As stated in UNGA Resolution 375 (IV):  
Every State has the duty to conduct its relations with other States in accordance with 
international law and with the principle that sovereignty of each State is subject to the 
supremacy of international law.8 
 
                                                          
3
 The Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas) (United States of America v the Netherlands), Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, Award of the Tribunal of 4 April 1928; hereafter the Island of Palmas Case.   
4
 Samantha Besson ‘Sovereignty’ in Rudiger Wofrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International 
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5
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6
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7
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8
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It therefore means that sovereignty is not absolute. Nevertheless the provision raises 
questions in relation to the qualification and use of the term ‘sovereignty’. As can be inferred 
from the relevant UN Resolutions on state sovereignty the term “sovereignty” originally 
referred to, inter alia, the prerogative of states to exercise their unlimited supreme authority. 
It is more likely that in practice, states do not have such unlimited and supreme powers. Hans 
Kelsen submits that if ‘sovereignty’ does not mean supreme authority as provided in the 
international law instruments, then it would be a fallacy that it is supreme power. He adds 
that against the restricted sovereignty, the power of a state in international law cannot then be 
equated to the original meaning of ‘sovereignty’.9 In the context of the study, however, 
‘sovereignty’ refers to the rights of states over control of domestic mineral resources and to 
derive benefits from their exploitation. However, a state’s prerogative powers may be defined 
in its municipal law but limited by international law principles such as investment and trade 
principles, as well as the conditions that come with international investment.10 Accordingly, 
the relationship between international law and municipal law has always not been equal; 
sovereignty is subject to a superior law.11 
 
There are four broad categorizations of sovereignty which are paired as follows: Political or 
legal sovereignty, internal or external sovereignty, absolute or limited sovereignty, and 
unitary or divided sovereignty.12 Political and legal sovereignty have been closely linked, and 
are inextricably connected to the contemporary claim of sovereignty.13 Besson argues that 
‘[p]olitical sovereignty is difficult to conceive without rules to exercise and constrain that 
sovereignty, but legal sovereignty is hard to fathom without a political power to establish its 
legal rules […].’14 Accordingly, legal and political sovereignty are inherently inseparable and 
therefore are important for the purposes of the thesis in order to support the manner in which 
sovereignty over mineral resources is worked out at the domestic level. 
  
                                                          
9
 Hans Kelsen ‘The Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States’ (1950) 44 The American Journal of 
International Law 259 at 276. 
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Internal and external sovereignty relate to a state’s internal affairs as well as external 
relations. The former can be referred to as internal state sovereignty and the latter as external 
state sovereignty.15 However, the differences between internal and external sovereignty 
should not be conflated with “domestic and international sovereignty”.16 Domestic 
sovereignty is both internal and external, since domestic law regulates internal affairs of a 
state as well as its external relations, and the same can be the case for international 
sovereignty.17 Domestic sovereignty empowers a state to control its domestic mineral 
resources, source investment and trade mineral products with other states. With regard to the 
other two categories of sovereignty; namely, absolute and limited sovereignty,18 and unitary 
and divided sovereignty,19 neither group is relevant for the purposes of this thesis. The 
distinction is crucial for the purposes of the thesis as it focuses on the strategic arena of 
domestic mining law and policy.  
 
Although sovereignty is the supreme authority within a state, it primarily entails rights and 
duties.20 Three sovereign rights are relevant for the purposes of this thesis; namely, the 
presumption that all state’s acts are legal in order to secure its independence and territorial 
integrity; right to constitutional or organizational autonomy, which is equated with self-
determination, and the right to protect sovereignty, integrity and freedom from external 
interference or intervention.21 The sovereign rights fundamentally underpin state control over 
domestic mineral resources; the rights are reinforced as part of the entitlements of states from 
international law against any party. Apart from the sovereign rights, there are various 
sovereign duties as well. Three duties are important for the purposes of this thesis; namely, to 
abide by the dictates of international law and to cooperate with other international law 
subjects in implementing international law. The other duty prohibits interventions in another 
states’ affairs, whether direct or in directly, through the use of force or not.22 The last duty is 
to amicably settle any dispute through enquiry or mediation, conciliation, arbitration or 
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judicial settlement or resort to regional agencies or arrangements.23 This duty also includes 
settlement of disputes that may arise from mining investments or trade in mineral resources. 
 
Regardless of the above, however, observation of the concept of sovereignty shows that its 
content and implication have constantly evolved.24 Falk notes that the principle of 
sovereignty is one of ‘conceptual migration’25 in that different periods of history have caused 
different challenges which in turn have contributed to shape the legal responses sought to the 
political challenges of each era, and conditioned the functions granted to sovereignty.26 
Another reason for the difficulties or challenges associated with sovereignty is linked to the 
subject-matter itself. For example, sovereignty touches on highly and politically controversial 
issues such as the standard treatment of foreign investors (the national standard versus the 
international minimum standard), state control over natural resources, expropriation of 
investors or alien property and the standard of compensation, and the choice of investors to 
grant mining licences.27 As such, sovereignty can be described as ‘[…] the most glittering 
and controversial [concept] in the history, doctrine and practice of international law’.28 
Regardless of the observation and the status of sovereignty, however, Schrijver noted various 
terms have been used to emphasize the status of “sovereignty”. In addition to giving 
sovereignty a ‘permanent status’, adjectives such as ‘absolute’, ‘inalienable’, and ‘free and 
full’ are also used in the literature, which are pointers that sovereignty is the backbone of the 
state.29 Accordingly, one cannot deny that the concept of sovereignty is inherently connected 
with the principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the state and self-
determination (discussed further below) which give host states the right to decide on their 
mineral resource policies and the manner in which to implement them with a view to, inter 
alia, promoting economic growth and development from exploitation of the resources.30  
 
The issues highlighted in the above paragraph are central to official relations among states 
and therefore potentially too sensitive for African states to exercise their sovereignty contrary 
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to the general or minimum expectations of foreign investors (discussed further below). 
Regardless of the sensitive nature of the issues which are at the centre of international law 
and domestic politics, as well as dispute settlement, however, the manner in which 
sovereignty is worked out at the domestic level in the control of mineral resources (discussed 
in chapters 4 and 5) is inherently fundamental. 
 
Sovereignty is very important as it is the basis upon which a state assumes control over 
domestic affairs and the manner in which mineral resources are regulated. The principle 
underpins almost all international law principles discussed in this thesis that support state 
control over mineral resources.  
 
2.3 Principles Mandating State Exploitation of Mineral Resources 
 
The three international law principles outlined in the introduction; namely, PSNR, non-
intervention (non-interference) and self-determination are inter-related and fundamental to 
the control of mineral resources in Africa. The principles are analyzed with a view to 
ascertain the extent to which each supports the mandate and assertion of sovereignty over 
mineral resources with a view to self-determination, and the potential problems that may be 
encountered in the process.  
 
2.3.1 The Principle of Self-determination 
Self-determination is a principle that refers to self-assertion or the claim of states and peoples 
to control their political and economic destiny.31 The principle also refers to the autonomy of 
the state and its political separation from foreign national bodies,32 and the right to separate 
state existence.33 Self-determination is a core principle of international law, arising from 
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customary international law, recognized and enshrined in various international treaties.34 For 
the purposes of this thesis, the focus is on state self-determination in order for a state to 
derive economic benefits from its mineral resources.  
 
2.3.1.1 Substantive Development of the Principle of Self-determination 
 
The literature on the evolution of the principle of self-determination is bound up with the 
history of the doctrine of popular sovereignty proclaimed by the French Revolution.35 In the 
context of the French Revolution, self-determination evolved as a democratic ideal valid for 
all humankind, and an assertion against tyranny, but with a focus on promoting the wishes of 
the people. Also, focus was on ‘the right[s] of a people of an existing State to choose freely 
their own political system and to pursue their own economic [...] development’.36 From its 
inception, the concept of self-determination had ‘[…] the character of a threat to the 
legitimacy of the established order and also tried to substitute for it one with more equality’.37 
Similarly, self-determination as a corollary of democracy supported the concept of nationality 
and the objective right of states to independent statehood. The Rights of Man envisaged by 
the French Revolution were transferred to nations.38 The principle was related to the concept 
of peaceful change, and that territorial transfer between sovereigns should not be carried out 
unless the affected parties agreed to a way of settling their disputes amicably.39 
 
In the early 1900’s, international support grew for the right of all peoples to self-
determination.40 However, the literature shows that the principle of self-determination was 
further developed and expounded by a number of UNGA resolutions. Through the UNGA, 
the self-determination of peoples became an established and well-known principle of 
international law.41 
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The UN Charter enunciates the principle of self-determination and its purposes, which are, to 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and peoples’ self-determination.42 The scope and content of the principle is based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and opportunities. Ideally, this entails recognizing a state’s 
inherent right to freely assert sovereignty over domestic affairs and the regulation of its 
mineral resources in a manner that gives effect to the wishes of the peoples.43 The principle is 
conceived as one among the possible measures to strengthen universal peace and co-
existence.44 Accordingly, states have unwavering rights to political and economic self-
determination, as well as to their natural endowment, which include domestic mineral 
resources.  
 
The principle of self-determination is a constituent entity of political order and it is inherently 
linked to the decolonization process.45 Legally, the principle gives host states rights to 
exercise their mandate in order to pursue their visions. Ideally, self-determination springs 
from the need or the process of decolonization because peoples who were under the colonial 
regimes were not in control of their political and economic destiny.46 Reference is made to 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States, which is a restatement of the establishment of sovereign or 
independent states, and free association with other states. The Declaration also refers to equal 
rights of the peoples to freely constitute ways to implement the principle.47 From the 
Declaration, it is clear that self-determination has to be exercised within a state as well as in 
the external affairs of the state.48 In this regard, however, it can be argued that the principle of 
self-determination ardently promoted the end of colonialism in all its manifestations.49 This 
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suggestion is legally based on the fact that all peoples and their states have inalienable rights 
to freedom and political independence, as well as their sovereignty and territorial integrity.50  
However, the host state being the rights holder has a mandate, as a duty-bearer to realize the 
benefits of self-determination. Accordingly, decolonization was a process that provided host 
states with a mandate to control domestic mineral resources for self-determination.    
 
The decolonization process was also affirmed in 1952 by the UNGA, which also affirmed 
that the right of states to self-determination was prerequisite to the full enjoyment of 
fundamental rights.51 Resolution 637A (VII) stated that: 
[…] the UN practice surrounding self-determination, including defining the content and 
subject of the right, has been consistent on certain central tenets. These tenets are preserving 
territorial integrity; granting self-determination only to independent, external colonial peoples 
and defining the subject of self-determination based on territory rather than ethnic criteria. 
Further, the political imperative of decolonization and the effort to clarify and define the 
trusteeship system in the early 1950s served as the driving forces behind the shift from the 
Charter [and self-determination as] expressed in the international human rights covenants 
drafted during the 1950s and 1960s.52 
 
UNGA Resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 196053 contributed to the development of the 
principle of self-determination. The Declaration set out seven Articles that confirm the need 
for self-determination and an end to all forms of colonialism.54 The realization of political 
and economic self-determination suggests that the process of introducing and establishing 
them was far from easy.55  
 
The principle of self-determination consequently covers not only political independence but 
complements state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states. 
Therefore self-determination does not necessarily mean a unique event or phase occurring 
only at the moment when a state obtains its political independence but a principle of 
continuous action for the peoples to decide their political and economic destiny. As a result, 
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the principle has been transformed substantially to fit the changing international order. In the 
context of the study, self-determination translates to a state having the capacity to make and 
enforce municipal laws and policies, and to regulate domestic mineral resources in a manner 
that achieves the economic aspirations of its people and in a way that successfully navigates 
the potential for interference and other threats to sovereignty. 
 
A bridge had been established from self-determination as a process of decolonization to self-
determination as a non-derogatory right.56 In the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the right of the 
peoples to self-determination is a free standing principle, which is no longer confined to 
colonization but continuous action.57 Further the principle of self-determination is intertwined 
with the PSNR and non-interference, which implores states and other subjects of international 
law to honour the internal affairs of a state and to refrain from interfering in them, including 
the regulation of mineral resources. 
 
2.3.1.2 Origin and Legal Status of the Principle of Self-determination 
 
The discussion of the substantive development of self-determination as a principle shows 
how it originated, gradually developed and acquired international law recognition.58 The 
principle is  
[…] considered as a form of self-assertion against any kind of [influence and] domination, its 
content is as varied as ways of domination are varied. Due to these circumstances, self-
determination has been considered a concept of political rather than legal character.59 
 
The quote shows the principle of self-determination carries normative weight that can be 
applied in various contexts. The term “normative” describes broader ways in which self-
determination can manifest, contrary to the assertion that the principle was limited to 
decolonization.60 Arguably, the principle applies to and can be used to justify the manner in 
which states may navigate interferences in order to realize economic benefits through 
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regulation and exploitation of mineral resources. Therefore, the principle has a broader 
meaning and accordingly, its application and implementation extend beyond the 
decolonization process. Irrespective of the content of the principle, regarded as too vague and 
imprecise to be considered a legal right or principle,61 it is argued, however, that the 
confusion surrounding the meaning of the principle originates from the diverse and 
conflicting interpretations.62 The principle is inter-connected with the principle of non-
interference.63 Ideally, self-determination, non-interference and PSNR (discussed below) are 
cardinal principles which have a deterrence component in international law.64 These three 
principles support host states to control their mineral resources by deterring other states from 
interfering in domestic affairs.65 Nevertheless, the principle has crystalized into customary 
international law albeit being considered relatively new to international law.  
 
In a nutshell, the principle of self-determination has been transformed substantially in its 
content and scope; it is one of the principles of international law that is relevant to the 
assertion of sovereignty over domestic natural resources. It cements the relationship among 
states and plays a cardinal role in supporting the PSNR and non-interference in the regulation 
of mineral resources in African states.  
 
2.3.1.3 The Relevance of the Principle to the Study 
 
There is close nexus between the principles of self-determination and sovereignty since the 
former supports the latter. By virtue of application of the principle of self-determination, 
African states should be able to pursue their economic or development goals, by exploiting 
their mineral resources. Although in theory there should be no interferences in the manner in 
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which a state asserts sovereignty over its mineral resources, since self-determination and non-
interference may imply no influence in the regulation of domestic mineral resources 
(depending on what meaning is ascribed to “interference” and “influence”); however, in 
practice this is the opposite. For that reason, it becomes imperative that host states should 
navigate tensions and threats associated with the regulation of their mineral resources for 
self-determination. The principle of self-determination enables host states to frame their 
economic visions in ways that can translate their exploitation into national economic growth 
and development.  
 
Theoretically, the principle of self-determination has the potential to curb conflict because a 
state is free to choose its development interests pursuant to domestic policies. A state should 
have the final decision over the regulation of its domestic mineral resources;66 the right to 
self-determination must be exercised freely.67 Self-determination as a principle empowers 
African states to be the agents of their own development through indigenization policies, 
transparency and accountability in control and regulation of their minerals, as well as revenue 
use management. The principle is also relevant to planning for the use of mineral resources, 
as well curbing threats to the domestic regulation of the resources.  
 
2.3.2 The Principle of Non-intervention (Non–interference)  
As highlighted in part 1.3.2 of chapter 1, non-intervention is a common term in the literature 
on international law, but non-interference appears to suggest a broader prohibition ‘[…] 
though in most contexts the two terms seem to be used interchangeably’.68 In the literature, 
non-interference is used interchangeably with non-intervention, denoting non-dictatorial 
interventions.69 However, Oppenheim submits that; 
[…] the interference must be forcible or dictatorial or coercive and otherwise depriving the 
state intervened against of control over the matter in question. Interference [that is] pure and 
simple is not intervention.70 
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From the literature, however, non-interference is a post-World War II development in 
international law that requires states to refrain from interfering in domestic affairs of another 
state.71 There are various definitions of this principle in the literature. According to Duc 
Tuyen;  
[t]he concept of state sovereignty defines that no sovereign may exercise authority in the 
domain of another. That means within the territory of a political entity, the state is the 
supreme power, and as such no state from without the territory can intervene, militarily or 
otherwise, in the internal politics of that state.72 
 
Apart from Duc Tuyen’s view, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, claim that;  
[i]nstead of the unbridled exercise of power in pursuit of interests characteristic of the free for 
all of international anarchy, [the principle of non-interference] introduces the concept of 
mutually respected order characteristic of international society.73 
 
In other words, the two definitions suggest that sovereignty is supreme and interference in 
domestic affairs of another state is illegal.  
 
2.3.2.1 The Substantive Development of the Principle of Non-intervention/interference 
 
 
Since the establishment of the UN in 1945, the principle of non-interference gradually shifted 
from its narrow focus (non-intervention) to its present broader form. Among other factors that 
influenced its current form was the inherent need to protect the sovereignty of states, 
international peace and security. When the principle of non-interference found space in 
international law, its development was influenced by various factors, as Alshammari notes:  
The chaotic and teeming world situation that unfolded in the period that preceded the creation 
of contemporary international law, which was rife with wars and permanent conflicts that led 
to human catastrophes, particularly in the form of the first and second world wars. This 
historical era has contributed to the development of the concept of global peace and security. 
There is no doubt that this concept seeks to restrict international disputes and has played a 
direct role in the development of the concept of sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention through the establishment of the rules of law on which this principle is based.74 
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This quotation highlights some of the concerns that led to the shift and development of the 
principle from non-intervention to non-interference. In line with the purposes of the UN, non-
interference in the affairs of another state developed with a view to influence friendly 
relations among states, which is underpinned by the principle of self-determination (discussed 
above) and equality of states,75 as well as international peace and security.76 
 
The need to end colonialism further influenced the development of non-interference in order 
to support the UNGA Resolution 1514(XV), which contained the Declaration on Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries.77 As international law developed, so did the terms 
“territorial integrity” and “political independence” which are commonly referred to as ‘[…] 
the totality of legal rights which a state has’.78 As the world order developed in its current 
form, and in order to protect the rights of all states, the scope of the principle of non-
interference broadened as well. The principle ‘[…] was considered as the most significant 
means to cope with the logic of anarchy that lies at the heart of international politics, and thus 
becomes the main governing rule of state relations’.79  
 
As highlighted in section 1.3.2 of chapter 1, what constitutes “interference” is not set out 
clearly and this failure goes a long way towards explaining the uncertainties surrounding this 
principle.80 However, Woods redefines what constitutes interference as what is outlawed and 
dictatorial interference. Unfortunately, he seems to ignore the threats or interferences that 
infringe the sovereignty of host states.81 Nevertheless, non-interference requires that a state 
does not interfere in domestic affairs of another state in a “coercive way”. For example, states 
or corporations making payments to political parties in another state, and conditionalities 
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incorporated in loan agreements82 (though not a key subject of this thesis), may constitute 
interference. Interferences which are opposed by host states are also unlawful.83  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, non-interference refers to direct or disguised interference with 
a view to restrict or weaken sovereignty over domestic mineral resources. Non-interference 
also includes non-enforceable influence, which can be in the form of mining investments that 
come with conditions that the host state is compelled to accept without exercising its 
discretion.84 Another example is the use of various forms of economic leverage (as when 
mining companies threaten job cuts or capital flight when host states propose new mining 
policies or laws) and policies which affect investment or trade in particular, where the major 
objective is to negatively affect the outcome of the host state’s internal affairs, as well as its 
mineral resource policies.85 From the literature, some states compete for influence and access 
to mineral resources in Africa, and through the fortunes of force, they understand that host 
states will be without options but to accept their conditions.86 Regardless of non-forcible 
influence not directly falling within the purview of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, however, 
this thesis submits that the conduct amounts to interference. 
 
Whether there is an exception to the principle in support of peoples seeking to exercise their 
lawful right to self-determination remains controversial in the sense that some peoples may 
be used in order to coerce the government of the state to implement or to undo certain laws 
that potentially interfere or influence certain outcomes in order to control domestic mineral 
resources. The reason is that some states and non-state actors have debased the principle to 
suit their needs and to control natural resources in host states. For example, the calls for 
regime change in Zimbabwe and the DRC might be an indirect influence by other powers to 
use the oppositions as proxies in order to access domestic mineral resources. 
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2.3.2.2 Origin and Legal Status of the Principle of Non-interference 
 
 
The origin and establishment of the principle of non-interference is indebted to the Treaty of 
Westphalia of 1648, which founded the system of states.87 Further the principle is based on 
equality of states in the international law system that discourages cross-border influences. 
Vattle is given credence as the first to formulate the principle and explore the application of 
natural law to the conduct of states and sovereigns.88 He further discussed the rights and 
obligations of states and limits of the rights, sovereign power and relations among sovereign 
states, including international legal agreements and treaties.  
 
Of the early treaty formulations of the principle of non-interference was Article 15(8) of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and, the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States, as well as the 1936 Additional Protocol on Non-Intervention, which inter 
alia, prohibited interference in the domestic affairs or freedoms of another state. It is reported 
that during the Cold War Era, the socialist states in the Soviet Bloc were insistent on the 
recognition of the principle of non-interference.89  
 
Also, insistent on the principle of non-interference were colonial Powers in the early years of 
the establishment of the UN, and thereafter many newly-independent states.90 Arguably, the 
colonial powers used the principle to justify illegal occupation of their territories vis-à-vis the 
moral voice of the community of states, while the newly-independent states used the same 
principle to ensure former colonial masters did not interfere with their affairs. Two 
distinctions can be made: On the one hand, the colonizers used the principle to block any 
legitimate attempts to stop their continued illegal occupation of the colonies. On the other 
hand, the former colonies used the principle for the good cause to establish and defend their 
self-determination. When used to defend a case that arises from a legitimate claim, one would 
argue that the principle underpins international peace and friendly relations amongst states. 
Accordingly, the principle of non-interference involves the rights of every state to conduct its 
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affairs without interference;91 however, colonial masters were not justified in their use of the 
principle because the colonies were not independent states. Similarly, the implication of the 
principle in domestic affairs of states ‘[…] is a corollary of every state’s right to sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence’.92 
 
Regardless of views to the contrary, no state should interfere, militarily or otherwise, in the 
domestic affairs of another state.93 However, ‘[t]he counterpart of [non-interference], 
domestic jurisdiction, is those issues that a state may freely choose for itself […]’94 - 
fundamentally the choice of economic and political system, as well as the manner in which 
states assert sovereignty over their mineral resources.95 Although the UN Charter does not 
overtly lay down non-interference as a rule governing international relations among states 
(except Article 2 that sets out the guiding principles for the UN and member states),96 the 
principle remains a well-established part of international law that supports state sovereignty.  
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that this principle is part of customary 
international law; however, examples of direct infringement of this principle are seldom 
encountered.97 For example, it could be argued a state may use the principle to prevent 
effective implementation and enforcement of rights provisions it does not consider 
favourable.98 Oppenheim says the prohibition of interference is a corollary of the state’s right 
to sovereignty, self-determination, economic and political independence.99 In the Case 
Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America), the ICJ referred to some matters to which each state is permitted, 
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by the principle of state sovereignty, to decide freely, including to exercise sovereignty 
without conditionality or pressure.100 It further endorsed and broadened the scope of, and 
legal status of the principle of non-interference to involve the right of a sovereign state to 
conduct its domestic affairs without external interference.101 The ICJ further submitted that 
one of these is the choice of economic policies and political system.102  
 
The ICJ stated that: 
[the non-interference] principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or 
indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must 
accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of 
State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, […] 
system, and the formulation of foreign policy. [The Court held that] [i]ntervention is 
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain 
free ones. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, 
prohibited [interference], is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses 
force, either in the direct form of […] action, or in the indirect form of support for […] 
activities within another State .103 (the words in bold is my emphasis). 
 
The highlighted part reiterates that the intention to coerce constitutes illegality in the practice 
of states in international law. As such, all coercive interferences are illegal regardless of their 
legal effect.104 Also, non-interference applies to non-binding policies, recommendations or 
decisions. Thus, it is unlawful to interfere in the competences of states including legislating 
laws or policies for, and control over domestic mineral resources.105 Any policy 
recommendation or investment conditions which cause the host state to change its domestic 
vision, and without the state excising its free discretion, amounts to interference and is 
therefore illegal. 
 
Similarly, the ICJ dealt with the principle of non-interference in the case of the DRC v 
Uganda.106 The involvement of Ugandan armed forces in the DRC and looting of some 
mineral resources were, inter alia, issues that the DRC brought before the ICJ for 
determination. Although the ICJ rejected some of the counter-claims relating to activities 
after August 1998, it is important to recall that the Court held that Uganda was liable for 
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interfering in the domestic affairs of the DRC during that period. The DRC was therefore 
legitimately entitled, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, to use force in order to repel the 
attack by Uganda.107 In its findings, the ICJ held that Uganda violated the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the DRC.108 In the context of the study, the ICJ’s decision is consistent 
with the objectives of the principle of non-interference.  
 
Non-forcible interferences which reach certain kind of influence may not be considered as 
interference for the purposes of the study. Further, since states may have accepted and, 
indeed, encouraged certain influences, ‘[…] international law cannot be said to prohibit all 
the kinds of external involvement in [domestic control and regulation of mineral 
resources]’.109 Taking into account the legal status of the principle of non-interference, I shall 
discuss in chapters 3, 4 and 5 examples of forms of interference, which have the potential to 
restrict the assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources. 
 
2.3.2.3 Relevance of the Principle to the Study 
 
Non-interference is a cardinal principle supporting state control over mineral resources. It 
reinforces sovereignty and self-determination by restraining others states from interfering in 
domestic affairs of host states in the control and regulation of mineral resources. The 
principle forbids interference, for example, in domestic legislative processes, judicial 
decisions and enforcement, and policing of mining laws. In terms of the principle, the host 
state is free to exercise its competences, for example, in the formulation of mineral resource 
laws, indigenization policies and implementation of mining policies, as well as their 
enforcement and policing. Accordingly, non-interference supports states to freely decide how 
to uphold the mandate and control domestic mineral resources, and their exploitation for self-
determination. Accordingly, the host state has prerogative powers and discretion to determine 
its property rights and security of tenure, and their implementation.  
 
2.3.3 The PSNR Principle 
 
As referred to in chapter 1, the PSNR found its space in international law and emerged as a 
new principle in the post-World War II era. The principle was advocated by developing states 
in the early 1950s in order to ensure host states have inherent rights of control over natural 
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resources within their territories. The principle is primarily based on two key concerns of the 
UN, namely, economic development of developing states and their self-determination.110 The 
objective was to ensure developing states derive benefits from exploitation of their natural 
resources without interferences.111 Accordingly, the PSNR is a dimension of sovereignty and 
is rooted in two traditional principles of international law, namely, sovereignty and territorial 
jurisdiction.  
 
2.3.3.1 Substantive Development of the PSNR Principle 
 
As states attained political independence and began to function as sovereign territories, one of 
the attributes of a nation’s assertion of sovereignty was control and exploitation of domestic 
natural resources for economic benefit. As referred to in chapter 1, the PSNR principle is 
intended to be an important pillar for economic development, as mere political independence 
without economic power and development does not constitute sovereignty.112 The PSNR 
principle is also referred to as ‘absolute territorial sovereignty’, suggesting that, in principle, a 
state has unrestrained rights to regulate and control, as well as to exploit its mineral 
resources.113 
 
The PSNR principle is considered one of the cardinal constitutional doctrines of the law of 
nations.114 The principle is linked to the idea of equality of states and regulates a community 
of states that bear uniform legal personality.115 The principle and the literature on sovereignty 
moved in the direction that supports the notion that there are higher norms or power than the 
state in international law,116 and could imply a right against interfering in domestic affairs of 
each state.117 There is clearly an overlap with the principle of non-interference in this regard.   
 
                                                          
110
 Ibid, at 3 - 17. See also Nico J Schrijver ‘Natural resources, permanent sovereignty over’ in Rudiger 
Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law (2008) 1 at 2.   
111
 Nico Schrijver, op cit note 10 at 3.  
112
 Surya P Subedi International Economic Law (2007) at 22. 
113
 Nico J Schrijver, op cit note 110 at 7.  
114
 Nico Schrijver, op cit note 10 at 2.  
115
 Ian Brownlie, op cit note 78 at 289. 
116
 Nico Schrijver, op cit note 10 at 1 – 2. See also John H Jackson Sovereignty, the WTO and the Changing 
Fundamentals of International Law (2006) at 58. 
117
 Ibid.  
   50 
The PSNR principle embodies the rights of host states, which are the representatives of the 
citizens to control, regulate and dispose freely of their mineral resources.118 The principle is 
grounded in three main concerns; namely, economic development of developing states 
through exploitation of domestic natural resources, self-determination of the peoples in those 
states, and to provide a legal shield against interference in the domestic affairs of host states, 
for example, issues to do with property rights, investment agreements or contractual claims 
by other states or foreign investors.119 In so doing, the PSNR principle is a mirror that reflects 
potential tensions between the traditional ‘[…] principles such as pacta sunt servanda and 
respect of for acquired rights and modern international law principles such as self-
determination and the duty to co-operate for development’.120 In the development of the 
principle, debates on resource sovereignty broadened the scope and deepened claims on 
resource-related rights, to the regulation of foreign investment and protection of investors’ 
business interests in the host state.121 In this way, the importance of the PSNR principle ‘[…] 
gradually shifted from a primarily rights-based to a qualified concept encompassing duties as 
well as rights’.122    
 
A survey of the literature on sovereignty suggests that a state has unrestrained rights cum 
mandate and, powers to regulate and control, as well as exploit its mineral resources. 
However, such powers are not inherently absolute. The assertion of sovereignty is limited, 
usually by treaties and international agreements freely entered into and also by the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda.123 Further sovereignty is limited when a state freely consents to a 
norm; for example, consent to ratify an instrument or excerpts of a declaration or 
convention.124 For example, while the Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio 
Declaration)125 indirectly supports the PSNR; it also restricts the assertion of sovereignty:  
States have, in accordance with the [UN Charter] and the principles of international law, the 
sovereign right to exploit their own [natural] resources pursuant to their own policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to […] other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.126 
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It is important to note the nature of the limitation here – the duty not to cause damage to other 
state or areas beyond national jurisdiction. This is a very restrictive limitation.  
 
Subedi also submits that,  
[a]asserting economic [independence] meant having control over the economic activities of 
both juridical and natural persons conducting business within the country, whether nationals 
of that country or foreigners.127 
 
Although there is recognition of a symbiotic relationship between economic independence 
and assertion of sovereignty, in many African states the minerals sector is controlled by 
foreign investors in terms of investment contracts concluded between governments of states 
and investors.128  
 
In recognition of the importance of natural resources as a catalyst for economic 
development,129 one of the important initiatives of developing states during the 
decolonization period was to prioritize, as a matter of urgency, the control and ownership of 
all domestic natural resources.130 It is widely known that the resolve of new politically 
independent states led to the enactment of the UNGA Resolution 1803(VII).131 Importantly, 
the Resolution recognized the rights of developing states to regulate all domestic natural 
resources within their territories, and derive economic benefits. Arguably, the PSNR principle 
was intended to give developing states the assertion of sovereignty and control over their 
domestic natural resources, thus, requiring domestic legislative interventions to effectively 
support the principle.132 
 
In the context of the thesis, however, the PSNR principle provides host states with the rights 
of control and to benefit from exploitation of their mineral resources. The principle vests the 
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state with permanent custodianship over mineral resources. Accordingly, the principle 
provides the executive and legislature with the authority to enact mining laws and policies, 
determine conditions of access and regulation of mineral resources, acquisition and 
cancellation of mining licences, as well as the system for security of tenure. Host states have 
inalienable rights to decide which investors to grant licences to the exclusion of others, as 
well as to decide on mining taxes, and the allocation and use of revenues for development 
purposes. By virtue of the PSNR principle, host states have legal authority to control and 
regulate all domestic mineral resources and their exploitation through municipal legislation 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
2.3.3.2 Origin and Legal Status of the PSNR Principle 
 
The literature shows that the decolonization period after World War II was an era during 
which the newly independent states hoped to redress economic and developmental challenges 
caused by colonialism.133 One of the ways was the assertion of sovereignty over domestic 
natural resources. Through the influence of international law, the newly independent states 
adopted several basic strategies through which they sought to satisfy their economic interests. 
Sinha says;  
[t]he new states attempted to revise […] doctrines to which they were ostensibly bound but 
which, they believed, were created to further the interest of the Western states and which 
[developing states] had played no role in formulating.134 
 
The newly-independent states focused on established doctrines of international law they saw 
as operating to their economic disadvantage, principally the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda.135 The desire to revise this principle, among others, was intended to address 
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investment agreements that afforded foreign investors extensive control over mineral 
resources in host states.136 The principle of pacta sunt servanda is in essence related to the 
concept of sovereignty in that it creates rights and duties. The new states wanted the 
development of international law principles and rules to assert and strengthen their political 
positions in international relations and to promote their economic and political interests.137 
 
Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,138 the concept of sovereignty served as the backbone 
of international law. The relations among states were based on the principles emanating from 
the interpretations of the Treaty of Westphalia, which established the basic rights and duties 
of states.139 This Treaty created fundamental rules applicable to the contemporary system of 
sovereign states; for example, the cardinal principle of state sovereignty, which includes non-
interference in the domestic affairs of states and self-determination.140 Therefore this Treaty 
is a landmark international instrument and the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of 
nations.141 
 
Importantly, the influence and importance of the Westphalian principles steadily expanded 
beyond Europe and over time became accepted as norms governing the relations among 
states on a global scale.142 However, it is not clear whether the political influence of the 
Treaty would be adequate to advance the economic development interests of independent but 
fragile states in Africa such as the DRC and Zimbabwe.  
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Further the newly-independent states used the UN as the main forum ‘[…] to express their 
uneasiness about their relationship with the [former colonial states] which they perceived as 
very unequal’. 143 Countries from Latin America, in particular Chile, ‘took the initiative of 
introducing [the discussion of] the principle of state sovereignty in the UN’.144 The initiative 
culminated in two UNGA resolutions; namely, Resolution 626(VII) of 1952 and subsequently 
Resolution 1803(XVII) of 1962.145 The view from the literature suggests the UNGA 
Resolution 626 (VII) is the origin of the PSNR principle.146 For this reason, the PSNR has 
frequently been branded as the Seventh General Assembly ‘nationalization’ Resolution.147 
 
The UNGA Resolution 1803(XVII) of 1962,148 however, entrenched the PSNR principle by 
declaring, that both indigenous peoples and nations have the right of control over their 
domestic natural resources. Arguably, the same Resolution recognized the possibility that 
national interests could override the hallowed principle of pacta sunt servanda. The 
recognition is a very important dimension of the PSNR principle. In this regard Article 4 
stated:  
[…] nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based […] on national interests 
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interest, both domestic and 
foreign.149 
 
Accordingly, the rights derived from the assertion of the PSNR principle are erga omnes, 
belonging to the peoples of a particular state, and therefore generate a corresponding duty 
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upon all states to recognize and respect those rights.150 The objectives of the Resolution could 
be, inter alia, to balance competing economic interests between developing states, that 
wanted nationalization of natural resources and, the colonial masters who were opposed to 
the idea. From the literature, domestic nationalization of natural resources is also consistent 
with the assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources.151 
 
Various injunctions have been framed according to which states have to assert their 
sovereignty, but there can never be a situation of complete non-interference.152 Thus, the 
interplay between internal and external factors, on one hand, and self-determination and non-
interference on the other hand, necessitates cooperation among states and citizens.153 
However, international law commentators disagree on whether foreign investors who 
obtained entitlements to exploit mineral resources under colonial regimes had to renegotiate 
the investment agreements.154 The debate on renegotiating new contractual terms versus the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda generated uncertainties between developing states (former 
colonies) and their colonial masters. The existence of legal complexities that were yet settled 
was used as an excuse to enforce potentially prejudicial mineral resource investment 
agreements between the new host states and investors from former colonial states.155  
 
Due to the principle of equality of states, the newly independent states (former colonies) are 
sovereign states; accordingly, they are treated equally with their former colonial masters in 
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international law.156 The changed circumstance could be an exception to the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda and opens room for renegotiation of prejudicial mineral resource 
investment agreements that were concluded before attaining political independence. The 
“changed circumstances” and the principle of pacta sunt servanda could be the cause of the 
difficulties in order to renegotiate mineral resource investment or contractual agreements that 
were considered prejudicial to host states.157 This brings in the general law on changed 
circumstances, which can be traced to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. 
In terms of this Convention, Article 62 gives guidelines on the general law on changed 
circumstances.158 A hardship clause is also relevant - an exception to the pacta sunt servanda 
principle. By definition, a “hardship clause” is a provision in an agreement that is intended to 
cover cases where unforeseen events so fundamentally alter the equilibrium of a contractual 
agreement in which disproportionate obligations are placed on one of the parties to the 
contract.159 In this regard Hans van Houtte submits that;  
[…] the mere presence of a hardship clause should not in itself exclude the application of the 
general law on changed circumstances. It would be too cumbersome if parties were obliged to 
negotiate and draft hardship clauses covering all possible events which may affect 
performance. Consequently, the general law on changed circumstances remains applicable to 
all changes not covered by a hardship clause.160 
 
However, the review of the literature showed that the proposal to renegotiate investment 
agreements, which are prejudicial to host states was a heated debate; former colonizers 
opposed the proposal with reference to the principle of pacta sunt servanda and respect for 
acquired rights.161 Further the literature showed that newly-independent states protested to the 
objection on the basis that the agreements were largely economically prejudicial to host 
states.162 Irrespective of the challenges noted above, the examination of issues relating to the 
PSNR principle also brings to the fore one preliminary issue, namely, the legal status of the 
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principle. The status has been mired in some controversy dating back to the negotiation of the 
principle.163  
 
The legal merits of the development of international law principles regarding sovereignty 
over natural resources through the political organs of the UNGA has always been a source of 
doctrinal debate. A further reason exacerbating the difficulty is that sovereignty deals with 
broad and controversial issues such as minimum standards for handling and treatment of 
foreign investors, as well as their investment.164 Developing states’ claims over domestic 
mineral resources reveal an inclination to broaden the natural resource debate and its 
international legal framework. Although much commentary has focused on this controversy 
over the years,165 it is no longer tenable to deny the principle its legal status.166 For example, 
the dissenting opinion of the two judges, namely; Weeramantry and Skubiszwski, in the East 
Timor Case, embraced the PSNR principle, as well as self-determination and non-
interference, as part of modern international law.167 The legal endorsement of the PSNR 
principle enhanced the establishment of corresponding duties upon all states to recognize and 
respect the rights derived from the principle. This strengthens the legal position of the PSNR 
to become universally accepted and a binding principle of international law.168 Further the 
PSNR principle has been endorsed by some international institutions and acknowledged by 
the ICJ. For example, in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v Government of the Libyan Arab 
Republic,169 the sole arbitrator, René-Jean Dupuy, held that sovereignty over natural 
resources was adopted by many developing states with varying levels of development, which 
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represents not only all geographical areas but also various political and economic 
classifications.170 The arbitrator examined, however, whether in the assertion of sovereignty, 
a state can disregard its international obligations assumed within the framework of its 
sovereignty.171 The arbitrator made it clear that international law governs contractual 
relations between states and foreign investors and ‘[…] for the purposes of interpretation and 
performance of the contract, it should be recognized that a private contracting party has 
specific international capacities’.172 Consequently, an important qualification is that a state 
cannot use its sovereignty to circumvent international obligations into which it freely 
contracted.  
 
In the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,173 which primarily 
involved allegations of violation of sovereignty of the DRC, the ICJ stated that the PSNR 
principle forms part of customary international law.174 In this case, as noted above, the DRC 
alleged, inter alia, that the Ugandan army systematically looted and exploited mineral 
resources and formally requested the ICJ to order Uganda to cease violating its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. However, Uganda denied responsibility in the absence of reliable 
evidence to corroborate the allegations.175 The ICJ held that the request by the DRC to order 
Uganda to cease continuing internationally wrongful acts in the absence of evidentiary proof 
of the allegations could not be sustained. Accordingly, the DRC’s request was dismissed. In 
this case, it may be argued that although the DRC failed to establish that Uganda violated its 
sovereignty, there could be some elements of interference in the affairs of the DRC. The fact 
that the DRC failed to prove its allegations does not automatically rule out that Uganda was 
not to blame. Regardless of the ICJ’s findings against the DRC, interpretation can also be 
inferred from the declaration by the same Court’s acknowledgement of the customary and 
global legal character of the PSNR principle, and implies that the rights and benefits 
formulated within always remain effective.176 
 
In a nutshell, the PSNR principle is not cast in iron and can evolve in light of more recent 
rules and practices accepted as binding by the international community. This could allow the 
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principle to encompass Africa’s concerns in natural resource politics including self-
determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. The need for foreign 
investment through bilateral investments (BITs) may weaken the effectiveness of the PSNR 
principle at a domestic level. However, the principle still serves as the fountainhead for a 
state’s freedom to regulate its mineral resources, and as the basis for corresponding national 
and international responsibilities.177 Since the world is characterized by inequalities of power 
and mineral resource distribution the extent to which African states endowed with the 
resources can use the principle as their best line of defence is a topic worthy of consideration. 
The principle is more than just a functional norm of international law but a legal tool to 
protect the assertion of sovereignty and regulation of domestic mineral resources from 
external interference. This is the point of departure for this chapter and the same aspect is 
amplified by the principles discussed below. 
 
2.3.3.3 The Relevance of the Principle  
 
The PSNR principle primarily vests host states with the mandate, legal authority and 
autonomy as well as permanent custodianship over domestic mineral resources on behalf of 
the citizens. The broader framework of the principle shows that it empowers the executive 
and the legislature, inter alia, to make mining laws and determine conditions necessary to 
control access to, and regulate domestic mineral resources for self-determination. The 
principle empowers host states to decide on security of tenure and to choose which investors 
to grant mining licences and exclude others. This is the broader context in which the DRC 
and Zimbabwe’s sovereignty is considered with a view to control and exploit the resources 
for self-determination. Also, the PSNR principle gives host states the opportunity to work out 
technical features of mineral resource control and regulation, which can manifest through 
property regimes applicable to mining, conditions of access to mineral resources, royalties 
and mining taxes, policy implementation, enforcement and policing; indigenization, 
beneficiation and trade (as discussed in chapters 4 and 5 below). 
 
2.3.4 The Right to Development 
 
The right to development is recognized in the preamble to the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (UNDRD), which states that;  
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[…] development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which 
aims at the constant improvement of well-being of the entire population and individuals on the 
basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in the development and the fair 
distribution of benefits resulting therefrom.178 
 
This definition is consistent with a further section in the preamble that considers the principle 
of self-determination as reinforcement of the right to development. States have the right to 
their autonomy and to economic development; by virtue of having the right freely to 
determine their political status and to pursue their economic development, they should be the 
masters of their economic destiny.179 
 
2.3.4.1 Substantive Development of the Right to Development 
 
As a concept of international law, the right to development was first attributed to Keba 
M’Baye, a Senegalese jurist, after he delivered a lecture at the International Institute of 
Human Rights in 1972.180 However, the notion of development had been in existence for 
decades and its substance is embedded in various international instruments, which include the 
Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organization.181 
The concept was later tabled and debated for inclusion in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948,182 but it was not incorporated into the final document. One 
of the reasons for not incorporating the concept in the UDHR was attributed to the failure to 
reach consensus over the content and scope of the right to development.183 Although legal 
commentators from developing states enumerated the possible content, the subjects and 
objects of the right to development, however, jurists from developed and industrialized 
countries did not support the proposal. Among their arguments, they disputed whether the 
notion was worth giving recognition.184 
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Regardless of the debate, however, the literature survey shows that the concept of 
development was used to support calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). This 
followed after the newly independent states hoped to take the opportunities to develop and 
improve the general standards of living of their peoples.185 It is further submitted that the 
NIEO strategy was used to support claims that the newly independent states had rights to 
receive development assistance from the developed and industrialized countries owing to the 
historical damage caused by colonialism and economic inequalities.186 In short, this shows 
how the concept of development gradually developed and found space in international law. 
 
2.3.4.2 Origin and Legal Status of the Right to Development 
 
The evolution of the right to development can be regarded in terms of both economic and 
political spheres. From the political sphere, major political factors that overshadowed the 
period spanning the formation of the UN in 1945187 and the adoption of the UNDRD in 1986 
play a significant role.188 Events that took place between the two periods point to the factors 
that shaped this right. Also, 
[t]he evolution of the right to development in international law has been both inspired and 
shaped by ethical insights. Against the backdrop of changing political factors, [new directions 
in religious perception] grow into vital comprehensive understanding of the right to 
development.189 
 
The idea of the right to development was originally proposed in Catholic teachings and 
various religious groups that participated in UN efforts to formulate this right.190 Further the 
literature show that debates preceding the right to development influenced the ethical views 
and calls for international justice, as well as an end to poverty. The evolution of the right to 
development, however, was subject to debates regarding its conceptual validity and practical 
implications.  
 
This right to development is ‘the cornerstone of the human rights system’191 and implies 
realization of the peoples’ rights through self-determination and non-interference enshrined in 
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the UN Charter and other international instruments considered above.192 In this vein, Article 
1 of the UNDRD states that: 
[t]he right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human 
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, 
cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can 
be fully realized.193 
 
Moreover, the right invokes states to benefit from the international duty to cooperate and to 
regenerate economic development. The provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights194 reaffirmed the right to development. The restatement shows that the right is not 
determined by a single factor but a collection of rights and principles such as PSNR, self-
determination, meaningful participation in development, equal opportunities, and creation of 
a favourable environment for the enjoyment of political and economic rights.195 Accordingly, 
the right to development makes the human person the participant and beneficiary.   
 
With regard to the legal status of the right to development, it springs mostly from UN 
documents.196 The 1979 Report of the UN Secretary-General established the international 
dimension of the right to development and  
[…] indicates that there is a very substantial body of principles based on the [UN Charter] and 
the International Bill of Human Rights and reinforced by a range of conventions, declarations 
and resolutions which demonstrate the existence of a human right to development in 
international law.197 
 
Alston supports this view and proposes that:   
 
‘[…] the existence of the right to development is a fait accompli [and] [w]hatever reservations 
different groups may have as to its legitimacy, viability or usefulness, such doubts are now 
better left behind and replaced by efforts to ensure […] the formal process of elaborating the 
content of the right [as a constructive exercise].198 
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The right to development is therefore a principle of international law in general and is based 
on the principle of self-determination.199 The adoption of the UNDRD in 1986 was a 
milestone in the furtherance of this right,200 which is also contemplated in the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights201 and the Arab Charter on Human Rights,202 the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR,203 the first and third session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
of 1964 and 1972, respectively.204 Another important step in the recognition of the right to 
development is the UN Resolution 1161(XII) in which the UNGA concluded;  
[…] that a balanced and integrated economic and social development would contribute 
towards the promotion and maintenance of peace and security, social progress and better 
standards of living, and the observance of and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms […].205 
 
In order to evaluate the feasibility of the right to development, the UNGA Resolution 4 
(XXXIII)206 and the UN Commission on Human Rights considered the insight to the 
problems hindering full realization of economic rights and measures to be considered at 
domestic and international levels to secure the enjoyment of this right.207 This is confirmed in 
some of the UNDRD provisions on domestic and international state’s development 
responsibilities, which include establishment of an enabling legal environment to spur 
development.208 
  
Although the right to development satisfies the procedural requirements to become a 
recognized international human right, however, a review of the literature shows that it is not 
legally binding in international law and therefore states cannot be liable for domestic failure 
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to implement and enforce it.209 Nevertheless, this does not mean states have to disregard this 
right because it does not give binding obligations to the parties to the various international 
instruments that support this right. The World Conference on Human Rights210 considered 
comprehensively the right to development by adopting the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action,211 which inter alia, acknowledged respect for economic development 
as interdependent and mutually reinforcing this right.212 
 
Accordingly, the right to development ties in with the international law principles discussed 
above. The principles support common interests in the assertion of sovereignty over domestic 
mineral resources in order to derive economic benefits and development in the long run. 
Accordingly, states are the primary duty bearers of right to development while the citizens in 
each state are the right-holders, on whose behalf states act to realize development.213 
 
2.3.4.3 Relevance of the Right to Development to the Study 
 
Firstly, the right to development places a duty (at least moral) to formulate a domestic 
development vision. Secondly, it reinforces the rights of the host state to benefit from 
exploitation of domestic mineral resources. In order to do so, a state can be influenced to 
apply the revenues derived from mineral resources in line with the domestic development 
vision. In order to achieve development, the way that could be worked out at the domestic 
level could include formulating a national development vision, undertaking development 
planning, and enacting development laws. However, the right to development does not stand 
alone; it is a corollary of the right of the good intentions and use of sovereignty, self-
determination and non-interference, as well as how sovereignty is worked out over control 
and exploitation of mineral resources and the use of economic benefits that are derived from 
the resources. The right to development underpins the objectives of the Africa Mining Vision 
(AMV), which inter alia encourages African states to be proactive and take advantage of their 
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mineral endowment in order to derive economic benefits from exploitation of the resources 
for economic growth and development. In a nutshell, the right to development underpins 
what constitutes economic development in legal and political settings,214 including the DRC 
and Zimbabwe as the selected case studies for this thesis.  
 
2.4 Principles Facilitating Investment and Trade in Mineral Resources 
 
The three international law principles mandating benefits over domestic mineral resources 
and the right to development (discussed above) provide African states with basic rights over 
their resources. However, in order to exploit and derive benefits from the resources, 
investment and trade are inherently required. As noted in chapter 1, principles and rules 
associated with investment in and trade of mineral resources may create tensions with the 
principles that establish host states’ mandate over the mineral resources. For purposes of this 
thesis, two basic non-discrimination principles are considered; namely, national treatment and 
the most-favoured nation (MFN) principles. These two principles overlap between 
investment and trade; however, this section discusses them from the perspective of 
international investment law because my focus is largely on investment. This section also 
considers two further aspects of international investment law, namely, foreign exchange and 
repatriation of profits, and compensation for expropriation. Rules relating to these aspects of 
international investment law potentially restrict revenues available for development in host 
states.  
 
2.4.1 National Treatment Principle 
The national treatment principle advocates non-discrimination amongst investors in 
international investment law and trade. One of the legitimate expectations of foreign 
investors arising from the conclusion of investment agreements with host states is to be 
guaranteed fair and non-discriminatory treatment, for example, through legislative, judicial, 
administrative or other domestic processes.215 The national treatment norm entails that the 
host state shall accord foreign investors and their business interests located in its territory no 
less equal and favourable treatment than what it accords, in “like or similar circumstances” to 
                                                          
214
 Isabella D Bunn, op cit note 178 at 2. See also Khurshid Iqbal ‘The declaration on the right to development 
and implementation’ (2007) 1 Political Perspectives 1.  
215
 Subedi, op cit note 112 at 177 – 178. See also UNCTAD ‘Investor – state dispute arising from investment 
treaties: A review’ UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, 2005, hereafter 
UNCTAD ‘Investor – state dispute’ at 32. 
   66 
its local mining investors in the regulation and disposal of their investments.216 On the one 
hand, the objectives of national treatment include discouraging and addressing any forms of 
discrimination based on, inter alia, the origin or foreign status of the investor,217 and on the 
other hand, to spur fair and equitable treatment towards foreign investors doing investment or 
trade business in host states.218 The scope of the national treatment principle is broad and 
covers pre- and post-establishment rights, which includes operational and winding up 
phases.219   
 
Like pre-establishment rights in terms of the General Agreements on Trade in Services 
(GATS),220 BITs do not always define the standard for fair and equitable treatment of foreign 
investors.221 However, the national treatment principle indicates that the standard which is 
expected is to provide at least equal treatment to foreign and local investors in host states.222 
Against this background, it can be argued that  
[a]sserting notions of sovereignty and sovereign equality, [has led developing states to argue] 
that foreign investors were not entitled to protection greater than that accorded to nationals 
under the laws of the country. Thus, if the host state treated foreign investors without 
discrimination, and on par with nationals of the country, then that host State [would be] in 
compliance with the norms of international law.223 
 
In light of this quote, there could be varying views on the nature of host states’ responsibility 
to reinforce the standard of national treatment and protect the interests of foreign investors. 
However, there is a need to assess whether host states’ regulatory measures are not contrary 
to the accepted international standards for national treatment. In S D Myers Inc v Government 
of Canada,224 the tribunal considered two factors; namely, whether the efficacy of practical 
effects of the measure creates a disproportionate benefit for locals over foreign investors, and 
whether, prima facie, the measure appears to favour the host state’s local over foreign 
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investors who may be protected by a BIT.225 The two factors may be considered as the 
substantive content in which the national treatment has to be applied. Also, in the process of 
interpreting provisions of national treatment, attention should be on determining the nature of 
entities and their operations; this serves as a point of reference in order to ascertain whether 
there is discrimination against foreign investors. The concept of ‘like or similar 
circumstances’ becomes vital and the basis for application of the standard national treatment 
principle.226  
 
The national treatment requirement might be one of the most important standards of 
treatment enshrined in international investment law, as well as in international trade law. 
However, it is also a complex standard to fulfill since it covers a wide spectrum of delicate 
and sensitive issues.227 Apparently, the obligation to render national treatment to foreign 
investors does not support or give the host state discretion to give preferential treatment to 
locals over foreign investors. It can be maintained that international investment law and the 
national treatment principle give foreign investors rights while host states have obligations to 
protect those rights; this distinction appears to favour the former, thus promoting an unequal 
relationship between the contracting parties.228 In international investment law, host states are 
required to provide protection to foreign investors operating within their territories, however, 
granting national treatment could restrict the sovereignty of the host, for example, to 
stimulate the development of manufacturing capacity and industrialization based on its 
mineral resources.229 Compelling the host state not to do so may amount to economic suicide 
for domestic entities, and adversely give an edge to foreign investors, that further restricts or 
weaken the host’s sovereignty. By compelling host states not to discriminate against foreign 
investors, the host has no discretion but to give national treatment to all foreign investors. 
This restricts sovereignty by limiting the host’s discretion to choose which foreign investors 
to afford national treatment to the exclusion of others.  
 
In a nutshell, the national treatment principle negatively affects sovereignty in that host states 
are compelled to guarantee and grant foreign mining investors non-discriminatory treatment 
through executive, legislative, judicial and administrative decisions. Compelling host states to 
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provide national treatment to foreign investors implies the host state cannot pass laws 
favouring nationals, this could negatively impact on indigenization laws. 
 
2.4.2 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Principle 
A second component of non-discrimination against foreign investors in international 
investment law and trade is the MFN treatment. By definition, the MFN treatment is 
[…] accorded by the granting State to the beneficiary State, or to persons or things in a 
determined relationship with that State, not less favourable than treatment extended by the 
granting State to a third State or to persons or things in the same relationship with that third 
State.230  
 
In the context of international investment, the MFN treatment clause is a treaty-based 
investment obligation and may be provided for in BITs between contracting states.231 The 
purpose of MFN treatment clauses is to ensure equal competing conditions among foreign 
investors who invested in similar fields, for example, in the host state’s minerals sector. This 
acts as a safeguard to curb discrimination and distort competition among foreign investors in 
the same field.232 In other words, the presence of MFN clauses in BITs entail that the host 
state extends the MFN treatment to all foreign investors covered in its BITs, as well as 
investors from non-contracting states. The obligation ensures the host state protects all 
foreign investors and their business interests in its territory. The treatment must not be less 
favourable than that which the host state accords to foreign investors from any third state.233  
 
Although BITs allow foreign investors and host states to establish legally binding rights and 
obligations in terms of specific investment agreements, the provision of MFN treatment 
clauses in the treaty are designed to increase investor confidence. A key factor is security and 
protection of the investment since investors invest to make profits and not for charity. 
However, the MFN treatment is subject to controversy in that it might be used to broaden the 
scope of investors’ procedural and substantive rights outside those provided for in the 
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agreement in terms of which a foreign investor may claim protection.234 The broadening of 
foreign investors’ rights against the contracting state could be a slap on the sovereignty of the 
host state to choose investment partners of its choice and grant them favourable investment 
conditions.235 Thus, sovereignty of the host state is restricted when the host is unable to 
extend favourable mining investment conditions to foreign investors from a certain state and 
ignore the same conditions to investors of another state doing mining business in the same 
state. Therefore MFN treatment may allow foreign investors to demand more favourable 
treatment conditions that are extended to third-country BITs; however, ordinary mining 
investment treaties may contain an explicit exception for MFN treatment.236  
 
The MFN treatment aims at establishing a non-discriminatory environment and conditions for 
investors from various countries operating in the host state. It is a fundamental legal norm 
underpinning equal treatment and competition amongst foreign investors. In the absence of 
indicators to the contrary, the MFN advantages foreign investors and adversely affects host 
states by weakening their sovereignty, amongst other things, their right to choose investors to 
give special treatment based on what such investors might in turn promise for development. 
Restrictions on the assertion of sovereignty can be high where the host state has limited 
capacity to regulate mining activities of foreign investors operating in its territory. It is most 
likely foreign investors are benefiting from investing in Africa and host states have not 
obtained any tangible benefits; thus, weakening the right of host states to develop through 
exploitation of their mineral resources. This assertion is supported by research showing that 
although investment has increased substantially in Africa, it has not produced notable 
economic development.237 This could be the case where most investment in the minerals 
sector, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, may not have significantly benefited host states.  
 
In a nutshell, the MFN principle weakens sovereignty and the mandate of host states. This is 
done through restricting host states’ discretion or choices regarding which foreign investor to 
give investment and trade advantages over others in the mineral value chain. Further 
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sovereignty is affected in that host states may not be able to pass laws giving investment and 
trade advantages to certain partners over others. Furthermore, the MFN principle negatively 
impacts on enforcing beneficiation laws. This is against the backdrop that the host state may 
require beneficiation and value addition for all its minerals before export.  
 
2.4.3 Foreign Exchange and Repatriation of Profits Restrict State Sovereignty 
 
One of the objectives of investors when investing in foreign states is to make profits and 
repatriate the proceeds to their home states. In the event that repatriation of profits is 
prevented or restricted, whether owing to exchange controls shortfall, the objectives of the 
investor are frustrated.238 In determining the potential to invest in the host state where there is 
a BIT,239 one of the issues to be considered is whether the contracting states spelt out the 
issue of repatriation of profits. In the absence of a BIT, negotiations on the potential 
investment between the host state and a foreign investor have to deal with repatriation of 
profits as a legitimate expectation prior to commencing investment.240 Identifying issues such 
as barriers to repatriation of profits and how to mitigate through appropriate regulatory 
measures comes to the fore.241  
 
The regulation of capital controls is marked by significant diversity and is shaped by states’ 
perceived economic interests.242 However, the common denominator is the international legal 
framework which regulates monetary relations among states. In particular, the Articles of 
Agreement of the IMF (IMF Rules)243 recognizes foreign exchange and capital controls.244 
The IMF Rules provides two types of capital transactions that are capable of restricting 
member states’ exchange controls. The two categories are “control of capital movements” 
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and “payment for current transactions” which are contemplated in section 3 of Article VI and 
Article XXX(d) of the IMF Rules, respectively. Section 3 of Article VI, section 2(a) of 
Article VIII and Article XIV of the IMF Rules are the principal provisions recognizing 
exchange control. As such, the IMF Rules are the most applicable and universally accepted in 
the regulation of exchange controls and repatriation of profits, ostensibly the reason being 
that the IMF has majority of state membership in the world.245 In terms of the Rules, member 
states may exercise controls of capital transfers when  
[…] necessary to regulate international capital movements, but no member may exercise these 
controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or which will 
unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments, except as provided in [section 
3(b) of Article VII and section 2 of Article XIV].246 
 
Accordingly, foreign investors’ basis to repatriate profits is international law backed and to a 
greater extent does not support the mandate of host states (developing states) to compel 
investors to reinvest greater percentages of their profits more than the investor can offer. As 
such, the requirement to repatriate a certain percentage of the profits restricts the amount of 
revenue available for local development.  
 
Yianni and Vera,247 as well as Salacuse248 correctly noted that section 3 of Article VI of the 
IMF Rules can be used by a state to hold back capital flight by reducing the ability of 
residents and investors to transfer or export capital, (the case of South Africa during apartheid 
as discussed below). Unless there are BITs regulating repatriation of profits, the host state 
may use Article VI of the IMF Rules to reduce or limit capital flight including the amount 
that a foreign investor may be allowed to repatriate.  
 
IMF member states are free to adopt measures on capital controls; however, states are obliged 
not to impose restrictive regulatory controls prior to obtaining permission from the IMF. 
Section 3(b) of Article VII and section 2 of Article XIV of the IMF Rules, as well as section 
2(a) of Article VIII deal with “avoidance of restrictions on current transactions” without 
express approval from the IMF. Regardless of the provisions, the IMF ‘[…] policy has 
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traditionally been to approve reasonable restrictions on current transactions’.249 It is presumed 
that by becoming a member, a state accepts the negative obligations which are provided by 
sections 2(a), 3 and 4 of Article VIII of the IMF Rules, which prohibit imposing restrictions 
on capital transactions and transfers for current international transactions. Also host states 
cannot apply discriminatory exchange controls and currency arrangements without IMF 
approval. As a result, there is the need for approval before a state engages in any capital 
restrictions and regulation on transfers and payments for current international transactions.250 
This restricts sovereignty, and failure to seek approval from the IMF is breach of sections 
2(a), 3 and 4 of Article VIII of the IMF Rules.251 Therefore member states cannot 
legitimately exercise their sovereignty over capital controls, unless approved by the IMF. 
 
The IMF may allow requests by member states to impose transitional arrangements in order 
to restrict foreign exchange for a certain period.252 When approved, the restrictions ‘[…] that 
would otherwise be in breach of […]’253 section 2(a) of Article VIII of the IMF Rules are 
legitimately justified in order to develop financial and commercial arrangements with other 
IMF member states and to facilitate international payments.254 When the period for 
transitional arrangement expires, the measures cannot be reintroduced by a member state 
without IMF approval in terms of section 2(a) of Article VIII of the IMF Rules.255 In terms of 
section 3(b) of Article IV of the IMF Rules, the IMF has a duty to monitor the exchange rate 
policies of member states.256 This restricts sovereignty of member states to adopt their own 
policies in addition to that which the IMF may prescribe for the state.  
 
‘[T]he right of repatriation of profits may be restricted in exceptional economic or financial 
circumstances’.257 Although not widely used, and regardless of the circumstances, domestic 
measures on repatriation of profits that implicate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
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of 1947 (the GATT)258 may require a foreign investor to re-invest a certain fraction of profits 
in the host state.259 Trade requirements and investment conditions that would otherwise 
contravene Article XI of the GATT may, however, be justified by Article XII of the GATT 
which permits ‘[…] mainly non-discriminatory, quantitative restrictions where necessary to 
address a balance of payment crisis.’260 On the contrary, limitations on repatriation of profits 
could be a challenge to the sovereignty of the host states vis–a–viz the desire to attract foreign 
investment.261 The requirement to re-invest a certain percentage of profits could support the 
state in its mandate to realize benefits from its mineral resources.262 Arguably, both re-
investing of a certain portion of the profits and limitations on repatriation of profits may 
contravene Article XV of the GATT, which requires the contracting parties to adhere to the 
IMF Rules regarding balance of payment and currency exchange arrangements.263 To a 
certain extent, the IMF Rules allow considerable scope for developing countries to restrict 
repatriation of profits and foreign exchange, as well as exchange controls.264  
 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Codes which 
prohibit the introduction or maintenance of regulations or practices which restrict repatriation 
of profits are relevant; however, the Codes are not used widely and therefore not considered 
for the purposes of this thesis.265  
 
IMF Rules are considered, and therefore the need for domestic laws which regulate 
repatriation of profits and exchange controls must be aligned with IMF Rules to avoid 
adverse effects.266 For example, the restructuring by South Africa relating to exchange 
control regulations during the apartheid era is a case in point. Severe capital-account 
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deficiencies in the 1980s forced the apartheid government to unilaterally adopt domestic 
measures to restrict currency outflows. The various measures that were adopted include 
restriction of exchange control and payment of current international transactions, as well as 
non-payments of claims in the form of foreign-currency-dominated loans that were governed 
by foreign law.267 In 1986 the apartheid government unilaterally declared provisional 
suspension of all short-term debt repayments.268 The moratorium was unilaterally extended 
twice in the same year violating section 2 of Article XIV of the IMF Rules. Regardless of the 
irregularity, the apartheid government had to control the amount of capital leaving the 
country through domestic-exchange control legislation, which interfered in many private-
sector contracts.269 However, the moratorium ostensibly failed to curb capital flight and 
apartheid South Africa experienced uncontrolled capital woes in the form of external debt 
repayments, interests, and various illicit flows.270 It could be argued that in an attempt to 
redress domestic exchange controls woes, the apartheid government willfully violated the 
IMF Rules and also investor contracts. Even the sovereign debt restructuring made around 
exchange controls failed to ease exchange control challenges.  
 
In a nutshell, foreign exchange and repatriation of profits restricts the quantity of revenue that 
would be available for local development. The requirement to repatriate profits does not, 
however, allow the host state (developing states) to claim a reasonable percent of the profits 
other than what the IMF Rules require. Accordingly, the mandate of the host state to derive 
benefits from its mineral resources is weakened to a certain extent since the host cannot 
compel foreign investors not to repatriate the maximum percentage of their profits.   
 
2.4.4 Compensation for Expropriation 
 
When investors invest in host states, it is recognized that they have a legitimate expectation 
that host states will protect their investments and business interests. The dominant elements 
of the legitimate expectation at least includes non-discrimination, fair and equitable 
treatment, and control over their investment and business interests.271 A distinctive concern of 
                                                          
267
 Andrew Yianni & Carlose de Vera, op cit note 247 at 367. 
268
 The unilateral imposition of unsanctioned exchange controls and capital transfers was a violation of section 
2(a) of Article VIII of the IMF Rules.  
269
 Andrew Yianni & Carlose de Vera, op cit note 247 at 367. 
270
 Ibid, at 366. See also Alan Hirsch ‘The origins and implications of South Africa’s continuing financial crisis 
(1989) 9 Transformations 31. 
271
 See generally Elizabeth Snodgrass ‘Protecting investors’ legitimate expectations: Recognizing and delimiting 
a general principle’ (2006) 21 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 1 at 1-2 & 25. See also Michele 
   75 
foreign investors is whether their business interests or assets are firmly secured from 
expropriation by appropriation, nationalization or confiscation.272 However, in the event of 
expropriation, four conditions must be met; namely, an expropriation must be for the public 
interest, should be non-discriminatory, must be done with regard to applicable municipal laws 
and due process, and full compensation must be paid.273 These requirements are the least 
legal expectations in international law. However, the standard of compensation and minimum 
standards of treatment create disagreements and conflicts between capital importing and 
capital exporting states.274 Traditionally, when expropriation or nationalization took place, 
the “Hull Rule”275 would apply and required the host state to “promptly, adequately and 
effectively” pay compensation to the affected foreign investor.276 However, the literature 
shows that after World War II developing states raised concerns regarding the “Hull Rule”, 
and claimed the right to determine the manner in which they have to treat foreign investors 
and the required standard of compensation where the treatment was not sufficiently harmful. 
The coming in of BITs on the international arena changed the traditional position reiterated in 
the Hull Rule; the contracting states may deviate from the standard treatment contemplated in 
customary international law with regard to the standard of compensation.277 Generally, BITs 
transposed the “prompt, adequate and effective” approach to “fair and equitable 
compensation" with regard to expropriations in foreign investment law.278 Although approved 
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without support of capital exporting states, the UNGA Resolution 3171(XXVII),279 the 
Resolution on New International Economic Order280 and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States,281 among others, sought to give host states the right to determine the amount 
for compensation.282 However, the absence of capital-exporting states during the passing of 
the resolutions could reflect high levels of dissatisfaction. Thus demonstrating the 
controversy of the issue and the extent to which it has not yet been sufficiently resolved in 
international law. 
 
When the host state expropriates a foreigner investor’s property or mining business interests, 
it could be argued that the state acts in the interest of the nation in order to promote the 
mandate and benefit from domestic mineral resources. However, the expropriation must be in 
accordance with the international minimum standards and therefore requires domestic policy 
formulation. Host states may not expropriate due to fear that arbitrary expropriation may 
cause disinvestment and maladministration. Accordingly, such fear may limit the mandate 
and restrict sovereignty. In the event of expropriation, the host state must pay fair and 
equitable compensation.283 Nevertheless, the international legal requirement to pay 
compensation subsequently limits the mandate and sovereignty to expropriate, especially 
where the host state cannot afford to pay compensation. Where the host state expropriates 
without compensation, litigation may arise (as discussed below). Even where capital is 
available, however, paying compensation lessens the revenue available for development. 
 
A leading African example of the nationalization of foreign investment is Libya’s 
nationalization of foreign interests in petroleum concessions.284 In this case, the Arab 
Republic of Libya issued two decrees, the first was on 1 September 1973 and the second on 
11 February 1974, with the effect of nationalizing all the properties, rights and interests of 
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company, which had been 
granted to the two corporations jointly by the Libyan government in terms of 14 deeds of 
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concessions.285 This was the cause of contention between the Libyan government and the two 
corporations. The 14 deeds of concession conferred upon the two corporations by the Libyan 
government, permitted the President of the ICJ to appoint an arbitrator to make a 
determination in the event of a dispute. Libya objected to the provision and submitted that the 
dispute was not subject to arbitration because the cause arouse as a result of sovereign acts. 
The President of the ICJ rejected the argument and appointed a sole arbitrator, Professor 
Rene-Jean Dupuy, to hear both sides of the dispute and make a decision. In the findings, the 
arbitrator questioned, however, whether the act of sovereignty which constitutes 
nationalization authorizes a state to disregard its contractual obligations it assumed within the 
framework of its sovereignty.286 This was found in the negative and the arbitrator ruled 
against Libya. It was held that the corporations were legally entitled to compensation or the 
state was obliged to uphold the terms of the treaty agreement.287 This was the first 
international arbitration award relating to breach of investment agreements. Regardless of 
Libyan asserting its sovereignty through nationalization of foreign interests in petroleum 
concessions agreements, the case shows that the assertion of sovereignty is limited and 
restricted by contractual agreements undertaken by the Libyan government in the process of 
exercising its sovereignty.  
 
Another case demonstrating the relationship between sovereignty and treaty agreements 
involves Zimbabwe and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Treaty. 
Zimbabwe is a member and signatory to the SADC Treaty. During the period spanning 2000 
and 2010, the Zimbabwean government expropriated white commercial farms (including 
those protected under BITs), without compensation. The victims of the land seizures were 
denied access to domestic courts after the constitutional amendment 17,288 which vested 
ownership of certain categories of land in the Zimbabwean government. The effect of the 
constitutional amendment was also to eliminate the jurisdiction of municipal courts to hear 
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and determine any court applications relating to the land expropriation. In Mike Campbell 
(Pvt) Ltd & Others v Republic of Zimbabwe,289 Mike Campbell and 77 other affected 
commercial farmers (applicants) filed an application in terms of Article 28 of the Protocol of 
the SADC Tribunal read with Rule 61(2) – (5) of the Rules of Procedure of the SADC 
Tribunal for interim relief restraining the government of Zimbabwe from interfering with the 
Applicants’ farm activities, whatsoever, pending the determination of the matter.290 After 
hearing of the matter in 2007, the Tribunal granted an interim relief in favour of the 
applicants and restrained the respondent from taking steps, whether directly or indirectly, to 
evict or interfere with activities of the applicants on their farms. On 28 November 2008, the 
SADC Tribunal passed its final decision on the matter and held, inter alia, that the 
respondent breached its obligations in terms of Articles 4(c) and 6(2) of the SADC Treaty 
and was therefore required to pay compensation to the applicants for their seized properties. 
Further the respondent was ordered to take all the necessary measures through its agents, to 
protect possession, occupation and ownership of the properties of the applicants291 and pay 
the legal costs but the respondent declined to enforce the order of the tribunal. In order to 
enforce the Tribunal’s order, the applicants applied to the Gauteng High Court of South 
Africa to have the order of the SADC Tribunal recognized in South Africa.292 The North 
Gauteng High Court sitting as a court of first instance granted the application.293 On appeal 
by Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa upheld a decision of the North 
Gauteng High Court and dismissed the appeal.294 In order to enforce the decision in Campbell 
case, the court ordered auction of the property of the Zimbabwe Government in South Africa, 
it was only then when Zimbabwe agreed to honour the SADC Tribunal’s order to pay 
compensation and legal costs. These cases show how state sovereignty can be challenged and 
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restricted. Further the relief that was provided by the SADC Tribunal and South African 
courts shows the manner in which the judiciary does not effectively support expropriation 
without compensation. 
 
The cases discussed above show the manner in which the sovereignty of Libya and 
Zimbabwe over their respective natural resources was challenged, restricted or weakened in 
regard to issues relating to expropriation. The competence of the two states to enter into the 
treaty agreements in each case was their sovereignty. However, they also manifested 
voluntarily and consented to limit the assertion of their sovereignty when each became a 
party to the agreements.  
 
2.4.5 Dispute Settlement  
 
In the context of the study, dispute settlement can be defined as a method of resolving 
disagreements or misunderstandings relating to mining investment agreements between the 
host state and foreign investor(s) or between contracting states.295 In settlement of the 
disputes, an international tribunal chosen by the parties plays a fundamental role.296 There are 
various international investment arbitration tribunals; here attention is given to the World 
Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)’s International Court of Arbitration297 and the 
International Commercial Arbitration.298 The tribunals are established by their own 
conventions, for example, the ICSID was established under the ICSID Convention. Just like 
municipal courts, the tribunals are expected to be impartial in resolving disputes, by invoking 
internationally accepted norms, standards and balancing competing interests of the parties to 
the dispute.299  
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This section highlights the development of investment dispute settlement, the manner in 
which the choice of international arbitration potentially restricts the assertion of sovereignty 
of the host state and the way in which municipal legislation spells out provisions for dispute 
settlement between the host state and a foreign investor.  
 
The history and development of investment dispute arbitration dates back beyond the 
eighteenth century;300 however, consideration is taken from common state actions by some 
states in Latin America, which were reportedly involved in arbitrary expropriations of foreign 
investors’ properties or cancellation of claimed contractual obligations against the host state 
by foreign investors. In this regard, disputes would arise where a legitimate foreign investor 
perceived itself to be injured and formulate a valid claim from the agreement, only to be 
rejected by the host state.301 As a result of the ill-treatment of foreign investors and arbitrary 
breach of their foreign investment agreements, the home states of foreign investors gradually 
developed tendencies to intervene in the controversies in order to defend the legitimate 
interests of corporations of their nationals that were investors abroad, and at times could use 
force in support of their claims.302  
 
For example, in Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula SPA (ELSI) (United States of America v 
Italy),303 the US advocated a claim on behalf of its investor, the Raytheon Corporation, 
against the Republic of Italy. Raytheon had an investment project located in Sicily, a region 
in Italy which was undeveloped in comparison to the rest of Italy. Raytheon’s plans were to 
manufacture and produce electronic parts in Palermo but resulted in severe financial 
constraints, and the management resolved to liquidate the Italian subsidiary. The ensuing 
bankruptcy proceedings faced interference and resistance from the Italian government, which 
frustrated efforts to resolve the matter amicably. After exhausting all domestic legal recourse 
in Italy, Raytheon sought help from its home government to resolve the matter. On half of its 
corporation, the US instituted legal proceedings against Italy in the ICJ, by assuming locus 
standi in judicio on the basis of a bilateral agreement, the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
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and Navigation, between the two countries.304 In its ruling, the ICJ held that local remedies 
had to be exhausted, regardless of the fact that the court did not conclude that the exhaustion 
of local remedies played no role in the proceedings.305 The procedural rules governing 
diplomatic protections, which include exhaustion of local remedies, had to be considered and 
applied.306 Although Italy is not a developing state, the case illustrates the manner in which 
home governments of foreign investors may intervene on behalf of their investors abroad. It 
can be argued that Italy exercised its sovereignty by adopting measures that interfered with 
the Raytheon liquidation matter; however, the sovereignty was challenged in the ICJ. This 
further shows that although a state may take advantage and exercise its sovereignty, however, 
the sovereignty is not absolute – it can be challenged and restricted. 
 
From the history and development of the concept of dispute resolution, home states of foreign 
investors, mainly from Europe, took advantage of the crystallization of customary 
international law rule that host states could not arbitrarily expropriate property or business 
interests of foreign investors without prompt, adequate and effective compensation.307 In 
support of the interests of their investors abroad, the home states reiterated that host states 
had responsibilities and to observe the commitments, as well as contractual obligations 
arising from investment agreements, which are underpinned by the pacta sunt servanda 
norm. The developing states became assertive of their equal sovereignty with their colonial 
masters,308 and as such, states in the Latin American region were at the fore and consistently 
resisted any form of colonial influence.309 It is further reported that the resistance became 
stronger and popular when the communist movement gained political control in Russia and 
other countries across the globe; they ideologically aligned themselves with developing states 
in Latin America. The countries established qualitative momentum and intensified ties among 
communist values as more developing states joined the world community during the period 
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of de-colonization in the mid-1940s and after.310 It is further reported the movement reached 
its peak in 1973, during the oil crisis which conferred a sense of empowerment upon 
developing states rich in natural resources.311  
 
The developments gave rise to a series of resolutions passed by the UNGA, including the 
resolution on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which largely renounced 
pro-investor principles and emphasized collective states’ responsibilities towards the 
international community.312 The Resolution set the stage to formulate the fundamentals for 
international economic relations, which included sovereign equality of states, non-
interference, mutual and equitable benefit sharing, peaceful settlement of disputes and co-
existence.313 The period spanning the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a paradigm shift as a result 
of international efforts to accommodate the doctrines and interests of capital importing and 
exporting states.314 Further the proliferation of BITs and attempt to agree on a multilateral 
investment agreement could be an indication of softening confrontations.315 It is reported that 
gradually the trend developed of referring issues of controversy between developing and 
developed states to arbitration before an appointed panel to resolve the dispute, rather than 
engaging municipal courts.316 
 
With the increase in the demand for mineral resources and foreign investment in the minerals 
sector among African states, it is becoming important for host states and foreign investors to 
have established methods of resolving investment and related disputes within a reasonable 
time. The types of disputes vary in nature and content,317 and when disputes arise, it is 
important for the parties to resolve them amicably and thereafter maintain their 
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relationship.318 The rules for arbitration promulgated by each forum are generally used to 
regulate the proceedings.  
 
Of the various forms of dispute resolution which include conciliation, mediation and 
negotiation,319 arbitration proves to be the most common form of resolving investment 
disputes.320 It is conceived as a dispute settlement mechanism which is outside municipal law 
and established judicial system of a sovereign state.321 With regard to arbitration agreements, 
they can be formed at two stages: during the negotiation of an investment agreement or after 
a legal dispute arises. The first phase has the advantage in that the investment agreement 
negotiation process offers an opportunity without the animosity that could arise at the second 
stage.322 Here arbitration clauses may be incorporated in the agreement in order to manage 
future dispute resolution process. What may be included in the arbitration clause is, inter alia, 
choice of law and the forum. The location may determine the potential aid or level of 
interference, by domestic courts during arbitral proceedings.323 
 
Generally, national Constitutions provide for the establishment of the domestic judiciary 
system of state.324 The provision for, and establishment of the judiciary in the constitution 
empowers courts to derive legitimacy and authority, as well as to hear and determine disputes 
arising from the territory of the state. However, the choice of law and forum may give a 
negative impression that host states’ judiciary is incompetent and biased.325 Further by 
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recognizing foreign arbitral awards, domestic courts may find themselves becoming 
rubberstamps for the decisions, which they did not reach and which are therefore not subject 
to appeal.326 In this case, it is mainly the judiciary of the host state (a pillar which supports 
sovereignty) is affected. Reference shall be made in chapter 4 and 5 whether Zimbabwe and 
the DRC provides for dispute settlement in domestic legislation, respectively.  
 
In a nutshell, dispute settlement in international investment law is difficult to understand, 
more particularly, why host states would voluntarily limit their sovereignty, by submitting to 
such processes of arbitration-enforced discipline. By consenting to such external, malleable 
tribunal, generally a state gains in reputation, in lowering its economic and political risk 
position and improving its ability to participate and benefit from the global economy.327 
However, the host state is at risk and consequently punished, usually with good reason, in 
many ways by investors and the global markets. Submitting to an external dispute resolution 
mechanism may also provide host states with defence against domestic business lobbies and 
ideological interests groups, which more often push domestic regulatory tools and manoeuvre 
it for protectionist policies which in the end damage the country’s economic potential.328 The 
tightly contested situation portrayed here gives host states limited options among or between 
competing and conflicting alternatives which, on the one hand, might support state 
sovereignty and, on the other hand, restricts it.  
 
2.5 How Sovereignty is Worked out at Domestic Level  
 
The manner in which sovereignty is worked out at the domestic level in order to uphold the 
mandate and control over mineral resources for self-determination is very important. The 
outworking aspect and implementation is accordingly a technical feature of resource 
sovereignty and forms a foundation upon which host states can successfully control their 
mineral resources. The technical manner in which Zimbabwe and the DRC have controlled 
and exercised sovereignty is discussed in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.  
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The principles discussed in this chapter can be operationalized in various themes discussed in 
the thesis. The table below provides a summary of the principles and effect of sovereignty.  
 
 
Principle 
 
Effect on Sovereignty (nature of the 
impact) 
The way in which 
sovereignty may be 
worked at domestic level 
 
Self-
determination 
-the right to decide how benefits from 
exploitation of mineral resources will be 
used in accordance with the wishes of the 
people. 
-indigenization policies and 
laws. 
-transparency and 
accountability in control, 
regulation as well as revenue 
use and management 
-planning for use of mineral 
resources 
-control of corruption 
 
 
Non-
interference 
-reinforces the PSNR and self-
determination principles by ensuring other 
subjects of international law are restrained 
from interfering in the domestic affairs of 
the host state in so far as the control and 
regulation of mineral resources are 
concerned.  
-non-interference in domestic executive, 
legislative or judiciary decisions, as well as 
enforcement and policing of mining laws.  
 
-policy formulation, 
implementation and 
enforcement, as well as 
policing. 
-dispute resolution 
-mineral resource policing 
 
 
 
PSNR 
The right to benefit from exploitation of 
mineral resources, as well as the following: 
(i)vesting the state with permanent 
custodianship over domestic mineral 
resources. 
(ii)providing the executive and legislature 
with authority to make laws to determine 
conditions of access & regulation, 
acquisition and cancellation of mining 
licences, security tenure system. 
(iii)inherent powers to choose who should 
invest and who to exclude. 
(vi)inalienable right to control and regulate 
the resources, as well as their exploitation, 
allocation and use of the revenue for 
development purposes.  
 
The way in which 
sovereignty is worked out at 
the domestic level is the 
technical features of mineral 
resource control and 
regulation which manifests 
through: 
-property regime applicable 
to mining. 
-conditions of access to the 
mineral resources. 
-policy implementation, 
enforcement and policing. 
-beneficiation and trade. 
-indigenization. 
-dispute resolution. 
-environmental 
requirements. 
-royalties and tax rates. 
-legal obligations towards 
indigenous communities 
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-investment laws. 
 
The right to 
development 
 
-the mandate and resource sovereignty, 
self-determination and non-interference in 
the control of domestic minerals and their 
exploitation and trade.  
-reinforces the right to benefit from 
mineral exploitation. 
-to apply revenues in line with 
development vision of the state. 
-development planning. 
-development laws. 
-sustainable development in 
line with African Mining 
Vision (AMV) 
 
National 
Treatment 
 
-executive and legislative under must 
guarantee foreign mining investors fair and 
non-discriminatory treatment through 
legislative, judicial and administrative. 
-host state compelled to provide same 
treatment to domestic and foreign 
investors.   
-may not pass laws favouring 
nationals - impact on the 
indigenization laws. 
 
Most 
Favoured 
Nation 
-restricts choices - which investor to give 
trade advantages over another.  
-state cannot pass laws giving trade 
advantages to certain parties in the mineral 
value chain. 
-restricts the mandate and sovereignty to 
grant trade advantages to one investor to 
the exclusion of others in the mineral value 
chain.      
-impact on enforcing 
beneficiation laws. 
-mineral laws that may 
convey advantages to one 
investor over another. 
 
Foreign 
exchange and 
repatriation of 
profits 
 
 
-restricts state’s ability to control 
movement of investors’ capital into the 
country and out of the country 
-restricts quantity of revenue (a reasonable 
percent) available for development. 
-municipal law relating to capital 
movements is inferior to international law 
which regulates capital controls and 
current transactions (the IMF Rules). 
 
-foreign exchange laws and 
current transactions. 
 
 
Compensation 
for 
expropriation 
-restricts the executive from expropriating 
unless compensation is available. 
-requires policy formulation to justify 
expropriate. 
-restricts arbitrary expropriation.  
-fear of causing disinvestment and 
maladministration could force executive 
not to expropriate. 
-paying compensation lessens revenue 
available for development. 
-expropriation law. 
-obligation on host states to 
equitable treatment of 
investors’ mining 
investments and interests. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has discussed the international legal framework that supports sovereignty over 
mineral resources, and how this can be worked out at the domestic level. The cardinal 
principles of international law discussed in this chapter collectively tell us that sovereignty 
over mineral resources is fundamental and provides a legal shield against interference, and 
African states have the autonomy to control the resources. This legal framework gives host 
states inherent rights to control domestic mineral resources for self-determination. 
Accordingly, other subjects of international law are legally required to respect the 
sovereignty of another state by not interfering in its domestic affairs, including in the 
assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources.  
 
The chapter has discussed the uncertainties surrounding the scope and content of the 
principles and how they are relevant to thesis. Chiefly what constitutes “interference” 
remains of cardinal importance in upholding the mandate and exercising sovereignty over 
mineral resources in Africa. The manner in which the principles collectively conceptualize 
the mandate and sovereignty gives African states the international legal basis in order to 
control their mineral resources for self-determination. The success in so doing lies in 
observing the duties imposed on each state individually and collectively in international law, 
and in turn this could be an aid to ameliorate the interferences and to navigate them. 
  
In a nutshell, sovereignty is a key principle that supports the mandate and control over 
domestic mineral resources and their regulation without interference. With reference to the 
DRC and Zimbabwe, the principle is considered in terms of the manner and extent to which it 
empowers African states to be the agents of their own development. Sovereignty confers 
states with a legal shield and authority to define the manner in which, for example the DRC 
and Zimbabwe, spell out the rights to ownership, custody of, and control over domestic 
mineral resources, as well as access to those resources. The authority includes setting out the 
terms and conditions fundamental for a state to exercise control over the resources. For 
example, the application of property rights and security of tenure, the right of access to a 
mineral resource, as well as criminalizing conduct that violates provisions of domestic 
mineral laws and policies. While empowered with the principle of sovereignty, states 
formulate policies and enforce them in order to assert control over the resources. This 
includes general policing, beneficiation and trade, taxation and investors’ obligations towards 
   88 
indigenous communities. These themes among others are discussed in chapters 4 and 5 with a 
view to show the operationalization of the principles discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THREATS TO THE “OUTWORKING” OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER 
MINERAL RESOURCES IN DEVELOPING STATES 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
There are various threats that can interfere with and weaken state sovereignty over domestic 
mineral resources and the mandate to develop through exploiting such resources. This chapter 
discusses four threats to the “outworking”1 of sovereignty over mineral resources, namely, 
the conditionality policies of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), illegal mining, corruption and 
mineral resource conflicts. The conditionalities in loan agreements (these are the actual loan 
agreements rather than the conditionality policy) are directly relevant since they potentially 
undermine sovereignty; however, the proponent deems it another area of study. Reference 
shall only be made thereto when necessary.  
 
While transparency initiatives such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, along with stabilization clauses in mining 
contracts also restrict sovereignty over mineral resources in various ways, these areas of 
focus are not considered in this thesis. However, reference shall be made when necessary. 
 
3.2 The Role of International Financial Institutions in Relation to State Sovereignty 
 
Two international financial institutions, namely, the IMF and the World Bank play a 
fundamental role in shaping the relationship and interaction between developing states and 
global capital. In particular, the IMF and the World Bank conditionality incorporated in 
policy agreements are capable of interfering with and affecting state sovereignty.2 
Conditionality can be defined as a technique which is used to attract the consent of the other 
party in return for support and in the process influences domestic policies of the recipient 
                                                          
1
 For purposes of the thesis, “outworking” refers to (i) the action or process by which states exercise authority to 
control and regulate domestic mineral resources; or (ii) the act or results of developing mineral resource 
activities with a view to derive economic benefits throughout the mineral value chain. 
2
 Ross P Buckley ‘Re-envisioning economic sovereignty: Developing countries and the international monetary 
fund’ in Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford & Ramesh Thakur (eds) Re-Envisioning Sovereignty: The End of 
Westphalia? (2008) 267. 
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state or proposes undertaking of certain domestic reforms in exchange for financial support.3 
The conditionality can be a way by which the recipient state is made to adopt or pursue 
specific policies or political reforms in exchange for financial support, which might not have 
been pursued in the absence of the conditionality.4 In the context of the IMF and the World 
Bank, conditionalities refer to policies or strategies a recipient or member state is 
conditionally expected to accept and follow in order to have access to financial resources of 
the two organizations.5 Generally, the conditionalities are programme related and are 
arguably, intended to ensure the capital provided to a member state is used for the purpose for 
which it was sought.6  
The World Bank and [the IMF] are two of the most powerful international financial 
institutions in the world. They are the major sources of lending to African countries, and use 
the loans they provide as leverage to prescribe policies and dictate major changes in the 
economies of these countries.7  
 
The two international financial institutions are controlled by the world’s richest states, 
including the US, which is the major shareholder in both institutions. The shareholders with 
the greatest financial contributions have the greatest influence in institutional decisions and 
policies.8 Also, major shareholders have the capacity to make funds contingent on such 
policies as they wish.9 The two institutions have the potential to use conditionality 
                                                          
3
 Ariel Buira ‘An analysis of IMF conditionality’ paper prepared for the XVI technical Group Meeting of the 
Intergovernmental Group of 24 Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago, on 13 – 14 February 2003 at 3. 
4
 Ibid. See also European Network on Debt & Development ‘Conditionally yours: An analysis of the policy 
conditions attached to IMF loans’ 2014, available at http://www.eurodad.org/conditionallyyours (accessed 10 
January 2015). 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 See generally Timothy F Geithner & Francois Gianviti ‘International Monetary Fund: Guidelines on 
conditionality’ prepared by the Legal and Policy Development and Review Departments, 2002. 
7
 The Levin Institute of the University of New York ‘International Monetary Fund and World Bank’ 2011, 
available at http://www.globalization101.org/uploads/File/IMF/imfall2011.pdf (accessed 21 October 2012). See 
also The World Bank and IMF in Africa 2008, available at 
http://rainbowwarrior2005.wordpress.com/2008/11/07/the-world-bank-and-imf-in-africa (accessed 22 October 
2012). See further Anne O Krueger ‘Whither the World Bank and the IMF?’ (1998) XXXVI Journal of 
Economic Literature 1983. 
8
 Ibid. From the voting structures of these two financial institutions, it is clear that they are controlled by the 
developed world. The US has about 17 per cent of the votes in the World Bank and the about 48 Sub-Saharan 
African states have a total of less than 9 per cent of the votes. The Group of 7 richest countries (G 7) controls 
about 54 per cent of the World Bank votes. This disproportionate control of the World Bank and the IMF 
ensures that these institutions largely act in the best interests of the rich states. Thus, promoting a model of 
economic growth referred to as ‘neo-liberal’ that only benefit the rich countries and the international private 
sector of those countries. See IMF, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx 
(accessed 22 October 2012). See also Namiita Wahi ‘Human rights accountability of the IMF and World Bank: 
A critique of existing mechanisms and articulation of a theory of horizontal accountability’ (2006) 12 University 
of California, Davies 331 at 333 – 351. 
9
 Michael Hodd ‘Africa, the IMF and the World Bank’ (1987) 86 African Affairs 331 at 338. 
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mechanisms designed to influence policy changes in recipient states, and this occurs most 
notably in African states.10  
 
The conditionality policy includes structural programmes (formerly structural adjustment 
programmes).  
Widespread and increasing use of controversial conditions in politically sensitive economic 
policy areas, particularly tax and spending, including increases in [value added tax (VAT)] 
and other taxes, freezes or reductions in public sector wages, and cutbacks in welfare 
programmes […]. Use of these types of conditions tends to be lower in low-income countries, 
but is very high in some of the largest programmes. Other sensitive topics include 
requirements to […], restructure and privatize public enterprises, and reduce minimum wage 
levels.11 
 
The research confirms that the IMF and the World Bank use substantial influence to promote 
controversial austerity and liberalization measures, with potentially severe impacts on the 
recipient states, most notably developing states.12 The two international financial institutions 
have various programmes, which include Stand-by Arrangements, the Extended Fund 
Facility, the Poverty Reduction and Growth facility (formerly the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility) and the Structural Adjustment Facility.13 The conditionalities associated 
with each programme constitute an integral feature of the two international financial 
institutions’ policies. However, the conditionalities are considered controversial policy tool 
and have the potential of undermining sovereignty,14 by restricting policy formulation and 
interfering with the state process to function as it would without such conditions. Also, the 
executive and the legislature can be compelled to adopt certain policies, such as structural 
programmes as well as political reforms, which may affect sovereignty by weakening 
enforcement capacity. For example, some African states including Zimbabwe and the DRC, 
conditionally accepted the structural programmes that were alien to their domestic policies 
                                                          
10
 Ross P Buckley, op cit note 2 at 268. See also John Robertson ‘Structural challenges of transformation in 
Zimbabwe’ in Richard Cobbold & Greg Mills (ed) Global Challenges and Africa: Report of the 2004 Tswalu 
Dialogue (2004) 45 at 46. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 See generally Doris A Oberdabernig ‘The effects of structural adjustment programmes on poverty & income 
distribution’ 2010, available at http://wiiw.ac.at/the-effects-of-structural-adjustment-programs-on-poverty-and-
income-distribution-p-2016.html (3 October 2013). 
14
 Joseph E Stiglitz Globalization and its Discontents (2002) at 195 – 197. See also Ariel Buira, op cit note 3 at 
1 – 31. See further Devesh Kapur & Richard Webb ‘Governance related conditionalities of the international 
financial institutions’ UNCTAD, G-24 discussion paper series, paper 6 of August 2000, available at 
http://www.g24.org/Publications/Dpseries/06.pdf (accessed 2 April 2014). 
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with a view to stimulate economic growth. However, upon implementation of the structural 
programmes as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, they did not perform as anticipated.15 
 
The issue of conditionalities is a long established principle relating to access to World Bank 
and IMF financial resources.16 The question arises as to whether the conditionalities 
constitute interference in the domestic policy space of the recipient African states. The extent 
to which the conditionalities are interference would relate to the extent to which they compel 
a state to depart from the track it would have taken to regulate domestic resources. In the 
absence of any agreeable international standard, the possibility for designing the 
conditionalities to suit the lender and at the same time prejudice the recipient state is most 
likely.17 Accordingly, the conditionality policy of both institutions has the potential to 
influence the recipient state’ sovereignty, by restricting space for policy development.  
 
Proponents of the two international financial institutions are of the view that the 
conditionalities are potentially a specific influential tool for guaranteeing compliance with 
institutional lending policies. Samoff and Carrol argue that the significance of World Bank 
and IMF policies is situationally determined and may assist one to understand that despite the 
influence they have on the recipient states, the policies are predicated on an inherently 
uneven relationship between the two institutions on one hand, and the recipient state, on the 
other.18 The requirements of conditionality have negatively influenced African states to turn 
their economies into sources of cheap natural resources and labour.19 Against this 
background, issues such as the legality of adopting such policies may arise. For example,  
                                                          
15
 Ibid. See also F E Ogbimi ‘Structural adjustment is the wrong policy’ African technology Forum 1995, 
available at http://www.iisd.org/youth/ysbk077.htm (accessed 2 April 2014); Anup Shah ‘Structural adjustment 
- a major cause of poverty’ 2013, available at http://www.globalissues.org/article/3/structural-adjustment-a-
major-cause-of-poverty (accessed 2 April 2014). 
16
 Fenardo Jose Cardim de Carvalho ‘Once Again, On the Question of IMF’s Conditionalities’ 2009 at 8 – 23, 
available at http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-
br/file/CAD/LXIII%20CAD/Economia/Once%20again,%20on%20the%20question%20of%20IMF's%20conditi
onalities.pdf (accessed 31 March 2013). See also Martin Khor ‘A Critique of the IMF’s Role & Policy 
Conditionality’ Global Economy Series No. 4, available at www.twnside.org.sg/title/geseries4.htm (accessed 3 
March 2014). 
17
 See generally Mac Darrow Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, The International Monetary Fund 
and International Human Rights Law (2003) at 29 – 51. See also Roland Rich ‘Development assistance and the 
hollow sovereignty of the weak’ in Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford & Ramesh Thakur (eds) Re-Envisioning 
Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? (2008) 231at 237 – 243. 
18
 Joel Samoff & Bidemi Carrol ‘Conditions, coalitions, and influence: The World Bank and higher education in 
Africa’ (2004) at 17, paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Comparative and International Education 
Society, Salt Lake City, 8 – 12 March 2004. 
19
 The World Bank and IMF in Africa, supra note 7. 
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[…] if the financial leverage of the IMF and World Bank acting alone is not decisive in 
imposing policy change, why then have so many African countries begun substantial 
restructuring of their economies […]? This is an intriguing question, particularly when the 
evidence is by no means conclusive regarding the efficiency benefits and the nature of 
distributional changes resulting from [appropriate regulation of mineral resources].20   
 
IMF programmes such as the structural adjustment, formerly the economic structural 
adjustment programme21 were adopted by some African states in the 1990s and caused 
domestic fiscal policy failure, and massive retrenchment in the public sector.22 Also, the 
structural programmes adversely affected such states and their capacity to develop.23 This is 
one example where IMF policies, coupled with domestic factors such as corruption and 
mismanagement, failed some African states including the DRC and Zimbabwe. This prompts 
commentators to assert that the IMF and the World Bank are the ‘death start of capitalism’.24 
While the two institutions’ policies and decisions may influence policy changes in poor 
recipient states, the same institutions may extend loans to developed states without strict 
contingent measures.25 This assertion is supported by the view that the IMF and the World 
Bank policies do not ‘march across featureless terrain’.26 This could translate to the fact that 
the IMF may use its conditionalities to derive benefits from poor states.  
 
It can be argued that the conditionality policy of the IMF and the World Bank can be linked 
to colonialism in the sense that it compelled the colonies to accept foreign rule. In this regard, 
the conditionality policy is forced on the recipient state as a condition for aid. The 
conditionality comes with the objective to control the recipient state and its internal 
regulation structures, policies and as well as self-determination. It can also be argued that 
both international financial institutions can interfere with the investment climate in host states 
by negatively influencing major potential investors. Further, the conditionality policy can be 
considered as a colonial tool to exploit recipient states, mainly developing states and African 
states are no exception.27 In this regard, it can be argued that,  
                                                          
20
 Ibid, at 340. 
21
 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme; hereafter ESAP. See John Robertson, op cit note 10. 
22
 Ibid, (John Robertson).  
23
 See generally Herbert Jauch ‘How The IMF-World Bank and structural adjustment programme (SAP) 
destroyed Africa’ News Rescue, 19 July 2012. 
24
 Samoff & Carrol, op cit note 18 at 3. 
25
 Joseph E Stiglitz, op cit note 14 at 33. 
26
 Samoff & Carrol, op cit note 18 at 4. 
27
 Jim Guenza ‘The IMF and the World Bank: A neo-colonial interpretation the destabilization of regions, the 
establishment of resource extraction mechanisms and economic slavery’ California State University, Chico, 
available at https://www.academia.edu/9667907/The_IMF_and_the_World_Bank_A_Neo-
Colonial_Interpretation (accessed 7 January 2015). See also Richard Gerster ‘The IMF and basic needs 
conditionality’ (1982) 16 Journal of International Trade 497; Claudia R Williamson ‘Exploring the failure of 
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[w]hen developing countries face financial ruin, agreeing to the one sided requirements 
contained in conditionality accords set forth in multilateral aid negotiations offered by the 
IMF and the World Bank are often their only option and must accept. This is significant 
because it serves as one of the foundations upon which the wholesale looting of developing 
countries’ wealth and resources occurs.28 
 
From this quotation, one can argue that developing states have been left without options but 
to accept the conditionality policy which adversely affects them. Like colonialism, local 
communities were forced to accept because they had no other alternative. Regardless of any 
contrary view and in order to support this notion, however, one can find substantive opinions 
from the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission report of 2000,29 in which 
the Commission concluded that,  
[t]he use of IMF resources and conditionality to control the economies of developing nations 
often undermines the sovereignty and democratic processes of member governments receiving 
assistance. IMF staff often admit (with pride) that the  executive branch of borrowing nations 
likes to use IMF conditions to exact concessions from their legislatures. While this mechanism 
may sometimes work to achieve desirable reforms, it often does so by shifting the balance of 
power within countries in ways that distort the constitutionally established system of checks 
and balances.30  
 
It can therefore be argued that the World Bank and the IMF are relatively new institutions or 
structures in the post-colonial era which superseded the old-fashioned imperial and colonial 
methods and practices once used by the colonial masters and their governments in order to 
subjugate African communities and their leadership with a view to loot, as much as they can, 
domestic mineral resources in the colonies.31 However, my views towards both institutions 
are never an excuse to shove aside greed and failure in the leadership of most African states. 
Regardless of the remarks about the leaders, both institutions can be blamed for wrongful use 
of conditionality policy and inappropriate policy advice to developing states (see chapters 4 
and 5 below), and the prevalence of such an attitude or practice can be ascribed to the weak 
economic situation in many of the recipient states that scramble for the aid.32 Like colonial 
regimes that were used as apparatuses in the colonies to derive economic benefits for their 
home governments (colonial masters), one can argue that the IMF and the World Bank are 
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tools that can be used by the world’s richest shareholders, particularly the US which is the 
major shareholder in both institutions, to control and extract wealth from politically weak and 
economically poor African states. This view is supported by the fact that both institutions,  
[…] are merely instruments of control and wealth extraction which operate under the 
benevolent auspices of charity and altruism. Furthermore, […] the extension of foreign aid 
and the conditionality agreements that go with it are the specific mechanisms that grant 
developed countries the ability to wield political influence, dictate policy, and undermine state 
sovereignty in developing countries.33 
 
Accordingly, the conditionality policy of the two financial institutions restricts sovereignty of 
the recipient state in the form of domestic policy space and its implementation. This could 
also translate to the way in which colonialism restricted the sovereignty of the colonies, 
where after the colonial regimes imposed their illegitimate rule, the freedom of local 
communities was no longer in existence. In a similar process, however, recipients of the 
conditionalilites in Africa restrict or compromise their sovereignty as discussed in chapters 4 
and 5 below. 
 
It can be argued that since the establishment of both the IMF and the World Bank about 60 
years ago, both financial institutions, in addition to conditionally providing aid to developing 
countries, took the lead in making policy prescriptions to recipient states, which were made to 
be adopted by making the policies and the prescriptions “conditions for lending”.34 
Accordingly, one cannot deny that the conditionality policy of both institutions is 
discriminatively imposed on the economically weak and poor recipient states (developing 
states, for example African states), and in the process interfere with, as well as restrict and 
weaken the recipient states’ rights to make sovereign decisions for self-determination. Further 
it can be argued that,  
[w]hen developing countries accept financial aid, the World Bank and the IMF are in the 
position to unleash the metaphorical soldiers waiting inside of their Trojan horse. Policy 
dictation is not contingent on a recipient country defaulting; the conditions of just accepting 
loans expressly spell out the powers gained by donors.35 These conditions are the 
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manifestations that come in the form of structural adjustment programs and conditionality 
agreements.36  
 
Accordingly, the extent to which the conditionalities are coercive depends on the prevailing 
financial circumstances of the recipient state.37 However, Volcker argued that when the two 
financial institutions consult with economically poor and weak states, the state succumbs to 
the pressure; however, when the institutions consult with economically strong and developed 
states, they fall in line with the demands of the state.38 It can therefore be argued that 
conditionality is a function of economic and political power. The fact that most African states 
are relatively weak, both economically and politically, means that the conditionalities are 
more likely to be coercive, when the cost of not accepting them is greater. Many African 
states have no choice but to accept the conditions; thus, compelling them to do things they 
would otherwise not have done.39 Under such circumstances, the conditionalities have the 
potential to heighten the possibility that African states will not take up their mandate to 
benefit from the exploitation of mineral resources. 
 
The policies of the two financial institutions have the potential to affect sovereignty of the 
recipient state in varying degrees.40 The effects of the policies on state sovereignty are more 
pronounced in developing states that rely extensively on the IMF and World Bank loans. The 
conditionalities may indirectly influence, for example, domestic policies such as structural 
transformation policies. This in turn can affect the mineral value chain and its regulation in 
that the conditionality policy has a coercive effect on the recipient developing states. For 
example, the mining sector and its regulation can be affected by weakening policing and 
enforcement capacity of the recipient state through reduction of the public service, the case of 
Zimbabwe.41 This is against the backdrop that almost all African states have sought IMF and 
World Bank loans and very few, if any, are in a position to reject the conditionalities of the 
loans. 
 
3.3 Illegal Mining 
 
Illegal mining can be defined as unlawful winning of a mineral resource from the soil or earth 
without a mining licence, mining rights or exploration rights, as well as in the absence of 
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mineral processing or transportation licence and any other legal documentation that may be 
required in the domestic mining processes and operations. Since the host state is the 
custodian of all mineral resources found or located within its territory, the resources are 
considered to be the property of the state in terms of the international law principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR).42 Illegal mining activities are done 
without state authorization; importantly, the activities do not comply with minimum 
requirements and environmental regulations, and those involved do not pay royalties and 
mining taxes. It is therefore illegal to exploit the resources without a mining licence or 
permit, which implies state authorization. Accordingly, the resources can only be lawfully 
exploited and processed by a licenced entity or individuals on a specific location in terms of 
the relevant laws and policies of the host state.43 Illegal mining or the practice of illegal 
mining is against the host state’s mining requirements in that the domestic state institutions 
responsible for regulating mineral resources cannot monitor and control the activities of 
unlicenced mining holders and ensure they comply with the requirements underpinning the 
issuance of the mining permit. It has to be noted too that illegal mining is not necessarily 
carried out by individual peasants or small groups of villagers but many of such activities or 
operations can actually be undertaken by criminal syndicates and entities too, which use 
different ways to corruptly and illegally amass revenues and in the process prejudice host 
states. 
 
Since illegal mining is against the laws of host states, however, the activities often take place 
under the cover of darkness, along river beds and river banks, in forests, on farms and remote 
locations.44 Illegal mining ‘[…] is a job that needs no education, qualification or experience. 
It is patronized by all categories of persons who are physically strong; men, women, children, 
teenagers and even the aged engage in the winning of diamonds’.45 Most of the illegal mining 
activities ‘[…] take place in low grade areas or abandoned mining sites. Low productivity 
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and limited production are therefore illegal mining’s main characteristics’.46 Regardless of 
this, however, it is most likely that the minerals that are illegally acquired are smuggled 
through the loopholes in the regulatory system, and the revenues are not always put in the 
formal channels. Accordingly, the host states loses substantial amount of revenues. 
 
Illegal mining can be linked to colonialism in the sense that both phenomena involve 
criminality and resource plunder, which disadvantage host states of their lawful control of the 
resources and the right to derive revenues that can be channeled towards national 
development for the benefits of the citizens.47 In other words, both phenomena involve illegal 
access to domestic mineral resources and their exploitation, as well as trading. Further, both 
phenomena deprive host states, which are the legitimate custodians and the citizens who are 
owners of the resources, of the economic benefits that are associated with the resources. 
During colonialism, however, the local communities were denied control of, and access to 
their resources for community self-determination.48 On the same note, illegal mining deprives 
the host state control of, and the power to determine the conditions of access to the resources 
in that the illegal activities overshadow state control in the areas where the activities are 
undertaken. Also, the loss of revenue is exacerbated by the fact that those involved in illegal 
mining do not pay any mining tax and they use illegal channels to trade the minerals, which 
more often are undervalued because illegal miners do not have legitimate claims. 
Accordingly, the host state’s mandate to develop is adversely affected due to the fact that the 
illegally mined resources do not contribute to national income. Therefore it can be argued 
that both colonialism and illegal mining are threats to PSNR and the mandate to control the 
resources for self-determination and development.  
 
Furthermore, illegal mining is a threat to state sovereignty in that the operations are not 
sanctioned by the state and are incapable of being regulated. In terms of the mandate of the 
state which is derived from the international law principle of PSNR, the host state has an 
inherent duty to control access to domestic minerals for self-determination. However, failure 
to do so as evidenced by illegal mining could also mean that the competence of host states to 
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regulate and enforce domestic mining laws and policies, as well as policing is threatened. 
Although the introduction of the PSNR principle in modern international law gives host states 
indisputable custody and control over domestic natural resources, mere legal entitlement 
without practical implementation could be one of the challenges undermining state 
sovereignty and the mandate to benefit from exploitation of mineral resources in Africa. 
Since the state is the supreme authority which enacts mining laws (through parliament) and 
derogates authority to the Ministry responsible for Mines, as well as entrusting with the 
responsibility to regulate the resources for national benefit; however, failure to curb illegal 
mining can be a threat to the state in that the mandate to derive benefits for self-determination 
is weakened. Also, the proliferation of illegal mining can be an indication that the Ministries 
responsible for Mines in host states are failing their responsibility to control and promote the 
mandate to develop through exploitation of the resources.  
 
Illegal mining does not support state sovereignty over mineral resources; instead the 
operations criminal and predatory practice, and undermine state sovereignty. This is a 
particular view on illegal mining; however, one should acknowledge that there might be other 
views. The state’s mandate in accordance with the PSNR principle, to develop through 
exploitation of the resources, is undermined because national interests are not protected. 
Accordingly, the presence or prevalence of illegal mining in host states could be an indication 
of weak regulation and flawed regulatory processes, which can discourage foreign 
investment, as well as a threat to state sovereignty and the mandate to develop through 
exploiting the resources. The prevalence of illegal mining activities in many African states 
can be an indication that regulation and enforcement of domestic laws relevant to the mining 
sector, as well as policing is largely lacking.49 Also, illegal mining could be a manifestation 
or an indication that state institutions or agencies responsible for regulation do not have 
adequate technically qualified personnel and tools for their effective operations. Accordingly, 
‘[…] lack of monitoring personnel from the regulatory agencies will also make it difficult to 
determine and verify the extent and volume of mineral extraction and processing making it 
difficult for government to assess its fair share of benefits to be obtained from mining 
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operations’.50 In the circumstances, it remains imperative for host states to effectively 
regulate and ensure those accessing the resources comply with domestic laws. Accordingly, it 
can be argued that host states’ mandate to develop from the exploitation of mineral resources 
is threatened due to lack of appropriate regulation, law enforcement and policing.  
 
In short, illegal mining is a threat to state sovereignty over mineral resources and the mandate 
to develop through exploitation of the resources. The operations are prejudicial to host states 
over control of the resources and the right to determine conditions of access. As a result, there 
is loss of revenues that could have been used for development and other areas of national 
priority.  
 
3.4 Corruption 
 
There is no clear consensus on a uniform definition of corruption. Former UN Secretary–
General, Kofi Annan, defined corruption as ‘an insidious plague that has a wide range of 
corrosive effects on societies’.51 Transparency International has defined corruption as any 
abuse of position of trust to gain an unfair economic advantage.52 Corruption in itself is hard 
to define since different phenomena are included in the umbrella definition. In light of the 
two definitions and in the context of the study, however, corruption can be defined as conduct 
which deviates from official and normal duties of a public officer due to pecuniary or status 
gain, and in the process violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence.53 
 
The UN Convention Against Corruption of 2003 was a step towards addressing corruption at 
international level. However, the convention is silent on defining corruption, thus, leaving it 
to each member state. 
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Regardless of the above, however, corruption can be linked to colonialism in the sense that it 
is exploitative in nature. Colonialism largely caused underdevelopment of Africa,54 and so 
does corruption.55 Both phenomena have unsustainable effects on economic growth and 
development. For example, the underdevelopment of Africa is largely traced back to 
colonialism,56 and corruption is exacerbating the levels of poverty by slowing down 
economic potential that can be derived from mineral resources. Regardless of the fact that 
Africa is endowed with an array of mineral resources, the continent is very poor, prompting  
‘[…] many people asking how there can be two such conflicting realities. And in particular 
they are asking about the exploitation and export of our region’s mineral resources. They want 
to know what governments are doing with the revenues that they collect from the 
commercialization of these minerals – and why our natural riches do not seem to translate into 
a reduction in poverty. And another question that comes up time and again is – how have 
other nations managed to use their minerals to successfully build their societies and diversify 
their economies?57 
 
Retrospectively, the exploitation of mineral resources in Africa commenced prior to 
colonialism and even before slave trade.58 Kabemba points out that ‘[…] the oldest mines in 
the world are to be found in Africa – such as the Ingwenya mine in Swaziland, which was 
being exploited 2000 years ago for iron […]’.59 Moreover, traces of ancient and current 
mining activities across the continent evidences years of active mineral exploitation, sadly, 
the continent is largely poor and underdeveloped.60 In this regard, the nexus between 
colonialism and corruption hinges on the fact that both undermine African states’ mandate to 
derive economic benefits from exploitation of domestic mineral resources for self-
determination. While colonialism plundered and siphoned various mineral resources and the 
proceeds derived from the exploitation of the resources for the benefit of colonial masters, 
however, presently the elites are involved in corruption, which is prejudicing host states to 
derive maximum benefits from exploitation of the resources. Accordingly, both colonialism 
and corruption have predatory tendencies which ultimately affect, negatively, the mandate of 
host states to derive benefits from mineral resources for self-determination. In these 
circumstances, however, sovereignty of host states over mineral resources and the mandate 
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can be weakened by the prevalence of corruption. It can be argued that corruption has a 
coercive influence that can restrict or weaken state sovereignty and the mandate of host states 
to derive maximum benefits from mineral resources. The perpetuation of corruption has 
unlawfully helped the elite as well as the outside world enjoy a monopoly over African 
mineral resources. At national level, arguably, host states have no much development that can 
be attributed to mineral resources. In other words, the prevalence of corruption in the mineral 
resources sector influences “kind of private conditions” in order to access the resources.61 
Thus, corruption disrupts the fair and equitable application, and enforcement of domestic 
mining laws. This in itself is contrary to the dictates of two core non-discrimination 
principles, namely, the most favoured and national treatment principles discussed in chapter 
2. 
 
It is widely acknowledged that corruption has far-reaching social, economic and political 
costs.62 Further, there is general consensus that corruption has a corrosive effect on 
sovereignty in that it affects economic growth and development opportunities.63 Furthermore, 
the negative effects of corruption can be sector specific, and other studies suggest it can be 
regime specific too. Thus, the political regime can be a vital determinant to the relationship 
between corruption and economic growth and development.64 However, it is extremely 
difficult to evaluate the quantities of these costs in monetary terms because of,  
[…] the methodological challenges inherent in the measurement of such a phenomenon. By its 
nature, corruption occurs clandestinely, making it difficult to identify and collect hard data as 
evidence. In addition, corruption has indirect and monetary costs that are difficult to define, 
identify and quantify.65  
 
Regardless of the challenges, it is argued that estimations of the costs of corruption vary, and 
range from bribery to illicit financial flows.66 Therefore the correlation between the extent of 
corruption at domestic levels has significant adverse impacts on state sovereignty and the 
mandate to derive benefits from mineral resources. Corruption thus affects the revenue 
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collection system as well as increases economic risks.67 The World Economic Forum 
estimates that corruption increases the cost of doing business by up to 10 percent68 and it also 
reduces the levels of foreign investment by increasing costs and creating uncertainty, as well 
as making doing business in the host state more complex.69  
 
For the above reasons, corruption is a threat to sovereignty over mineral resources. It 
weakens the state’s regulatory capacity and the mandate to derive economic benefits from the 
resources, by incapacitating regulatory institutions to enforce mining laws and policies, as 
well as policing. The economic contribution of mineral resources to the economy is 
negatively affected because the revenues that would have been used for national development 
are siphoned by pernicious private hands.70 In turn, host states lose the prospects to obtain 
maximum revenues because ‘[a] review of literature indicates that corruption has a significant 
negative impact on the levels of tax revenue collected in a country’.71 Also, corruption 
hinders economic growth and development, thereby adversely affecting the future mining tax 
revenue base and tax structures.72  
 
The prevalence of corruption in Africa’s mineral sectors and value chain is in part driven by 
lack of strong regulatory institutions, weak enforcement of mining laws and enforcement 
capacity.73 As such, corruption makes the mandate of the state to develop through the 
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exploitation of mineral resources more difficult. The two case studies (chapters 4 and 5 
below) include a discussion of how corruption is a threat to Zimbabwe and the DRC’s 
sovereignty over mineral resources and the mandate to develop from the exploitation of the 
resources, as well as how it adversely affects economic growth and development in both 
countries. This is against the backdrop that both states have established anti-corruption 
institutions and enacted anti-corruption law. Regardless of this, however, it is reported that 
corruption is very high in both countries.74  
 
3.5 Conflicts 
 
Natural resource conflicts can be defined as disputes or disagreements over access to, and 
control or regulation and use of natural resources.75 The disputes or disagreements can be 
violent or non-violent, and frequently arise because peoples or communities have diverse 
needs and uses for natural resources, including minerals. Further, conflicts can be acts of 
sabotage and violence, or can remain hidden or latent.76 However, the disagreements or 
disputes over mineral resources can arise when community interests and needs conflict with, 
or become incompatible, especially when the priorities of different mineral resource user 
groups are ignored or not considered to the extent that was expected. Also, disputes can arise 
when policies are imposed without the participation of local communities, or poor 
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identification of, and inadequate consultation of local communities.77 Further conflicts over 
control of, and access to mineral resources and their regulation can arise due to disputes 
between indigenous and ‘introduced management systems, misunderstandings and lack of 
information about policy and programme objectives, contradictions or lack of clarity in laws 
and policies, inequality in resource distribution or poor policy and programme 
implementation’.78 However, the picture becomes more complex when access to the 
resources, their control and management is the reason for conflicts, or more often, the 
resources are used to fuel conflicts, for example, diamonds.79 Apparently, amongst the causes 
of conflict, control and access to minerals figure prominently in natural resource conflict. 
 
Apart from being dissatisfied with the manner in which mineral resources accessed and 
regulated, as well as the transparency and accountability in revenue use and management, 
conflicts can rise from other factors, which include exclusion and marginalization. The 
alienation from participating and equitable sharing of benefits derived from mineral 
resources, as well as development is considered to be on the increase in many parts of 
Africa.80 The literature survey shows that since 1990 at least twenty deadly conflicts in Africa 
have been associated with “alienation” as well as control of, and access to mineral 
resources.81  
 
What exacerbates conflicts in many developing states and Africa includes corruption and 
mismanagement, policies imposed without local consultation and participation, as well as 
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lack of noticeable development.82 This brings to the fore the nexus between mineral resources 
and conflict, which is inherently not a new phenomenon in the history of natural endowment 
in Africa.  
Research further suggests that over the last 60 years at least 40 percent of all intrastate 
conflicts have a link to natural resources. These statistics provide a clear basis for United 
Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) and UN Missions to incorporate principles and practices 
that promote the equitable, transparent and sustainable management of natural resources into 
transition planning processes and activities.83 
 
The nature of conflict in the control of, and access to, mineral resources can be linked to 
colonialism in the sense that the colonizers used force to access and control the resources, and 
to overcome resistance by the indigenous communities. Accordingly, the nexus between 
conflict and natural resources, in particular strategic mineral resources, which I can refer to as 
“conflict resources”, is not a new phenomenon in human history. The nexus can be traced to 
the genesis of the human settlement and as the basis for establishment of kingdoms and 
empires in which powerful communities controlled almost all the resources.84 Alao submits 
that; 
[h]istory is also replete with examples of friendships and alliances forged by empires and 
kingdoms to defend access to, and control of, essential natural resources, while efforts have 
always been made to appease those who might block access to sources of vital natural 
resources. This portrays the importance of natural resources to politics […] and intergroup 
relations. The formation of modern nation-states, however, introduced more complex 
dimensions into the nature of resource politics, with issues such as disagreements […] [and] 
protests over the forceful incorporation of hitherto autonomous units into nation-state 
structures, [and] creation of new national identities […], all becoming crucial factors that 
consequently changed the nature of the conflict surrounding natural resources. 85   
 
The quote illustrates how modern conflicts over the control of, and access to, certain valuable 
mineral resources have been tailored along political and ethnic lines, as well as cultural 
beliefs in order to ensure that certain user groups have control over, and access to, certain 
portions of the resources as a symbol of authority and dominance. In this regard and by virtue 
of the principle of PSNR, host states have the prerogative to control all domestic mineral 
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resources and determine the conditions of access, as well as investors who can access them to 
the exclusion of others. 
 
The present conflicts over mineral resources can be linked to colonialism.86 Initially, the 
communities vehemently resisted the colonial rule but the resistance often led to violent 
conflicts.87 In contemporary natural resource conflicts, however, user groups or communities 
clash with the government in control in the host state.88 The host state being the custodian of 
all domestic mineral resources, by virtue of the operation of the international law principle of 
PSNR has the right to defend its sovereignty and the mandate to exploit the resources for self-
determination. Accordingly, host states may use every legitimate means available in 
international law to defend their sovereignty over mineral resources.  
 
It is argued that the costs of mineral resource plunder during conflict are shockingly high and 
history is full of examples of the close nexus between conflict and control over host states’ 
lucrative mineral resources.89 Arguably, mineral resource conflicts are obstacles to economic 
growth and development. For example, with regard to;  
[t]he loss of economic capital – countries affected by resource-driven conflicts suffer lost 
revenue from depleted resources, a displaced labour pool as people flee the fighting, and the 
destruction of governance institutions. Such a triple loss severely hinders a country’s ability to 
support itself during active conflict and undermines its capacity to rebuild to quality, but the 
immediate dollar value of resources lost to plunder or destruction during the [conflict] is 
significant.90 
 
From the quotation, it becomes obvious that mineral resource conflicts disrupt the mineral 
value chain and self-determination. There is fundamental challenge to the host states’ control 
over the resources vis-a-vis balancing competing or conflicting interests between the host and 
other parties to the conflict.91 The conflicts interfere with sovereignty over mineral resources 
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in that the host state’s ability to determine how to regulate the resources, by setting conditions 
to access and control the resources becomes a security issue, which if not carefully monitored 
can threaten sovereignty and the mandate to the exploitation of the resources for national 
benefit. In this regard, mineral resource conflict is a threat to state sovereignty and the 
mandate to foster a stable regulatory environment in order to derive economic benefits from 
the resources.  
Natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, that are controlled by the state (which 
is the case in most developing countries) are used as exports by the government to attain profit 
and power. Developed countries have established an industrial infrastructure that relies 
heavily on imports of natural resources, and mineral-rich countries are positioned to supply 
that demand. Many of these resources have great value in the global market, which allows the 
developing countries in possession of the resources to be active participants in the 
international economic system.92 
 
This quote shows the importance of mineral resources, including the fact that minerals 
dovetail many industrial activities, both domestic and internationally. Mineral resource 
conflicts create a precarious situation that can cause challenges and almost insuperable 
problems for resource exploitation and related activities in the mineral value chain.93 In such 
a situation, the host state’s mandate to derive economic benefits from the resources is 
adversely affected. Further the conflicts affect the security of the state, obstruct space and 
process for policy formulation, its implementation and enforcement due to multiple and 
competing demands. In such an unstable or fragile political situation, transparency and 
accountability in the regulation of mineral resources becomes a lesser priority compared to 
protecting the state security. It becomes difficult to ensure transparency and accountability in 
revenue use and its management. Furthermore, the conflicts undermine prospects of 
development due to threats to the security of the host state. Accordingly, the investment 
environment becomes unfavourable due to insecurity and viability concerns.94 The conflicts 
become a threat to sovereignty because they weaken the regulatory capacity of the state, 
making the exercise of self-determination difficult. Also, the conflicts use up revenues that 
would have been available for development,95 thus weakening the mandate to develop 
through the exploitation of mineral resources.96 In this regard, however, it can be argued that 
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mineral resource conflict is a threat that interferes with the right to development. The 
conflicts may also end up having cross border effects, as currently experienced in many parts 
of Africa, for example, the Great Lakes Region (as highlighted in chapter 5 below). Although 
the control and management of mineral resources is the primary responsibility of the host 
state through the department responsible for minerals and mining development, however, 
some politicians and individuals take the precarious opportunity created by conflicts to 
illegally amass benefits through plunder of the resources.97 Since conflict can weaken state 
control over the resources, it also perpetuates illegal mining, closure of some mining 
activities, and losing investment and capital flight. Intrinsically, the mandate of the host state 
to derive economic benefits for self-determination can be threatened because the capacity to 
regulate is weakened. 
 
Apart from being a threat to state sovereignty and the mandate to derive economic benefits 
from the exploitation of mineral resources, natural resource conflicts in Africa have other 
ramifications, which cannot be canvassed in this study. Nevertheless, one can argue that 
natural resource conflicts are a threat to state sovereignty over mineral resources, and some 
aspects of the mandate that are discussed in the thesis are affected.  
 
3.7 Summary: Threats to the Outworking of Sovereignty over Mineral Resources 
 
Threats to the outworking of sovereignty over mineral resources restrict operationalization of 
PSNR in various ways as discussed in chapters 4 and 5 below. The effects of the threats have 
been summarized in the table below. 
 
Threat Relationship to Principles in chapter 2 Potential for state to take 
reasonable measures 
 
 
Conditionality 
policies of the 
IMF and the 
World Bank 
-restricts policy formulation, interfere 
with state process to function 
independently as it would have been 
without the conditions. 
-executive and legislature are compelled 
to adopt certain policies and political 
reforms. 
-structural adjustments weaken 
enforcement capacity. 
 
-domestic laws implementing 
the conditionalities. 
-better negotiation of 
international agreements in 
trade and investment, as well 
as loan agreements. 
 
-undermines state effort to assert control -strong regulatory institutions, 
                                                          
97
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Illegal mining 
and access to, mineral resources. 
-restricts the state mandate to develop by 
reducing mining revenues that could be 
available for development. 
 
increase monitoring agents to 
enhance policing and 
enforcement capacity. 
-regularize activities of illegal 
miners in order to enable free 
participation in the mineral 
resource value chain and to 
pay mining taxes. 
 
 
Corruption 
-conflicts with state sovereignty over 
mineral resources and the mandate to 
establish and maintain legitimate, 
transparent and accountable regulatory 
institutions. 
-could trigger and sustain conflicts. 
-contributes to slow economic growth 
and development contrary to the 
objectives of the principles of PSNR and 
self-determination, alongside the right to 
development. 
-undermines effective regulation and 
revenue transparency and accountability. 
-conflicts with the objectives of the 
principle of self-determination in that 
corruption reduces revenues available for 
development. 
-corruption is counter-productive and 
undermines sovereignty by reducing 
prospects of investment and making “the 
ease of doing business” more complex. 
-undermines the right to development. 
 
 
-implementing domestic 
mechanisms to curb 
corruption.  
-strong institutions require 
withstanding the test of time 
and political intimidation. 
-the need for good regulation, 
effective policing and 
implementation, as well as 
enforcement of anti-corruption 
laws without fear or favour. 
-the need for good governance 
in the minerals sector, to 
enhance transparency and 
accountability in the 
regulation of minerals, as well 
as revenue transparency. 
-host states to manage the 
distribution of mineral wealth. 
 
 
Conflicts 
-threaten the principle of self-
determination and non-interference in 
domestic affairs of states by challenging 
control, regulation and access to mineral 
resources.  
-challenges the mandate to foster a stable 
regulatory environment to sustain 
economic growth and development, as 
well as to derive benefits for self-
determination. 
-potential to restrict policy formulation or 
contrary to what user groups may 
anticipate. 
-undermines prospects of development in 
that conflict threatens security of the state 
as well as investment, and unfavourable 
environment for development.  
-undermines the principle of non-
-there is the need to treat 
mineral resource regulation as 
a crucial dimension of conflict 
prevention in order to unlock 
the economic potential and 
build peace, as well as create 
room for political stability, 
state control and regulation by 
redefining access conditions. 
-host states, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), civil 
society organizations are 
actors to participate and 
facilitate smooth resolution of 
conflicts, while paying 
attention to the role of 
investors and the community 
in mineral resource regulation. 
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interference, self-determination and the 
right to development. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed threats to the outworking of sovereignty over mineral resources and 
the mandate to develop through the exploitation of the resources. The IMF and the World 
Bank conditionality policy is paradoxical and potentially restricts the sovereignty of 
politically and economically weak developing states. The question is why do states 
voluntarily join the two financial institutions and in the process cede their sovereignty as well 
as restricting that sovereignty?98 African member states are caught between competing or 
conflicting interests, on the one hand, the need to improve their reputation and to attract 
foreign investment and, on the other hand, the inherent need to protect sovereignty and not to 
restrict it unnecessarily. Illegal mining, corruption and resources conflicts restrict or weaken 
state sovereignty, by contributing to breakdown of the operationalization of the mandate to 
exploit mineral resources for self-determination and development (as discussed in chapters 4 
and 5 below). 
 
Having considered other threats to the outworking of sovereignty over mineral resources, 
chapters 4 and 5 contextualize the manner in which the sovereignty and mandate to develop 
is asserted in Zimbabwe and the DRC mining laws, as well as how that sovereignty and 
mandate is restricted or interfered with. Themes such as property and ownership rights, 
access or allocation of rights to mineral resources, mineral resource policing and 
enforcement, beneficiation and trade, mining royalties and taxation, as well as obligations 
towards indigenous communities are considered in how Zimbabwe and the DRC assert 
sovereignty and mandate. Further the World Bank and the IMF conditionality policy, illegal 
mining, corruption, and conflicts are considered as these constitute threats and interfere with 
the mandate.  
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While taking into account the international law principles and the right to development 
discussed in chapter 2, and the threats to the outworking of sovereignty over domestic 
mineral resources in developing states discussed in this chapter, three issues arise, namely; (i) 
how do international law principles work to protect African countries in governing and 
exploiting their mineral resources? (ii) What is the key role of national mining laws and their 
enforcement in order to ensure host African states derive economic benefits from their 
mineral endowment? (iii) What is the manner in which the international law principles 
manifest? The choice of Zimbabwe and the DRC case studies demonstrates this aspect.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SOVEREIGNTY, MINERAL RESOURCE REGULATION AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter, on Zimbabwe, is the first of two case studies considering how states use 
domestic law to operationalize international principles discussed in chapter 2, and navigate 
the threats outlined in chapter 3. Zimbabwe is an appropriate case study because its colonial 
history is wound up with its mineral resource endowment, it has experienced conflicts in 
relation to that endowment, and (perhaps as a result), it has adopted radical policies with a 
view to asserting its sovereignty over domestic natural resources. Also, Zimbabwe is richly 
endowed with natural resources but is poor. 
 
Taking into account the framework discussed in chapters 2 and 3, and the themes which both 
support and restrict the assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources; this chapter first 
provides a brief profile of Zimbabwe, including its political economy, mineral resource 
endowment and the importance of domestic minerals for national development. It then 
considers the manner in which Zimbabwe has exercised its sovereignty over domestic 
mineral resources and whether the state is benefiting from the exploitation of the resources. 
This is done through analysis of the municipal legislation relevant to the regulation of mineral 
resources. The challenges faced by Zimbabwe in its attempt to regulate and benefit from 
domestic mineral resources are considered, as well as identifying ways in which sovereignty 
over mineral resources is exercised or restricted.  
 
4.2 Country Profile 
 
Zimbabwe is a relatively large, land-locked country in Southern Africa and has a land surface 
area of approximately 390 757 square km.1 The population based on the 2012 census is 
                                                          
1
 Munyaradzi Murwira ‘Zimbabwe population stabilization report’ 2011, available at 
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approximately 13 million,2 excluding more than 3 million absentees living or working as 
migrants in neighbouring countries and overseas.3 Zimbabwe is surrounded by five countries4 
and lies between two major rivers, the Zambezi River along the northern border with Zambia 
and the Limpopo River along the southern border with South Africa.5 
 
As regards topography, Zimbabwe has a wide central Highveld area, which is often referred 
to as the ‘Zimbabwean Plateau’.6 Stretching north-east and south-west across this central 
Highveld is a ridge notable for various mineral resources, which are mined along its length.7 
The Matobo Hills, at the southern end of the city of Bulawayo, are one of the notable 
physical features made up of huge granite whalebacks or dwalas set alongside the formations 
of gigantic ‘balancing’ rocks. The Eastern Highlands is another defining landform, a narrow 
north-south mountain range stretching approximately 250km in the east of the country.8 This 
mountain range occupies the central section of the border between Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique, which ends with a rise of about 2600m at Mt Nyangani in the north of the 
range.9 One of the world-famous sites, Victoria Falls, are at the north-western tip of the 
Zimbabwe border with Zambia and further down the Zambezi River is one of the world’s 
largest human-made lakes, Lake Kariba, which stretches for about 200km.10 
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In terms of natural resource endowment, Zimbabwe is richly endowed with an array of 
mineral resources. The country has more than 40 economic mineral resources that are mined 
or capable of being mined, in addition to having the second largest platinum reserves in the 
world after South Africa.11 Among its mineral resources, Zimbabwe is endowed with major 
deposits of diamonds, platinum, gold, coal, nickel, chrome, emeralds, iron ore, graphite, 
nickel, asbestos, copper and cobalt.12 The discovery of diamonds in Marange (Manicaland 
Province) and Devure Ranch in Bikita district (Masvingo Province) helped the country to 
increase its mineral resource exports.13 The karoo sediments adjacent to river basins around 
the periphery of the central plateau contain commercial coal, alluvial diamonds and gold ore, 
and some areas have signs of gas such as coalbed methane.14 Geological reports indicate that 
the country has not been fully explored for major minerals such as diamonds,15 uranium, 
platinum, gold and chrome, hence the approximate quantum cannot be ascertained. 
 
Given that Zimbabwe is richly endowed with a variety of mineral resources, it can be 
concluded that its potential for development is high if those resources are exploited in a 
manner that allows for the creation of human, financial and manufactured capital. In order to 
exploit these resources, Zimbabwe relies largely on foreign investment. Mineral resource 
exploitation and processing is capital intensive, therefore the regulatory framework for this 
sector requires transparency and accountability, appropriate regulation and protection of 
foreign investment, as well as security of tenure, which in turn provide investor confidence.  
 
Between 1980 and 1995, the minerals sector was one of the pillars of the economy. As with 
many countries in Africa, Zimbabwe is highly dependent on mineral resources. The history of 
mineral resource exploitation shows that there have been between 4000 and 5000 mines, and 
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the majority were small gold operations.16 The domestic minerals sector once became the 
largest of its type in Africa north of the Limpopo River.17 Eight major companies including 
BHP Minerals, Wankie Colliery and Delta Gold operated about 40 mines amongst them. The 
value of mineral production including gold and diamonds was significant, and it made a 
valuable contribution to the national GDP.18 
 
Until the 1990s Zimbabwe was widely regarded as the ‘breadbasket’ of Africa, with high 
prospects for economic growth and development. Despite having a developed infrastructure 
and economic systems these declined rapidly from the late 1990s, ostensibly as a result of 
poor governance, negative external publicity and the land reform programme. The national 
GDP fell by more than half between 1998 and 2008.19 However, the formation of the Unity 
Government and adoption of the US$, as the official currency, in 2009 significantly and 
steadily reversed the relentless economic decline.20 The minerals sector was not spared by the 
economic quagmire affecting the country; nevertheless, the sector contributed significantly to 
the economy. In 2010 the sector contributed 60.1 percent, in 2011 about 25.1 percent, in 2012 
about 10.1 percent, 2013 about 17.1 percent and 22 percent in 2014 to the economy.21 It is 
projected that in 2015 the sector will contribute 15 percent to the economy.22 Regardless of 
the predictions, variations on the performance of the sector could have been contributed to, 
inter alia, by international market pricing. 
4.2.1 Political Economy 
There is considerable literature about the transition of Zimbabwe from British colonialism to 
political independence and democracy. For the purposes of the study it is not necessary to 
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canvass the issues raised in the literature, but simply to highlight the salient stages in 
Zimbabwe’s political history and economic development.23 
 
The political uncertainty and economic difficulties experienced by Zimbabwe since 2000 are 
not simply a struggle against dictatorship. They are also a struggle over ideas and deep-seated 
natural resource issues, still unresolved from the political independence process that both 
President Robert Mugabe's ruling party,  Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front,24 
and the main opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), are vying to define 
and address.  
 
Against the domestic political background where the State President yields much political 
power, entrusting him or her with custody of the rights to domestic mineral resources could 
defeat the system of checks and balances. For example, with the current polarized political 
environment, the decision of the State President is arguably authoritative and influences 
decision-making processes in the assertion of sovereignty and regulation of mineral 
resources. This includes the discretion to grant mining licences to potential investors 
(nevertheless, this is controversial as discussed in section 4.4.2 below). 
 
4.2.1.1 Political Context of Zimbabwe in Brief 
 
Zimbabwe’s independence from British colonial and white racist rule since 1980 plays a vital 
role in understanding the domestic political control and ownership of mineral resources. 
Although the political and economic history of Zimbabwe has been reviewed by others,25 my 
focus is to give a brief narrative of the manner in which domestic politics influenced mining 
laws and mineral resources regulation before and after political independence. Two 
considerations are of importance: first, the historical background of mineral resources 
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exploitation in Zimbabwe before 1980 and second, the political influence and exploitation, as 
well as post-independence regulation of the resources. 
 
Before colonization in 1890, the country’s mineral endowment was known for gold, copper 
and iron, and was documented in various sources including reports of Portuguese traders and 
missionaries who were active in the Munhumutapa Empire during the 17th century.26 Gold 
and iron were the most valuable mineral resources of that time. The European prospecting for 
gold began some few years before 17th century, and towards the beginning of 1890, extensive 
wagering was proclaimed.27 The colonization of the country was largely driven by the desire 
to exploit gold, which was the main domestic mineral resource.28 The late Cecil John Rhodes 
spearheaded British Settlers’ occupation in 1890 and the country became known as Rhodesia, 
a British colony for about a century, and it was named in honour of Rhodes.  
 
During colonization the major objective of the colonial government was to maximize 
economic advantage of whatever domestic minerals were beneficial to exploit. The colonial 
government exercised sovereignty by giving ultimate title of all domestic mineral resources 
to British Settlers. The colonial government granted easy acquisition of title to mineral 
resources,29 such as surface rights, and rights of prospecting and mining.30 The British South 
Africa Company (BSAC),31 a chartered company founded by Rhodes, assisted the colonial 
government’s imperial mission and played a major role in consolidating British rule over 
domestic mining activities.32 This monopoly influenced the BSAC’s financial policies on 
internal interference in mining.33 Through its political affiliation, the BSAC influenced 
ownership of mineral resource policies and proposed the introduction of strict access to the 
resources.34 The policy and regulation of domestic mineral resources were not consolidated 
but proceeded on an ad hoc basis.35 The European settlers and their mining companies, which 
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included Rio Tinto and Lornho Mining Limited enjoyed unrestricted access to mineral 
resources.36 
 
The initial mineral endowment of the country was apparently over-estimated and the potential 
for economic contribution from the resources.37 When the colonial government re-evaluated 
the economic potential of domestic mineral resources, it was far less than initially anticipated; 
national interest became less dependent on mining but on other economic activities such as 
agriculture.38 However, mining remained the mainstay of the economy and boosted the 
country’s international status.39 
 
On gaining political independence in 1980, the first black government raised concerns about 
foreign involvement in the minerals sector but swiftly realised that it would be premature to 
nationalize the sector in the absence of capital to finance exploration and mining activities.40 
Also, in light of the general African mining experience, uncertainties existed whether 
Zimbabwe would manage to regulate and reinvigorate the mining sector without foreign 
investment, as well as the required mining experience.41 The realization came only after 
consideration of the fact that the minerals sector was dynamic and diversified, hence a major 
potential source of revenue that significantly aided the country to increase revenue and 
employment creation.42 The BSAC played a fundamental role in the regulation of mineral 
resources for the benefit of the colonial government. The BSAC previously exercised 
dominion and influenced the regulation of mineral resources without checks and balances; 
however, the monopoly changed after the first black government took political control.  
 
In 1982, a state-owned parastatal, the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe 
(MMCZ), was established as a tool in the regulation of the domestic minerals sector and 
sealed the regulatory gap that was created by the transition period between the departure of 
the BSAC and the coming into effect of the first black government. The establishment of the 
                                                          
36
 John Hollaway, op cit note 16 at 29. 
37
 Veasey, op cit note 11 at 1356. See also Arrighi, op cit note 34; Dzepasi Innocent Tizora Zimbabwe: Why 
ZANU PF Won 2013 Harmonized Elections (2014) at 1.  
38
 Ibid. The effect of these changes has been described and discussed extensively with reference to State Power 
versus the Multinationals in the context of the post-independence minerals marketing policy in Zimbabwe; see 
generally Jeffrey Herbst State Politics in Zimbabwe: Perspectives on Southern Africa (1990).  
39
 John Hollaway, op cit note 16 at 28 – 29. 
40
 Veasey, op cit note 11 at 1357. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid. 
   120 
MMCZ marked a departure from the pre-independence regulation of domestic minerals 
sector in which the BSAC was the sole multinational enterprise which spearheaded the 
regulation of the minerals sector.43 The need to expand the mining sector and attract foreign 
investment lead the MMCZ to invite new entrants, mainly foreign investors such as BHP 
Billiton Limited, Anglo-American, Zimplats and Cluff Gold Mining Company. Various 
mineral explorations and exploitations helped Zimbabwe to become one of Africa’s strongest 
economies in the 1980s.44 
 
Exploitation of mineral resources in the colonial era has vestiges in two facets of the present-
day Zimbabwean mining law; namely, the discovery of mineral resources is a prerequisite for 
title and the obligation to maintain valid title depends on work or payment derived from 
mining activities.45 Although Zimbabwe inherited various mineral resource policies, it 
slightly amended, and redefined the desire of the colonial government. The first black 
Zimbabwean government administered marketing policy for domestic mining companies and 
the relationship between the government and mining companies gradually came into full 
operation.46 There was largely continuity between the colonial and democratic eras as regards 
the relationship between most of the mining companies and the state. To a large extent, 
regulation of the minerals sector remain unchanged until the coming into operation of the 
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act in 2008,47 which is discussed below.  
 
The coming into effect of the Indigenization law also initiated a debate on the state of 
property rights, thus, causing uncertainties in the minerals sector and occasioning a set-back 
in the regulation process.48 It is reported that President Mugabe and his political party, ZANU 
PF, vehemently deny any wrongdoing; in his address to the Occasion of the General Debate 
of the 66th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), he argued that ZANU 
PF’s push to nationalize the country’s mineral resources and other natural resources made 
Zimbabwe the target of western superpowers. He further argued that when Zimbabwe sought 
to redress the ills of colonialism, by fully exercising sovereignty over domestic natural 
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resources in order to economically empower the indigenous people, the country was and still 
is subjected to unparalleled vilification and pernicious economic sanctions.49 Furthermore, he 
argued that Zimbabwe has become a victim by trying to effectively implement and 
operationalize the PSNR principle as opposed to expounding the principle theoretically.50 
 
However, the problem does not lie in the appropriation but the manner in which it was done, 
apparently in conflict with the minimum requirements in international law discussed in 
chapter 2. From the research, the majority of the politically-connected elites clandestinely 
claimed the country’s mineral resources as private property,51 thus potentially debasing the 
PSNR principle and the actions cannot be legitimately seen as enhancing the economic 
development of the country. It is considered in this chapter how the assertion of sovereignty 
over domestic minerals can be abused in order to enrich individuals at the expense of national 
economic development.  
 
The above-mentioned short history of political economy contextualizes the assertion of 
sovereignty over mineral resources during and after the colonial period. Notwithstanding the 
relatively fragile political and economic situation, Zimbabwe’s assertion of sovereignty over 
domestic mineral resources is examined and evaluated by focusing on the country’s major 
domestic mineral laws. This is done by providing a brief overview of the relevant mining 
laws in section 4.3 before examining, in section 4.4, how state sovereignty over mineral 
resources has been operationalized, both in terms of how Zimbabwe has exercised the 
mandate of sovereignty over its mineral resources, as well as the manner in which it has 
navigated the landscape established by principles of investment and trade, and other threats to 
the exercise of sovereignty.  
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4.3 Municipal Law Relevant to the Exploitation of Mineral Resources 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, Zimbabwe’s power to control and regulate domestic mineral 
resources is recognized and provided for by the PSNR principle. The meaning of Zimbabwe’s 
sovereignty over mineral resources, in this context, is the ability to yield legitimate authority 
over the resources, more particularly as a facet of the principle of self-determination as well 
as non-interference, which underpins the right to development. Against the need to examine 
the manner in which Zimbabwe asserts sovereignty over mineral resources, it is necessary to 
consider the way in which sovereignty is applied through domestic mining legislation and 
how it is operationalized. This takes into account, for example, property and ownership 
rights, conditions of access to mineral resources, policing and enforcement of mining laws, 
beneficiation and trade,  taxes and royalties, obligations towards indigenous communities, 
compensation for expropriation, exchange controls and repatriation of profits, equitable 
treatment of mining investors, strategic planning for development, dispute settlement and to 
guard against threats (discussed in chapter 3) on state sovereignty over domestic mineral 
resources. 
 
Generally, there are more than thirty statutes and regulations governing mineral resources and 
mining operations in Zimbabwe.52 Of these, approximately ten including Regulations are 
directly relevant to the regulation of Zimbabwe’s mineral resources. These statutes are 
considered because of their direct significance in the regulation of major domestic mineral 
resources.  
 
4.3.1 Mining Laws  
 
The principal statute regulating the minerals sector and mining development is the Mines and 
Minerals Act.53 The Act is administered by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, 
and the Minister of Mines is entrusted with its implementation. The Mines Act provides 
general conditions relating to access, control and acquisition of mining rights in Zimbabwe. 
There are also other pieces of legislation dedicated to specific mineral resources, and 
providing additional measures for acquisition of, control and access to specific mineral 
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resources. Such statutes include the Zimbabwe Diamond Policy,54 Gold Trade Act,55 Copper 
Control Act,56 Precious Stones Trade Act,57 Revenue Authorities Act58 and Minerals 
Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe Act.59 The Mining General Regulations60 were enacted 
in terms of section 403 of the Mines Act, to spell out the implementation of the principal Act. 
The statutes set out the manner in which a particular mineral resource is regulated, and by 
exercising ministerial discretion in order to issue mining licences, the Minister of Mines 
make recommendations to the State President and Cabinet to determine who qualifies to 
access and exploit a domestic mineral. 
 
4.3.1.1 Mines and Minerals Act, 1961, (Chapter 21:05) 
 
 
The Mines and Minerals Act (hereafter referred to as the ‘Mines Act’) came into effect in 
1961 and is the principal law governing the regulation of mineral resources. The Act was 
enacted by the colonial government and has been amended several times over the years. The 
scope of the current 1996 revised edition of the Act is broad; it provides for prospecting, 
exploration and exploitation of domestic mineral resources.61 It further provides for the 
conditions and eligibility for acquisition and registration of prospecting, exploration and 
mining rights, as well as pegging on grounds reserved against prospecting. Furthermore, the 
Act provides for different types of mining leases, rights of claim to licence holders and the 
conditions for working on alluvial or eluvial mineral deposits,62 as well as the manner in 
which title can be relinquished.63 Also, the Act provides for control of siting of works on 
mining locations, royalties and mining taxes, payments to local authorities,64 termination of 
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entitlement to share in royalties, conditions for expropriation of mining locations, as well as 
offences and penalties, and the general administration of the Act.   
 
The Mines Act confers powers on the Minister of Mines,65 which include decision-making 
and determinations relating to granting and cancellation of mining licences. In exercising the 
discretion and to make recommendations to grant, renew or cancel licences, the Minister may 
delegate the powers in order to authorize the correction of any error in the administration of 
this Act, as may be necessary, to the Secretary of the Ministry of Mines.66 However, the 
extensive powers conferred on the Minister could allow him or her to act unilaterally without 
consultations.  
 
The Mines Act provides for the administration of the Act, by conferring on the Secretary of 
the Ministry of Mines authority to oversee and regulate, as well as carry out the activities 
contemplated in the Act.67 Further, the Mines Act provides for the appointment of office 
bearers such as Mining Commissioners, Director of Geology Survey, Director of Metallurgy, 
Chief Government Mining Engineer, Regional Mining Engineers and Mine Surveyors, and 
Chief Mine Surveyor.68 These functionaries are empowered to exercise their duties in the 
administration of the minerals sector. Furthermore, the Act provides for the establishment of 
mining commissioners’ courts69 and vests the mining commissioner with powers to convene a 
court in order to determine any mining complaint in any district to which he or she is 
appointed.70 The commissioner is entitled to hear and determine in the simplest, speediest and 
cheapest manner, all claims, actions, demands, disputes and questions arising within his or 
her jurisdiction, as well as to make orders and costs as may be necessary in the 
circumstances.71 
 
The Mines Act provides for establishment of the Mining Affairs Board72 and provides for its 
composition, duties and functions.73 The Board has statutory powers to investigate issues 
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relating to mining applications, and to summons any mineral resource applicant, title holder 
of a mining location or any person who has a temporary right of control over any piece of 
land to answer certain questions.74 The Act imposes penalties on any person who obstructs 
authorized officials to perform duties on behalf of the Mining Board. The duties include but 
are not limited to examining and investigating mining locations.75 Also, the Act provides for 
registration of approved prospectors,76 conditions for cancellation or suspension and the 
effects thereof,77 as well as renewal and expiry of registration.78 Further the Act provides for 
acquisition and registration of mining rights,79 prospecting rights80 and payment of 
royalties.81 Since the Act is the principal mining law, it provides general conditions relating, 
for example, to the rights of access to, acquisition of mining rights and exploitation of 
domestic mineral resources. Additional requirements are provided for by subordinate Acts, 
which, as indicated above, apply to specific minerals. 
 
The Mines Act creates various offences and penalties for contravening its provisions.82 The 
offences include making it illegal to mine83 or prospect for minerals without a valid permit or 
licence,84 failure to comply with the requirement for prospecting85 and unauthorized 
pegging.86 In some cases, the Act leaves the discretion and the extent of the penalty to a 
specific statute relevant to a particular mineral resource. Further, the Act criminalizes conduct 
which obstructs the functions of the Mining Affairs Board.87 Being the principal mining law, 
one can argue that the Mines Act creates a framework which governs, amongst others, 
exploration, mining and the general regulation of the minerals sector, as well as offences for 
its violating.  
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4.3.1.2 Precious Stones Trade Act, 1978 (Chapter 21:06)  
 
 
The Precious Stones Trade Act of 197888 (hereafter Precious Stones Act) is a key legislation 
that provides a legal framework for the regulation of precious stones. The Act has been 
amended several times over the years to address new challenges relating to precious stones. 
The Act provides for possession and dealing in rough diamonds, as well as emeralds and 
matters incidental to the aforesaid.89 Also, the Act defines dealing in precious stones as 
including buying and selling, pledge, exchange, giving or receiving. Regarding the scope of 
the Act, it includes conditions for the issuance of licences, renewal and their cancellation, and 
the conditions in which licence holders should deal in or possess precious stones.90 The Act 
gives the Minister of Mines authority to issue and renew licence to investors who intend to 
deal in precious stones, as well as cancel any licence in certain conditions.91 Further the Act 
requires licence holders to keep up-to-date registers of all precious stones transactions that 
were undertaken by licence holders.  
 
The Act defines precious stones as rough and uncut diamonds, emeralds or any other 
substance found within the country, which qualifies to be declared a precious stone.92 The 
Act prohibits dealing in or possess precious stone(s) unless one is a licenced dealer, permit 
holder, holder of a mining location, a “tributor”93 who has lawfully recovered precious 
stone(s) in terms of any domestic law of the country or an employee or agent of any of the 
holders referred herein, who is authorized by his employer or principal to possess or deal, on 
his or her behalf, in precious stones.94 The Act provides the conditions under which a 
licenced dealer or permit holder and miners may deal in or possess precious stones.95 The 
terms and conditions vary depending on the nature of the permit or licence. 
 
The Act allows the Minister to delegate his or her authority to the Secretary of the Ministry of 
Mines to issue or alter a dealer’s licence on the condition an applicant has no criminal 
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conviction in terms of the Act.96 The Secretary may issue or renew a permit to acquire, 
possess or dispose of precious stones but not trading.97 The Act gives the Secretary powers to 
amend the conditions of a permit, and on breach of those conditions, or upon a criminal 
conviction for contravening any provision of the Act, or for any justifiable good reason, may 
cancel the permit.98 In addition, the Act provides the Minister of Mines with excessive 
powers which are not regulated; he can make any decision without consultations. 
 
The Minister may exercise discretion and make Precious Stones Regulations in order to spell 
out the implementation of the objectives of the Act.99 However, no such Regulations have 
been drafted so far. The Act prohibits licensed dealers who do not have approval from the 
Secretary of Mines, from holding interests in mining locations registered for precious 
stones.100 Further the Act provides for conduct which qualifies as offences, for example, 
dealing in or possession of precious stones without a valid licence.101 Also, providing false 
statements with the intention to mislead the Minister of Mines is punishable in terms of the 
Act.102  
 
With regard to the regulation of diamonds, and to a certain extent, however, the coming into 
force of the Diamond Policy in 2012 supersedes the Precious Stones Act and renders it less 
relevant to the regulation of domestic diamonds.  
 
4.3.1.3 Zimbabwe Diamond Policy, 2012 
 
The Zimbabwe Diamond Policy103 is a first step towards enacting a new diamond Act. The 
Policy embodies a shift in regulatory approach toward the domestic diamond industry. The 
Precious Stones Act104 (discussed above) read together with the Mines Act reinforces the 
regulation of domestic diamonds. The preamble to the Diamond Policy has three key 
objectives; namely, (i) to ensure sustainable development of the diamond sector and its 
economic contribution to the national GDP; (ii) to facilitate optimal exploitation of diamonds, 
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ensuring security and accountability in order to achieve full realization of the economic 
potential of the diamonds, and (iii) to facilitate the establishment of an environment 
conducive to domestic and foreign investment.105 These factors broadly highlight the reasons 
underpinning the drafting of the Policy. Further, the Policy provides for the establishment and 
composition of the Diamond Board which is responsible for advising the Minister of Mines 
on issues relating to domestic diamonds.106 
 
Of interest is the scope of the Diamond Policy and its relevance to the regulation as well as 
exploitation of domestic diamonds. The scope covers widely all stages and processes of the 
diamond value chain; namely, exploration, exploitation, transportation, marketing, 
beneficiation, value addition, capacity building, and security.107 The major objective of the 
Policy ‘[…] is to promote the sustainable development of the diamond industry for the 
benefit of all Zimbabweans […]’.108 Further the Policy encourages local beneficiation and 
value addition prior to exporting the diamonds, as well as sustainable development of the 
sector and its downstream activities.109 In order to do this, the Policy provides strict access to 
diamonds; however, like any other domestic mineral resource, ownership vests in the State 
President.110 The Policy reiterates that the State holds 100 percent ownership of all diamond 
deposits and, if the state wishes, may invite investors to partner in their exploitation.111 
Furthermore, the Policy provides factors that underpin Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, and could as 
well assist in the regulation and exploitation of domestic diamonds.112 The establishment of 
the Sovereign Wealth Fund is provided for in the Policy,113 which entails that all diamond 
revenues collected by the national treasury shall be deposited in the Fund.114 The funds shall 
be invested in the sectors of the economy to enable citizens to benefit from diamond 
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resources.115 Provision for policing, offences and penalties are provided for in the Policy, and 
if appropriately enforced, it can support and enforce the regulation of diamonds.116 
 
However, in line with international best practice for the diamond industry, the Diamond 
Policy has provisions that potentially restrict state sovereignty; for example, by prescribing 
mandatory minimum requirements for regulation and security control as well as terms and 
conditions in order for Zimbabwe to be able to trade its diamonds freely on international 
markets.117 Although the Policy is a remarkable departure from the regulation of diamonds in 
terms of the Precious Stones Act, the success of implementing the Policy depends largely on 
political will. Appropriate enforcement of the Policy is fundamentally desirable in order to 
reinforce the PSNR principle against the backdrop of allegations of corruption in the minerals 
sector, as discussed below.  
 
The Policy provides for state ownership and control of domestic diamonds.118 Regardless of 
the fact that in principle the State holds total ownership,119 one needs to distinguish between 
dominion in the minerals themselves and the right to exploit them; here the ‘controlling 
stakes’ becomes important.120 Although diamond ownership vests in the State President, 
awarding the right to exploit them is also the discretion of the President with the help of the 
Minister of Mines, as well as the Mining Board. In this regard, consistency with provisions of 
the Diamond Policy becomes an issue vis-a-vis state sovereignty over mineral resources, as 
well as concluding investment agreements that are beneficial to the country. However, policy 
inconsistencies coupled with some weaknesses in the Diamond Policy have the potential to 
weaken and restrict state sovereignty over domestic diamonds. Under such circumstances, 
and overreliance of the Diamond Policy on a weak and outdated principal mining law (Mines 
Act) could be its biggest weakness and affect Zimbabwe’s sovereignty over diamonds.121 
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As shall be discussed below, corruption, illegal mining deals have the potential to undermine 
and weaken state sovereignty (as discussed in chapter 3 above).122 It is crucial for Zimbabwe 
to exercise sovereignty through appropriate and consistent legislative measures in order to 
ensure the legality of regulation and exploitation is supported by legitimate operationalization 
of aspects of international law in domestic law, this can be a catalyst to attract foreign 
investment.123 
 
4.3.1.4 Gold Trade Act, 1940, (Chapter 21:03) 
 
The Gold Trade Act124 is dedicated to the regulation and trade of domestic gold. The 
preamble to the Gold Act provides the founding provision, which is to ‘prohibit the 
possession of gold by unauthorized persons and to regulate dealings in gold, and for other 
purposes connected with the forgoing’.125 The Act provides licensing for gold and the 
conditions for acquisition of the licences. Three categories of licences are issued to applicants 
upon payment of the prescribed fee; namely, gold dealing licence, gold recovery works 
licence and gold assaying licence.126 The Act provides that the Minister of Finance as the 
authority responsible for issuing gold licences. However, the Minister may delegate his or her 
authority to the Secretary of the Ministry of Finance to issue the licences.127 The Act 
prohibits gold dealing, whatsoever, unless the dealer or his agent is a holder of a gold licence 
or an authority, grant or permit issued in terms of the Mines Act to work on domestic alluvial 
gold deposits.128 
 
The Gold Act provides conditions for cancellation of licences. Accordingly, holders of gold 
licences are obliged to comply with the requirements and obligations of licensing; failure to 
do so may lead to criminal sanctions or cancellation of the licence.129 The Act also provides 
for forfeiture and the procedure for confiscation for gold; for example, where the licence has 
been cancelled, or where the holder of the gold is unauthorized.130 Further, the Act provides 
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timelines to perform certain duties; for example, holders of gold mining licences shall, not 
later than the 10th of every month, deliver to a registered gold buyer or dealer all gold in his 
or her possession except gold which has been exempted by the Minister of Mines or a mining 
commissioner, by special authority.131 In the event of a criminal conviction related to gold, 
the conviction automatically has the effect of cancelling any licence issued in terms of this 
Act.132 
 
Failure to comply with provisions of the Gold Act is an offence.133 Accordingly, the Act 
penalizes gold permit holders for malicious placement of gold,134 as well as smelting or 
changing the form of any manufactured article which contains gold unless the person has 
been authorized by the Minister of Mines.135 Where there is reasonable suspicion of unlawful 
possession or dealing in gold, the Act authorizes and grants the police powers of entry and 
search any premises or persons.136 And as such, a holder of a gold licence is legally expected 
always and on demand to produce, and show it to any police officer. The Act provides for 
offences and mandatory penalties to be imposed on the offender.137 Also, the Act empowers 
the Minister of Mines to enact Regulations in order to spell out the implementation of the 
Act.138 
 
While taking into account the general provisions contemplated in the Mines Act, it can be 
argued that the Gold Act provides additional measures that are relevant to safe keeping and 
trading of gold. As such, the Act penalizes any conduct that has the potential of undermining 
lawful control and regulation of domestic gold.  
 
4.3.1.5 Copper Control Act, 1962, (Chapter 14:06) 
The Copper Control Act139 has three major objectives, namely, (i) to provide for licensing of 
dealers in copper and to regulate the business activities of such dealers, (ii) to control and 
regulate the sale of copper and (iii) to make provision for the suppression of illegal dealings 
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in copper.140 The Act prohibits dealing in or possession of copper without a valid licence.141 
In order to legalize dealing in or possession of copper, the Act provides that the Minister of 
Mines is the competent authority to issue a dealer’s licence, and the decision to grant or 
refuse issuing licences is at his discretion.142 A licence is valid for one year and it is subject to 
renewal upon fulfillment of the conditions for renewal as well as payment of the prescribed 
fee.143 After a licence is granted to an applicant, it is not transferrable to any party.144 The 
holder of a dealer’s licence issued in terms of this Act, and who fails to uphold his or her 
obligations is potentially liable for contravening the provisions of the Act.145 
 
The holder of a dealer’s licence is obliged to keep an updated register of all copper 
transactions relevant to his or her daily business. The data to be recorded include the nature 
and weight of the copper which was purchased, when the transaction was concluded, the 
name and address of the person from whom the copper was purchased. In the case of any 
copper sold or disposed of by the dealer, details such as the nature and weight of such copper, 
the date, and place of the person to whom the copper was sold or disposed of, is required.146 
The sale of copper to any person is prohibited unless the parties have the necessary licence to 
deal in copper and have been cleared by the Minister of Mines to sell or buy it.147 After 
purchasing or receiving the copper, and before processing it, the dealer is legally allowed to 
keep it for not more than four days.148 The Act restricts hours during which copper may be 
kept or purchased. The Act prohibits purchase of copper between 9pm and 7am; the reason 
could be for security purposes, transparency and accountability; contravention of this 
provision is an offence.149 Possession of copper which is reasonably suspected to have been 
stolen is an offence in terms of the Act.150 The consequence of a conviction for any offence in 
terms of the Act could lead to cancellation of a dealer’s licence and confiscation of the copper 
in his or her possession. In addition, a fine and /or imprisonment for a certain period to be 
determined by the court may be imposed.151 
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In order to spell out the implementation of the Copper Act, the Minister of Mines may make 
the necessary Regulations.152 However, to date no Regulations have been enacted under this 
Act. As considered in the themes identified in section 4.4 below, the focus is on the manner 
in which Zimbabwe exercises sovereignty in the regulation of domestic mineral resources 
including copper. The manner in which sovereignty is exercised reinforces the 
operationalization of international law principles discussed in chapter 2, which could be seen 
as supporting Zimbabwe’s sovereignty over domestic mineral resources. 
 
4.3.1.6 Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act, 2007 (Chapter 14:33) 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act of 
2007153 is considered as far as it reinforces sovereignty over domestic mineral resources. The 
major drive of the indigenization law is to assist indigenous Zimbabweans to work towards, 
and derive economic benefits from domestic natural resources, including mineral 
resources.154 In the context of the minerals sector, this could refer to rendering support in 
addressing the challenges faced by the minerals sector, as well as strengthening the regulatory 
capacity, improving community engagement, transparency and accountability in revenue 
collection, management and use. Economic indigenization is given legal status by the 
Indigenization Act, which is the principal law concerning economic empowerment of 
indigenous Zimbabweans.155 
 
The Indigenization Act has two broad objectives, which are relevant to the study, 
summarized as ‘[…] to provide for support measures for the further indigenization of the 
economy [and] to provide for support measures for the economic empowerment of 
indigenous Zimbabweans’.156 Underpinning both objectives could be the need to redress 
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historical economic imbalances and prejudices to indigenous people caused by colonialism. 
The Indigenization Act gives the Minister responsible for economic empowerment powers to 
review and approve indigenization and empowerment plans and their enforcement.157 In order 
to spell out the indigenization policy, the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment 
(General) Regulations of 2010158 were enacted and took effect on 1 March 2010. Within five 
years of coming into effect of the indigenization law, the Regulations set to achieve its major 
objective – a minimum of 51 percent indigenous shareholding in all foreign-owned mining 
companies operating in the country.159 To ensure compliance with this minimum 
requirement, the principal Regulations were amended by the Indigenization and Economic 
Empowerment (Amendment) Regulations,160 which came into effect on 25 March 2011. The 
2011 Regulations specifically included, within the ambit of the indigenization policy, foreign 
companies operating in the mining sector. 
 
The adoption of the indigenization policy ostensibly broadens and enables new indigenous 
participants in the minerals sector, to establish collective ownerships and economic interests, 
which could reinforce Zimbabwe’s sovereignty over domestic mineral resources discussed in 
chapter 2. In the process to exercise sovereignty, however, the indigenization policy can be 
seen as a law supporting the interests of politicians and the elite to control domestic 
resources. The challenges which adversely affect the potential for foreign investment, as well 
as the programme being largely considered as an empowerment of already rich politically 
connected individuals at the expense of the community come to the fore. As discussed in 
chapter 6 below, the loopholes and weaknesses in the indigenization policy have the potential 
to affect objectives of the empowerment law; if not addressed these could contribute to 
corruption and leave many ordinary indigenous Zimbabweans to the walls of poverty. 
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4.4  The Assertion of Sovereignty and Operationalization of International Law 
Principles in Support of State Sovereignty over Mineral Resources 
 
With reference to the mining laws introduced and outlined in the afore-going sections, the 
following sections examine the manner, in which state sovereignty is exercised through the 
operationalization of aspects of international law principles which support state sovereignty 
over mineral resources discussed in chapter 2 and the threats in chapter 3, regarding property 
rights, access to mineral resources, mineral resource policing, beneficiation and trade, mining 
taxes and royalties, obligations towards indigenous communities, principles facilitation 
investment and trade in mineral resources, foreign exchange and repatriation of profits, 
compensation for expropriation and dispute settlement. These themes are important as far as 
they determine the manner which Zimbabwe exercises sovereignty over domestic mineral 
resources and highlight the loopholes that allow for perverse application of the principle of 
PSNR, as well as contradictions in the exercise of state sovereignty that establish the 
conditions for principles of trade and investment to override permanent sovereignty over 
mineral resources. 
 
4.4.1 Property and Ownership Rights 
 
At the outset, a distinction must be drawn between (i) property rights in the minerals 
themselves throughout the value chain, and (ii) the property associated with exploration, and 
exploitation rights, which include the manner and extent to which Zimbabwe can grant or 
impose rights of tenure on mining companies. The different types of rights shows the 
assertion of sovereignty and the operationalization of PSNR, whereby the government of 
Zimbabwe flexes its sovereignty muscle in order to define classes of rights. As the owner of 
mineral resources, the State President has the right to alienate property rights associated with 
exploitation of the minerals and regulate the alienation as well as the income derived from the 
resources.161 Accordingly, the right to property which is embedded in the minerals 
themselves is fundamental and critical aspect to potential investors against the backdrop of 
weak protection of such rights.162 
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The preamble to the Constitution of Zimbabwe163 acknowledges the natural resource 
endowment and the Mines Act specifically provides for inherent state ownership and custody 
of all domestic mineral resources.164 The fact that dominium over all domestic minerals vests 
in the State President, and held in trust on behalf of all Zimbabweans, shows that ownership 
and property rights in the minerals themselves cannot be transferred. In his representative 
capacity, the State President is exclusively and absolutely vested with ownership rights to all 
mineral resources found within the Republic and this right is protected by the Constitution 
and the Mines Act.  
 
In order to exploit domestic mineral resources, Zimbabwe requires foreign investment. In the 
assertion of sovereignty, the state may grant an investor the right to explore or exploit 
specific minerals, by granting exploration or mining licences for a certain period of time 
subject to renewal.165 However, a holder of mining rights does not have ownership but merely 
legitimate rights of access to a resource subject to the conditions underpinning the issuance of 
the licence. Regardless of the fact that holders of exploration or mining rights do not have 
ownership rights, however, they enjoy domestic protection in terms of the law after 
registration of their licences; thus, obtaining security of tenure. Accordingly, it is very 
necessary to register these rights because this contributes to security of tenure. Further the 
registration of mining licences in terms of Part IV of the Mines Act166 converts the right 
contained in the licence to secured property rights, and therefore the investor enjoys security 
of tenure. This is the correct domestic legal position regardless of the Mines Act being 
inexplicit about it. 
 
Since ownership of mineral resources vests in the State President, this is an assertion of 
sovereignty over the resources, which is also underpinned by regulating the allocation of 
mining or exploration licences to foreign investors of Zimbabwe’s choice. Property rights are 
a driver that can promote protection of the investments and security of tenure. However, 
security of tenure can be threatened in various ways, one of which would be changing the law 
on the extent of foreign versus indigenous shareholding in firms already holding exploitation 
rights. 
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With reference to the Mines Act and Indigenization law discussed above, mineral resources 
are never owned by individuals since all the rights of ownership are vested in the State 
President.167 This amounts to a strong assertion of state sovereignty over minerals. It also 
shifts the space of engagement between the State and foreign investors to the nature of 
property in exploitation rights. In Zimbabwe, the form in which the State has asserted its 
sovereignty over exploitation rights, but thereby also threatening security of tenure, has been 
to specify indigenization requirements amongst existing rights holders. This creates tension 
between what supports and restricts the assertion of sovereignty. The investor community 
generally views states that provide security of tenure in mineral exploitation rights 
favourably. The fragile political situation and inconsistences in the application of economic 
indigenization policy, however, render the security of tenure insecure. For example, this 
could be noted in the uncoordinated manner in which the indigenization policy was 
implemented under the leadership of former Minister, Saviour Kasukuwere. Unconfirmed 
reports allege that Kasukuwere threatened some mining companies for not complying with 
the indigenization law.168 This created uncertainty which scared investors and threatened 
security of tenure in the mining sector. The insecurity shaped unfavourable conditions for 
foreign investment and even the established mining operations were less productive; thus 
paradoxically rendering the assertion of sovereignty over domestic mineral resources weak 
and ineffective.  
 
Although Zimbabwe has a legal framework for protection of property rights relating to 
mining rights and other rights that can be awarded in terms of the Mines Act, and other 
mining laws, investors’ security of tenure is weak. The country is ranked 171 out of 213 
countries, denoting a low ranking according to the World Bank Doing Business Report 
2014.169 This negatively impacts on foreign investment in the minerals sector, which may in 
the long run weaken state sovereignty.  
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4.4.2 Access to Mineral Resources  
 
On behalf of the people of Zimbabwe, the major issue is who decides about who gets to 
exploit and which domestic mineral resource, as well as how these decisions promote narrow 
private or broader public interests. While vested with ownership and custody of, as well as 
the right to search and exploit all domestic mineral resources in Zimbabwe, the State 
President, with the help of the Minister of Mines and the Cabinet, has a statutory duty to 
ensure access to mineral resources is discharged in an appropriate and transparent manner. 
However, the question is who actually decides the allocation of mineral resource rights? This 
is a complex issue to determine in the absence of guidance in the primary sources. The right 
to grant exploitation rights vests in the State President who is the custodian and the owner of 
domestic minerals on behalf of Zimbabweans. Accordingly, those who possess and exercise 
political powers actually have the capacity to decide who gets what, when and how.170 The 
Minister of Mines in consultation with the Cabinet plays a crucial role in assisting the State 
President to arrive at an appropriate decision on whether to grant rights of access to a mineral 
resource to an investor. There is no requirement that consultations prior to coming up with a 
decision be transparent. It is not unreasonable to believe that the allocations may be 
politically biased.  
 
As a result of the lack of guidance in the Mines Act, it is not clear whether the decision-
maker has to consider conditions such as the ability to meet a minimum capital requirement, 
the level of professionalism and competence of the applicant, as well as the applicant’s record 
on tax evasion. Further the Mines Act does not specify economic considerations or 
development criteria. In this way, the Act does not maximize the positive impact of mineral 
endowment as an asset that is capable of promoting economic development and is also 
attractive for foreign investment. All the work on economic development criteria and 
empowerment that should have been borne by the principal mining law is therefore 
shouldered by the Indigenization Act.  
 
The Mines Act provides for the acquisition171 and maintenance172 of mining and mineral 
rights, as well as how they may be relinquished.173 It provides for six types of mining licences 
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depending on the nature and purpose of the application. The six titles are divided into two 
broad groups, namely, exploration rights (first group) and mining rights (second group). The 
first category can be subdivided into further two groups, namely, Exclusive Prospecting 
Orders174 and Special Grants for exploration in reserved areas.175 The second category 
comprises of four rights; namely, mining claims,176 mining leases177 and special mining 
leases,178 as well as special grants. Special grants are further subdivided into grants licences 
issued for coal and energy minerals in terms of Part XX of the Mines Act.179 Further special 
grants are issued for all domestic mineral resources except coal and energy minerals, which 
are issued in terms of Part XIX of the Mines Act.180 Upon registration of the right, the holder 
of the right to prospecting or mining has legally protected and enforceable rights against the 
State.181 The permit gives the holder182 legal authorization and access to the resource defined 
in the permit.  
 
Although the Mines Act provides for acquisition of mining licence,183 however, this is subject 
to compliance with the indigenization policy.184 There are situations where state mining 
companies are not able to exploit certain resources without the input of foreign investors due 
to various reasons; for example, the capital requirement and specialized technology due to 
geological structure. Under such circumstances, joint ventures are necessary as in the 
Zimbabwe-Essar deal which was established to mine iron ore and manufacture steel. 
However, the fact that parties to a joint venture deal can each hold 50 percent control does 
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not necessarily mean a foreign investor is exempted from the indigenization law and other 
municipal legal requirements completely. Investors are required to meet the requirements in 
terms of the Companies Act,185 as well as conditions required in order to obtain an 
Investment Certificate issued by the Zimbabwe Investment Authority.186 Further, the Mines 
Act spells out the general conditions that ought to be fulfilled in addition to those required in 
terms of specific statutes regulating the acquisition of the mining rights for specific minerals 
such as diamonds, gold and precious stones.187 Only after fulfilling the requirements of the 
indigenization law and other statutory requirements, is a foreign investor legally allowed to 
be part to a mining joint venture.188 
 
With regard to becoming an indigenization partner, the Indigenization Act generally requires 
any foreign investor intending to invest in the country to do so subject to becoming a 49 
percent partner while the indigenous partner holds 51 percent. The Indigenization Act read 
with Indigenization Regulations of 2011 set out minimum requirements for foreign-owned 
mining companies doing business in Zimbabwe, by amending section 4 of the principal 
Regulations of 2010 which required foreign companies with a net value of less than US$500 
000 to be exempted from the indigenization law.189 However, the amended 2011 Regulations 
now requires at least 51 percent190 of the controlling business interest of a foreign mining 
company, operating in the country with a net value of at least US$1, to be ceded to 
indigenous Zimbabweans.191 The implementation of the 51 and 49 percent requirement, 
however, is negotiable particularly where the investment is strategic and unique to the 
country. Through this mechanism, the Zimbabwean state ostensibly radically increased the 
leverage it might bring to negotiations over shareholding.  
 
The indigenization policy thus acts not only as a potential threat to security of tenure of 
existing rights holders, but also as an access barrier to new ones. Further, while the objectives 
of the Indigenization Act are laudable, potentially creating opportunities for Zimbabwean 
citizens to benefit from their natural resources and determine their own economic destinies, 
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however, most indigenous Zimbabweans are incapable of meeting the 51 percent 
shareholding capacity due to lack of capital. As a result, only a handful of Zimbabweans are 
able to meet the financial requirement and benefit from the policy.  
 
However, it is not an overstatement that the presence of many faces and politics in decision-
making over the allocation of rights of access to domestic mineral resources to investors, and 
in the absence of clear and transparent mechanisms, gives those involved in the process ‘[…] 
unfettered say in the allocation of […] mineral resources in accordance with their 
preferences. [Accordingly, the] allocation can be done through corrupt means as is 
manifesting in Zimbabwe’s mining sector’.192 In the exercise of political power, the powerful 
elites, though a relatively small group which includes top and influential politicians and 
military bosses, influence the allocation of rights of access to domestic mineral resources in a 
shrewd and self-serving manner. They can clandestinely make the allocation of rights of 
access to a mineral a private affair and shield the process from public scrutiny. The lack of 
any articulated principle for allocation of rights in the Mines Act facilitates this. Abuse of 
political power in relation to access and allocation decisions cause the plunder of domestic 
minerals for personal economic benefit while national economic interests are ignored.  
 
Whether the allocation of the right of access to mineral resource may be challenged 
successfully in courts is not clear. The lack of clear criteria for the granting of such rights 
emasculates the judiciary, an institution that could bring some objectivity through the process 
through judicial review. The executive may simply argue that decisions to award rights of 
access are based on the best interests of the state and therefore devoid of unfair 
discrimination. This can be the basis upon which the state defends its decision against any 
court application challenging the decision. As noted above, the decision to grant or refuse to 
grant rights of access is the sole prerogative of the state, which is vested in the State President 
on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe. Accordingly, it is imperative that the assertion of 
sovereignty can be challenged; however, prospects of a successful court challenge are 
minimal.  
 
The absence of clear criteria for granting access to domestic mineral resources, with strong 
centralization of these powers in the State President and the Cabinet, creates conditions 
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conducive to exploitation rights being granted in a manner that advances private rather than 
public interests. Appropriate access to, and regulation of mineral resources could translate to 
exploitation of the country’s minerals, and derived economic benefits, that in the long run 
spurs economic development and the distribution of benefits to a broader range of people. 
Zimbabwe is richly endowed with mineral resources, but the legal framework for allocation 
exploitation rights has adversely helped in creating economic classes and widening the gap 
between the rich and poor.193 The powers of determining access and allocation have been 
operationalized in a way that potentially debases the supporting international principles 
discussed in chapter 2; tainting the primary and rightful meaning of the principles of PSNR, 
self-determination and the right to development.  Regardless of the Mines Act spelling out 
the conditions that must be considered in the regulation of mineral resources, the criteria for 
allocation of licences to foreign investors in order to access domestic minerals remains 
unknown to the public. There is no transparency and accountability yet the resources are held 
in trust by the state for the benefit of Zimbabweans. 
4.4.3 Mineral Resource Policing and Enforcement of Mining Laws 
Mineral resource policing and appropriate enforcement of mining laws is the primary 
vanguard against illegal mining, smuggling and corruption, as well as conflicts relating to 
access and control of the minerals value chain. Accordingly, the Mines Act and subsidiary 
Acts discussed above provide for conduct or behaviour which constitutes offences in the 
regulation and policing of domestic mineral resources. For example, the Mines Act classifies 
and criminalizes behaviour which deviates from the intention of the legislature, and includes 
prospecting without a licence or in prohibited areas, illegal pegging, theft of ore, fraudulent 
acts, false declarations and failure to disclose the discovery of precious stones.194 The Gold 
Act and Precious Stones Act criminalize conduct which contravenes both Acts including 
unauthorized dealing in gold or precious stones, possession of gold or precious stones without 
licence, and failure to keep an up-to-date register of all transactions in gold or precious 
stones. Accordingly, these offences support the state to assert sovereignty over domestic 
mineral resources because fear of sanctions encourages compliance with the law. However, 
there has to be a framework which supports enforcement of the offences and penalties with a 
view to realizing self-determination and the right to development. 
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The conditions that should be in place for the offences to be effective necessitate not only 
discussion of the enforcement apparatus in the Acts but also the state of the criminal justice 
system generally. The conditions have to include the presence of, and respect for the rule of 
law, and all citizens and institutions should be accountable regardless of their positions in the 
society. Strict application of the law and transparency ensure the objectives to enact the 
offences are effectively realized. Accordingly, the entire judicial system and process require 
capacitating enforcement officers, including judicial officers and the courts, as well as 
reviewing conditions of service with a view to curbing corruption that adversely affects 
transparency and effective delivery of justice. These conditions are undoubtedly important 
drivers for the offences under the mining laws to be effective and support the exercise of state 
sovereignty over domestic mineral resources.  
 
On the enforcement and policing apparatus in the Mines Act, the Chief Mining 
Commissioner and Mining Commissioners or any person duly authorized in terms of the 
Mines Act, is expected at all reasonable times, to have access to any location of a mining 
company or offices for the purposes of inspecting books and records as well as reports 
relating to acquisition, disposal and removal of minerals or mineral-bearing products as may 
be necessary for the purposes of ascertaining any returns, solemn declarations or other 
relevant documents in terms of the Act.195 On the one hand, the Chief Mining Commissioner 
and Mining Commissioners have powers to act as adjudicators over simple mining disputes, 
and on the other hand, as regulators and inspectors. They are very important officers in the 
regulation and enforcement of mining laws in order to ensure compliance. The 
commissioners are assisted by other law enforcement agents such as customs officials at 
designated ports of entry and exit, Mineral Unit and Border Control officers, as well as police 
officers; together they are responsible for, and investigate cases relating to smuggling and 
unlawful possession of, and illegal dealing in minerals. With regard to the number of 
inspections per mining location, there is no specific requirement in the law but administrative 
measures require that inspectors check mining companies’ books and production registers at 
reasonable intervals. However, the presence of suspicions could mean inspections take place 
more regularly in order to ensure total compliance with the law. Accordingly, the inspections 
have the potential to assess the extent to which mining companies consistently comply with 
the legal requirements in their operations. Where there is reasonable suspicion for illegal 
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possession or dealing in minerals, any police officer, mining commissioner or mining 
inspector may, without a search warrant, enter and search any premises or search any 
persons. The search is necessary to investigate and gather evidence or detect any offence 
relating to breach of any mining laws, as well as to arrest any suspects.196 
 
With regard to deadlines prescribed by each Act, it is peremptory for every registered miner, 
not later than the tenth day of each month, to deliver to the mining commissioner returns in 
the prescribed form showing, in respect of all minerals other than precious stones, production 
output and comprehensive details of the disposal. Precious stones that have been exploited 
from the miner’s registered site must be accounted for, including production output and 
quantity, as well as the quality.197 For accountability purposes, each licence holder is obliged 
to keep an up-to-date register and returns on prescribed forms, which he or she is entitled to 
record any transaction timeously. Mining companies are obliged to furnish to a mining 
commissioner documents such as certificates, affidavits and supporting detail which confirm 
production output and disposal of the resources.198 For accountability purposes, holders of 
gold licence are obliged to keep true and correct records relating to all gold deposited with, 
received, dispatched or disposed of by them.199 The fulfilment of the requirements by mining 
companies ensures compliance with mining laws. Full compliance supports PSNR with a 
view to realizing self-determination as well as the right to development in the long run. In the 
event of contravention of the monthly returns provision, a miner is held criminally liable and 
sentenced to a fine not exceeding US$200 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six 
months, or both such a fine and imprisonment.200 However, the maximum fine of US$200 is 
too lenient and may not deter miners from covering-up the loopholes in the preparation of 
monthly returns. This a threat to sovereignty over natural resources in that the likelihood for 
repeat offenders to commit the same offences is very high because they benefit more than 
what they lose. Also, the fine and the alternative imprisonment term are not concomitant. The 
leniency in the sentence and disproportion between the fine and the imprisonment term could 
weaken policing, which is a factor that also weakens sovereignty over domestic mineral 
resources.  
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In order to ensure compliance in royalty payments, the Mines Act prohibits disposal of 
minerals or mineral-bearing products from the location or any location registered in the name 
of a miner, until outstanding royalties have been paid, or until a reasonable, acceptable and 
binding payment arrangement has been mutually agreed.201 Where a registered miner in 
respect of whom the prohibition order was issued by the mining commissioner, fails to 
observe the order, or any person who has knowledge of the order receives any mineral from 
the location referred to in the order, contravenes the provision of the Act.202 The Mines Act 
imposes a fine not exceeding US$500 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year, 
or both such a fine and the imprisonment.203 However, the penalties appear to be too lenient 
and do not deter potential offenders. 
 
Arguably, two factors underpin the need for policing; first, to ensure those awarded mining 
licences comply with the full spectrum of relevant domestic laws.204 The second factor is that 
policing helps to curb illegal mining and unlawful dealings in mineral value chain, and that 
those who have not been licenced, do not access any mineral resource, whatsoever, as well as 
to ensure the state derives maximum financial benefits through payment of the required fees 
and taxes by licenced miners. Since it is illegal to access domestic mineral resources without 
valid licences, effective policing is the most safeguard measure to protect the resources.205 In 
this regard, policing is a method to assert sovereignty. This is wholly supported by the 
international law principles discussed in chapter 2.  
 
However, effective policing is affected by weak and outdated laws, as well as poor 
enforcement. For example, the Mines Act has ostensibly overstayed its purpose as it has been 
overtaken by modern regulatory requirements as well as enforcement challenges in the 
domestic mineral value chain. Although the Act has been amended several times, however, 
the fact that it came into force in 1962 and applies 35 years after obtaining political 
independence certainly mean the challenges of the 1960s are not the same as those 
encountered in the 21 century. For example, appropriate policing and enforcement are drivers 
which support assertion of sovereignty. Specific implementation and enforcement 
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requirements are fundamental in order to give value to provisions of the laws. However, in 
the absence of strong checks and balances, the Mines Act grants excessive powers to the state 
President and the Minister of Mines to exercise discretion and they are capable of making 
unilateral decisions which negatively affect the sector, thus, debasing the PSNR principle and 
undermining the rule of law in a manner that negatively affects the criminal justice system.206 
For example, granting of special diamond mining rights to Chinese investors to mine the 
diamonds in Marange without appropriate legal procedures is clearly an abuse of power and it 
is unlikely that proper enforcement actions will then be taken against such investors.207  
 
The mandatory penalties for illegal dealing in or possession of gold, which were introduced 
to the Gold Trade Act by the Finance Act of 2006, raise questions regarding the 
disproportionality of the prescribed offences: A penalty of 5 years imprisonment or a fine of 
US$200. This does not take into account the amount of the gold. Further amending the Gold 
Act penalties without doing the same to the Precious Stones Act as well as the Diamond 
Policy cause inconsistencies in the delivery of justice.208 The inconsistency does not assist to 
affirm sovereignty and curb leakages in the minerals sector. Another concern is the omission 
in the Acts of reference to companies that were caught illegally dealing in or possessing 
precious stones. The omission opens loopholes and uncertainty regarding the appropriate 
criminal penalties. 
 
The success of appropriate implementation and enforcement of domestic mineral laws as well 
as policing of the minerals sector is the duty of the Ministry of Mines and its agents. In order 
to implement and enforce the laws, the Ministry is expected, through its agents ‘[t]o facilitate 
and regulate the sustainable mining, value addition and marketing of the country’s mineral 
resources for the social and economic well-being of Zimbabweans’.209 This reinforces the 
objective to regulate minerals sector and derive economic benefits in order to enhance 
national economic development. 
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While presenting the 2014 National Budget Statement, the Minister of Finance, Patrick 
Chinamasa, indirectly highlighted that weak or inappropriate enforcement of domestic 
mining laws has caused various loopholes in the minerals sector. Mining investors are 
reportedly taking advantages of the loopholes to deprive the state of substantial amounts of 
revenues.210 Also, research shows that the Ministry of Mines is generally understaffed and 
under-resourced.211 Although there are no specific details regarding the extent to which the 
Ministry is short of mining commissioners and inspectors as well as under-financed, the 
shortages are critical and adversely incapacitate the sector to competently enforce mining 
laws to support domestic operationalization and implementation of the PSNR principle. 
 
Among the loopholes that are causing loss of mining revenues include malpractices in the 
form of under-invoicing and simulated mining equipment purchases, as well as smuggling 
and externalization of export proceeds.212 Arguably, had the minerals sector been 
appropriately resourced and regulated, the loopholes could be minimized. Weak policing and 
enforcement of mining laws is adversely enhanced by policy inconsistencies which in turn 
undermine investor confidence. Furthermore, this undermines Zimbabwe’s assertion of 
sovereignty over mineral resources and in turn translates to less revenue generation than 
would be, had there has been appropriate enforcement. 
 
It can be argued that the mineral endowment comes with responsibilities, which require 
policing and enforcement, among other measures, in order to derive maximum economic 
benefits. Although Zimbabwe has the leverage to assert sovereignty over its minerals, 
however, the department in charge of policing is not adequately resourced. The current 
regulatory measures show that policing and enforcement are weak and inadequate to curb 
corruption, illegal mining and smuggling of minerals. Also, the absence of transparency and 
accountability as well as legal certainty in the minerals sector affects the potential economic 
contribution of the sector to national development. In turn, the extent of assertion of 
sovereignty over domestic minerals is affected negatively. 
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4.4.4 Beneficiation and Trade  
 
Beneficiation can be defined as adding value to minerals through industrial processes, which 
include crushing, separating and converting mineral ores into valuable substances. To a 
greater extent, beneficiation is attributed to the rise in ‘resource nationalism’213 which is 
reinforced by higher international market commodity prices.214 Trading of beneficiated or 
value added minerals is a strategic priority for Zimbabwe, the reason being that export of 
value added minerals fetches higher prices compared to unprocessed mineral ores.215 
 
Being an outdated mining law, the Mines Act does not specifically provide for beneficiation; 
however, in practice, beneficiation of minerals such as iron ore, gold and diamonds is being 
done. The Mines Act and other Acts discussed above only regulate access to specific 
domestic mineral resources. The Diamond Policy provides for local beneficiation and value 
addition, which are essential aspects prior to export; however, the Policy does not spell out 
the provision and clarity on the standard for issuance of permits to those involved in sections 
such as cutting and polishing.216 The Policy only states that ‘[a] quota of all locally produced 
rough diamonds […] shall be reserved for local beneficiation’, and in order to promote 
beneficiation the state intends to offer incentives to players in the local cutting and polishing 
industry.217 Further the Policy only provides that the cutting and polishing industry has to be 
encouraged to optimize value in its activities.218 Lack of clear administrative procedures in 
the regulation creates uncertainty and loopholes, which in turn give rise to the potential for 
corruption, smuggling and illicit dealings throughout the diamond value chain. Ostensibly, 
the Policy does not authoritatively make beneficiation mandatory in that it appeals to players 
in the domestic diamond industry to undertake beneficiation in return for some financial 
incentives. The reasons could be, inter alia, that beneficiation is a capital-intensive industrial 
process. However, here the purpose is not to critique the process but to highlight the reasons 
underpinning the need for local beneficiation. The Zimbabwe Diamond Technology Centre 
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(ZDTC) which is taking shape in Mt Hampden, on the outskirts of Harare is understood to 
provide a solution to diamond beneficiation and value addition and upon its completion, the 
Centre will employ about 1 200 people.219 Arguably, this confirms that beneficiation creates 
employment and dovetails with the country’s agenda for sustainable socio-economic 
transformation.  
 
In the absence of a beneficiation policy, some raw minerals are exported resulting in low 
export prices, which translate into low revenues for the state.220 The initiative to enforce 
beneficiation of major domestic minerals such as platinum, chrome, iron ore and diamonds is 
currently being pursued but there is no mandatory legislation compelling mining companies 
to undertake the process.221 There is not even a clear national policy on beneficiation.222 It is 
suggested that when the law is enacted for mandatory beneficiation, it will include substantial 
financial penalties for exporting raw materials where beneficiation and value addition options 
are available.223 To compel mining companies, particularly those mining platinum, the 
government effected a 15 percent levy on exports of unbeneficiated platinum and there were 
plans to completely ban raw platinum group mineral exports by the end of 2014.224 Also, 
unconfirmed reports allege that export of unbeneficiated chrome had been banned and the 
government is reportedly insisting on those mining major mineral resources to build 
refineries or lose their licences.225 This amounts to a strong assertion of state sovereignty over 
mineral resources.  
 
To ease the challenge, unconfirmed reports point out that Mwana Africa, a mining and 
exploration company listed on the London’s Alternative Investment Market which also 
operates in Zimbabwe, offered its smelter in the country at an undisclosed fee for use by 
platinum miners.226 This comes when the government has demanded that mining firms 
establish a domestic precious metal refinery plant to ensure that Zimbabwe gets maximum 
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export returns from its minerals. At a conference held recently under the theme 
“Beneficiation: Maximizing Value from the minerals sector”, however, Zimbabwe was urged 
to adopt an incremental approach to beneficiation.227  
 
Arguably, beneficiation is not bad from the assertion of sovereignty point of view. It is vital 
to a developmental path that shifts the country from being a mere producer based on the 
exploitation of mineral resources, to one where it exports services and hardware. Further 
beneficiation not only increases state revenues but also provides jobs for local people. The 
increase in revenues and employment give the concept of sovereignty concrete meaning. 
Apart from the benefits derived from pursuing beneficiation, however, there are challenges 
affecting the process.228 Lack of substantial capital injection is one of the major drawbacks. 
 
4.4.5 Royalties and Taxes 
 
Mining royalties are not defined in the Mines Act but can be defined as payment to the owner 
of mineral rights for the privilege to exploit a domestic mineral resource. In addition to 
specific corporate tax rates, such as income tax or corporate tax and additional profit tax, 
mining companies are subject to pay royalties, which arises from mining rights acquired by a 
mining investor to exploit a specific mineral resource based on a contract or lease 
agreement.229 The royalty payment is based on a portion of earnings from production and 
varies depending on the type of mineral and the market conditions.230 Unlike royalties, other 
forms of mining tax such as corporate tax are levied on mining companies after the deduction 
of all capital and operational expenses. Additional Profit tax is tax levied on profits accrued 
to a holder of special mining lease in terms of section 22 of the Income Tax Act read with the 
22nd and 23rd Schedule of the same Act. Royalty and ordinary mining taxes are two separate 
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income streams for the state, which if used responsibly and transparently can contribute to 
economic growth and development. 
 
Royalty and mining tax are forms of taxes, which are levied on all minerals or mineral-
bearing products obtained from a domestic mining location and disposed by a miner or on his 
behalf.231 Despite not being defined in the Act, the payment of royalties and taxes is provided 
for in the Mines Act read together with the Revenue Authorities Act.232 In other words, a 
royalty is calculated as a percentage of the overall gross fair market value of minerals that 
were produced and sold.233 With effect from the 1st of January 2012, the Zimbabwe 
government revised the rates of royalties for all its minerals.234 The royalty payment applies 
to other taxes which include surface rentals,235 capital expenditure allowance, withholding tax 
and income tax levied at a flat rate of 15 percent of the total profits.236 The fiscal regime for 
mining provides for a withholding tax of 5 percent which is charged on dividends declared by 
mining companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE); for other companies not 
listed, the rate of withholding tax is 10 percent.237 Further, an additional 5 percent 
withholding tax is charged on interests paid to mining investors.238 However, from early 
2012, the Zimbabwe Small-Scale Miners Council and Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines, as well 
as the African Development Bank urged the government of Zimbabwe to revise downward 
the tax rates on the basis that they were too high,239 and the government heeded this advice. 
This could also mean in the process to assert sovereignty, the state does not need to be 
dictatorial but where necessary invite stakeholders to contribute constructively. 
 
Section 244 of the Mines Act empowers the state to receive royalty payments from domestic 
mining rights holders. In the event that royalties are not paid by the due date, interest is 
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calculated based on a rate determined by the Minister of Finance.240 It is reported that some 
mining companies are not paying full taxes to the state, some are evading paying and some 
hide profits,241 because they are taking advantage of a flawed revenue collection system.242 
The fact that not all revenues are remitted to the state and accounted for is potentially 
undermining sovereignty.243 Arguably, tax evasion is a consequence of the state’s failure to 
remedy and build safeguards in revenue collection. It is further reported that some mining 
companies are understating production output in order to pay less taxes. For example, it was 
alleged that Marange Resources’ low revenue remittance is the tip of the iceberg.244 
Furthermore, it is reported that investigations and audits revealed that some mining 
companies were looting from the state through procurement, by inflating figures in order to 
simulate transactions.245 This would mean the capital spent on alleged purchases is capital 
expenditure and therefore exempted from tax. There are indications of connivance between 
officials in state enterprises within the Ministry of Mines. It is reported that the connivance is 
well-orchestrated, while in other cases it is claimed that certain mining equipment was 
procured yet nothing was bought.246 In 2012 and 2013 former MDC Minister of Finance, 
Tendai Biti, revealed that his Ministry received only US$364 million from diamond exports 
but ZANU PF members argued that the amount was far higher.247 
 
To show how weak regulation undermines the assertion of sovereignty in the revenue 
collection, Sharife provides detail on the manner in which domestic diamonds are siphoned 
from the country.248 A system of fraudulent and illicit dealings has become a catalyst of 
                                                          
240
 Tony Hawkins, op cit note 233 at 46.  
241
 Staff Reporter ‘Fight unfair Chinese labour practices, civil society urged’ New Zimbabwe, 17 August 2014. 
242
 Richard Snyder & Ravi Bhavnani ‘Diamonds, blood and taxes: A revenue-centered framework for explaining 
political order’ (2005) 49 Journal of Conflict Resolution 563 at 570 – 572. See also Philippe Le Billon ‘the 
political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts’ (2001) 20 Political Geography 561; Anita 
Sundari Akella & James B Cannon ‘Strengthening the weakest links: Strategies for improving the enforcement 
of environmental laws globally’ 2004 Centre for Conservation and Governance Report at 3. 
243
 Try MP ‘Zimbabwe is richest in sub-Saharan Africa' The Zimbabwe Mail, 29 May 2013. See generally 
Michael L Ross ‘How mineral-rich states can reduce inequality’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs & 
Joseph E Stiglitz (eds) Escaping the Resource Curse (2007) 237. 
244
 Zimbabwe News ‘Bosses in Marange looting spree’ NewsdzeZimbabwe, 3 February 2014. 
245
 Ibid. See also Partnership Africa Canada ‘Reap what you sow: Greed and corruption in Zimbabwe’s Marange 
diamond fields’ (2012) at 1& 5 – 6; Clayton Masekesa ‘Tempers flare in Mutare over diamond looting’ The 
Zimbabwe Mail, 19 May 2013; Zimbabwe News ‘Not a penny for Marange trust, one year on’ 
NewsdzeZimbabwe, 23 February 2013. 
246
 Ibid. 
247
 The 2012 Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review, supra note 20 at 110 paras 359 & 360. 
248
 Khadija Sharife ‘Disappearing diamonds’ 100Reporters, 20 February 2013. See also Ray Ndlovu ‘Gross 
mismanagement: Looting in Zimbabwe’s diamond sector’ African Business Day, 25 June 2013; Khadija Sharife 
& Nick Meynen ‘Blood diamonds, regulation system broken – but where to look for blame?’ 2012, available at 
http://www.ejolt.org/2012/10/blood-diamond-regulation-system-broken-%E2%80%93-but-where-to-look-for-
   153 
wholesale theft of the resources and consequently, undermines the assertion of sovereignty 
over domestic minerals and adversely the right to development.249 The practice could, unless 
corrective measures are appropriately considered and implemented, affect the economic 
status and importance of mineral resources’ contribution to the national GDP.250 In the 
absence of influence from the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiatives,251 since 
Zimbabwe is not a member, it remains a challenge to determine the actual amount of 
revenues that mining companies are paying and what is not accounted for. The uncertainty in 
revenue transparency has propagated a culture of corruption and tax evasion in the minerals 
sector. 
 
In a nutshell, although Zimbabwe asserts sovereignty over mineral resources, by imposing 
mining royalties and ordinary taxes on the mining rights holders, tax evasion and looting of 
the resources undermine sovereignty and lessens the amount of revenues that could have been 
available for development. 
 
4.4.6 Legal Obligations Toward Indigenous Communities  
 
The Mines Act requires any mining company that intends to prospect, explore or exploit 
domestic mineral resources to apply for a mining permit and authorizes the state to regulate, 
as well as set standards and conditions for the subsequent operations. The terms and 
conditions could also be incorporated in mining agreements. Mining contracts incorporate 
basic obligations that a mining investor must comply with, such as environmental 
requirements in the form of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), resettlement plans,252 
community development, employment of local people and revenue sharing.253 These 
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conditions spell out legal obligations of mining companies towards local communities and 
therefore the transparency of these agreements is critical.  
 
Provisions of the Mines Act, Land Acquisition Act254 and the Constitution are used to acquire 
land for the purposes of mining. Section 73 of the Constitution provides the right to clean and 
environmental protection, which encompasses freedom from pollution and other degrading 
activities. Further the Constitution provides freedom from arbitrary evictions; thus, no one 
may be evicted from their homes without a valid court order.255 Mining companies may not 
evict anyone from their homes for the purposes of mining unless the removal is legally 
justified and sanctioned by courts following due process. Furthermore, the inclusion of 
environmental rights in the Constitution is likely to influence the enforcement of legal 
obligations of mining companies towards local communities. The Mines Act provides for 
payment of compensation by a holder of mining rights to private landowners where mining 
operations are to be established.256 The fact that land is owned by the state, holders of mining 
rights are required to pay compensation for developments on the land and not for the land 
itself. However, the criterion to determine the amount of compensation is not expressly 
provided for in the Mines Act. Moreover, the rights of rural communities, where most mining 
activities take place, are not directly compensated since the Mines Act states that 
compensation has to be paid to Rural District Councils, which act as the landowner.257 In 
practice, some mining companies compensate indigenous communities by providing 
relocation expenses, building houses and providing other social services, as well as 
undertaking activities to reduce poverty.258 With reference to communities that were evicted 
in order to make way for diamond exploitation in Marange, it is reported that compensation 
was not paid, however. The diamond mining companies only gave the communities a 
“disturbance allowance” of US$1000 per household and resettlement houses, the majority of 
which are reportedly built below minimum standards.259 It is reported that the government 
maintained that the affected communities were not legally obliged to be compensated as the 
land in question belongs to the state.260 The assertion of sovereignty could as well conflict 
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with the right of the people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of Zimbabwe’s natural 
resource endowment. 
 
Regardless of the conflicts over compensation between government and diamond companies, 
on the one hand, and the Marange communities on the other hand, mining companies have 
obligations towards indigenous communities which are affected by mining operations.261 
Mitigating negative environmental impact through EIAs262 and environmental plans before, 
during and after closure of mining operations is necessary.263 In the event of failure to do so, 
the affected communities may use the provisions in the Constitution to protect their rights and 
hold government and the mining companies accountable through public litigation.264  
 
4.4.7 Compensation for Expropriation 
Since 2000 the practice of expropriating white commercial farms without compensation has 
been experienced across the country. Although the focus of this thesis is not on land, it is 
difficult to broach the topic of expropriation without also highlighting the expropriation of 
the land. Of late, the Zimbabwean government has threatened to seize foreign mining 
companies operating in the country unless they comply with the indigenization law.  
 
The new Constitution of 2013 provides for protection of property rights.265 It further goes to 
define property as any right or interest in property266 and thus embraces property rights 
incorporated in mining licences. In Zimbabwe, mineral resources are not individually owned 
because they belong to the people of Zimbabwe;267 however, one can be legally entitled to 
access them as discussed above. The Constitution provides for compensation in the event of 
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expropriation of property but the conditions underpinning the expropriation must be fulfilled 
before a mining investor is deprived of mining rights.268 
 
In the event of expropriation of mining rights, however, it must be of national interests; for 
example, where it has to be proved that there was underutilization or abuse of the rights.269 
The Mining Board may investigate the activities of mining rights holders with a view to 
establishing the true facts and give recommendations to the Minister of Mines and the 
President, after consultations with each rights holder.270 The amount of compensation does 
not include value of the mineral resource because ownership thereof belongs to the State 
President. Where the investor is aggrieved regarding the amount for compensation,271 he or 
she may seek redress via the municipal judicial system or arbitration depending on the 
preferred dispute settlement method and forum agreed in terms of the BIT (between states) or 
mining contract between the parties. 
 
The Mines Act provides for expropriation of mining locations that have not been developed 
or worked. The Act provides for the manner in which expropriation has to be done, which 
must be in accordance with the law.272 The same Act vests the Mining Commissioner with 
authority to transfer the expropriated mining location to the Minister of Mines for safe 
custody on behalf of the state.273 Further the Act provides that any mining location 
expropriated on the basis of non-use or not being worked adequately, will not lead to an 
obligation to pay compensation.274 This is an exception to the general rule that expropriation 
must be followed by fair and adequate compensation before acquiring the property or within 
a reasonable time after the acquisition.275 Where the expropriation is contested, the state must 
use due process to obtain an order to confirm the acquisition.276  
 
When the state expropriates mining locations, in terms of the general acquisition or on the 
basis of non-use or under-use, it exercises sovereignty. Although the state has the mandate to 
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expropriate when necessary, fair compensation must be paid. However, the provisions in the 
law dictating to the state how expropriation should be done can be an internal limitation on 
sovereignty in that arbitrary expropriations are illegal. The limitation can be binding if the 
state upholds the requirements of international law in this regard. Also, it can be argued that 
the requirement to pay compensation reduces the revenues that might be available for 
development. The Zimbabwe government has no capital for compensation; this alone is a 
factor restricting the sovereign to expropriate.  
 
4.4.8 Exchange Controls and Repatriation of Profits 
 
The rules regarding repatriation of profits discussed in chapter 2 apply to Zimbabwe because 
it is a member of the IMF. Being a developing state, Zimbabwe enjoys the benefits of the 
exception extended to developing countries regarding repatriation of profits.277 Due to this 
exception, developing countries that have exchange controls can be referred to as “Article 
XIV countries” after the provision in the IMF Rules which allows domestic policy and 
measures in order to regulate exchange controls for developing states. Measures on exchange 
controls were a common feature in the 1990s in developing countries and protectionist 
movement of foreign currency across national boundaries but were largely abandoned when 
the coil of trade and globalization began to exert its power following advocacy for economic 
liberalization. In the present day, developing states which impose exchange controls use 
Article XIV of the IMF Rules as the exception rather than the rule.278 
 
The advantages of the exception allow Zimbabwe, as a developing state, to require that a 
certain percentage of profits be retained in the host state. Domestic regulation of exchange 
controls and repatriation of profits is done by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) in terms 
of the RBZ Act279 and the Exchange Control Act.280 In terms of both Acts, repatriation of 
profits and how it must be done requires foreign mining investors and financial institutions 
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dealing in foreign currency to be holders of valid licences,281 unless an exception is granted 
by the RBZ.282  
While all new foreign shareholders post 1992 in Zimbabwe are permitted to remit full dividends 
declared from current after tax trading profits, [however],these remittances are subject to approval by 
the RBZ or an authorised dealer and confirmation that no recourse to local borrowing will be necessary. 
Although [a foreign mining investor] may be able to thereby to remit 100 percent of any dividends 
which it may pay in the future, the ability to do so will be dependent on the availability of foreign 
currency in Zimbabwe and the RBZ’s willingness to prioritise the remittance of the foreign 
currency component of the company’s dividend.283 [the words in bold is my emphasis]. 
 
The highlighted, and more particularly the underlined, show that the RBZ is the highest 
domestic monetary authority with discretion to approve repatriation of profits, as well as 
payment of current transactions. It can therefore be argued that the state asserts sovereignty 
regarding these issues. However, the requirement to uphold IMF Rules on repatriation of 
profits, and in order to remain in good standing, restricts Zimbabwe from adopting control 
measures to the contrary.284 Accordingly, Article VIII of the IMF Rules compels Zimbabwe 
to avoid restrictions on payment of current transactions and discriminatory currency 
practices.285 
 
Although Zimbabwe asserts sovereignty as shown above, however, “the conditions to 
determine willingness” can be a barrier to foreign investment in the absence of legislative 
clarity regarding repatriation of profits and payment of current transactions; for example, the 
adverse measures undertaken by the RBZ against mining companies such as the order to stop 
processing Zimplats’ export transactions in order to compel the investor to comply with 
exchange control regulations.286 However, in 2014 the RBZ was compelled to relax its strict 
foreign exchange regulations as part of the measures to stimulate foreign direct investment.287 
Also, foreign mining companies are under intense pressure from government to comply with 
indigenization law, ‘[…] whereby 51 percent of a company’s shares must be owned by 
indigenous (black) Zimbabweans’.288 In these instances Zimbabwe asserted its sovereignty. 
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The outworking of sovereignty and taking into account the international law principles of 
self-determination and non-interference discussed in chapter 2, shows that Zimbabwe asserts 
sovereignty by adopting regulatory measures regarding how repatriation of profits and 
payment of current transactions has to be done, as well as compelling mining investors co 
comply with domestic laws.  
 
4.4.9 Equitable Treatment of Mining Foreign Investors 
 
Zimbabwe’s “Look East Policy” (LEP) could lead to preferential treatment of foreign mining 
investors, giving preference to those from eastern countries over the west. Although there is 
no complaint over the issue one can argue that Chinese mining investors could be enjoying 
preference especially on the 51 percent indigenization requirement. The assumption is based 
on the preferential strategy - “LEP”. The absence of detail regarding uniform application of 
the indigenization law to all foreign mining companies operating in the country provides no 
clarity whether the law is applied without bias. Ideally, it can be argued that Zimbabwe is a 
sovereign state and therefore cannot be compelled to treat all foreign mining investors (from 
different countries) the same, as well as to comply with indigenization requirements.  
 
4.4.10 Revenue Transparency and Accountability  
 
The use and management of revenue from mineral resources require transparency and 
accountability in order to realize the contribution of resources towards national development. 
Zimbabwe does not have explicit policies on mandatory transparency and accountability: 
This is supported by mining legislation that does not provide for declaration of mineral 
resource payments to the State.  
 
The absence of domestic law or provisions for compulsory declaration of payments and 
publication of what mining companies pay to the state, as well as Zimbabwe not being a 
member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI), Publish What You Pay 
Zimbabwe (PWYP Zimbabwe) – a branch of the global network of civil society organizations 
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united in their call for transparency and accountability in the mineral value chain, and 
regulatory institutions.289  
It is largely uncontested that there is opacity in Zimbabwe’s mining sector. In the previous Government 
of National Unity [2008-2013], there was finger-pointing between the Ministry of Finance, the 
diamond mining companies and the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development with respect to the 
receipt of diamond mining revenues. The Ministry of Finance from the 2010 to the 2013 National 
Budget Statements has been on record stating that there have been leakages in the flow of diamond 
mining revenues. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development has openly stated that it 
solely concerns itself with mineral production and not mining revenues. This finger-pointing and blame 
shifting has clearly shown that the details surrounding diamond mining revenues are murky and 
shrouded in secrecy.290 
 
Lack of political will and high level corruption in the sector (discussed below) makes it 
necessary for civil society and stakeholders to pressure government and mining companies 
operating in the country to publish their contracts and revenues, as well as the types of taxes 
they are paying and the amounts, and what is exempted. This can be a strategy that can 
improve transparency in the minerals sector.291 
 
As highlighted above, the vaunted Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO), and Essar 
agreement has been in limbo since its signature in August 2011. The details of the agreement 
were not publicized ‘[…] save for the fact that the source of inertia has been the valuation of 
iron ore assets central to the deal’.292 Also, there has been no transparency regarding mining 
deals that were concluded as part of compliance with the indigenization law. Whereas 
Zimbabwe has exercised its sovereignty, on the one hand, there is unwillingness to allow 
public scrutiny of the mining sector and, on the other hand, the trend in many African states 
endowed with mineral resources ‘[…] has been to open the process of granting mining claims 
to public participation’.293 The variations can be a source of debate regarding the regulatory 
system, which is weak and devoid of transparency and accountability. This is further 
compounded by the fact that;  
[t]he controversy surrounding diamond mining has not been restricted to revenues accruing 
from the diamond mines but extends to the contracts entered into by the government and 
private investors in Marange. The finer details surrounding the engagement of core mining 
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have not been made public and are the subject of a court case that has been raging since 
2010.294 
 
Given the background of mistrust and secrecy in the minerals sector and the value chain, one 
would argue that the assertion of sovereignty over resources is fraught with weaknesses that 
can breed corruption; and the loopholes can be a deliberate ploy in order to avoid 
transparency and accountability, and public scrutiny of the manner in which the revenues are 
used and managed. One would also argue that practice of secrecy spur self-serving interests 
and not the objectives of the state as entrenched in the AMV, which advocates for, among 
others, transparency and accountability in the regulation and exploitation of domestic mineral 
resources. 
 
4.4.11 Strategic Planning on how to use Mineral Resources for Development 
 
The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset) is a 
strategic planning blue-print that includes how to use and manage mineral resources for 
development (for the period spanning October 2013 and December 2018).295  
In pursuit of a new trajectory of accelerated economic growth and wealth creation, [the] 
Government has formulated a new plan known as the [Zim-Asset]. Zim-Asset was crafted to 
achieve sustainable development and social equity anchored on indigenization, empowerment 
and employment creation which will be largely propelled by the judicious exploitation of the 
country’s abundant […] natural resources.296  
 
In order to achieve strategic planning, the Zim–Asset provides an improved planning tool for 
mineral resources development by developing a reliable database for the country’s minerals 
and strengthening the Geological Survey Unit (GSU). There is also the need to evaluate the 
country’s minerals in order to determine and develop a pattern for exploitation the 
resources.297 There is the need to restore fiscal sustainability and strengthen fiscal 
management by combatting corruption, and fostering good governance, transparency and 
accountability.298 Undertaking policy formulation, advocacy and coordination, as well as 
promoting investment by improving the country’s “doing business or investment 
environment” in order to ensure optimum exploitation of mineral resources is imperative.299  
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Mineral beneficiation and value addition through establishing diamond cutting and polishing 
centres is fundamental.300 This strategy, Zim-Asset notes, is the anchor that can boost 
revenues through value increase on the market. The private sector is encouraged to take an 
active role in funding and executing these activities and providing the required support 
regarding alignment, consistency and cohesion of policies that include mining or minerals 
development policy, national trade policy and indigenization policy, as well as local authority 
licensing and regulation policy.301 However, the success of beneficiation and value addition is 
dependent on availability of primary enablers such as reliable and affordable electricity, 
water and infrastructure.302  
 
Underpinning the above strategy and objectives, is the need to curb corruption and strengthen 
the State’s regulatory capacity. The Zim-Asset provides for zero tolerance of corruption, and 
in order to achieve this goal the state has to strengthen and capacitate anti-corruption agencies 
through code of ethics and values, and to implement and impose stiff criminal penalties on 
offenders.303 Accordingly, the requirement to implement mechanisms in order to curb 
corruption is an assertion of Zimbabwe’s sovereignty over mineral resources. 
 
4.4.12 Non-judicial Dispute Settlement 
 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe is the supreme law of the country.304 Among other things, it 
provides for the establishment of the domestic judiciary, the hierarchy of the courts and their 
composition,305 as well as jurisdiction.306 The judicial authority is derived from the people of 
Zimbabwe and it is vested in the courts.307 The courts are independent (in theory) and only 
subject to the Constitution and municipal laws of which they are the custodians.308 The Mines 
Act provides for dispute settlement; mining commissioners have powers to resolve mining 
issues as well as domestic courts. Apart from the judicial processes to resolve disputes, 
Zimbabwe acknowledges arbitration as an integral aspect for dispute settlement. Two Acts 
were enacted for this purpose; namely, the Arbitration Act (Trade Arbitration Act)309 which is 
                                                          
300
 Ibid, at 114. 
301
 Ibid, at 102. 
302
 Ibid. 
303
 See generally Zim-Asset, supra note 295 at 126. 
304
 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
305
 Sections 162 – 165 of the Constitution. 
306
 See generally sections 166 – 176 of the Constitution 
307
 Section 162 of the Constitution. 
308
 Section 164 of the Constitution. 
309
 Arbitration Act 6 of 1996, (Chapter 7:15) as amended. 
   163 
dedicated to settlement of trade issues and Arbitration International Investment Disputes Act 
(Investment Arbitration Act)310 for international investment disputes. The Investment 
Arbitration Act is directly relevant to this section because it relates to resolving mining 
investment issues. 
 
The Mines Act does not provide for mining investment arbitration; however, any mining 
complaint or dispute has to be investigated and decided upon by the mining commissioner in 
the first instance.311 The mining commissioner plays a fundamental role in the preliminary 
stages of a mining or mineral resource dispute settlement. The commissioner may convene a 
court in any part of the mining district to which he or she is appointed, or at his or her 
discretion and to the convenience of the parties to the dispute, may convene a court outside 
the mining district.312 This is assertion of state sovereignty. The magistrates’ court procedures 
are observed in the commissioner’s court.313 In certain circumstances, a magistrate may hear 
and make determinations on matters arising under the Mines Act or when a party to the 
dispute requests that the matter be heard by a magistrate instead of the commissioner.314 
Further, a party may appeal to the High Court or Supreme Court of Zimbabwe against the 
decision of the commissioner’s court.315 Depending on the circumstances and the gravity of 
the matter, however, the High Court of Zimbabwe has original jurisdiction in civil matters, 
complaints or disputes that may arise under the Mines Act.316 However, the Mines Act is 
silent and does not expressly affirm that mining-related disputes between Zimbabwe and 
foreign investors can be referred to domestic arbitration. 
 
Regardless of the shortfalls of the Mines Act, the Investment Arbitration Act spells out the 
framework and scope for, as well as the circumstances under which an investor may request 
domestic arbitration. As a general rule, what may be arbitrated could be any investment 
dispute, which the parties to a dispute agreed to submit to arbitration.317 However, the Act 
provides for a category of matters that are not subject to arbitration, which include criminal 
cases and disputes which in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe cannot be determined through 
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arbitration.318 Further, the Act gave effect to domestic and international arbitration 
agreements by recognizing aspects of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards,319 whereas the Trade Arbitration Act domesticated some of the 
modifications that were brought in by the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration that was adopted by the UN Commission on International Trade Law.320 
Therefore one can say Zimbabwe legitimately acknowledges and upholds the law of 
international arbitration in dispute settlement.  
 
With regard to the hierarchy of domestic courts, the Investment Arbitration Act seemingly 
gives the ICSID tribunal higher status than local courts. The Act provides that;   
[i]f any proceedings are instituted in any [domestic] court in regard to any matter which, under 
the [ICSID Convention], is required to be submitted to the [ICSID Arbitration Tribunal] for 
conciliation or arbitration, any party to the proceedings may apply to the court to stay the 
proceedings, and the court, unless satisfied that the matter is not required to be submitted to 
the [ICSID Tribunal], shall make an order staying the proceedings.321 
 
From this provision, the use of “shall” is imperative and denotes that domestic courts must 
give precedence to any application submitted to the ICSID regardless of the fact that the same 
issue was pending before a local court. However, one may argue that domesticating and 
giving legal effect to the ICSID Convention adversely affects Zimbabwe’s assertion of 
sovereignty.322 Further the legal effect of domestic recognition of international arbitration 
freezes the competence and jurisdiction of municipal courts to exercise their constitutional 
mandate over the issue. Domestic courts cannot hear the issue once a decision has been made 
by the ICSID because the decisions are non-appealable.323 Furthermore, domestic courts are 
robbed of their constitutional legitimacy and mandate; the courts become incapable of 
supporting the assertion of Zimbabwe’s sovereignty. In other words, the ICSID tribunal acts 
authoritatively like the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.  
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Depending on the nature and gravity of the dispute as provided for in the Investment 
Arbitration Act, a party may proceed by way of domestic or international arbitration.324 Since 
Zimbabwe concluded bilateral investments agreements with some countries, reference is 
made to dispute settlement provisions as provided for in the BITs. For example, the 
Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government 
of the Republic of Zimbabwe on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments has provision for dispute settlement between the two Contracting States and 
between an investor from either Contracting State.325 Article 8(1) of the China-Zimbabwe 
BIT provides that any dispute between the two Contracting States concerning interpretation 
or application of the BIT, the issue shall be settled by consultation through diplomatic 
channels. In the event that the dispute cannot be settled within a period of less than six 
months, ‘[…] it shall upon the request of either Contracting Party, be submitted to an ad hoc 
arbitral tribunal’326 and the composition of the tribunal is provided for in terms of the BIT.327 
The tribunal is given powers to determine its own procedures and settle the dispute in 
accordance with provisions of the BIT, as well as principles of international law recognized 
by the Contracting States.328 The decision of the tribunal shall be binding on both states and 
is non-appealable.329 Also, Zimbabwe legally recognizes the importance of the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States330 and 
the international Arbitration Tribunal established under it. As a sign for the recognition, the 
Investment Arbitration Act was enacted in order to domesticate aspects of the Convention.331 
Further, Zimbabwe recognizes the awards of the tribunal, which are only enforced by 
domestic courts after they are registered with the High Court of Zimbabwe.332 The 
Investment Arbitration Act provides for the procedure which a party intending to register the 
award has to follow.333 When registered, the legal effect of the award is that it becomes 
recognized in the country and carries legal authority as awards made by the High Court of 
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Zimbabwe. Therefore the High Court has control of the award and it has to be executed as an 
order of the Court.334 
 
Article 9(1) of the China-Zimbabwe BIT provides for dispute settlement between Zimbabwe 
and Chinese investors in Zimbabwe, which shall ‘[…] as far as possible, be settled amicably 
through negotiations between the parties to the dispute’.335 In the event that the dispute is not 
resolved within six months from the time of initiating the settlement process, any party to the 
dispute is entitled to approach a competent court of the host state to hear the matter. If the 
dispute involves expropriation and compensation, and has not been settled within a period of 
six months, at the request of a party to the dispute, an ad hoc arbitral tribunal may be 
established and its composition is guided by the relevant provisions of the BIT.336 If there are 
delays to constitute the panel of the arbitral tribunal, any party to the dispute is entitled to 
invite ‘[…] Secretary General of the [ICSID] to make the necessary appointments’.337 With 
regard to choice of law, the tribunal has to determine its own procedures and may resort to 
the Arbitration Rules of the ICSID; the decision of the tribunal is final and binding on the 
parties.338 With reference to Chinese mining investors operating in Zimbabwe, the BIT 
protects their investment interests against expropriation as well as any form of discrimination 
or unfair treatment.339 
 
BITs create rights and duties between the Contracting States. The conclusion of the China - 
Zimbabwe BIT created treaty obligations binding on Zimbabwe, as the host mining state, to 
render fair and equitable treatment,340 full protection and security.341 The treatment ought to 
be not less favourable than that is granted to local mining investors or any other mining 
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investors from a non-Contracting State.342 In the event that the obligations are breached, as 
referred to in chapter 2,343 this may lead to the BIT being adversely interpreted against 
Zimbabwe. This is due to fact that the BIT is a treaty in character, and therefore binding only 
on the parties involved; Zimbabwe being the host state has obligations while the investors 
from China (Contracting State) have rights which Zimbabwe must protect.  
 
The objective of the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe344 was to create favourable conditions for greater 
investment by South African investors in Zimbabwe. In the event of a dispute arising, the 
BIPPA provides for settlement mechanisms and if the dispute is not settled amicably, it may 
at the choice of the investor, be submitted for arbitration under the rules of the ICSID or 
UNCITRAL.345 However, ‘[d]ue to the non-prescriptive wording of Article 7’ of the 
BIPPA,346 one of the applicants - a South African company, Amari Nickel Holding 
Zimbabwe Ltd, and its other partner Amaplat Mauritius, chose the International Chamber of 
Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration rules to be applied to the arbitration 
proceedings. The applicants sued the respondent for cancelling Memoranda of Understanding 
that were concluded by the parties for platinum and nickel concessions.347 The two 
companies then sued the ZMDC for US$35 million for damages suffered as a result of the 
unilateral cancellation of the agreements, which include the exploration rights concerning 
platinum that the applicants intended to explore and then exploit in Zimbabwe through a joint 
venture with the Respondent. On the arbitration panel was a British barrister, Stewart Isaacs, 
who was nominated by the United Kingdom International Chamber of Commerce National 
Committee to chair the tribunal. However, the ZMDC objected to the nomination on the basis 
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that a British national would be biased against it and that his home country was against 
Zimbabwe. Also, the ZMDC claimed that it was the UK that persuaded the EU to impose 
targeted sanctions on President Mugabe and his ruling elite. Further the ZMDC alleged that 
Isaacs persuaded the South African judge to be biased against it. This was the basis upon 
which the ZMDC tried to have the two removed by taking the issue to court in Cape Town, 
South Africa, but the court ruled against it.348 The ZMDC then approached the International 
Court of Arbitration in Paris, France, and again lost the case.349 Unsatisfied with the decisions 
of the two decisions, the ZMDC approached the High Court of Zambia where it finally got a 
provisional order to stop all the arbitration proceedings until the dispute on the appointment 
of Isaacs and South African judge was finalized.350 
 
This is classical case that might convince any potential investor that it is better to steer clear 
of Zimbabwe. After all, Zimbabwe through its agent the ZMDC asserted its sovereignty by 
cancelling the exploration and mining agreements it had concluded with the two applicants. 
 
From the case above, it can be argued that when Zimbabwe government concluded the BITs, 
which it entered freely while asserting its sovereignty, and in the same process of assertion of 
sovereignty, it adversely restricted that sovereignty. Further, the choices of law and forum 
adversely rendered Zimbabwe municipal law and courts, which are the internal reasons for 
sovereignty to be dysfunctional. Furthermore, by appearing before the South African court, 
ICC International Court of Arbitration and the Zambian High Court, Zimbabwe surrendered 
certain portion of its sovereignty to supernatural international arbitration forums, and courts. 
 
4.5 Threats to Sovereignty over Mineral Resources  
 
Various domestic factors have the potential to further weaken the assertion of state 
sovereignty over domestic mineral resources. As discussed in chapter 3, a few have been 
chosen with a viewing to show the manner in which Zimbabwe’s assertion of sovereignty 
over domestic mineral resources is further restricted. 
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4.5.1 Illegal Mining  
Illegal mining can be defined as unlawful access to, and exploitation of a mineral resource. 
The absence of lawful rights is inferred from engaging in mining or related activities without 
a valid licence or mineral transportation permit, as well as any documents that legitimizes the 
operations.351 Illegal mining also includes blood diamonds because they are exploited 
clandestinely and traded illegally.352 It is unlawful to exploit any mineral resource in 
Zimbabwe without a valid licence. 
 
Unconfirmed reports point out that illegal mining is on the increase throughout the country. 
For example, unconfirmed reports say police have failed to stop thousands of illegal miners 
from invading Doves area in Inyathi, Bubi district following the discovery of gold 
deposits.353 Further, it is reported that the uncertainty regarding the future control of Marange 
diamond claims has caused rapid increase in illegal diamond panning ‘[…] with a brutal 
response being meted out by security details’.354 Furthermore, it is reported that syndicates of 
diamond panners are active at the diamond fields since the alluvial diamond deposits were 
discovered. However, according to the Center for Research and Development, the recent 
months have witnessed an increase in the numbers of panners and syndicates engaging in 
illegal mining of alluvial diamonds.355 Since the government announced that it was planning 
to hand over control of the Marange diamond fields to one mining company, production has 
reportedly gone down. The announcement affected diamond mining companies in Marange 
and since then, it was reported that the companies are failing to pay their workers who are 
now alleged to be involved in illegal mining to make ends meet.356 The communities 
surrounding the diamond fields and those who were forced to relocate have experienced 
poverty-stricken lives and are reportedly not benefited since the commencement of 
commercial mining operations.  
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Illegal mining potentially causes problems; it has put citizens against each other in Marange 
diamond fields before the state used force to reclaim the area, and indigenous people against 
the Chinese miners along the major rivers across the country. Illegal miners, among them 
foreigners such as Chinese and Nigerians, have taken advantage of weak enforcement 
capacity and corruption in the mining sector, as well as the overall regulatory structures.357 
Undeniably, illegal mining undermines state sovereignty because the operations are 
unauthorized and unregulated, as well as not compliant with domestic laws.358 Exacerbating 
the situation is the fact illegal miners use illegal channels to siphon the resources out of the 
country, thereby depriving the state the right of control over processes and revenues.359 This 
undermines the assertion of sovereignty over domestic minerals and the potential to derive 
economic benefits to spur national development through the exploitation of minerals. 
 
Also, illegal mining is reportedly associated with some politicians, who are using their agents 
to unlawfully engage in mining and trade of minerals.360 The practice has the potential to 
undermine national development, as well as restrict the minerals sector’s potential 
contribution to the economy. The Mines Act is not explicit about artisanal mining. Regardless 
of the silence, however, Zimbabwe attempts to navigate illegal mining by criminalizing the 
activities through legislative and executive actions. 
 
4.5.2 Corruption 
 
Unconfirmed reports allege that some politicians use their influence and intimidation in order 
to derive self-serving economic benefits from mining companies. In addition, influential 
officials in government and the Ministry of Mines have been accused of demanding bribes.361 
To escape attention and public scrutiny, these politicians use agents or runners in the mining 
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or trade of the minerals.362 Former Minister of Mines, Obert Mpofu, allegedly dismissed calls 
for transparency and accountability in the mining sector arguing that one has to reap where he 
sows.363 Further the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy (PPC) was in 
April 2010 and August 2010 denied access into the Marange diamond fields in order to 
conduct on-site inspections of the mining companies’ operations.364 The basis for denying 
entry to the PPC was allegedly that it needed police clearance because the site was protected 
in terms of the Protected Places and Areas Act.365 However, it is reported that the Marange 
diamond fields are not legally declared a protected area in terms of the Protected Places and 
Areas Act. Regardless of the inconsistencies, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(KPCS) monitor, Abbey Chikane and international monitoring groups were allowed access 
and, without any restrictions, free entry into the diamond fields.366 News reporters were 
barred from, and activities in the diamond fields are shielded from public scrutiny. The only 
body that attempted to uncover the facts on the ground with the intention of reporting to 
Parliament was the PPC on Mines and Energy. However, when permission was granted, the 
publication of the first report of the PPC on Mines and Energy over Marange diamonds was 
not debated in Parliament. As reported, it is alleged that the findings were very controversial 
and the cause for the assassination of the chairperson of the PPC on Mines and Energy, 
Chindori–Chininga, a few days after he presented the adverse report before Parliament.367 
 
In its investigation on Foreign Affairs, Industry and International Trade, the PPC found that 
another parastatal, former Ziscosteel entered into partnership with a foreign investor, Global 
Steel Holdings Limited, without a public tender.368 It is reported that Mpofu, who at that time 
was a Minister of Industry and International Trade, professed ignorance of the legal 
procedure as required by law.369 Entering into joint partnership without public tender violates 
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certain provisions of Zimbabwe’s Procurement Act, which require a state enterprise wishing 
to form a joint partnership with private investors, to request the Government’s Procurement 
Board to publicly invite tenders on its behalf.370 Against this background, it can be argued 
that there was deliberate contravention of the law and analysis shows that joint mining 
operations could have been formed in opaque ways with little regard to the relevant domestic 
laws. The fact that Zimbabwe is touting for joint mining ventures to exploit domestic mineral 
resources could be concluded that plans are as little more than exchanging one form of 
resource plunder.371 Therefore it may not be an overstatement to allege that corruption is 
promoted by deliberate circumvention of the legitimate processes, and lack of transparency 
and accountability.  
 
Unconfirmed reports alleged that joint diamond mining companies that have been awarded 
mining rights are directly linked to the ruling party and military elites.372 The clandestine 
manner in which mining negotiations and contract deals have been concluded leave the door 
open for corruption. Also, the executive and its officers are generally not willing to be held 
accountable to parliament.373 Where state mining entities seek partnership with investors, 
there must be tenders to the public prior to formation of joint mining ventures; as required by 
the Procurement Act. However, reports show that the joint mining venture between ZMDC, 
on one the hand, and Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners, on the other hand, were not 
subject to public tender.374 It is alleged the ZMDC was given names of the two mining 
partnership companies, on the basis that they had been approved by the Ministry of Mines.375 
It is further reported that Mpofu was tasked to spell out the procedure that was adopted in 
selecting the two companies, in the absence of public tenders, but there was no legitimate 
response.376 It is not the first time under Mpofu’s leadership of a government ministry to 
bypass procurement or tender procedures. Furthermore, it is reported that Mpofu admitted 
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before the PPC that he was aware of the shady business deals in the mining sector, especially 
in Marange diamonds, but he tried to justify this by arguing that his own research showed 
that ‘people in the diamond business globally are drug traffickers, smugglers or plain 
crooks’.377 Although Mpofu tried to justify the shady deals in the mining sector by comparing 
to global trends, as alleged, this is an indirect acknowledgement of corruption in the sector. 
Arguably, Mpofu’s remarks suggest an extremely worrying trend underlying the rationale for 
establishment of joint mining ventures, namely, looting of the resources.378 Also, Sharife’s 
report detailed the orchestrated and clandestine manner in which high-value minerals, like 
diamonds, are being siphoned from the country.379 
 
Furthermore, it is reported that about US$300 million collected by ZMDC and MMCZ, the 
two state entities which directly fall under the Ministry of Mines, did not reach the national 
treasury.380 Although former Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, ordered the Auditor-General 
and the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority to carry out an audit, no one was held responsible.381 
Against this background, transparency and accountability becomes a very important tool; the 
state has an inherent duty to ensure that revenues are controlled and held in trust for national 
benefit. It appears; however, that lack of political-will and failure to regulate the regulators 
undermine transparency and accountability, thereby facilitating orchestrated corruption in the 
sector.382 It was also reported that the Minister of Finance, Chinamasa, made a startling 
admission that the government was incompetent to curb corruption on the basis that the 
offence is very sophisticated for law enforcement officers to detect and investigate.383 The 
intricacy is exacerbated by the fact that both, the briber and the bribed, illegally acquire some 
financial benefits, therefore none of them report to the police. 
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In a nutshell, Zimbabwe is losing mineral resource revenues through various ways including 
but not limited to corruption, illegal mining and smuggling. These threats have weakened and 
undermined the assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources, as well as the 
operationalization of PSNR. Corruption has also restricted the revenue base through negative 
effects on taxable income and opened loopholes in the tax collection system.384  
 
4.5.3 Internal Conflicts  
 
In contrast to the cold war period, present day domestic conflicts are less about seizing the 
reins of a state than about controlling or plundering natural resources.385 Internal conflicts in 
Zimbabwe are not caused by armed conflicts but policy differences regarding the manner in 
which natural resources have to be regulated in order to avoid resource plunder. Resource 
conflicts in Zimbabwe have their origin in long-standing and unsettled domestic disputes. 
The need to redress this as a matter of urgency and without proper structures in place may 
spoil the good intentions of resource regulation thereby causing and promoting self-serving 
interests, and illegal access to the resources.386 
 
The major post-independence Zimbabwean conflict over mineral resources occurred in the 
Marange diamond fields.387 The discovery of alluvial diamonds in Marange in 2006 could 
have influenced some people to engage in illegal diamond mining. It is reported that 
thousands of people were involved in diamond panning and illegal trade. When the 
government became aware that it was losing potential revenue from untapped Marange 
diamonds, the first step was to control the diamond fields, by sending the army and police. It 
was reported in 2007 that police officers who were manning the diamond fields allegedly 
used force to compel illegal diamond miners to work in syndicates and get bribes, or beat and 
killed those who refused to follow their orders.388 The 2008 economic hardships pushed many 
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ordinary Zimbabweans to the diamond fields in the hope of finding alluvial diamonds.389 It is 
reported that state control of the diamond fields initially failed because of the large numbers 
of illegal miners and as a last resort, force was used to control and stop illegal diamond 
mining.390 
 
Unconfirmed reports provide detail on the operation that was undertaken by the police, army 
and security agents known as ‘Operation Hakudzokwi’, which translates to “You Shall Never 
Return”.391 This meant that the illegal miners would not return to the diamond fields after the 
operation. It is reported that five military helicopters armed with automatic rifles fired live 
ammunition and teargas at the unarmed illegal miners in the diamond fields and at the same 
time about 800 soldiers on the ground fired their assault rifles at the miners 
indiscriminately.392 The massacre reportedly took place between October and November 
2008, and was investigated and reported on the BBC, Human Rights Watch and Global 
Witness, amongst others.393 
 
The Marange diamond blood purge is an example of internal conflict, which arguably is 
illegitimate and incorrect way for asserting of sovereignty over domestic minerals.394 This 
story shows the excesses, tensions and challenges as well as the changing face of assertion of 
state sovereignty. Was the use of force against unarmed and poor civilians reasonable and 
necessary in order to assert sovereignty over the diamonds? Would this be considered a 
legitimate way to exercise sovereignty and self-determination to benefit all Zimbabweans? 
The method that was used to claim control is unquestionably unreasonable as well as an 
albatross in the history of the regulation of natural resources in post-independent Zimbabwe. 
 
It is reported that the purge in order to control the diamonds was very gross and attracted 
international attention and condemnation. The reaction by the Kimberley Process in order to 
bring stability included suspending Marange diamonds exports until Zimbabwe was 
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Kimberley Process compliant. Zimbabwe was ordered to withdraw its military and police 
from the diamond fields, and to allow for an independent investigation of the alleged gross 
violation of human rights. Further Zimbabwe was compelled to freeze the introduction of any 
new diamond mining companies into the diamond fields. A Joint Work Plan was established 
to assist Zimbabwe to comply with the minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process.395 
To ensure compliance, the Kimberley Process appointed a monitor over Marange diamonds 
who had to be very watchful in order to prevent exports of the diamonds as well as to report 
any breach to the Plenary Meeting of the Process. The measures that were adopted by their 
nature restricted Zimbabwe’s sovereignty over the control of the diamonds. On the one hand, 
the measures are justified in order to ensure appropriate regulation of the resources, and on 
the other hand, they interfered with Zimbabwe’s sovereignty. Regardless of the conflicting 
interests, one can argue that the interference could be an indication that Zimbabwe failed to 
appropriately regulate its diamonds.396 Further the interference shows that sovereignty is not 
absolute but has to operate within the legitimate confines of international law.397 
 
While the limits of sovereignty are debatable,398 it is vital for Zimbabwe to balance the 
assertion of sovereignty with legitimate and appropriate regulation of domestic mineral 
resources.399 By virtue of the operation of the international law principles which support 
sovereignty over mineral resources discussed in chapter 2, gives Zimbabwe exclusive rights 
and control over domestic mineral resources. However, weak regulation of mineral resources 
might lead to conflict over access to the resources. This in turn may cause the assertion of 
sovereignty to be challenged or weakened as shown by the interference by the Kimberley 
Process.400 
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4.5.4 IMF and World Bank Conditionalities 
 
The World Bank and IMF, the US and Europe compelled most African states to adopt a 
“thatcherite free-market” and free-trade best known as ‘structural adjustment’.401 The IMF 
and World Bank influenced Zimbabwe to take advantage of liberalized trade opportunities 
ushered in by globalization in the 1990s.402 As a result, Zimbabwe adopted an Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) after the World Bank and the IMF, as well as 
some developed countries from the west, promised substantial aid during the first year of its 
implementation.403 While in the middle of the implementation process, problems arose from 
different perspectives, both domestic and international. On the domestic spheres, challenges 
included those caused by labour unions, private sector and strikes for improved work 
conditions.404 From the international perspective, Zimbabwe faced challenges from its 
bilateral and multilateral donors, which included the World Bank and IMF.405 
 
It is reported that the IMF and World Bank courted Zimbabwe during the 1980s but the 
African state resisted the economic and political changes suggested by the industrialized 
world. In 1990s, Zimbabwe acceded to the influence to lift the restrictions on imports such as 
tariffs on foreign products destined for the domestic market in return for substantial aid.406 
However, after being lured to adopt the ESAP programme by the two international financial 
institutions, Zimbabwe faced economic challenges within a short period after adopting the 
programme. The challenges were exacerbated after the two institutions withheld aid in an 
effort to force Zimbabwe to adopt further economic and political reforms.407 Surprisingly, a 
year after the implementation of ESAP, the World Bank and IMF, as well as other 
international donors backtracked on the conditions they initially agreed on and demanded 
substantial economic reforms that by far altered the original conditions for the agreement.408 
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Furthermore, only a small fraction of the promised aid was actually given to Zimbabwe. The 
justifications were that substantial reforms were required for the donor community to be able 
to give the full aid.409 Underpinning this unprincipled departure and breach of the initial 
agreement is that donors urged Zimbabwe to renegotiate a more liberalized market with the 
IMF and World Bank or risk losing the promised aid.410 While taking into account the 
conditions that were advocated by the World Bank and IMF, as well as the negative effects 
caused by ESAP during period of implementation, various sectors of the domestic economy 
including the minerals sector were adversely affected.411 
 
The fact that the World Bank, IMF and other international donors insisted on further reforms, 
which include scaling-down the public service employees and government departments is 
absolutely critical point as this contributed to weak policing and enforcement, and in turn to 
corruption and illegality. Also, liberalizing the economy as prerequisite for aid412 can be 
dictatorial interference in Zimbabwe’s domestic affairs in the name of trade liberalization.413 
The IMF and World Bank’s conditionalities interfered with, and undeniably restricted 
Zimbabwe’s assertion of sovereignty.  
 
In conclusion, Zimbabwe today faces economic problems as a result of manifold chain of 
events ignited by the ESAP adopted in the 1990s at the behest of the World Bank and IMF.414 
The conditionality policy was a trigger event of the major cause of the economic crises in 
Zimbabwe. However, Newburg is of the view that alleging this per se, as it is commonly 
manifested would be misrepresentation of the reality.415 I somewhat agree to this, but 
strongly maintain that the IMF and World Bank conditionalities were the prime cause of 
economic challenges in Zimbabwe.  
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4.7 Conclusion  
 
The chapter has discussed the importance of mineral resources to Zimbabwe’s economy, the 
provisions in mineral laws and themes that support, as well as the restriction of the assertion 
of sovereignty over domestic mineral resources and the manner in which this is done. The 
chapter also discussed the operationalization of international law principles in the various 
themes in support of state sovereignty over mineral resources. Although Zimbabwe is 
endowed with abundance of mineral resources, their economic contribution to the national 
GDP is negatively affected by various factors, which include lack of firm property rights, 
illegal mining, corruption, weak policing and enforcement of the relevant laws.  
 
Although indigenization policy is a step towards economic empowerment and giving the 
PSNR principle practical meaning to assert sovereignty; however, threats to state sovereignty 
remains the biggest challenge for Zimbabwe to derive maximum economic benefits from its 
mineral resources. Owing to lack of transparency and accountability, a handful of politically-
connected elite are illegally amassing economic benefits while majority of indigenous 
Zimbabweans are living in dire poverty. The biased way in which the minerals sector is 
regulated breeds threats to sovereignty; this is a challenge which undermines the assertion of 
sovereignty and economic growth and development. Accordingly, lack of transparency and 
appropriate use of PSNR in the regulation of mineral resources cause bottlenecks and restricts 
and weakens sovereignty. As a result, loss of mining revenue is exacerbated by the porous 
legal framework, weak tax collection system and enforcement of the relevant laws due to 
institutional failure among others. Further, the Mines Act is outdated and does not address 
new challenges in the sector, as well as provide an ideal framework for regulation to meet 
modern mining standards. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SOVEREIGNTY, MINERAL RESOURCE REGULATION AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC) 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
As with the chapter on Zimbabwe, this chapter examines how the DRC has operationalized 
principles relevant to the exploitation of minerals for development. The chapter provides a 
brief profile of the DRC, its political economy, the economic importance of its mineral 
endowment and its contribution to national development. It then considers the manner in 
which state sovereignty over mineral resources is exercised. This is done through analysis of 
key domestic mining laws, as was the case with Zimbabwe. The key categories of the 
analysis are, property and ownership rights, access to mineral resources, mineral resource 
policing and enforcement of mining laws, beneficiation and trade, legal obligations toward 
indigenous communities, compensation for expropriation, exchange controls and repatriation 
of profits, equitable treatment of foreign mining investors, revenue transparency and 
accountability, and strategic planning for development. The challenges faced by the DRC in 
regulating its mineral resources are considered, whilst taking into account threats to its 
mandate of sovereignty over mineral resources.  
 
5.2 Country Profile 
 
Positioned in west-central Africa, formerly Zaire, the DRC straddles the equator, and is 
located in the center of equatorial central Africa with one third of its provinces lying within 
the northern part and two-thirds in the southern part of the equator.1 The DRC, often called 
the “Congo” or “Congo-Kinshasa”, to distinguish it from the neighbouring Republic of the 
Congo (often known as Congo-Brazzaville), is landlocked, except for a coastline of 
approximately 37 km containing the mouth and lower reaches of the Congo River, which 
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connects the country to the South Atlantic Ocean.2 The DRC is the second-largest country in 
Africa after Algeria3 and shares common borders with nine other countries; the Central 
African Republic to the north, South Sudan to the northeast, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and 
Tanzania to the east along Lake Tanganyika, then Zambia to the southeast, Angola to the 
southwest and the Republic of the Congo to the northwest.4 
 
The country has a population of approximately 72 million;5 however, research failed to 
establish whether this includes displaced peoples from conflicts elsewhere in the region. The 
country is the ancestral homeland for over 200 ethnic groups, most descended from 
individual kingdoms established long before the Europeans arrived in the late 1800s.6  
 
Regarding physical landforms, there are three major ones; namely, the DRC Basin,7 the 
Congo River, and the Great Rift Valley. The Basin covers most of the central and west parts 
of the DRC and is surrounded by plateaus, which stretch to reach huge expanses of dense 
forests.8 Lying north of the Equator, the Ruwenzori Mountains, is a range on the border with 
Uganda, which extends between Lakes Albert and Edward.9 Running through the Basin is the 
Congo River, which is the only major river to flow into the Southern Atlantic and an 
important means of water transport.10 The last major landform is the Great Rift Valley that 
was formed due to tectonic actions;11 the DRC's ‘Great Lakes’ were also formed through 
tectonic activities. The Great Rift Valley can be described as three landforms in one; a valley 
with some dormant volcanoes, a chain of lakes such as Lake Albert, Lake Edward and Lake 
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Tanganyika. The country is largely mountainous along the western front,12 and the major 
rivers offer abundant sources for potential generation of hydroelectricity.13  
 
Regarding mineral resource endowment, the DRC is richly endowed with an array of 
resources including substantial reserves of cobalt, cadmium, diamonds, gold, manganese, 
germanium, uranium and bauxite, silver, zinc, iron ore, coltan, coal and copper14 and its 
fertile soils harbour a wide variety of minerals with often very high quality.15 Further, the 
DRC is likely to be the world's largest producer of cobalt ore, copper and industrial 
diamonds.16 The volcanic region straddling the border with Rwanda contains lavas from 
which several new types of mineral resources have been found.17 The northern parts of Kivu 
province has protrusions of carbonatite or lueshe which are rich in pyrochlores while along 
the DRC-Rwanda border is the region of dormant volcanos containing lavas with several new 
silicates.18 The northern parts of the country including the Oriental province are where the 
famous gold exploitations of Kilo-Moto can be found. Most mining activities are found in the 
regions stretching from the Oriental to Katanga provinces.19 The Katanga region is reportedly 
to have the second largest world deposits of copper, estimated to be in excess of 70 million 
tonnes and some of the world's richest deposits of cobalt.20 On the western part closer to the 
border of the country with Congo- Brazzaville, the west of the capital Kinshasa encloses 
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deposits of zinc and lead vanadate, where there are deposits of copper silicate on the massif 
of Niari.21 Mineral wealth is the DRC’s greatest natural asset and is profoundly concentrated 
in the northeast part of the country, including North and South Kivu provinces. Other 
provinces do not contain many minerals with the exception of the diamondiferous deposits, 
the eluvium and alluvium of the region of Mbuji-Maji (mostly industrial diamonds) and gold 
mines of the Upper DRC, in the Kilo-Moto.22 Also, the DRC has onshore petroleum deposits 
that it has yet to exploit on a commercial scale; however, petroleum does not form part of the 
study. 
 
It is argued that mineral resource exploitation activities are presently concentrated in the 
northern and eastern parts of the country, where the Copper-Belt extends from the Republic 
of Zambia into the country near Lubumbashi because this is the region where most minerals 
are found.23 Given the level of mineral endowment, the DRC is a potentially eminent mining 
territory - the centre of various exploitations of most diverse minerals,24 and also one of 
Africa’s richest mining countries. The mineral endowment and the remarkable nature of the 
DRC have been associated with conflicts. For that reason, the endowment is often referred to 
as the “geological scandal” or “the curse of raw materials”,25 an indication that it does not 
really serve the Congolese people. 
 
Since the colonial era mineral resources, such as gold found in 1903 in the north-east of the 
country and diamonds discovered in 1907 in the Kasai region, have been the basis upon 
which a number of foreign extractive companies have entered the DRC.26 Since then, mining 
has been the DRC's main source of exports and foreign exchange under the political 
leadership of Belgium. Following the ushering in of political independence in 1960, the new 
government did not change much of the existing mining and regulatory structures. Instead, 
the state nationalized most of the existing mining companies including major companies such 
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as the Belgian company, Societe des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto (SOKIMO), which later 
became the Office des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto (OKIMO).27 During the 1960s and 1970s, 
the DRC, then Zaire, was the world’s leading producer of minerals such as copper and cobalt. 
Before gaining political independence, a Belgian mining company, Union Miniere du Haut 
Katanga (UMHK), exclusively operated the country’s copper and cobalt mines but after 
independence, the desire to open up investment opportunities in the DRC attracted new 
entrants into the mining sector.28  
 
When the late Mobutu Sese Seko came into power, his government nationalized the UMHK 
in 1966 and renamed it Generale’ des Carriers et des Mines (Gecamines).29 Copper 
concessions were managed by Gecamines and during that period, it was a major state-owned 
mining company. Gecamines was very productive and viable enterprise, however, from the 
1980s, it had viability problems and finally collapsed in early 2000 due to, inter alia, the 
collapse of the mine of Kamoto and ethnic riots in Shaba, mismanagement and liquidity 
problems, as well as aging infrastructure and equipment.30 Gecamines had partnerships with 
foreign mining companies operating in the country such as AngloGold Ashanti, Mwana 
Africa, Moto Gold Mines, Barrick Corporation and Banro Corporation.31  
 
Prior to adopting Law 007 of 2002 (the Mining Code), the DRC mining law was based on a 
concession system and was not regulated by any form of domestic law; this could be the 
reason Gecamines had the leverage to exercise its discretion without accountability to the 
state. Although there are efforts by the government to revive Gecamines, the company is 
currently in partnership with some foreign companies operating in the country such as 
Phoenix, Arizona-based Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold Incorporation (FCX: US) and 
London-based Glencore Xstrata Plc (GLEN).32 The main mining companies operating in the 
DRC are listed in Canada, the US and Australia,33 and are gradually being joined by some 
Chinese and Indian mining companies. 
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The DRC has been experiencing problems in its minerals sector; chief among which are 
problems in the allocation of mineral resources and mining contracts between 1996 and 
2003.34 This led to intense parliamentary debates regarding the irregularities affecting 
transparency and accountability in the sector. In order to redress this, and ensure 
transparency, the DRC government established a parliamentary commission in 2005, known 
as the Lutundula Commission,35 to investigate the allegations. In its findings, the Lutundula 
Commission noted that although Gécamines approved joint-mining agreements, the decision 
was not economically viable. As a matter of fact, joint-mining ventures faced management 
problems that eventually contributed to the collapse of such entities.36 In some cases, the 
Commission established that management committees running public enterprises had 
negotiations in which the Kinshasa authorities interfered with, had no transparency, 
collaboration and cohesion.37 Against these findings, there has been little success in 
expanding the viable mineral production activities in the country.  
 
5.2.1 Political Economy 
 
As shown below, the DRC is a fragile Republic riddled with post-independence conflicts.38 
Regardless of this, a report by Garrett and Mitchell shows that the late 1960s and early 1970s 
were periods of exceptional economic growth,39 and the exploitation of mineral resources has 
traditionally brought economic benefits to the country.40 Prior to the 1997 armed conflict, the 
DRC government tightened its fiscal policy and managed to curb inflation. Nevertheless, the 
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gains were lost as a result of lack of foreign aid and investment due to armed conflicts. 
Although armed conflict is a major contributor to economic hardship, it is not the sole 
factor.41 Other factors include the country’s poor infrastructure, ineffective legal system, 
corruption and lack of transparency as well as illegal mining.42 Official meetings between the 
DRC and the IMF and the World Bank to develop comprehensible fiscal policies and 
strategies have been on hold partly due to the prevailing fragile political environment.43  
 
Diplomatic attempts by the Southern African Development Community44 to create a 
permanent political settlement appear to be failing. For example,  
[t]he Pretoria Accord, a peace agreement signed between the warring factions in 2002, paved the way 
for free elections in 2006 and the Goma Agreement signed by the DRC government and over 20 armed 
groups in 2008 further brightened prospects for political stability and economic growth.45 
Despite this, efforts to establish peace and permanent political stability were thwarted by lack 
of mutual trust from the opposition political groups and the negative influence by sections of 
the Congolese society.46 The negative influence is potentially behind illegal access to, and 
control of natural resources including strategic minerals such as coltan which is used in 
modern “heartland” technologies of the information age, such as cellphones. 47 
 
In 2007, the DRC adopted the Governance Contract after consultations with the State 
President and the Minister of Mines, and recommendations by the World Bank with a view to 
promote, inter alia, management of public finances and transparency in the mining sector. 
The initiative, however, exposed major state weaknesses in the mineral value chain.48  
Regardless of the weaknesses, the mineral sector plays a significant role in the economy. 
Since 2001, the economy gradually recovered against a background of recurrent internal 
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conflicts.49 However, the underlying indicators did not measure all aspects of “doing 
business” and factors that affect the competitiveness of the minerals sector. After the 
introduction of various economic measures, the DRC’s ranking improved as reported in the 
2011 Doing Business Report.50 The budget deficit, which had worsened in 2009 due to 
internal conflicts and the global economic crisis gradually improved in 2010 as a result of 
increased government revenue. An improvement in “doing business” ranking could be an 
indication that the DRC created an environment relatively conducive for operating 
businesses.51 The improvement could help to consolidate the “Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative”52 and bring investor confidence in the DRC’s minerals sector.53 Despite 
the current political and economic challenges faced by the DRC, the economy relatively 
gained from mineral exports estimated at US$6.6 billion in 200854 and the trend gradually 
increased in the subsequent years.55 The minerals sector contributed substantially to the 
economy56 and in 2010, the national GDP growth increased to 6.1 percent from 2.8 percent in 
2009. The mining sector contributed approximately 11.8 percent to the national GDP.57  
 
In 2009, the DRC signed a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility with the IMF and received 
approximately US$12 billion in multilateral and bilateral debt relief.58 The adoption of the 
World Bank project “Growth with Governance in the Minerals Sector” sought to increase 
                                                          
49
 World Bank, supra note 12.  
50
 International Finance Corporation & World Bank ‘Doing business - economic ranking: The DRC’ 2011, 
available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (accessed 6 March 2012). See also International Finance 
Corporation ‘Doing business’ (2012), 10 -13, available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Profiles/Country/ZAR.pdf 
(accessed 6 March 2012). 
51
 Ibid, at 5. 
52
 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, hereafter HIPC. See US Department of State, supra note 44. 
53
 World Bank, op cit note 50. 
54
 See generally IMF ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress Report 
2010; (hereafter Poverty Reduction Strategy Progress Report 2010). See also World Bank ‘Project information 
document: Concept stage’ Report No. AB3834 at 1, available at http://www.worldbank.org (accessed 2 March 
2012).  
55
 Among the agricultural produce coffee, palm oil, rubber, cotton, sugar, tea, and cocoa are accordingly 
cultivated. The agricultural industry engages about 66 per cent of the population with provisions for crops like 
cassava, plantains, maize, groundnuts, and rice. See US Department of State, supra note 44. See also Stefaan 
Marysse, op cit note 1 at 17; Catherine Ragasa, Suresh C. Babu & John Ulimwengu ‘Institutional and capacity 
challenges in agricultural policy process: The case of Democratic Republic of Congo’, discussion paper 01066 
(2011) International Food Policy Research Institute at 3 – 4 & 12, available at                             
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp01066.pdf (accessed 9 March 2012).   
56
 Afribiz ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Mineral industry overview’ 2011, available at 
http://www.zimbio.com/Kinshasa+Congo/articles/RLvDbGwBVMv/Democratic+Republic+Congo+Mineral+In
dustry (accessed 6 March 2012). 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 The conditions under pinning acceptance and signing the IMF agreement are considered in the section 5.6.4 
dealing with IMF and World Bank Conditionality below.   
   188 
transparency and accountability,59 as well as improve production output and lowering costs. 
The other objectives were, inter alia, to strengthen institutional capacity and regulation, and 
create an enabling environment for investment in the minerals sector.60 The gradual increase 
in mining production output was largely attributed to measures adopted to ensure 
transparency and accountability in the sector. However, production declined in 2011 partly 
due to recurrent armed conflicts,61 which disrupted mining activities in the northern and 
eastern parts of the country. 
 
Partnerships with emerging economies such as China and India62 in mining, technology 
transfer and social development have presumably helped the DRC’s prospects to revive its 
economy, albeit for a short term because there are no permanent industries established in the 
country. One can conclude that the post-independence era has generally been characterized 
by political instability, and unequal business partnership practices owing to lack of 
investment, competition and economic challenges.63 The fact that the DRC is endowed with 
an array of mineral resources could not alone bring tangible economic benefits; this could be 
attributed to the government’s apparent failure to exercise its sovereignty in order to 
consolidate peace and political stability.  
 
5.2.1.1 Political Context of the DRC in Brief 
 
The struggle for regulation and control over mineral resources in the DRC is a continuation 
of fighting against external influence and domination, which dates back to the 1880s when 
King Leopold II64 of Belgian colonized the country.65 From 1884 to 1885, and at the Berlin 
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Conference in German, the European powers recognized Leopold’s claim to the Congo basin. 
Under his leadership, the Congo experienced a ruthless colonial history. For example, from 
1892 to 1894, the Eastern Congo experienced wars between Leopold’s regime and the East 
African Arabs who controlled the area including natural resources.66 Leopold took personal 
control of the Congo territory and exploited mineral resources through harsh autocratic 
governance which included slave labour.67 Regardless of these atrocities, however, Leopold 
was recognized as the legitimate authority and in control of the Congo and all domestic 
natural resources.68 Conversely, the international outcry and pressure against Leopold’s 
dictatorial practices compelled him to transfer control of the Congo to the Belgian 
government in 1908.69 
 
The above shows that the political history of Belgian colonization of the Congo is loaded 
with capitalist interests and the desire for mineral resources, which is traced back to the 
establishment of Leopold’s personal rule in 1885.70 The upsurge of the Congo people’s 
nationalist sentiments and the growing demand for black majority rule weakened Belgium’s 
political control. The 1959 political events in the Congo caused serious uprisings against the 
government in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa).71 In 1960, Congo became politically 
independent and ushered in black majority rule with Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister.72 
Due to fear of sabotage, Belgium sent troops ostensibly to protect its mining and economic 
interests in the Congo.73 
 
With the help of Belgium and the US, the late Lumumba was overthrown and the late 
Kasavubu became the leader of the Congo.74 In 1965, Kasavubu was over-thrown and the late 
Mobutu Sese Seko became the leader of the Congo. During his reign, it is reported Mobutu 
considered the country and its natural resources his private property,75 and unilaterally 
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renamed Congo as “Zaire” in 1971.76 During his 32 year-rule, Mobutu enjoyed partial 
support from the US and Belgium, and in return granted them unlimited mining 
concessions.77 The cold war tension also played into the Congo leadership wrangle and 
economic interests, with the US fearing that charismatic Congo nationalists would cause the 
secession of the Congo from Belgium control, by taking advantage of the former Soviet 
Union’s influence in Central Africa.78 Taking this into account, Mobutu used domestic 
mineral resources to co-opt potential rivals, and to enrich himself as well as those in his 
administration through a patronage system, described as fervently corrupt, such that one can 
conclude that his government’s principal objective was to loot minerals and other public 
goods.79 Mobutu’s regime acquired economic benefits illegally at the expense of national 
interests. This was evidenced by high levels of corruption during Mobutu’s administration; 
for example, it is reported he illegally amassed more than US$5 billion from the country and 
much of this loot moved to international banks and investments.80   
 
Two reasons underpinned the ouster of Mobutu from office in 1996: Firstly, the Great Lakes 
region regarded Mobutu as the main supporter of opponents of his neighbouring countries 
and his long standing relationship with National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) rebels, and his support for the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) of Uganda justified 
the involvement of Angola and Uganda respectively.81 Secondly, Mobutu blocked all 
democratic processes that emanated from the 1992 National Sovereign Conference,82 
resulting in the local non-armed opposition leadership championing for his removal.83 
However, the political history of the DRC since the removal of the late Mobutu from power 
could be an example of economically motivated interferences by foreign states as well as 
corporations.84 From the beginning of the 1996 conflict, the late Laurent Desiree Kabila 
mobilized financial resources for his military operations by granting “lucrative contracts in 
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the east of the DRC”.85 Although the late Kabila was just a rebel leader in control of a small 
part of the DRC; it is reported that Rwanda, Uganda and international corporations such as 
Bechtel, American Mineral Fields and De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited supported 
him.86 The conflict was influenced by various domestic and international players that 
ostensibly intended to control the DRC’s mineral resources.87 
 
The assassination of Kabila and the anti-Kabila conflicts were allegedly influenced by some 
governments, which hoped to maintain monopoly and access to mineral resources required 
for industrial processes in their home countries.88 Under these circumstances, perhaps one 
may conclude that external interferences in the DRC affairs contributed to political and 
economic instability since obtaining political independence in 1960. Although the DRC has 
abundant mineral resources, the potential to exploit them may have been deeply paralyzed by 
fragile politics and instability. Presumably, weak central authority that cannot implement 
successful political reforms due to challenges, referred above, has affected appropriate 
regulation and state sovereignty over domestic mineral resources.89 It could therefore be 
argued that the DRC’s post-independence political instability has damagingly and adversely 
contributed to failure by the successive regimes to regulate domestic minerals resources.  
 
Notwithstanding the fragile political situation, the DRC government has attempted to exercise 
its sovereignty over mineral resources in various ways. One of the ways is through adopting 
various domestic mining laws. In the following sections, the researcher examines and 
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evaluates the DRC’s mineral laws in light of the international law principles conferring a 
mandate upon the state to exploit the resources for development, principles governing 
international investment and trade (outlined in chapter 2 above), and the manner in which the 
DRC has navigated the threats outlined in chapter 3.  
 
5.3 Municipal Law Relevant to the Operationalization of the Mandate over Mineral 
Resources  
 
In considering the relevant domestic mineral laws, reference is made to various themes which 
reinforce, weaken or restrict state sovereignty over domestic regulation of the available 
mineral resources. 
 
5.3.1 Municipal Law Relevant to the Regulation of Mineral Resources  
 
There are approximately ten pieces of statutes including Regulations that are relevant to the 
regulation of mineral resources. These include certain provisions of the DRC Constitution of 
2005; Law No: 007 of 11 July 2002 (the Mining Code); Mining Rules enacted by Decree No. 
038 of 26 March 2003; the 16 Annexes to the 2003 Mining Regulations, including the 
Artisanal Mining, Protection of the Mining Environment; the Tax and Customs Regimes for 
Mining and the Exchange Rate Regime.90 These are relevant to the regulation of domestic 
mineral resources.  
 
5.3.2 Mining Laws  
 
The mining sector is regulated through national legislation and Mining Regulations. In a strict 
sense, the legal framework for the regulation of mineral resources consists of certain 
applicable provisions of the DRC Constitution, Law No.007, the Mining Rules enacted by 
Decree No.038 and the 16 Annexes to the Mining Regulations. Of these four, Law No 007 
and the Mining Rules (Mining Regulations) are considered to be the main pieces of 
legislation in the mining sector and they are directly relevant to the study. 
 
5.3.2.1 The DRC Constitution, 2005 
 
The DRC Constitution, as amended, is the supreme law of the country and all laws in force 
are subordinate to it. Although the Constitution is not strictly relevant to the regulation of 
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mineral resources, there are some provisions relevant in the context of this thesis. The 
Preamble to the Constitution provides for, and has provisions which could be attributed to the 
pillars of state sovereignty over mineral resources. In particular, the principle of self-
determination, PSNR and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states are entrenched in 
the Preamble to the Constitution.91 The DRC may exercise the mandate derived from the 
PSNR principle, by granting concessions to mining investors, and it is inherently the state’s 
responsibility to determine the terms and conditions of accessing domestic mineral 
resources,92 discussed in section 5.5.2 below.  
 
Article 58 of the Constitution confers upon the Congolese people the right to enjoy national 
wealth, including economic benefits derived from mineral resources. To achieve this, the 
state has a constitutional duty to ensure equitable distribution of national wealth93 and uphold 
the right to development, discussed in chapter 2. In order to derive economic benefits and 
ensure equal distribution across the country requires appropriate control and regulation of the 
resources, as well as transparency and accountability in the mineral value chain.  
 
5.3.2.2 Law No: 007 of 11 July 2002 (The Mining Code) 
 
Law No: 007 of 200294 is the expression of the DRC’s new mining law, which came into 
effect on 11 July 2002. The Mining Code is the principal mining law which is dedicated to a 
single mining system and, it regulates and controls access to domestic mineral resources 
through a system of licensing. The Code repealed the previous mining law, which was based 
on a concession system. As discussed below, the scope of application of the Code is set out in 
section 2; this includes prospecting, exploration, exploitation, processing, transportation and 
export of all domestic minerals. Further, basic principles relevant to the regulation of 
domestic mineral resources are set out in Section II of the Code. Also, the Code introduced a 
clear distinction between the conditions for granting, revoking and the renewal of mining or 
quarry permits and provides for operational terms.95 Regardless of this, it needs to be 
highlighted that at the time of writing this thesis the Mining Code was under review.96 
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The Mining Code provides and spells out the role of the state and supporting public 
institutions in the regulation of domestic mineral resources.97 Five principal administrative 
bodies are outlined and entrusted with the responsibility of regulating as well as controlling 
access to mineral resources, mining and ancillary activities. The five main administrative 
bodies are; namely, office of the President of the DRC,98 office of the Minister of Mines,99 
the Mining Registry,100 the Directorate of Mines101 and the Department in Charge of the 
Protection of the Mining Environment.102  
 
Article 9 of the Code confers on the State President statutory powers,103 which he or she 
cannot delegate, and such powers are exercised by Decree made on the President’s own 
initiative. The decree can be made on the proposal of the Minister of Mines after consulting 
with the Directorate of Geology or the Mining Registry, to enact Mining Regulations in order 
to spell out the implementation of the Mining Code.104 The State President has jurisdiction 
over the enactment of the Mining Regulations105 and extensive powers to classify mineral 
resources in different categories and to declare a mineral resource “a reserved substance” or 
an area “a prohibited zone” for the purposes of mining activities.106 However, in the absence 
of consultations, the unilateral decision by the State President might interfere in the 
regulation of domestic mineral resources. Insofar as jurisdiction is concerned, Article 10 of 
the Mining Code confers upon the Minister of Mines jurisdiction over granting, refusal or 
cancelation of mining rights. The Minister exercises his or her discretionary powers by way 
of a Decree with the exception of Article 10(k) of the Mining Code.107 Further Article 10 of 
the Code spells out the powers and responsibilities of the Minister on issues such as exports 
of unbeneficiated minerals and creation of artisanal mining areas.108  
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The Mining Registry (the Central Mining Cadastre)109 is an autonomous statutory body under 
the co-supervision of the Minister of Mines and Minister of Finance, and it was established in 
terms of Article 12 of the Mining Code. The Mining Registry is entrusted with duties that 
include collecting and administering the costs of filing applications, as well as the 
administration of mining rights on a “first come first serve basis”. In terms of its functions, 
the Minister of Mines has exclusive responsibility for the administration of, granting or 
refusal of mining and quarry rights, withdrawal and cancellation, as well as the expiry of the 
rights.110 The implication of the Minister’s decision determines whether the mining rights 
could be established as security of tenure. Also, among its obligations, the Central Mining 
Cadastre maintains, on a regular basis, an update of registry books and publishes renewals of 
mining and quarry permits in accordance with the requirements contemplated in the Code.111 
In doing so, one may argue that the DRC asserts sovereignty over domestic mineral 
resources. 
 
The Directorate of Mines is a statutory body established in terms of Article 14 of the Mining 
Code. The body is responsible for, inter alia, inspecting and supervising mining activities on 
issues such as health and safety on the mining site, labour standards, and recording statistics 
on production and sales.112 The responsibilities are an important element of the assertion of 
sovereignty in the regulation of mineral resources and to ensure the state monitors 
compliance, as well as production output and sales for taxation purposes. Finally, the 
Department in charge of the Protection of the Mining Environment was established by Article 
15 of the Mining Code. This statutory body has powers to define and implement Mining 
Regulations on environmental protection, rules governing exploration and artisanal miners. 
The Department is also involved in technical evaluation of EIAs, environmental management 
plans, mitigation and rehabilitation plans.113 It can be argued that the Code sets out the 
requirements for environmental standards applicable to all mining activities in the DRC. 
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Apart from the regulatory authorities referred above, the Mining Code recognizes Provincial 
Governors and Heads of Provincial Authority of Mines over areas of competence and 
concurrent jurisdiction spelt out in Article 11 of the Code and Article 13 of the Mining 
Regulations. The Provincial Divisions of Mines have jurisdiction over issuing artisanal 
mining cards and the establishment of artisanal mining zones in their respective provinces 
subject to approval by the Directorate of Mines.114 The mandate of the Provincial Divisions 
of Mines includes implementing provisions spelt out in the Mining Regulations relating to 
exceptional granting of licences to artisanal miners.115 However, the Central Mining Cadastre 
has overall authority and jurisdiction.116  
 
The Mining Code introduced procedures for application, granting, renewal and withdrawal of 
mining or prospecting licences, and at the same time it guarantees to expedite processing of 
applications within a reasonable time.117 The Code also provides an opportunity for 
determination of mining or prospecting applications while taking into account objectivity, 
transparency and credibility of the processes.118 With regard to settlement of potential 
disputes relating to rights of access to mineral resources, exploitation and matters 
antecedental thereto; as discussed below, the Code provides three distinct ways of resolving 
such issues. These are domestic administrative process,119 municipal courts120 and domestic 
or international arbitration.121 Further, the Mining Code provides for mining taxation,122 
environmental protection obligations123 and penalty provisions for breach of any provision of 
the Code.124 The Code also provides for appeal procedure before penalties are enforced.125  
 
In a nutshell, the Mining Code establishes a legal framework for regulation and control of, 
and access to domestic mineral resources, as well as institutions entrusted with 
responsibilities to implement and enforce the law.  
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5.3.2.3 Decree No: 038 of 2003 (The Mining Regulations) 
 
The enforcement of provisions of the Mining Code is provided for by Mining Rules enacted 
by Decree No.038 of 2003126 (as provided for in Article 334 of the Mining Code), which 
came into force on 26 March 2003. The Mining Regulations are divided into twenty-four 
broad titles and each is subdivided into various chapters.  
 
The Mining Regulations gives the Ministry of Mines discretion in exercising its powers in 
order to promote sufficient and competent skills in the regulation of mineral resources. The 
Regulations spell out the manner in which provisions of the Mining Codes have to be 
implemented and the Ministry of Mines is entitled, subject to approval by the State President, 
to propose and develop a legal framework to enhance the country’s mineral resource 
regulations in line with the Code.127 This is pursuant to facilitating sound and coordinated 
promotion of investment in the mining sector.128 In particular, Article 7 of the Mining 
Regulations gives the Ministry of Mines the right to develop the relevant legal mechanisms in 
order to promote sound regulation of mineral resources, their exploitation and to ensure the 
objectives of the legislature espoused in the Mining Code are fulfilled.  
 
The Mining Regulations provide for the establishment and functions of the Directorate of 
Mines, whose functions includes inspecting, supervising and regulating mining activities, as 
well as health and safety standards,129 mineral production output, transportation and trade.130 
The Regulations established Service d’ Assistance et d’ Encadrement de Small Scale Mining 
(SAESSCAM); the department responsible for assisting, overseeing, and supervising 
operations for small-scale mining. The Regulations also define the powers and duties of the 
Department of Geology,131 the Department of Mines (Directorate of Mines)132 and the 
Directorate for the Protection of Mining Environment.133 Further the Regulations outline the 
powers of these departments and areas of concurrent jurisdiction with the Divisions of 
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Provincial Mines.134 Furthermore, the Regulations establish the Department of Investigations 
which is vested with the power to investigate, detect, prevent and penalize offenders, as well 
as enforcement of decisions against offenders who contravene any provision of the Mining 
Code.135 This Department is also entrusted with the duty to investigate cases of fraud relating 
to, and smuggling of mineral resources.136 In this regard, it can be argued that the DRC 
asserts sovereignty over domestic mineral resources through the establishment and legal 
empowerment of the institutions aforementioned.  
 
The Mining Regulations sets out conditions for exploration,137 quarrying and other forms of 
mining,138 as well as for granting licences to artisanal miners.139 In order to obtain a mining 
permit, the applicant has to ensure that all statutory requirements such as environmental 
obligations,140 obligations towards local communities,141 financial minimum requirements,142 
fees payment143 and mining taxes144 are complied with.145 Compliance with the requirements 
is a precondition for an application to be placed before the relevant competent authority for 
determination. However, the DRC government has the right to refuse to grant or may 
withdraw a licence where it can be proved that the applicant or a holder of a licence 
previously contravened and/or continues to contravene a fundamental obligation as may be 
defined in the Mining Code and the Mining Regulations. 
 
Moreover, the Mining Regulations provide for offences which are broadly categorized into 
two; namely, violation of exploration, quarry or mining permit holders’ obligations;146 and 
conduct or omissions which are classified as violations of environmental obligations imposed 
on title holders.147 This includes use of mercury in contravention of the Regulations.148 
Enforcement of penalties is inherently important and underpins the assertion of sovereignty 
over domestic mineral resources, as well as self-determination and the integrity of the DRC 
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in the regulation of the resources. It can therefore be concluded that the Mining Regulations 
complement the Mining Code, as legal tools that the DRC could use to regulate its mineral 
resources as discussed in section 5.5 below. 
 
5.3.3 Economic Indigenization 
 
Apart from provisions contemplated in the Mining Code that allow free carried interest and 
artisanal mining to be carried out by Congolese nationals only, the DRC does not seem to 
have a single and consolidated law that can be considered as “economic and indigenization 
law” or transformative economic development policy, which comprehensively builds upon 
the Mining Code and the Mining Regulations. However, in line with some countries in the 
region,149 the DRC requires mining companies to comply with domestic mining laws and 
Regulations on issues such as safety and health,150 environmental151 and heritage 
protection.152 The DRC government introduced a 5 percent free carried interest in all mining 
ventures, and in practice, 10 to 15 percent of mining companies’ share interests have to be 
held by local partners.153 Although this could be recognized as economic indigenization, 
however, the free carried interest that was introduced by the Mining Code could be as a result 
of political pressure on the DRC government.  
 
Against the backdrop of the international law principles which support the assertion of state 
sovereignty and the right to development discussed in chapter 2, and taking into account the 
relevant provisions from mining laws aforesaid, the focus now turns to an analysis in 
accordance with the themes highlighted in chapters 2 and 3.  
 
5.4 The Assertion of Sovereignty and Operationalization of International Law 
Principles in Support of the DRC’s Sovereignty over Mineral Resources 
 
With regard to the mining laws and provisions in the Constitution relevant to mineral 
resources introduced and outlined in the afore-going sections, the next sections examine how 
state sovereignty is exercised through the operationalization of international law principles 
which support state sovereignty over mineral resources discussed in chapter 2. The 
examination of the various themes that assert the manner in which sovereignty is exercised is 
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necessary in order to classify and demystify how the DRC operationalizes the international 
law principles which support sovereignty over domestic mineral resources. 
 
5.4.1 Property and Ownership Rights 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the state in which mineral resources are located or found has the 
mandate and privilege derived from the PSNR principle to exercise control over the 
resources. As such, the DRC has sovereign control and the right to regulate domestic mineral 
resources, by enacting laws or provisions in domestic laws that spell out the acquisition of 
property rights.  
 
The DRC Constitution154 and the Mining Code155 provide that the state is the owner and 
custodian of all mineral resources found within the Republic. State ownership of these 
resources is therefore protected under the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the DRC. 
Article 32 of the Constitution confirms that every foreigner who is legally in the DRC enjoys 
personal and property protection according to the conditions that are set out in treaty law and 
domestic laws. Also, Article 34 guarantees the right to private property. The Mining Code 
further spells out the manner in which state ownership is exercised and protected. In terms of 
Article 3 the State has exclusive and inalienable ownership rights to all mineral resources 
found in the Republic. However, in the assertion of sovereignty over the resources, the DRC 
may grant a foreign investor the right to explore or exploit a specific resource, by awarding 
mining rights subject to renewal for a certain period.156 Holders of mining rights do not have 
real rights but only personal rights, which enable them to exploit the resources subject to the 
terms and conditions underpinning the issuance of mining or exploration licences. However, 
the fact that a holder of mining rights does not have ownership rights does not necessarily 
mean the rights accrued to him or her are excluded from legal protection. As discussed 
below, once a mining or exploration licence is granted, it is registered with the Mining 
Registry, thus, providing security of tenure.157 
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Holders of surface rights have no legal entitlement to mineral resources found on or under the 
surface area over which they have the right of control.158 However, they are entitled to fair 
compensation, if the land they have the right of control over is expropriated for the purposes 
of establishing mining projects. There is no special method relating to the issue of mining 
rights in areas covered by surface rights.159 Further, mining laws do not impose a specific 
classification system for reporting mineral resources that may be found by holders of surface 
rights.160 Classification of these reserves may be imposed by the stock exchanges upon which 
the mining companies are listed. Nevertheless, the DRC government may decide to grant 
investors mining licences to exploit such resources pursuant to specific applications and 
administrative procedures.161 The Mining Code provides for explicit administrative and legal 
recourses for potential mining rights holders against surface rights holders.162 
 
In the assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources and by granting mining rights to some 
foreign investors, the DRC government is helped by the judiciary, which reinforces the 
state’s sovereignty through court decision-making on whether an applicant, who may have 
been denied mining licence through administrative actions, can be granted, following court 
processes.163 In other words, where the right was not granted and the applicant was of the 
view that there were reasonable grounds that were not considered, the applicant can take the 
administrative decision on review by a competent court. 
 
Taking the above into account, and the cumulative effect of the international law principles 
discussed in chapter 2, unswervingly supports the DRC’s sovereignty and prerogative to 
regulate domestic mineral resources.164 However, upon registration of the mining rights, an 
investor is granted secure rights of access to a specific mineral resource for a certain period of 
time, subject to payment of certain fees and fulfillment of the conditions for renewal of a 
mining licence. Although the legal framework covers property rights, however, protection of 
foreign investors is relatively weak. This could be one of the factors which situated the 
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country on rank 185 on the World Bank’s Doing Business Report of 2014.165 This is an 
extremely low ranking which shows weak protection of property rights, which incorporates 
mining rights. In this regard, weak protection of property rights would seem to mean the 
presence of political influence to assert the state’s interest over the interests of investors. This 
does not promote the rule of law and accordingly erodes investor confidence. 
 
5.4.2 Access to Mineral Resources  
 
The coming into effect of the Mining Code and the Mining Regulations in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively, influenced the DRC to allocate mining rights and the rights of access to 
domestic mineral resources on a ‘first come, first served basis’.166 The Mining Code provides 
conditions for access to domestic minerals and the Mining Regulations spells out the manner 
in which access has to be obtained. The ownership provision contemplated in the Constitution 
has been provided for and reinforced by the Mining Code,167 making the state the sole 
authority entitled to decide who may be granted temporary rights of access to its mineral 
resources. 
 
Article 5 of the Mining Code provides for authorizations of mining and quarry activities; any 
investor who is allowed to engage in non-artisanal mining of mineral resources has to be a 
holder of a valid mining or quarry licence. The same Article permits any Congolese national 
to engage in regulated artisanal mining on condition that he or she is a holder of an artisanal 
miner’s card, issued by the relevant and competent authority.168 However, Article 5(2) of the 
Code does not expressly allow non-Congolese to engage in artisanal mining. In other words, 
artisanal mining is only reserved for Congolese nationals; the reason is possibly to encourage 
locals to participate in artisanal mining since it is not capital intensive and the requirements 
for, and procedure to obtain an artisanal miner’s card is easy. This is assertion of sovereignty, 
and a way to create employment by allowing citizens to engage in artisanal mining under the 
watchful eye of the state. 
 
Title I of Chapter II of the Mining Code spells out the role of the State and its relevant 
institutions in the regulation of domestic mineral resources. In particular, Article 8 of the 
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Code provides that the DRC is not fully capacitated to exploit its mineral resources; instead it 
requires joint partnerships with private investors. The fact that investors are required to assist 
the DRC to fully explore and mining its mineral resources is an indication that investment 
plays an integral part. Regardless of the fact that foreign investment is required, the DRC has 
to assert its sovereignty by controlling access to the resources, by formulating and setting out 
conditions that investors have to comply with. The role and jurisdiction of the State is 
assumed through the relevant state institutions, such as the Ministry of Mines under the 
Minister of Mines,169 the Mining Registry,170 the Directorate of Mines,171 and the Head of the 
Provincial Authority of Mines172 and the Department in Charge of the Protection of the 
Mining Environment.173 The jurisdiction of each state institution is spelt out in the Code and 
the Mining Regulations. The manner in which the DRC asserts sovereignty manifests in the 
provision of the terms and conditions for access to domestic mineral resource. 
 
With regard to eligibility for access to mineral resources, the Mining Code and Mining 
Regulations spell out who qualifies. Article 17 of the Mining Regulations provides that every 
Congolese corporation and any foreign corporation duly registered in terms of the relevant 
domestic legislation governing exploration or mining of mineral resources is legally entitled 
to the right of access to a mineral resource. Prospecting or mining is allowed only upon 
fulfillment of all the conditions for access to mineral resources as contemplated in the Mining 
Code and Mining Regulations.174 The conditions include meeting the financial minimum 
capacity175 and environmental obligations.176 The State through its agencies determines areas 
that can be explored for, and mining of mineral resources. In terms of Article 6 of the Mining 
Code, access is prohibited to explore or mine mineral resources in protected areas.177 Further, 
eligibility to obtain mining and quarrying rights178 is generally provided for in Title II of 
Chapter I of the Code. This includes eligibility to obtain an artisanal miner’s card.179 Article 
23 of the Code provides for persons eligible to be granted rights of access to domestic 
mineral resources. This includes any Congolese national who has reached the age of 
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majority,180 an entity either duly incorporated in terms of the DRC laws181 or doing scientific 
research.182 Also, any foreign national who is regarded as a major in terms of the laws of his 
or her country, and who is capable of becoming an investor in the DRC,183 subject to electing 
domicile of choice with an authorized mining and quarry agent located in the Republic, can 
apply to the Ministry of Mines for a mining licence which confers the right of access to a 
domestic mineral resource.184 
 
Article 27 of the Mining Code provides for the category of persons who are not eligible for 
access to domestic mineral resources, whether as holders of an artisanal miner’s card, trader’s 
cardholders, mining or even quarry title holders.185 Any person who lacks legal capacity in 
the context of the DRC laws,186 or who has been condemned by a non-appealable court 
judgment for contravening mining and quarry laws or economic activities which involves 
mining or quarry rights or affiliated entities, does not qualify to have the right of access to 
domestic mineral resources.187 Further persons whose artisanal miner’s or trader’s cards have 
been cancelled are temporarily excluded from holding rights of access to any mineral 
resource for a period of 3 years.188 Furthermore, of those excluded to carry out any mining 
and related activities, the following are also included in that category by virtue of their 
offices; judicial officers, members of the armed forces, civil servant, police officers and 
security agents, as well as government employees.189 Nevertheless, the exclusion from 
accessing mineral resources and related activities does not disqualify a member of the 
categories referred herein to participate in the capital of mining companies. Regardless of the 
exclusion, allowing such people to be party to the capital of a mining entity could be a 
weakness in the legislation that may cause conflict of interests. 
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In terms of the Mining Code, any person intending to undertake prospecting has to make a 
preliminary declaration with the Mining Registry.190 Where a party is granted a prospecting 
licence, the permit only confers rights to search for specific mineral resources and in the 
event that a discovery has been made, the substance containing a mineral deposit, called the 
prospect, is then explored to determine the quantity of valuable characteristics of the 
deposit.191 Prospecting licences do not entitle holders access to mine a mineral resource 
because the nature of the licence does not confer rights of access to, and exploit a resource.192 
It could therefore be arguable that in deciding on exploration, the DRC asserts its sovereignty 
by setting out terms and conditions for, and access to its mineral resources.193 
 
Article 43 of the Mining Code is important regardless of the little it says about the criteria 
when deciding whether to grant rights of access to a mineral resource. Applications for 
exploration194 and mining or quarry permits must take into account environmental 
obligations,195 safety and health issues,196 as well as obligations towards indigenous 
communities.197 The applicant has to prove that environmental obligations such as 
environmental impact assessment,198 environmental management plans,199 mitigation and 
rehabilitation plans,200 and mining taxation required by the Mining Code and Mining 
Regulations have been complied with.201 The decision to grant rights of access to a mineral 
resource is determined by the Minister of Mines upon receiving all the necessary 
documentation, which must include the favourable opinion of the registrar of mines, as well 
as technical and environmental opinions.202 After making a determination on the application, 
it becomes mandatory for the competent authority to send its decision to the Mining Registry 
within a reasonable time.203 The Mining Registry is entitled to take note of the decision, 
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whether favourable or not, for the purposes of notifying the applicant.204 In the event that the 
Minister does not send the decision to the Mining Registry in terms of Article 43 of the 
Mining Code, it will be legally presumed that the decision to grant mining or quarry rights 
has been allowed.205 It is imperative for the Minister, when making a determination over an 
application to grant access to a mineral resource, to expedite the process by ensuring that all 
the requirements are considered accordingly in order to avoid adverse inferences. In making a 
determination, the Minister represents the State and has the obligation to exercise his or her 
discretion in the best interests of the state. By granting an application and upon registration of 
the decision, the applicant is entitled to the right of access to a specific mineral resource and 
security of tenure is guaranteed. Therefore, the process of making determination over 
applications is an assertion of state sovereignty, which is supported by the international law 
principles discussed in chapter 2.  
 
In the event that an application for research, exploration or mining permit has been rejected 
under unclear circumstances, the applicant may seek administrative206 or judicial 
intervention.207 Where an application for a mining permit is granted, or in the event of a 
decision to register via the judicial system as provided for in Article 46 of the Mining Code, 
the Mining Registry issues a permit showing the nature of the right applied for, provided an 
annual surface fee has been paid.208 Upon delivery of the licence to the applicant, the Mining 
Registry issues a receipt of payment of the annual surface rights fee and registers the title.209 
This makes granting of rights of access to a mineral resource complete and binding, and 
becomes enforceable against the State. The requirement for application and determination 
process could show the manner in which the DRC asserts sovereignty over domestic mineral 
resources. Also, the process shows the ability of the state to exercise self-determination 
regarding access to domestic mineral resources. 
 
In a nutshell, access to mineral resources is generally done throughout the entire DRC 
territory provided a party has a valid mining licence; however, there are certain areas where 
access is restricted or not allowed.210 Such areas include protected areas or natural reserves 
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such as wetlands and wildlife, and cultural heritage sites,211 as well as areas governed by 
special laws.212 In determining the eligibility for access to domestic mineral resources, and 
regardless of the loopholes and weaknesses that are available in the process, the DRC could 
be considered to be asserting sovereignty over domestic mineral resources.  
 
5.4.3 Mineral Resource Policing and Enforcement of Mining Laws 
 
The Mining Code and Mining Regulations provide a set of policing measures in the 
regulation of mineral resources. In terms of Article 8 of the Mining Code, the State through 
its relevant institutions has the prime role in the regulation of mineral resources. To ensure 
compliance with the DRC mining obligations, all parties who undertake mining and related 
operations in the country are required to observe the law. The Mining Code and Mining 
Regulations created categories of conduct classified as contravening mining laws. It is an 
offence to mine or possess a mineral resource without a valid permit,213 and theft of mineral 
ore or mineral products is prohibited.214 Theft is generally regarded as a common law 
offence, however, when it is committed in respect of a mineral resource, such conduct 
contravenes a provision of the Mining Code which relates to theft.215  
 
It is an offence to purchase and sell a mineral resource or substance without a permit, to 
assume custody, possess or keep a mineral resource or mineral substance without a permit216 
and also to transport mineral substance without authorization.217 Further, it is an offence to 
contravene any health and safety regulations,218 or any act or violent conduct against agents 
of,219 and any conduct that is intended to obstruct the activity of the Mines Authority.220 Any 
conduct which contravenes a provision of mining laws, depending on the gravity of the 
offence, potentially affects the DRC’s ability to assert its sovereignty over mineral resources. 
Furthermore, illegal dealings have the potential of breaking down the operationalization of 
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PSNR, thus, disadvantaging the DRC and preventing it from benefitting from its mineral 
resources.  
 
The role of the State and its institutions, such as the Mining Registry, Directorate of Mines, 
the Department in Charge of the Protection of the Mining Environment, Provincial Mining 
Authority and the Department of Investigations are of paramount importance in order to 
ensure that the objectives contemplated in the Mining Code and the Mining Regulations are 
realized. The Department of Investigations is entrusted with the duty to investigate all 
mineral-resource related issues and is assisted by the police to arrest and bring the offender to 
justice.221 The nature of fines that are imposed for violation of provisions of the Mining Code 
depends on the nature of the offence; the offender can be sentenced to a custodial term 
without an option of a fine or could have both a fine and custodial sentence imposed. Where a 
fine is considered appropriate, it may be up to US$30 000 or equivalent of Congolese 
Francs.222 The Parliament and the executive arm of government are involved in enacting 
penalties. The judicial system plays a vital role to determine and, impose appropriate fines 
and imprisonment terms on offenders. The government enforcement agencies from the 
Ministry of Mines, such as mining inspectors as well as the national police are involved in 
policing the minerals sector. However, as shall be discussed below, the effectiveness of the 
processes raises further questions against allegations of high levels of corruption in the 
minerals sector.  
 
The implementation and enforcement of statutory requirements in the regulation and policing 
of the minerals sector is underpinned by conditions that are required to acquire mining, 
quarry223 or exploration licences. The prerequisite for environmental and technical 
evaluations form part of the conditions. Although the Mining Code outlines the categories of 
offences, which include breaching of licence conditions, however, it is not clear how many 
offenders have been successfully prosecuted and ordered to pay fines. The fact that illegal 
dealings in the mineral value chain continue unabated is perhaps an indicator that policing is 
not effective. Arguably, one may therefore question the efficacy of the policing system and 
enforcement of the relevant laws.  
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The provision for criminal sanctions could be deterrent measures and to ensure that all parties 
in the mineral value chain and the general public uphold domestic mineral laws. Fear of 
sanctions presumably gives the state an advantage and the ability to regulate, and control 
access to, as well as accountability in the sector. Although fear of sanctions is a potential 
deterrent, however, weak implementation and enforcement of the laws adversely affects 
policing.  
 
The role of policing of mineral resources and the manner in which it is done, as well as 
compliance with domestic mineral laws are important aspects in the DRC’s ability to assert 
sovereignty over domestic resources. Policing is an important regulatory tool, a safeguard 
measure that enables state institutions entrusted with the duty to enforce mining laws to fulfill 
their mandate, which include curbing endemic corruption, illegal mining and smuggling of 
the resources. Appropriate and effective policing has the potential to strengthen the DRC’s 
assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources and the potential to derive maximum 
economic benefits. Against this backdrop and as shall be discussed in the next chapter, there 
is the need for the DRC to ensure effective policing.224 Enforcement and monitoring 
mechanisms are tools that are used by the state to ensure the conditions leading to conclusion 
of the contracts between the state and various mining companies operating in the country are 
implemented. In the process, the DRC regulate the operations of mining investors in line with 
domestic laws for self-determination.225  
 
The first step to ensure appropriate enforcement and monitoring is to identify each mining or 
permit holder’s obligations and which obligations must be monitored. Although the legal 
framework that regulates the minerals sector in the DRC tends to be uniform across mining 
companies, there are relatively slight variations in the obligations of one company to another 
depending on the nature of the permit.226 It then flows from Article 14 of the Mining Code; 
the Ministry (Directorate) of Mines is not only responsible for inspecting and supervising all 
mining activities but also compilation and publication of production statistics, and marketing 
mining and quarry  products. The Directorate also monitors and inspects the entire DRC 
mining industry, small scale and artisanal mining; each category signifies overlap or different 
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obligations. Further the Ministry is responsible for receiving and approval of under-
purchasing counters and issues opinions on the state of mining operations, compliance and 
implementation of the conditions prior to the issuing of mining licences.227 Furthermore, the 
Ministry monitors social commitments, worker health and safety, environmental obligations, 
operational commitments such as work programmes and fiscal terms like taxes and 
royalties.228 Against this background, the issue is whether the Ministry is capable of meeting 
its statutory obligations in order to ensure that all mining and exploration permits holders 
comply with their statutory obligations.  
 
In order to establish the effectiveness of enforcement and monitoring capacity of the Ministry 
of Mines, one has to consider the multitude of statutory obligations the department has 
against the total number of the officials employed to discharge the obligations. Also, one has 
to consider the number of law enforcement officials in the mining sector and the budget the 
department works with. On the same issue, consideration has to be on the distance the 
officials are obliged to travel in order to monitor the process, and how frequency do they do 
so? Furthermore, one has to consider whether there are instances in which mining companies 
have been charged and prosecuted for contravening the country’s mining laws. The absence 
of information on these issues entails no definite responses. 
 
Enforcement of mining laws and monitoring mining activities could be a major challenge for 
the DRC. This might be exacerbated by the state’s failure to attract and retain sufficiently 
experienced staff to monitor compliance. As a result, inferences may be drawn from endemic 
corruption in the minerals sector, illegal mining and resource conflicts as evidence of weak 
regulation and enforcement of mining laws.229 The fact that there seem to be monitoring 
problems suggest that the Ministry could be understaffed, under-resourced and therefore 
incapacitated to do its duties.230 In spite of the DRC’s long history as a mineral producing 
country, research by the World Bank concluded that State institutions responsible for 
implementation, enforcement and supervising the minerals sector are weak and ineffectual.231 
Although the Mining Code and the Mining Regulations, theoretically, establish the 
organizational structure which is consistent with international practice, the State faces an 
                                                          
227
 Article 14 of the Mining Code. See also Article 10 of the Mining Regulations.  
228
 Erin Smith & Peter Rosenblum, op cit note 227 at 7. 
229
 Ibid, at 12. 
230
 Ibid, at 9. 
231
 The World Bank, supra note 50 at 37. 
   211 
enormous challenge to strengthen the institutions at all levels and align them with their 
statutory obligations.232  
 
Since most mining activities in the country are joint-mining ventures between the government 
of the DRC and private investors, this could make it complex to ensure the standards for 
enforcement and monitoring are effective on such entities because there could be conflict of 
interests.233 The intricacy is exacerbated by the fact that the State, on the one hand, is an 
operator and in the other, a regulator. A cardinal point in enforcing and monitoring the 
implementation of mineral laws and regulation of the minerals sector is the distinction 
between the State’s role as a regulator and as a stakeholder in joint-mining ventures.234 
However, in the DRC context, balancing these two conflicting interests is ostensibly difficult 
due to the challenges identified above. 
 
It may be argued that the DRC’s weak enforcement of its mineral laws is adversely affecting 
the regulation of mining sector across the value chain. As a result, the weakness in 
enforcement has negatively influenced corruption, illegal mining and smuggling as well as 
resource conflicts. While the DRC has potential to exercise its sovereignty over domestic 
mineral resources, it has not kept pace due to weak implementation, enforcement and 
monitoring.235 This has weakened and restricted sovereignty of the state as far as exercising 
and deriving benefits as mandated by the principle of PSNR discussed in chapter 2 above. 
The weaknesses have economically deprived the state of its meaningful mandate to exploit 
mineral resources for self-determination and the operationalization of aspects of international 
law principles (as discussed in chapter 2 above). Also, the weaknesses adversely promote 
threats to sovereignty over mineral resources (as discussed in chapter 3 above). 
 
5.4.4 Beneficiation and Trade  
 
The DRC’s beneficiation policy is embedded and scattered in several policy documents.  For 
example, Article 10(c) of the Mining Code as well as Articles 218 and 219 of the Mining 
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Regulations encourage local beneficiation. Ministerial permission ought to be sought where 
beneficiation can be carried out of the DRC for various reasons highlighted above. However, 
the provisions merely highlight the need to undertake local beneficiation but there is no 
coherent law dedicated to this topic. Although there are growing calls for local beneficiation, 
academic views as well as the legal regime which spells out beneficiation and value addition 
is not yet in place. It would seem one needs to connect these documents and reconstruct that 
policy into a coherent whole.  
 
Regardless of the Mining Code’s position regarding prospecting, exploration and exploitation 
of mineral resources, it also regulates processing,236 transportation and trade of minerals 
substances.237 Article 10(c) of the Code gives the Minister of Mines unfettered jurisdiction 
and powers to exercise discretion whether to grant leave for export of unbeneficiated mineral 
resources.238 Further Article 10(j) of the Code confers jurisdiction on the Minister of Mines to 
authorize processing or transforming artisanal exploitation mineral products.239 These powers 
have been exercised, for example, by the Minister when he granted leave for export of 
unrefined cobalt ore to China for beneficiation. The DRC has more than half of the world’s 
cobalt reserves; only 5 percent was refined in the region. In contrast, China which does not 
have cobalt reserves produces about 40 percent of the world’s refined cobalt. However, it is 
this dynamic that the DRC should encourage local beneficiation in order to export value-
added minerals and mineral-bearing products, as well as employment creation for the 
locals.240 
 
The Mining Regulations provides more details regarding the legal requirements for 
authorization of applications for export of unbeneficiated minerals.241 There are two basic 
criteria for the Minister to consider when deciding whether to grant leave or not; (i) a permit 
holder applying for authorization must prove that it is impossible to process the mineral ore 
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in the country at a cost that is economically viable for the applicant’s mining venture,242 and 
(ii) the applicant has to establish that it is to the economic advantage of the country if the 
export authorization is granted.243 In relation to (i) above, this cannot be difficult to prove in a 
context of the DRC because of lack of facilities, it would always be cheaper to beneficiate it 
elsewhere – hence it undermines the legal restrictions that are in place, thus, showing another 
instance in which the legislation itself has fissures. 
 
Generally, there are no restrictions or limitations in marketing minerals and mining products 
from exploitation areas.244 However, the absence of a single consolidated policy on 
beneficiation does not necessarily mean exporting raw mineral resources is free of legal and 
administrative restrictions.245 The Minister of Mines’ authorization is a prerequisite for 
exporting unprocessed mineral ores.246 Therefore the Minister has extensive powers to make 
decisions that may influence DRC’s policy on exportation of unbeneficiated minerals. 
 
Regarding export and import restrictions, trade restrictions generally distort free trade and a 
direct confrontation with international trade law, as well as trade liberalization. I focus briefly 
on the manner in which the DRC exercises its sovereignty over domestic mineral resources 
through import and export restrictions. This is against the fact that the DRC has inherent 
regulatory autonomy over mineral resource imports and exports, subject to whatever 
obligations it may have taken on under the international trade regime. 
 
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the DRC may have strict domestic laws regarding 
export of minerals, unless the potential exporter has the approval of the Minister of Mines. 
However, restrictions on unbeneficiated mineral exports could be one of the ways in which 
the DRC exercises sovereignty over domestic mineral exports and reflects the government’s 
power to regulate and limit unnecessary exports of raw minerals.   
 
In the absence of a consolidated beneficiation policy and effective policing, the requirement 
to seek Ministerial authorization before exporting unbeneficiated mineral resources and 
related substances may be bypassed; thus, making it possible to illegally export 
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unbeneficiated minerals. Due to a lack of transparency, however, it is not clear how many 
tons of raw mineral exports bypass Ministerial authorization. Regardless of this, the DRC has 
the potential of asserting sovereignty over domestic mineral resources by making it 
mandatory to export beneficiated minerals. However, the “cracks” in the assertion of 
sovereignty over raw mineral resource exports are already apparent in the legislation. 
 
5.4.5 Royalties and Taxes 
 
It is a legal duty for every mining company operating in the DRC to pay mining taxes and 
royalties to the state.247 Like Zimbabwe, the DRC’s mining tax regime includes mining 
duties, mining royalties and taxes payable by mining companies on the concessions. In this 
regard, one may then ask what forms of duties, royalties and taxes are paid by private mining 
title holders who are engaging in various mining activities in the country.248  
 
The tax and duties regime that is applicable to mining activities in terms of the Mining 
Code249 is extensive and includes mining royalties, mining taxes, charges and other fees 
payable to the state by mining or exploration title-holders.250 However, this does not 
necessarily preclude tax agencies from claiming relevant additional taxes from mining or 
exploration title holders.251   When appropriate, the Mining Code provides an outline of the 
DRC mining taxation regime and all forms of mining taxes payable to the state.  
 
The Mining Code guarantees stabilization in that the current mining taxes, royalties, customs, 
exchange controls and other charges as well as benefits applicable to all mining activities in 
the country remain in effect for ten years from 2002 to 2012. The stabilization of conditions 
was in favour of each mining title holder operating in the DRC in 2002 regardless of any 
subsequent amendment to the Mining Code during the ten year period.252 However, the 
stabilization clause has the potential effect of undermining state sovereignty, as discussed in 
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chapter 2, in that the DRC could not freely and unilaterally amends its domestic law contrary 
to the clause.253 If the state does, then, it might be liable for damages and compensation.  
 
The mining royalty is owed from the date of commencement of effective exploitation of a 
mineral resource and is payable upon sale of the mineral concerned.254 The mining royalty is 
calculated based on the total value of sales, less transport costs and less assays, insurance and 
marketing costs.255 The current rate of mining royalty is 0.5 percent for iron or ferrous metals, 
2 percent for non-ferrous metals and 2.5 percent for precious metals.256 The distribution of 
the mining royalty proceeds is also provided for in terms of the Mining Code,257 and the 
Mining Regulations spells out the conditions for collection and distribution of the royalties in 
terms of the distribution procedure contemplated in paragraph 1 of Article 242 of the Mining 
Code. Article 242 is critical to this discussion – especially that the royalty must be 
proportionally distributed to all levels of government and that local authorities must use it for 
basic infrastructure in the interests of the Congolese community. This is a noble idea and 
when implemented properly, the financial benefits derived from mineral resources can 
contribute significantly to the development of the DRC. However, the central challenge can 
be the appropriate practical implementation of the provision against the backdrop of weak 
central authority, as well as weak enforcement, corruption and policing.  
 
Apart from the forms of mining taxes referred above, the DRC also imposes profit-based tax 
on net benefits from exploitation of a domestic mineral resource at the preferential Mining 
Code rate of 30 percent.258 The rate of profit-based tax is determined in accordance with the 
accounting and tax legislation currently in force.259 
 
Approximately two-thirds of the DRC's industrial minerals including diamond production are 
realized through unregulated artisanal diamond diggers. Like industrial diamonds, gold 
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production takes place mostly through artisanal mining and is not significant.260 However, 
mining production could have been negatively affected as a result of armed conflicts in the 
country over the years. This has a negative effect on the number of parties who pay mining 
royalties and taxes to the state. Thus in turn negatively affects the total amount of revenue 
from the mining sector. 
 
Regarding the use of mineral resource revenues, transparency and accountability is 
paramount. Theoretically, the DRC has zero tolerance to corruption. This might be a potential 
driver that helps to curb resource conflicts since communities would benefit from the 
country’s mineral resources. This proposal could turn the potential for “resource curse” into 
tangible economic benefits that enhance indigenous peoples’ standards of living. 
Comparative research and debates on war economies balances the view that where mineral 
endowments form the bases for conflicts, they can also form the basis for economic growth 
and development.261 However, as discussed below, corruption in the minerals sector is 
prevalent and militates against the national approach to exploit mineral resource for national 
economic benefit. 
 
5.4.6 Legal Obligations Toward Indigenous Communities 
 
Mining is inherently unsustainable towards the environment and communities adjacent to the 
mining site. There are a number of scientific and legal obligations and measures to mitigate 
the negative impacts on the environment and local communities. The legal obligations 
expected of the mining houses towards the indigenous community and its surrounding 
environment is regulated by the Mining Code and the Mining Regulations. According to 
Andre-Dumont, there are no specific rules applicable to protect specific populations in 
relation to the exercise of mining rights.262 Despite this averment, the legal requirement is 
that mining companies are obliged to honour their obligations toward the communities 
adjacent to the mining locations or affected by mining activities.263  
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Where the intended mining location has the potential to affect human settlements, 
compensation and resettlement are issues to be considered before relocating the community. 
The Mining Code and the Mining Regulations require a mining company to fulfill its legal 
obligations toward indigenous communities adjacent to, or that are affected by mining 
operations.264 Together with the DRC Land Law of 1973, these statutes recognize customary 
occupation of rural land and customary rights; however, there are little details provided for 
customary land management. In terms of the 1977 Expropriation Law, (Law No, 77 – 001), 
the state owns all the land that constitutes the DRC and may expropriate land held by local 
communities as may be deemed reasonable under mining concessions.265 In general practice, 
however, mining houses that hold the mining title to the mineral resources within a certain 
location meet their financial obligations to compensate affected communities. However, the 
issue of fair and equitable compensation ostensibly remains unresolved. Imperatively, the 
Constitution provides certain requirements and obligations that have the potential to bind 
mining investors or holders of mining rights in order to protect the interests of indigenous 
communities. In terms of Article 34 of the Constitution, expropriation of private property for 
general interests or public utility basis can only take place in accordance with the general 
laws of the DRC and followed by equitable compensation. Article 281 of the Mining Code 
states that occupation of land or modification, whatsoever, rendering it unfit for cultivation, 
by depriving the rightful holders of enjoyment of land surface rights, is subject to fair 
compensation. Further a holder or lessee of mining rights is legally entitled to, upon request 
of the parties or community entitled to the land, pay fair and appropriate compensation 
equivalent to the value or rent of the land at the time of occupying it, plus 50 percent.266  
However, due to lack of information on the enforcement of the provisions, it is difficult to 
provide detailed analysis on the practical implications. In the interim, it is not clear whether 
local communities that were deprived of their land were compensated. 
 
Environmental health and safety of the indigenous communities is considered to be of 
importance.267 Article 405 of the Mining Regulations imposes statutory obligations on title-
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holders of mining rights, to develop and implement environmental plans in order to protect 
environmental interests and indigenous communities closer to mining locations. The 
Regulations make it mandatory to consult with the public, and interested and affected 
communities.268 The Regulations spelt out the procedure to be taken before, during 
preparation for an EIA and after consultation with the public and the affected communities.269 
EIAs ought to be considered taking into account environmental provisions that provide self-
contained measures spelt out in terms of Law No: 011 of 2002 (the Forest Code). While the 
process of undertaking EIAs requires public consultations, it is imperative that the interested 
and affected parties work together in order to mitigate potential negative effects of a proposed 
mining project. Working together could be one of the bases to establish trust and mutual 
relationships between mining companies and local communities. The Directorate of Mines is 
directly responsible for regulating, inspecting and supervising all mining activities with 
regard to health and safety.270 The state’s agents are responsible for regulating the activities 
of mining companies and towards indigenous communities.  
 
5.4.7 Compensation for Expropriation 
 
The Constitution of the DRC guarantees security and protection of individual and collective 
property rights.271 Security of property is fundamental and therefore requires protection in 
order to secure foreign investment for exploitation of mineral resources and related processes 
in the mineral value chain.272 Further the Constitution provides for expropriation but goes on 
to say the acquisition must have a prior payment. ‘No one may be deprived of his or her 
property except for reasons of public utility and in return for prior payment of just 
compensation under the conditions established by law’.273 This provision provides the 
manner in which expropriation can be done and the state has the responsibility to compensate 
the property holder(s) for the expropriation. Arbitrary expropriation is illegal and the 
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Constitution further provides that ‘[a] person’s assets may only be seized by virtue of a 
decision issued by a competent judicial authority’.274  
 
Articles 275 and 276 of the Mining Code provide compensation for expropriation. In terms of 
Article 275, mining or quarry installations cannot be compulsorily expropriated by the State 
except in exceptional circumstances set by law. As referred to in the preceding section, in the 
event of expropriation, fair compensation has to be paid to the holder of the affected rights or 
business interests at least 6 months before the compulsory execution of the decision to 
expropriate. The same Article provides that within 48 hours following the date of notification 
of the decision to expropriate, the State has to inform the affected investor of the proposed 
amount of compensation as well as the date on which the actual expropriation takes place. In 
the event of a dispute, the same provisions of the Mining Code provide the procedures to be 
followed in order to resolve the issue amicably.    
 
The manner in which sovereignty is worked out with regard to expropriation is provided for 
in Article 34 of the Constitution. Apart from the Constitutional and the Mining Code 
provisions on expropriation, Land Law of 1983275 and Law No. 77 – 001 of 1977 
(expropriation law) spells out the requirements for expropriation that the acquisition should 
be of public interest. Where rights to minerals were acquired illegally, it is also a ground for 
expropriation. However, the status quo should be restored before consideration of appropriate 
remedy. ‘In any case of expropriation, the DRC is required to offer fair compensation; as 
with many Congolese laws, these requirements are not always fully respected’.276 However, 
equitable and fair compensation for expropriation is an integral legal requirement of 
international law that is generally accepted standard practice as discussed in chapter 2. 
 
The Expropriation law provisions in the Land Law and the Constitution empower the DRC 
government with the mandate to expropriate private property for general purposes.277 In the 
ordinary course of events where the expropriation is contested, the state is entitled to obtain a 
court order before the acquisition. It can therefore be inferred that there is an exception where 
the state can expropriate without a court decision; however, due to the lengthy legal the 
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process to obtain a court order, may further derail the fulfilment of the objectives of the 
acquisition. For example, the DRC government expropriated the London-listed, Canada-
based resources group, First Quantum Minerals’ mining interests with the former citing that it 
“suspected wide-scale gross misconduct” during the latter ’s mining operations in the 
country.278 On this basis, the DRC granted title to the expropriated interests in the mining 
location to a state-controlled mining company, Société de développement industriel et minier 
du Congo (SODIMICO).279 It can be argued that in order to expropriate business rights or 
interests in question, the DRC government acted in the public interest on the basis that the 
investor failed to comply with fundamental provisions in domestic mining laws.  
 
The expropriation of business interests or mining rights from First Quantum Minerals 
reiterates that mineral resources are not privately owned in the DRC. They are ‘[…] 
exclusively, inalienable and imprescriptible property of the States’.280 Although the 
constitutional provision dealing with property rights does not define what constitutes 
property, however, in the context of the thesis one can argue that property includes rights of 
access to s mineral resource embedded in mining licence(s). Intrinsically, mining investors 
have no claim to own or possess domestic minerals but rights of access to, and use of the 
resources per conditions underpinning the issuance of a mining licence. 
 
In a nutshell, the expropriation of the business interests that were conferred to First Quantum 
Minerals is a manifestation of sovereignty in order to redress non-compliance with domestic 
laws. The DRC Constitution provides for a framework for policy formulation and grounds to 
justify expropriation. Regardless of this, the DRC was challenged (see section 5.4.12 ((“non-
judicial dispute settlement”)) below) before an international arbitration for an order to reverse 
the acquisition or pay compensation. However, it can be argued that the requirement to 
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compensate the investor restricts arbitrary expropriation, and failure to raise sufficient capital 
in order to pay compensation can be a stumbling block for the executive to expropriate even 
in circumstances where the investor has been in gross non-compliance with domestic laws. 
On the contrary, paying compensation lessens revenue available for development. Also, one 
can argue that the DRC’s sovereignty can be under siege because there are competing 
interests that have to be protected: On the one hand, to attract foreign mining investors and 
protect their investments, and on the other hand, the right of the DRC to regulate and exercise 
the mandate derived from international law principle of PSNR to benefit from exploitation of 
domestic minerals for self-determination. 
 
5.4.8 Exchange Controls and Repatriation of Profits 
 
Generally, the exchange control regime is made up of Acts of Parliament, Presidential 
Ordinances and circulars of the Central Bank. Together, these pieces of legislation constitute 
the “Exchange Control Regulations” of the DRC. From these three broad categories, there are 
four main pieces of legislation, namely, the Ordinance Law of 1967,281 which grants 
regulatory authority to the Central Bank of the DRC; the Central Bank Circular (Circulaire 
de la Banque Centrale du Congo) of 2001;282 the Law 78-017 of 1978,283 and Decree-Law 
004 of 2002,284 which directly applies to national and foreign currencies in the Republic.285 
At the core of the regulation process and enforcement of these laws, the Central Bank of the 
DRC takes a pro-active role, which it derives from the Constitution.286 Apart from these 
categories, the Mining Code provides for repatriation of profits and payment of current 
transactions. In terms of Article 269 of the Code, a foreign mining investor is allowed to 
repatriate from his or her DRC bank account not more than 40 percent of the receipts from 
exports within 15 days of receipt of same in the main bank account as provided for in terms 
of Article 267 of the Code (that provides for the establishment of “main account and accounts 
for the servicing of foreign debts”). Further, Article 270 of the Code provides for payment of 
exchange control duties and any foreign mining investor is required to comply with.  
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The exchange controls and, provisions on repatriation of profits and payment of current 
transactions are some of the major financial rules in the DRC.287 Among other financial 
issues, the exchange control regulations are fundamental in the transfers of financial 
resources to, or from outside the DRC in the form of repatriation of profits and payment of 
current transactions. Regardless of the customer or the beneficiary, the Central Bank is 
entitled to receive an exchange control fee of 2 percent of the amount involved in each 
financial transaction.288 The Central Bank has discretion on the fees and the maximum 
amount that can be transferred from the country subject to meeting the regulatory 
conditions.289 For example,  
[a]ll transactions relating to transfers of income, current transfers and capital movements with 
a value exceeding US$10 000 require the purchase of a licence (“Model RC”) at an approved 
bank. In the case of an amount less than US$10 000, no statement is required’. […] The entry 
of capital under direct investment or export pre-financing is permitted subject to subscription 
of a declaration RC Model. The capital must come from transactions with legitimate economic 
origin. For external borrowing, repayment of principal and interest are made through 
voluntary subscription by the “Model LR”.290 
 
From the quote, one would argue that the DRC asserts sovereignty through the Central Bank 
in order to regulate exchange controls and capital movements, as well as payment of current 
transactions and repatriation of profits. However, the exchange controls and repatriation of 
profits restrict the amount of revenues available for domestic development. Since the DRC is 
a member of the IMF, it is bound by the IMF Rules, including Article XIV of the Rules, 
which regulate exchange controls and capital movements, as well as repatriation of profits 
and payments of current transactions (discussed in chapter 2). The fact that the IMF Rules are 
cascaded to the domestic level means the DRC cannot enact laws contrary to IMF 
requirements. If it does, however, the move does not promote mutual relationship with its 
traditional donor and the chances of losing the much needed financial aid will be very high. 
The requirement to align domestic laws relating to repatriation of profits and payment of 
current transactions as well as exchange control with the IMF requirements takes away 
freedom to enact laws for self-determination. As much as the DRC requires capital for 
mining activities, the requirement to allow foreign mining investors to repatriate profits 
lessens revenues available for reinvestment and expansion of mining business as well as 
capital available for development. In the event that the DRC restricts repatriation of profits 
                                                          
287
 KPMG ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo fiscal guide’ 2012/2013 at 9 – 10, available at 
www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/KPMG-in-Africa/DOcuments/MC9197_Fiscal_Guid_DRC.pdf (accessed 3 January 
2015). 
288
 Ibid, at 10. 
289
 Ibid. 
290
 Ibid 
   223 
and payment of current transactions, however, can cause tensions and also shun potential 
investments. Thus, the DRC government is in perpetual tension between the wish to 
encourage and attract mining investment to develop the country, and create employment, on 
the one hand, and the desire to benefit by capturing large share of the revenues derived from 
mining activities, on the other hand.  
 
5.4.9 Equitable Treatment of Foreign Mining Investors 
 
The DRC is a politically independent state and has the prerogative to decide on the conditions 
of access to domestic mineral resources (discussed above), by deciding on which foreign 
mining investors to issue mining permits in order to exploit the resources, as well as to 
regulate their operations in terms of domestic legislative requirements. The Lutundula 
Commission referred to (in section 5.2) above was established to review all mining contracts 
that were concluded during two conflict periods of 1996 – 1997, and 1998.291 In its 
investigations, the Commission focused on all mining contracts concluded between these two 
periods regardless of the nationality of the foreign mining investor or where the company was 
registered. One can argue that the conduct of the Commission at the behest of the DRC 
government in order to review mining agreements concluded in the period under assessment 
was in fact without fear or favour. In the context of equitable treatment of mining investors, it 
is essentially to argue that the DRC treated all foreign mining investors whose contracts were 
concluded between the two conflict periods impartially because the contracts that were 
reviewed were considered to be prejudicial to the country.   
 
The equitable treatment requirement that arises in order to avoid discrimination in 
international investment and trade law, the national treatment and the most favoured nation 
(MFN) requirements (discussed in chapter 2), restrict the DRC from choosing foreign mining 
investors who might confer investment and trade advantages over others in the mineral value 
chain. Further the equitable treatment requirement restricts the mandate and sovereignty of 
the DRC to grant investment and trade advantages to one foreign mining investor or foreign 
mining investors from one country over those from other countries. Both the national 
treatment and the MFN requirements restrict the DRC legislature and the executive from 
passing laws favouring nationals, thus the restriction can have an impact on indigenization 
laws as the government is compelled to provide the same treatment to domestic and foreign 
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mining investors. Accordingly, the executive and legislature are compelled to guarantee 
foreign mining equitable treatment standards and non-discriminatory treatment through 
legislative, judicial and administrative decisions or practices. 
 
Regardless of the non-discrimination requirement, the state of the DRC economy is very 
weak and therefore new mining investment can be granted very favourable tax treatment. One 
can argue that since investing in the DRC is a risky undertaking on the basis that the political 
situation in that country is very delicate. The first significant investment after the deadly war 
can be granted nearly tax free status while investors who come to invest years later can pay 
more taxes. The discrimination will fair in this regard. Accordingly, the DRC can navigate 
the non-discrimination requirement, by taking its risky political situation to grant low taxes to 
mining companies already operating in the country and then grant relatively higher taxes to 
mining investors that invest in the country some years later. The assumption is that by then, 
the DRC will be politically stable and peaceful, as well as enjoying economic boom. 
 
5.4.10 Revenue Transparency and Accountability  
 
The DRC has been plagued by resource conflicts; against this background, reassertion of 
central government’s authority and sovereignty over mineral resources is important in order 
to promote transparency and accountability in the minerals sector.292 It is incumbent upon the 
central government to change the secretive manner of resource regulation to an open system 
which promotes public participation and scrutiny develops. In addition,  
[t]he DRC is a member of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region [ICGLR], 
whose members committed themselves in 2010 to increasing transparency and traceability in 
the region's minerals trade, along with measures designed to keep armed groups from 
exploiting the sector. This effort has included a joint operation with Kenya to combat gold-
smuggling [among other precious minerals].293 
 
From the quotation, it can be argued that mineral endowment comes with responsibility that 
requires the DRC to regulate access and exploit the resources (in partnership with private 
sector) for the benefit of the citizens. The fact that the DRC is a member of the ICGLR and 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) fundamentally requires the government 
to uphold its obligations in terms of the necessary reporting conditions, as well as 
transparency and accountability in order to remain within the contours set by the initiative. At 
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all material times, the DRC is required in terms of both organizations to insure transparency 
and accountability as well as traceability of revenues derived from the resources. The 
mandate of the DRC government ultimately ties in with the responsibility to control and 
regulate domestic mineral resources – the responsibility which lies with an elected 
government. Regardless of these requirements, however, the DRC’s over-dependence on 
mineral wealth and foreign aid has often propagated and encouraged authoritarian rather than 
a democratic system of governance. This has been exacerbated by weak legal frameworks 
and regulatory instructions as well as their structures.294 Further the DRC is under pressure to 
comply with the requirements of organizational membership. For example, 
‘The G8 countries ‘[…] urge[d] candidate countries to the [EITI], including the DRC, to 
complete the EITI implementation process as a mechanism to enhance government and 
accountability in the extractive sector. The recent inclusion of coltan and cassiterite in the 
DRC’s [European Information Technology Observatory (EITO)] reporting is a step in the 
right direction’.295 
 
It is important to ensure transparency and accountability against the backdrop of large and 
unregulated inflow of revenues in state accounts, which serve as an irresistible temptation for 
those in positions of authority. For that reason, the absence of checks and balances that 
include transparency and accountably, the ruling clique’s illegally and perniciously use 
available resource revenues to enrich themselves through corruption (see section 5.6.2 below) 
and political patronage in order to consolidate political power and control.296 It is imperative 
to adopt and use checks and balances to curb threats to sovereignty discussed in section 5.6 
below, by ensuring the revenues are used and managed transparently and responsibly. 
 
It therefore remain important for the DRC government to, 
‘[t]ake advantage of international interest and support for increased transparency and 
accountability in the management of extractive industries to develop more specialized 
knowledge of the extractive industry, and become more engaged in management and oversight 
issues. [Also, it is imperative to] [m]ake better use of existing legislative resources to 
influence policy and conduct oversight activities, from standing committees that deal directly 
with the extractive industry to finance and budget committees that have an impact on revenue 
management.297 
 
From the excerpt, one can argue that revenue transparency and accountability are 
mechanisms to ensure the mineral revenues are channeled towards national development 
issues. By strengthening these two mechanisms, also strengthens the operationalization of 
PSNR and the mandate to exploit mineral resources for self-determination. 
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5.4.11 Strategic Planning on How to Use Mineral Resources for Development 
 
Since the DRC has the sovereignty derived from international law principles, namely, self-
determination, non-interference and PSNR (discussed in chapter 2); these principles 
reinforces the right to development, by providing the government with the mandate to exploit 
the resources and derive benefits for national development.298 The DRC’s  
‘[…] report on the implementation of its Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper 
(GPRSP) for 2009, […] was put in place for practical reasons relating notably to limitations of 
the statistical apparatus and weakened human and institutional capacities in formulating 
development policies, the delayed consequence of years of political, economic, and social 
instability. 299 
 
Regardless of the delicate political challenges owing to the instability in the country, the 
implementation of the GPRSP began in 2007 a year in which the DRC had; 
[…] an extremely challenging environment, marked by  marked by (i) the devastation of 
economic and social infrastructures, a formidable obstacle to private sector growth and 
development; (ii) uncertainties surrounding the preparation and staging of the first truly free 
and democratic elections in a climate of heightened tensions; (iii) renewed hostilities in the 
eastern region, bringing grave humanitarian consequences; (iv) the global food and energy 
crises; (v) the international financial crisis (the most serious since the Great Depression of 
1929); (vi) the collapse in commodity prices and resultant contraction of government revenue; 
(vii) the lack of budgetary support since the 2006 suspension of the [Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF)] program; and (viii) weak human and institutional capacities, 
particularly in the areas of statistics, policy formulation, and the monitoring and evaluation of 
policy implementation.300 [words in bold is my emphasis]. 
 
The extract shows the DRC’s background is riddled “with the episodic and recurrent 
resurgences” political tensions and instability,301 and the situation underscores extreme 
fragility which requires all levels of the DRC government and the international community to 
spearhead and speed up reforms in order to create an enabling environment for conditions 
that usher in peace and sustained economic growth through strategic planning as well as the 
contribution of mineral resource exploitation for self-determination and development. 
 
Against the background of political fragility and uncertainty due to recurrent conflicts, the 
DRC government requires stability and, development laws and planning, whereby mineral 
resource revenues have to be used and managed in line with the development vision of the 
state. Strategic planning through mineral resource exploitation can be used as a peace asset 
and to stabilize the economy, then economic growth and development, as well as poverty 
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reduction plans.302 Although the DRC has sound strategic planning on the manner to use and 
manage domestic mineral resources for self-determination and development strategy, as well 
as in order to curb resource conflicts, however, development planning is indiscriminately 
hampered by recurrences of conflicts as well as lack effective implementation and 
enforcement of mining laws. These factors systematically disempower the mandate to 
regulate and use the resources for self-determination, as well as to spur national development.  
 
The initiative by the DRC government to undertake a review of mining contracts can be 
considered a strategy in order to ensure all prejudicial contracts were renegotiated for the 
benefit of both the state and investors. The review was strategic in nature in order to ensure 
the state did not suffer prejudice and irreparable financial loss as during colonialism 
(highlighted in section 1.2 of chapter 1). The review was not without its critics:  
Some participants worried that undertaking a review of contracts would further discourage 
investments in mining Congo’s natural resources and subsequently hurt development. 
However, one panelist noted that Liberia’s positive experience with reviewing contracts in the 
aftermath of its civil war served as a good example for ameliorating unfair contracts, while 
retaining the confidence of international mining interests. One of the critical factors in 
Liberia’s review process was the political will for reform; it was an integral part of the 
transition process in Liberia.303  
 
While strategic planning and influence form the Liberian experience is fundamental and a 
living example, it is necessary for the DRC to actively review its mining contracts concluded 
during the two war periods in order to ameliorate the irregularities in future contracts. Also, 
publicity of malfeasance of the mining companies could be a strategy that motivates investors 
to operate transparently. Further the strategy can be a catalyst for other mining investors 
doing business in the country to comply with domestic mining laws, thus giving the 
government room to regulate responsibly and boost chances to derive more revenues through 
mining taxation.304  
 
Apart from the review of contracts, there does not appear to be a strategic plan for national 
development that references the mineral sector. The drawing of GPRSP does not provide an 
accurate and complete picture of strategic development plans.  
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5.4.12 Non-judicial Dispute Settlement  
 
The DRC Constitution provides for the legal machinery to resolve disputes arising from the 
territory, by establishing the framework for the country’s judicial system, and spells out a 
hierarchy of domestic courts and their composition,305 as well as jurisdiction.306 The judiciary 
is the ‘[…] guarantor of the individual liberties and fundamental rights of the citizens’,307 and 
the executive authority has no legal basis to interfere in the manner in which the rule of law is 
exercised and executed.308 Apart from the courts and tribunals established in terms of 
paragraph 2 of Article 149 of the DRC Constitution, there is no provision for any 
extraordinary or special tribunals that may be established.309 The DRC does not have single 
arbitration law but provisions for arbitration in different Acts. One has to canvass the 
different provisions to make a coherent whole. For example, Articles 37 and 38 of the 
Investment Code310 Articles 74 and 159 of the Code on Congolese Civil Procedures, the 
provisions in the Mining Code, as well as adhering to the Regulations on Supplementary 
Mechanisms in the procedures in terms of the ICSID Convention on settling investment 
disputes. Also, the DRC acceded to the International Chamber of Commerce Rules of 
Arbitration of Paris, which forms part of its arbitration rules.  
 
With regard to solving potential mining disputes and related issues, the Mining Code spells 
out provisions for dispute settlement between the DRC government and mining investors. 
The Mining Code provides for the establishment of dispute settlement mechanisms between 
the state and foreign investors. Two forms of appeal are provided for, via the DRC’s judicial 
system311 and arbitration.312 With regard to the domestic judicial system, the dispute is 
subject to ordinary court appeal313 and the courts  
[…] shall apply the procedure pursuant to substantive law as set forth in the Congolese Code 
of Civil Procedure, the Criminal Procedure, the procedure before the Supreme Court of 
Justice, as well as all the general principles of law which apply to judicial matters.314  
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Article 315 of the Mining Code provides the categories of disputes that are subject to court 
appeals in the Republic and such matters are not subject to arbitration; these include disputes 
concerning compensation for expropriation, the ban on leaving the national territory, overlaps 
between holders of mining rights, and disputes between mining rights holders. By giving 
categories subject to domestic court appeals and not arbitration, the DRC asserts sovereignty 
in such strategic cases, by setting the record to avoid uncertainties and systematic 
disempowerment of its court if such cases were to be resolved through arbitration. By 
involving domestic courts, it could be a way to ensure formal and traditional legal structures 
supporting the assertion of sovereignty are involved.  
 
Disputes between the DRC and mining investors relating to the interpretation or application 
of the provisions of the Mining Code may be resolved through arbitration.315 The Mining 
Code provides two processes regarding arbitration, which are domestic and international 
arbitration.316 The nature of the dispute determines whether foreign investors take the 
domestic or international arbitration route. For domestic arbitration to apply, the Mining 
Code provides that the dispute must arise from the interpretation or application of provisions 
of the Code. The arbitration shall then be based on the rules provided for in the Congolese 
Code of Civil Procedure.317   
 
However, with regard to the choice of international arbitration, the Mining Code provides 
that when a dispute arises, and at the request of a party that proceeds first, (usually a foreign 
investor), the party may choose an international arbitration forum in accordance with the 
investor’s home state’s BIT with the DRC.318 If the foreign investors are not from a 
contracting state, they may choose any international tribunal but have to notify the DRC 
government of such intention.319 The rules underpinning the conclusion of the mining 
contract between the DRC government and the foreign investor will be applied in the dispute 
settlement.320 
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Regardless of the choice of arbitration forum, international arbitration in which the DRC 
government is involved must apply domestic rules, unless expressly provided for in the BIT 
between the DRC and the contracting state. In terms of Article 320(3) of the Mining Code, 
the DRC government may waive its rights of immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement of 
the decision of the tribunal. By giving priority to domestic law unless expressly provided in 
the BIT, the DRC gives priority to the assertion of sovereignty which is supported by 
municipal law over foreign law. By waiving immunity from domestic jurisdiction, the DRC 
may also be waiving its assertion of sovereignty in a way, weakening its influence and 
control over the subject-matter with a view to settling competing interests between the state 
and the foreign investor.321  
 
In International Quantum Resources Limited, Frontier SPRL & Compagnie Minière de 
Sakania SPRL v Democratic Republic of the DRC,322 the dispute arose out of administrative 
steps taken by the DRC (respondent) in 2009 and 2010 to exclude the three applicants from 
their legitimate mining activities in the country. The respondent had cancelled the applicants’ 
joint mining contract over a multi-billion US$ copper and cobalt tailings processing plant that 
the respondent had previously concluded with the applicants. The applicants initiated 
arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration 
(ICC Tribunal)323 against the respondent. The applicant alleged that the cancellation of the 
mining permits, and the expropriation of the various investments and assets of the applicants, 
was part of the agenda of reprisals orchestrated by the respondent against the group of mining 
investors, because on 29 January 2009, a group of mining investors led by Congo Mineral 
Developments Ltd sued the respondent and Gecamines in the ICC Tribunal for compensation. 
In an ostensible retaliation, the respondent instituted domestic legal proceedings against the 
applicants alleging defamation of the country’s reputation in the international mining 
community and claimed US$ 12 billion as damages before the DRC’s Court of Appeal. The 
claim was granted.  However, the applicants challenged the decision to award the respondent 
US$12 billion in the ICC Tribunal.324 The Tribunal ordered that the US$ 12 billion damages 
judgement granted by the DRC Court of Appeal could not be enforced by the DRC or 
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Gecamines. The decision to order non-enforcement of the DRC’s Court of Appeal could be a 
seen as a slap against the assertion of the country’s sovereignty.  
 
In a similar case, the DRC cancelled two other mining permits jointly held by applicants. The 
cancellation led the applicants to institute arbitration proceedings against the respondent at 
the ICSID.325  In their arbitration application, the applicants maintained that the respondent 
withdrew certain mining rights in breach of the provisions of the Mining Code and of the 
applicable municipal law.326 The aforesaid mining rights authorized the applicants to explore, 
develop and operate copper mines, especially at the Lonshi and Kishiba mines in the copper 
belt of the DRC. Regardless of the DRC’s defence, the tribunal found in favour of the 
applicants on the basis that the DRC acted unlawfully.  
 
Although the DRC exercised its sovereignty by cancelling mining permits that were issued to 
the applicants; presumably, the exercise of sovereignty was corrupted in that it was done to 
‘get back’ at certain mining investors. Against this backdrop, however, it can be argued that 
the sovereignty was challenged when the DRC appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the ICSID and the ICC Tribunal in order to resolve the disputes. When the DRC appeared 
and submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribunals, this undermined local courts and perhaps 
regarded them as inferior and unreliable compared to international arbitration forums that 
hear and determine the disputes  
 
5.5 Threats to Sovereignty over Mineral Resources  
 
Although the mining sector is the mainstay of the DRC economy there are domestic factors 
threating state sovereignty over mineral resources. It is important to consider these threats in 
the context of domestic regulation of mineral resources and the potential way they negatively 
affect the DRC’s ability to benefit from its mineral resources.   
 
5.5.1 Illegal Mining  
 
As highlighted above, more than two-thirds of the DRC mineral production that include 
strategic minerals such as diamonds, gold and coltan comes from informal mining.327 From 
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the statistics, the informal mining activities contribute more to the overall mineral production 
in the DRC, and this is one of the factors leading up to the need to regularize informal 
mining.328 Illegal mining is prevalent in the country and takes various forms that include 
illegal transfer of stored mineral resources. One of the well-known involved the Societe 
Miniere et Industirelle du Kivu (SOMINKI), reportedly siphoned about 3 000 and 1 500 
metric tons of cassiterite and coltan respectively from Kivu province of the DRC to Rwanda 
between November 1998 and April 1999.329 The UNSC and civil society reports on illegal 
mining of mineral resources in the DRC provide insight into the extent to which the DRC is 
prejudiced of its minerals, and the revenues through various illicit ways that include 
smuggling and corruption. Presently, the DRC mining sector can be described as disorderly 
with little respect for the rule of law in most mining regions in the country.330 The informal 
and disorderly mining situation is largely caused by weak central authority leading up to the 
prevalence of illegal artisanal mining. Accordingly, the DRC government as the owner and 
custodian of the resources on behalf of the Congolese people has the responsibility to regulate 
mining activities for self-determination.  
 
In order to bring sanity and curb illegal mining and simultaneously allow locals to participate 
in regulated artisanal mining, the Mining Code provides for the regularization of artisanal 
mining activities, by the provision of artisanal miner’s card as a legal requirement for the 
miners.331 In this regard, one can argue that the DRC navigates illegal mining by regulating 
artisanal mining.  
 
The Mining Code provides the DRC government with the mandate to promote responsible 
artisanal mining regulation through licensing and registration of artisanal miners, as well as to 
set aside areas for artisanal work. Accordingly, all artisanal mining has to take place within 
the designated areas and sinking of shafts within such zones cannot be deeper than 30 meters. 
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‘Artisanal mining outside of [designated zone] is technically illegal’.332 In other words, the 
Mining Code distinguishes between artisanal mining, semi-mechanized artisanal mining and 
industrial mining. Further, the Mining Code defines artisanal mining to include all activity by 
which a Congolese person, in an artisanal exploration region delimited in area and depth not 
exceeding 30 meters, win mineral substances using non-industrial, simple tools, techniques 
and processes that are limited in mechanization.333 Therefore any Congolese person wishing 
to participate in artisanal mining is legally required to obtain an artisanal miner’s card or 
artisanal exploration card(s) (AECs), which is valid for one calendar year, from the Head of 
the Provincial Division of Mines (HPDM). The AEC(s) is renewable without limitation for 
another.334 Any unregulated artisanal mining is illegal and therefore a contravention of 
Article 5 of the Mining Code.335  
 
The Mining Code allows Congolese artisanal miners who are holders of artisanal miner’s 
cards wishing to undertake artisanal exploration within the artisanal mining zones to form 
cooperatives and obtain authorization from the Minister of Mines. It can be argued that the 
Mining Code provides a framework defining artisanal mining and the requirements for, as 
well as eligibility for artisanal miner. In order to prevent mineral substances from artisanal 
mining being sold illegally, the Mining Code provides that holders of artisanal miner’s cards 
are allowed to sell their produce to the National Territory provided the buying authority is a 
holder of a trader’s card or an authorization has been issued or granted by a competent 
authority in terms of the Mining Code.336 In this regard, the Mining Code provides strict 
compliance regarding the categories of persons who disqualify to be a buyer and to 
participate in artisanal mining.337  
 
From the above, one can argue that the Mining Code provides a regulatory regime applicable 
to artisanal mining, however, apart from the few provisions in the Code, there is no enabling 
legislation or policy dedicated to artisanal mining. Those involved in artisanal mining are 
causal, seasonal (or migrants from nearby countries) and majority of them are illegal artisanal 
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miners. Migrants are not eligible to for artisanal mining and their involvement is a violation 
of Article 27 of the Mining Code. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to ascertain the 
number of legal and illegal artisanal miners. It is fundamentally a legal requirement to have 
an artisanal miners’ card in order to lawfully engage in artisanal mining; however, with the 
high levels of poverty many Congolese people are not able to raise the required application 
fee of US$25 to be eligible for artisanal mining.338 The requirement to obtain an artisanal 
miner’s card was intended to regulate artisanal mining and to ensure holders of the card sell 
their produce to the state. In other words, it is illegal to sell or process minerals won through 
artisanal production to unlicenced buyers. A violation of this requirement can lead to 
cancellation of the card.339 By requiring artisanal miners to sell or process their minerals to 
registered dealers ensures all minerals won through artisanal production go into state 
controlled channels. This is a critical important way to navigate illegal mining and to curb 
revenue losses through smuggling and corruption.  
 
The regulatory regime for artisanal mining is very reasonable on paper; however, the absence 
of enabling legislation and structures to regulate the activities of artisanal miners is a major 
breakdown of the operationalization of PSNR. Given that artisanal mining constitute more 
than 80 percent, there was a fundamental need to appropriately regulate the activities.340 Few 
artisanal miners have acquired the cards, partly because the government’s failure to print 
sufficient cards due to lack of printing materials and supplies, and the practice to overcharge 
instead of the required US$25. Poor implementation and enforcement of the card requirement 
is a weakness in the regulatory system and the majority of those involved in artisanal mining 
see no reason to have an artisanal miner’s card.341  
 
5.5.2 Corruption 
 
In 2005, the DRC enacted an anti-corruption law which was intended to curb corruption, 
should it have been consistently implemented and enforced.342 The Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission that was established in 2003 by the transitional constitution to fight 
corruption was never included in the 2006 Constitution. Despite the establishment of the 
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Anti-Corruption Commission and anti-corruption law, there are various factors that are 
potentially influencing corruption in the minerals sector. The factors include political 
instability, weak implementation and enforcement of mineral resource laws and taxation laws 
owing to weak central authority.343 It is also reported that more than 80 percent of the mining 
companies were expected to make illegal payments to secure government mining contracts as 
well as to pay kickbacks to get mining licences.344 
 
Despite the DRC’s anti-corruption campaign, it has not achieved any significant results to 
reverse corruption. Inefficient mining and government supporting structures, weak 
administrative capacity and low salaries have adversely helped to perpetuate corruption in the 
minerals sector as indicated in the paragraph below.345 This has been compounded by the 
potential that the DRC lacks an effective judicial system, policing and complaint mechanisms 
where victims of corruption may seek redress. Further the State’s Auditor General, who is 
entrusted with the duty of reviewing expenditure, is mostly ineffective.346 It is inherently 
impossible to curb corruption in the minerals sector against this dysfunctional background 
which militates against the sovereignty of the state over mineral resources. 
 
 It can be argued that there is a record, a catalogue of mismanagement, corruption and large-
scale looting of various mineral resources, including strategic gold, coltan and diamonds. 
Against this backdrop, the post-independence conflict has negatively affected the economic 
environment and the country is among the most corrupt countries, ranked 154 out of 177 
countries that were ranked by Transparency International‘s Corruption Perception Index of 
2013.347 As such, corruption has the potential of undermining the DRC’s inherent sovereignty 
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over domestic mineral resources, their exploitation, and prospects of deriving economic 
benefits. 
 
5.5.3 Internal Conflicts 
 
Since the ushering in of political independence in 1960, internal conflicts have been 
experienced in the DRC between government forces and armed militia groups. It is reported 
that alienation, and control of, as well as access to mineral resources is the major cause for 
the conflicts.348  
 
The presence of illegal miners, the so-called independent miners or orpailleurs, especially in 
gold mining compete with legally registered mining companies operating in the country, such 
as AngloGold Ashanti, which has exclusive access to, and the right to exploit gold.349 The 
presence of these orpailleurs is illegal. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that illegal 
miners claim that they are naturally and historically entitled to have access to the resources 
and by virtue of being born in the area. In the absence of appropriate regulation and 
institutional control, their claims potentially further the conflict which the armed militia 
groups take advantage of advancing their own economic and political interests.350 The fight to 
control strategic mineral resources like gold, coltan and diamonds has become a definition of 
daily life in places such as Mongbwalu.351 It is reported that citizens of Mongbwalu, for 
example, were determined to fight for access to, and control of mineral resources found 
within or adjacent to their community, since the proceeds they get from illegal mining is the 
prime source of their livelihood. Mazalto asserts that the continuation of irregularities, lack of 
transparency and opportunities for civil society participation in the mineral resource 
regulation processes contributes to the tension in the country’s mining sector between two 
contradictory cultures; ‘opacity and corruption versus transparency and legality’.352 Further 
the tension in the relationship between mineral resources and internal conflict is also 
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influence by provincial economic disparities in the country.353 Mazalto identifies the 
disparities which reflect four key factors summarized as follows: 
(i) the nature of the industrial economic processes responsible for developing DRC’s 
mining resources, 
(ii) economic and poverty level imbalances among the DRC provinces, 
(iii)  uncontrollable violence, more particularly in the mineral endowed eastern parts of the 
country,  
(iv) the incompetence of the central authority to ensure political stability and its failure to 
effectively exercise control over the regulation of domestic mineral resources.354  
Each province is affected by several challenges, which at least vary from mineral resource 
endowment to the benefits derived from such endowment, and the effect this has on the 
majority of the Congolese community welfare. These factors are potentially the core cause 
for tensions and eventually conflict across most local communities in the country.355 
 
The UN Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Natural Wealth of the DRC of 2002 reveals that the illegal exploitation of 
mineral resources has two major consequences; (i) external massive financial resource 
influence for Rwanda armed forces and individual enrichment of top Uganda military 
commanders as well as influential civilians, and (ii) the emergence of illegal networks headed 
by influential army commanders for business persons.356 The Report concluded that the two 
factors are the basis of the hostile relationship between mineral resources endowment and 
internal conflicts in the country. Although there are other contributing factors referred above, 
these two could be considered the core cause of the recurrence of mineral resource conflicts 
in the country. 
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In its finding, the Panel of Experts submitted that;  
[t]he conflict in the [DRC] has become mainly about access, control and trade of five key 
mineral resources: coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold. The wealth of the country is 
appealing and hard to resist in the context of lawlessness and the weakness of the central 
authority.357    
 
Apart from the findings, recent research shows that access to, control and regulation of 
valuable minerals such as tantalum (extracted in the form of coltan), tin (extracted from 
cassiterite) and tungsten (in the form of wolframite) is the cause of mineral resource internal 
conflict, particularly in the eastern part of the country.358 The other contributing factors to the 
internal conflict over domestic mineral resources include the role played by some 
opportunistic entities, mining companies and institutions, powerful and influential individuals 
including some decision makers in the DRC and Zimbabwe.359 There could be pre-existing 
networks for channeling illegally exploited minerals. The purported loophole and the conflict 
could weaken and distort the regulatory potential of the state, thereby contributing to illegal 
access, control and exploitation of mineral resources.  
 
Some political leaders in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Great 
Lakes regions bear a direct responsibility for the internal conflict in the DRC.360 The direct 
involvement by some countries in the conflict raises a lot of issues, including whether the 
intervention was genuinely intended to defend or protect the sovereignty of the DRC over its 
mineral resources. Among the reasons for intervening, the security of the DRC’s 
neighbouring countries, such as Rwanda, Angola,361 Burundi and Uganda is considered.362 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, however, intervened in the DRC war albeit not sharing the same 
political borders.363 Both countries did not intervene like other neighbouring states that cited, 
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prima facie, their territorial security.364 It is reportedly the intervention by both countries 
could have been camouflaged with a view to have access to “strategic” domestic mineral 
resources. In contrast to Namibia’s participation, Zimbabwe’s involvement was largely seen 
as an extension of corruption of some of its leaders who derived economic benefits in that 
process.365 Unlike in Angola where the DRC conflict was perceived a threat to peace and 
stability, most Zimbabweans did not see any lawful and meaningful reasons for Zimbabwe to 
be at the helm of the DRC conflict.366 Further the Final UN Security Council Report of the 
Panel of Experts implicated Zimbabwe, among other countries, in the looting of the DRC’s 
mineral resources. However, Zimbabwe did not refute the allegations but maintained that it 
did a good job in the DRC and that it would not respond to malicious allegations by the 
British masquerading as the UN.367 Zimbabwe’s remarks are partly based on economic 
interests; one of the potential primary reasons for Zimbabwe’s military intervention in the 
DRC.368 Despite this apparently damaging official statement, it is alleged that Zimbabwe 
might have been cautious of the repeat of its Mozambique adverse experience where;  
[it] did all the donkey work only for South Africa to gain the peace dividends and now 
Mozambique has overtaken Zimbabwe as South Africa‘s biggest trading partner.369 
 
Against such camouflaged interventions, the concern is whether the Congolese people are 
benefiting from their mineral resources or whether other countries are taking advantage of the 
fragile political situation and the apparent weak regulation and control to derive economic 
benefits from the exploitation of the DRC’s mineral resources.  
 
As noted above, Although DRC is known for its lucrative mineral resources that have been 
exploited since the colonial period, when King Leopold II of Belgium took personal control 
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of Congo territory in the 1880s, mineral resource endowment has been an integral motivation 
for interests.370 The control over domestic mineral resources has been an influential motivator 
for external influence in order to exploit the resources.371 The motivations underpinning 
domestic conflict could be a consequence of economic interests; chief among them the need 
to have access to, and control of domestic mineral resources.372 Naidoo points out that the 
externally planned and executed overthrow of Mobutu was undertaken primarily to ensure 
economic and political interests, as well as security of the DRC’s neighbouring states such as 
Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Angola and to secure mineral resource interests of some 
western governments and their mining companies operating in the DRC.373 The armed 
conflicts which began in May 1997 negatively affected domestic mineral production.374 
Foreign investors reduced their operations due to political uncertainty and this adversely 
affected domestic economic development.375 The transitional government that was formed 
after the withdrawal of external evading troops in 2002 established a platform for economic 
recovery, investment negotiations and renegotiation with international financial institutions 
and donors, as well as implementing political and economic reforms.376  
 
From the above, the DRC’s mineral endowment continues to be the core for external interests 
and interference, on the one hand, and the resources are also the DRC’s greatest natural asset, 
on the other hand. This brings in tension between domestic and foreign interests over control 
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and access of the resources. Thus the ability by the DRC to assert sovereignty over the 
resources is dependent upon the central authority’s ability to strengthen regulatory capacity.  
 
Mineral resources conflicts in the eastern DRC could be considered to be motivated by the 
external desire for access to, and control of the resources. Ezekiel confirmed that the UN 
Report of the Panel of Experts documented the role of various rebel groups, proxy groups, 
armed forces, and some governments of neighbouring countries played a major role in the 
illegal exploitation of the DRC minerals.377 The findings of the UN Panel of Experts confirm 
that the DRC’s mineral resources and weak regulation is the major cause for conflicts. Thus, 
the DRC’s assertion of sovereignty over domestic mineral resources is restricted and 
weakened from various competing external interests aimed at accessing and controlling the 
resources.378 The inability to assert sovereignty could undermine the international law 
principles which support the DRC’s sovereignty discussed in chapter 2. 
 
With the aid of their home governments, most of the foreign troops illegally looted mineral 
resources from the DRC; depriving the Congolese people of their lawful rights to benefit 
from their natural endowment.379 When mass plunder of mineral resources declined owing to 
various reasons, including the end of vicious circle of armed conflicts and the gradual 
depletion of the stocks, the DRC government lost minerals worth billions of US dollars.380 
Undeniably, looting of the DRC’s mineral resources is a direct confrontation with the 
international law principles, which support the assertion of sovereignty over domestic mineral 
resources and an affront to the right of the Congolese to benefit from their mineral resources. 
 
While it is the duty of the state to put regulatory and enforcement measures in order to 
control domestic mineral resources, the DRC’s fragile efforts to effectively assert sovereignty 
has been hindered by various external interests and political instability.381 Presumably, this 
shows the weakness of the central authority to effectively regulate domestic mineral 
resources. The absence of appropriate regulation and enforcement mechanisms is a challenge 
that restricts the assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources. It can be argued that the 
DRC’s assertion of sovereignty, self-determination and integrity, as well as the right to 
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development has been compromised due to conflicts associated with the control, exploitation 
and regulation of domestic mineral resources. Whether the disguised military intervention 
was necessary to help the Congolese people to restore their integrity and sovereignty over 
mineral resources is debatable.382  
 
Of all post-cold war civil conflicts in Africa, the DRC conflict reflects the intricacies of the 
nexus between mineral resources and conflict, on the one hand, and negative and adverse 
effects of weak central authority on restricting or weakening sovereignty of the state over 
domestic mineral resources, on the other hand. It can be concluded that mineral resource 
endowment and weak central authority, and regulation have the potential to lead to natural 
resource conflicts. The extent of the correlation is potentially more pronounced in the DRC 
context where the central authority’s ability to defend its sovereignty from internal conflicts 
seems to be unremediably weak. Moreover, the camouflaged interference has the potential to 
weaken regulation and control of, as well as sovereignty of the DRC over domestic mineral 
resources. In this regard, internal conflict influences illegal access to, and control of domestic 
mineral resources as well as illicit trade. This in turn adversely restricts or weakens the 
potential of the DRC to derive much economic benefits.383 
 
Post-independence resource conflicts presently affecting political stability and economic 
development in the DRC could be a denial of the rights of, and disempowering the Congolese 
people and their sovereignty over mineral endowment. Political instability and interference in 
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the internal affairs of the DRC can be traced back to the scramble for Africa in 1884 to 
1885,384 colonization and under-development. Regardless of this, the DRC is a sovereign 
state; the role of international law in protecting politically weak states that cannot defend 
themselves is imperatively a need to uphold the principle of non-interference in domestic 
affairs of another state, permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) and self-
determination.385  
 
5.5.4 IMF and World Bank Conditionalities 
 
The relationship between the DRC and international financial institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank under the late Mobutu and Laurent Kabila regimes from the 1990s until 
2003 was not cordial due to a myriad of political and economic factors.386 The civil war 
affected the economy, which suffered hyperinflation and other economic ills during the same 
period. Although the DRC’s national budget is partly dependent on financial assistance from 
international institutions and foreign aid, the Kabila government laid a three legged 
foundation; first, the restoration of the relationship with international financial institutions 
and donors; second, steps to rejuvenate economic recovery continues and third, the first 
democratic elections since the DRC’s ushering in of political independence from Belgium in 
1960. When Joseph Kabila regime assumed office in 2001, and thereafter, the new DRC 
government that was installed was technocratic, much like the present government.387    
 
The appointment of Mbuyamu Matungulu, a renowned and longtime IMF economist, as the 
DRC’s Minister of Finance was presumably instrumental in the restoration of the formal 
relationship between the DRC, on the one hand, and the World Bank and IMF, on the other. 
Perhaps using the experience acquired while working for the IMF and the influence of the 
international financial institutions, Matungulu assisted the DRC to liberalize the labour 
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Global Magazine, 1 April 2002, available at http://www.winne.com/congo/cr00.html (accessed 8 September 
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http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep2012-21Jun.pdf (accessed 8 September 2014).  
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market, mining and forestry industries. Following these reforms, the DRC started receiving 
technical and financial assistance from the World Bank and IMF.388 Although it is not 
expressly stated, inference may be drawn that economic reforms undertaken by the DRC 
were conditionalities proposed by either the IMF or the World Bank, or both in order to 
receive assistance from the two international financial institutions.  
 
The reforms referred above were not the only conditionalities, aid and debt relief from the 
two financial institutions was conditional upon the recipient countries drawing and spelling 
out ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’.389 The DRC was no exception to this influence; it 
drew up its own PRSPs. The issue central to this is the manner in which the conditionalities 
affected the DRC’s assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources. Paradoxically, it appears 
these reforms did not affect the DRC’s sovereignty because theoretically, the state still enjoys 
the right to control, alienate, vindicate, encumber and expropriate domestic mineral 
resources. However, in practice the liberalization of the economy under the influence of the 
IMF and World Bank means the nature of the entity with the right to mine is being changed, 
thus eroding the object of the DRC’s assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources by 
redefining the role of the state from the custodian and manager and confining it to the 
regulator. This can be seen in one of the most recent economic reforms in the DRC, which 
consist in transforming the main mining parastatal, Gecamines, into a private company, with 
some state participation, a process that is still under way. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter deliberated on the importance of domestic mineral resources to the DRC 
economy, the provisions in two major mining laws that support, as well as themes that restrict 
the assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources and the manner in which this is done. 
While the DRC is endowed with an array of mineral resources, their economic contribution to 
the national GDP is affected by various internal and external factors, which include illegal 
mining, mineral resource associated conflict, the absence of firm property rights, corruption, 
weak enforcement of the relevant laws and policing. The cumulative negative impact of these 
factors has been exacerbated by weak central authority. 
 
                                                          
388
 See generally Geraldine Baudienville ‘Public financial management reforms in fragile states: The case of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’ 2012, available at http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/7853.pdf (23 October 2013) 
389
 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, hereafter PRSP. 
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Regardless of the various steps undertaken in the regulation of domestic mineral resources, 
including giving meaning to the assertion of sovereignty as shown in the chapter, the 
enforcement of mining laws is fraught with loopholes, and corruption in the sector continues 
unabated. Some of the citizens including politicians have amassed riches while the majority 
of indigenous Congolese are pinned to the walls of poverty. The unequal distribution of 
economic benefits derived from the exploitation of domestic mineral resources undermines 
the assertion of sovereignty and economic development. Lack of transparency and 
accountability in the processes of regulation of mineral resources has caused bottlenecks and 
challenges to sovereignty. As a result, the DRC is losing revenues derived from the resources, 
and the loss is aggravated by weak policing and tax collection system, as well as enforcement 
of the relevant laws owing to institutional failure. 
 
The Mining Code and the Mining Regulations are modern mining laws that provide an 
adequate legal basis for transparency and accountability, and assertion of sovereignty over 
domestic minerals, as well as economic development through the exploitation of the 
resources. However, the DRC has to an extent not been able to exercise its mandate and 
sovereignty in order to derive maximum benefits from exploitation of the resources due to 
weak regulation as a result of political fragility and instability as well as poor implementation 
and enforcement of the relevant mineral resource laws. 
 
Taking into account the DRC’s mandate and assertion of sovereignty over mineral resources 
and the threats discussed in this chapter, alongside with those discussed in chapter 4, the next 
chapter provides a comparative analysis of the operationalization of international law 
principles governing Zimbabwe and the DRC as regards sovereignty over their mineral 
resources for self-determination. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING SOVEREIGNTY 
OVER MINERAL RESOURCES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 provided a conceptual frame for this thesis in terms of international law 
principles governing state sovereignty over mineral resources and threats to the outworking 
of that sovereignty. In chapters 4 and 5, I discussed the manner in which Zimbabwe and the 
DRC operationalize international law principles that were discussed in chapter 2; that is, how 
sovereignty over mineral resources manifests in domestic mining laws, and how the mandate 
derived from the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) is 
restricted by threats identified in chapter 3. The manner in which Zimbabwe and the DRC 
assert sovereignty over mineral resources occurs in various ways, through property rights, 
conditions of assess to the resources, beneficiation and trade, enforcement of mining laws and 
policing, as well as creating obligations toward indigenous communities. Both countries also 
assert sovereignty through the manner in which they respond to the constraints imposed by 
principles of international investment and trade.  
 
Despite being richly endowed with various mineral resources and as well asserting their 
sovereignty in the manner outlined and discussed in chapters 4 and 5, both Zimbabwe and the 
DRC are economically weak and poor. The inverse relationship invokes the resource curse: 
The paradoxical relationship between mineral endowment and underdevelopment dovetail 
with the complexity of resource governance in a context of state fragility. In this chapter, I 
therefore return to the problem and questions posed in chapter 1: How Zimbabwe and the 
DRC used the strategic area of domestic law and policy to operationalize aspects of 
international law principles relating to sovereignty over natural resources, taking into account 
threats to such sovereignty? 
  
The chapter discusses how the DRC and Zimbabwe’s operationalized aspects of the 
international law principles governing state sovereignty over mineral resources discussed in 
chapter 2. This chapter adopts a relative comparative analysis in order to show how both 
states’ mineral laws (as discussed in chapters 4 and 5) operationalize salient aspects of PSNR, 
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self-determination, non-interference, as well as principles facilitating investment and trade. 
The extent to which both states managed or failed to manage threats discussed in chapter 3, 
as well as the challenges is worth of consideration. Appendix A provides useful information 
for the purposes of a comparative analysis of some issues discussed in this chapter.  
6.2 Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (PSNR) 
Chapter 2 established that the principle of PSNR vests host states with the mandate and right 
to control and regulate, as well as exploit domestic mineral resources and derive economic 
benefits for national development. Also, the PSNR principle vests the state with permanent 
custodianship over domestic mineral resources, as well as the right to enact and implements 
laws determining conditions of access; regulate the acquisition and cancellation of mining 
licences; decide who should be allowed to invest in the mining sector and use the revenue 
generated from exploitation of minerals for development purposes.  
 
In both the DRC and Zimbabwe, the PSNR principle is primarily operationalized through the 
following features of the domestic legal regime: The property regime applicable to mining; 
conditions of access to mineral resources; policy implementation enforcement and policing; 
beneficiation and trade; the indigenization policy; dispute resolution; royalties and mining tax 
rates; beneficiation and trade, and specification of legal obligations toward indigenous 
communities.  
6.2.1 Custodianship over Domestic Mineral Resources  
Based on the analysis provided for in chapters 4 and 5, Zimbabwe and the DRC have not 
been reticent in claiming custodianship over mineral resources in their national laws. In 
Zimbabwe, on the one hand, the state President is exclusively and absolutely vested with 
permanent custodianship over domestic mineral resources on behalf of Zimbabweans. The 
state President has been conferred with dominium over all the mineral resources located 
within the country and has the right to alienate property rights in the resources for the benefit 
of the citizens. There are no private ownership rights and control of the resources; they are 
the property of the state. In his or her representative capacity and in consultation with the 
cabinet, the state President can grant rights to exploit a mineral resource subject to the 
conditions discussed in section 4.4.2 of chapter 4.  
 
   248 
In the DRC, on the other hand, the Constitution and the Mining Code provide that the state is 
the owner and custodian of all domestic mineral resources. Custodianship is vested in the 
state on behalf of, and for the benefit of, the Congolese people. As the case with Zimbabwe, 
the DRC has no private ownership of the resources but they are the property of the state. As 
such, the state has exclusive and inalienable ownership rights to all domestic minerals. 
Through the department of the state responsible for mines and mineral development, the state 
grants access to the resources by way of mining rights as discussed in section 5.4.2 of chapter 
5. 
 
As an expression of custodianship both Zimbabwe and the DRC restrict ownership in mineral 
resources by granting limited exploitation rights to investors. Two issues arise in connection 
with this position. The first is whether it makes any difference to vest mineral resource 
ownership in the state President (as in Zimbabwe) or in the state (as in the DRC)? The 
second, is how the decision to limit rights to exploitation rights squares with the realpolitik of 
investment and, particularly, investors’ desire for security of tenure?   
 
In response to the first issue, one could argue that it should not make a difference whether 
custodianship rights vest in the state or the state President. Both Zimbabwe and the DRC 
recognize the supremacy of ownership and custody of mineral resources. Vesting custody of 
mineral resources in the state and the state President does not entitle private claims over the 
resources, providing instead the responsibility to act in good faith, transparency and 
accountability as well as trust for the benefit of citizens.1 As suggested in chapter 4, however, 
vesting custodianship in the state President is subject to debate, particularly where there are 
no checks or balancing mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability. It could lead 
to personalizing ownership and custody of the resources contrary to the good intentions of 
PSNR, thus making the state less able to manage the threat of corruption. The orchestrated 
and intricate links in dodgy mining joint venture agreements are used to loot minerals. Other 
mechanisms that are used to loot the resources include under-invoice production, thereby 
making it hard to investigate and arrest those involved. Arguably, those involved in such 
illicit, self-serving and pernicious deals are mostly politically connected and they enjoy 
political protection. Further, one can argue that opaque mining agreements and company 
                                                          
1
 OSISA ‘Existing legal and institutional frameworks’ 2013, available at 
http://www.osisa.org/book/export/html/5137 (accessed 3 August 2014). The requirement for transparency and 
accountability is one of the major objectives of the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) as highlighted in preceding in 
chapters. 
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structures are used to hide the beneficiaries of illicit dealings as well as provide cover for the 
police and military. The illegitimate beneficiaries of Zimbabwe’s mining concessions, for 
instance the Marange diamonds, are often obscured. Undeniably, the operationalization of 
PSNR and the mandate to exploit the resources for development breaks down due these self-
serving and pernicious deals. In the circumstances, how may corruption be linked to the 
vesting in the state President with the powers to control domestic mineral resources? In the 
absence of strong checks and balances, vesting of custodianship in the state President could 
be manipulated and used as a vehicle for corruption in the mineral value chain. While, on the 
one hand, vesting of ownership and custody over mineral resources in the state President 
could be influential and useful tool to curb corruption. On the other hand, this all depends on 
the moral integrity of the state President, the credibility of the regulatory authority, as well as 
transparency and accountability in the mineral value chain.   
 
Regarding the second issue, as a result of limiting investor rights to exploitation rights, both 
Zimbabwe and the DRC provide some form of security of tenure. Zimbabwe’s Mines Act 
requires holders of mining or exploration licences to register with the Ministry of Mines.2 In 
the DRC, holders of mining or exploration licences have to register with the Mining Registry. 
In both countries, the requirement to register mining licences converts the rights imbedded in 
the licences to secured property rights, thus providing security of tenure. Despite these 
efforts, however, weak central authority (in the DRC) and property rights, and the rule of law 
in both jurisdictions are a concern. One can argue that doing business in both states is risky 
because of the lack of firm property rights, as reflected in low World Bank ratings (as 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5). Arguably, low ranking in the protection of property rights and 
“ease of doing business” adversely affects foreign mining investment in both countries. Thus 
contributing to breakdown of the operationalization of PSNR, precisely because both 
countries require foreign investment in order to successfully exploit their resources. It can 
therefore be argued that the operationalization of PSNR is inherently underpinned by host 
states’ ability to attract mining investment and provide firm property rights.  
 
In a nutshell, the principle of PSNR provides Zimbabwe and the DRC with the mandate, 
rights and authority to enact laws or provisions in domestic laws regarding property rights 
embedded in mining licences. Apart from the differences in vesting custody and ownership of 
                                                          
2
 See generally section 4.4.1 of chapter 4, above. See also section 15 of the Mines Act (of Zimbabwe). 
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mineral resources between Zimbabwe and the DRC, both countries are quite similar in how 
they define property in mineral rights and limit “ownership” to exploration and exploitation 
rights. This can be a strong assertion of sovereignty over the resources for self-determination. 
However, low investor ratings suggest lack of various fundamental factors including failure 
to establish firm and sufficient security of tenure for exploration and exploitation rights.   
 
6.2.2 Determining Conditions of Access  
 
In addition to asserting custodianship over mineral resources, both Zimbabwe and the DRC 
have articulated fairly elaborate conditions of access to their mineral resources in domestic 
laws. In both states, regulation and control of rights to access to mineral resources is 
exclusively the responsibility of the state through the departments in charge of mines and 
mining development. However, there are important differences in their strategies of 
allocation.  
 
In Zimbabwe, the conditions of access to mineral resources are set out in the Mines Act, 
which provides the Minister of Mines and Mining Development with authority, in 
consultation with the state President and cabinet, to grant or refuse a mining investor rights of 
access to a domestic resource. As discussed in chapter 4, the Mines Act provides for six 
different types of mining licences which confer rights upon prospective mining investors. 
Each category of mining rights has varying conditions of access.3 Generally, in order to be 
granted rights of access to a mineral resource foreign mining investors must meet the 
requirements of the indigenization law relating to mining joint ventures and the 51 percent 
indigenous share ownership.4  
 
Unlike Zimbabwe, the DRC government grants rights to access a domestic mineral resource 
on a “first come, first served basis”.5 The “first come, first served” requirement is provided 
for in the Mining Code, which makes it an obligation for the government to consider or reject 
applications in that order. This is a departure from the Zimbabwean approach. The Mines Act 
is silent on the issue, thus affording the state President and the Minister of Mines the 
discretion to decide which potential investor to grant the rights regardless of the date of 
submission of the application.  
                                                          
3
 See discussion in section 4.4.2 of chapter 4 above. 
4
 See discussions in sections 4.3.1.6 and 4.4.2 of chapter 4 above. 
5
 See discussion in section 5.4.2 of chapter 5 above. 
   251 
 
Unlike Zimbabwe’s Mines Act, the DRC’s Mining Code specifically provides that the 
Congolese have rights to engage in regulated artisanal mining activities on condition that 
each is a holder of an artisanal miner’s card, and is otherwise eligible to carry out artisanal 
mining.6 Artisanal mining is not formalized and regularized in Zimbabwe, and those 
engaging in the activity cannot obtain technical, financial and administrative assistance from 
the state, and also cannot freely use formal channels to trade their minerals.7 Due to this, 
artisanal miners are not capable of operating freely and have to use intermediaries to sell their 
produce. In that process, they are exploited and even arrested. In both countries, unregulated 
mining activities are illegal and therefore an offence to win a mineral from the earth without a 
valid licence. Further, both the Zimbabwe’s indigenization law and the DRC rules to reserve 
regulated artisanal mining for the Congolese stretch the boundaries of PSNR principle in 
respect of access to domestic minerals.  
 
As discussed in chapter 5, the DRC expressly prohibits government and civil servants, 
magistrates, employees of public entities which are authorized to undertake mining activities, 
armed forces, security agents and polices officers from carrying out mining activities. 
However, the Mining Code8 simultaneously allows such categories or persons to participate 
in the capital of any mining companies operating in the country. The provision is self-
contradicting: The objective to exclude the categories of people and then allow them to 
participate in the capital of mining companies is incompatible with the reasons to exclude 
them in the first place. The contradiction defeats the purpose of the provision and creates 
room for corruption. Unlike the DRC, however, Zimbabwe’s Mines Act does not expressly 
provide for categories of persons excluded from undertaking mining activities. The silence in 
the principal law is a cause of concern where conflict of interest arises.  
 
Regardless of being empowered by the PSNR principle to exercise sovereignty and the 
mandate to exploit domestic minerals for self-determination, both Zimbabwe and the DRC 
require capital that comes with foreign investment. Accordingly, both countries require 
                                                          
6
 See generally Articles 17 & 27 of the Mining Code. 
7
 Norman Mukwakwami ‘Formalizing Zimbabwe’s artisanal mining sector’  2013 at 
http://projekt263.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/formalising-zimbabwes-artisanal-mining-sector (accessed 3 
August 2014);  Oladiran Bello & Megan Bybee ‘Revamping artisanal gold mining in Zimbabwe to catalyze 
poverty Reduction’ 2014 at http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-briefings/revamping-artisanal-gold-mining-in-
zimbabwe-to-catalyse-poverty-reduction (accessed 3 August 2014). 
8
 Article 27 of the Mining Code.  
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partnerships with private investors in order to realize substantial investment. In this regard, 
however, there is tension where the application or the exercise of PSNR is limited. The DRC 
Mining Code9 and Zimbabwe’s indigenization law10 provide for mining investor partnerships 
with the state in order to exploit the resources. Unlike Zimbabwe’s Mines Act, the Mining 
Code provides for joint-mining venture with investors where the state deems it necessary. 
The provision for mining partnerships can be an acknowledgement that both states cannot 
successfully exploit their mineral resources without foreign investment. 
 
While Zimbabwe’s Mines Act is an outdated principal law, the DRC Mining Code is a more 
recent principal law that provides for partnerships and better operationalization of PSNR. The 
Code clearly states who can be an investor and who is excluded. Regarding artisanal mining, 
the Code provides for who qualifies to obtain an artisanal miner’s card and who should be 
disqualified. Zimbabwe’s Mines Act is explicitly silent over the same issues. Regardless of 
these strengths and shortfalls in the Mining Code and the Mines Act, respectively, however, 
one can therefore argue that the DRC and Zimbabwe do not provide for unrestricted access 
across all categories of mining, yet both states also recognize the need for partnerships. 
 
6.2.3 Power to Choose Who Should Invest  
 
The power to decide and choose which mining investor should be granted mining or 
exploration licence(s) is the prerogative of the state in both Zimbabwe and the DRC. This 
power is derived from the international law concept of sovereignty discussed in chapter 2 and 
is at the same time a manifestation of sovereignty. That said, my focus is on the use of such 
power to enhance indigenization policies to benefit the indigenous people in Zimbabwe and 
the DRC.  
 
The operationalization of PSNR though indigenization is a noble strategy in order to execute 
the mandate to exploit domestic mineral resources for national development. Fundamentally, 
the DRC and Zimbabwe flex their sovereignty muscles: The power to choose mining 
investors as well as to compel such investors to uphold indigenization policies is an act of 
asserting sovereignty. However, the operationalization of PSNR breaks down in that politics 
and not equitable distribution drives the benefits arising from the implementation of 
                                                          
9
 Para 3 of Article 8 of the Mining Code. 
10
 The indigenization law of Zimbabwe requires a 51 percent indigenous partnership.  
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indigenization policies. Have local communities benefited from the indigenization policy? 
Arguably, the response is in the negative; indigenization has illegally enriched a few, mainly 
politicians and their close relatives. It is evident that the objectives of indigenization in both 
countries have been debased; the implementation and enforcement of the policy has not been 
concomitant or in accordance with the wishes of the people. Accordingly, one can argue that 
the operationalization of PSNR breaks down because powers to choose who to invest can be 
abused for self-serving interests. 
 
6.2.4 Inalienable Right to Control and Regulate Resources  
 
The DRC and Zimbabwe have inalienable rights to control and regulate their mineral 
resources. This is an aspect of PSNR that is operationalized by rules relating to access and 
allocation of mineral resources discussed above, as well as rules on implementation and 
enforcement, together with beneficiation and trade. Accordingly, effective and appropriate 
implementation and enforcement of mining laws as well as policing is the core vanguard 
against threats to sovereignty over mineral resources discussed in chapter 3.  
 
Zimbabwe Mines Act and subsidiary laws, and the DRC Mining Code have provisions on 
implementation and enforcement. In both states, contravention of provisions in mining laws 
occurs either by way of commission or omission. For example, the Mines Act criminalizes 
failure to comply with any provision of the Act; this includes failure to keep an up-to-date 
register of mineral transactions11 and disposal of minerals from a location without payment of 
royalties. The DRC’s Mining Code criminalizes certain conduct that includes dealing in or 
possession of minerals without a licence. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, mining offences 
were enacted as a way to flex sovereignty muscle in order to control the resources, as well as 
to execute the state’s mandate to exploit the resources for self-determination.   
 
With regard to implementation and enforcement, Zimbabwe’s indigenization law is a case in 
point, which exhibits poor and the absence of clear, consistent, and legitimate enforcement 
structures and mechanisms. The authority in the Ministry of Youth and Economic 
Empowerment is responsible for facilitating appropriate implementation and enforcement of 
this law. However, as discussed above and in some instances, the state has rather used 
                                                          
11
 See discussions of the Gold Trade Act & Copper Control Act in sections 4.3.1.4 & 4.3.1.5 of chapter 4, 
respectively. 
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intimidation in the form of threats of seizure of business interests of foreign mining investors 
in order to compel them to agree to the 51 percent indigenization share ownership. Arguably, 
the indigenization law is largely perceived by many foreign mining investors as an obstacle to 
foreign investment purportedly for lack of simplicity. Against this background, ‘[f]oreign 
investors often point to the government's policy of forcing foreign-owned firms to sell a 
majority of shares to locals as an impediment to investment’.12 This is one example of how 
the operationalization of PSNR breaks down, as the state flexes its sovereignty muscles and 
at the same time breaches the rule of law.  
 
Although the DRC and Zimbabwe have institutions responsible for regulation and 
enforcement of mineral laws and policing, the role of the state and its mining institutions as 
well as regulatory structures are better defined in the DRC’s Mining Code than in 
Zimbabwe’s Mines Act. The DRC’s regulatory system rests on cooperative governance and 
hands-on approach in order to ensure the objectives of the Mining Code are realized. Also, 
the statutory fines and imprisonment terms for contravention of provision(s) of the Mining 
Code are higher and more prohibitive compared to Zimbabwe’ mining laws.13 However, due 
to a weak central authority, the implementation and enforcement as well as policing of the 
DRC mining laws fundamentally breakdown and so is the operationalization of PSNR and 
mandate to exploit the resources for self-determination. Regardless of the DRC’s mining laws 
being good on paper, one can argue that weak implementation and enforcement have 
adversely contributed to the prevalence of illegal mining, corruption and resource conflicts. 
The negative effects on the operationalization of PSNR over the DRC’s mineral resources do 
not mean Zimbabwe has not been affected from the same threats. As discussed in chapter 4, 
Zimbabwe mining laws have weaknesses that also cause breakdown of the operationalization 
of PSNR due to, inter alia, failure to define the mandate of each office bearer. Neither the 
DRC nor Zimbabwe spells out with certainty specific powers of mining law enforcement 
agents. Also, there is no detail regarding the number of mining inspectors and officials 
deployed to each mining region and the field distance each has to monitor.  
 
Apart from indigenization laws, a number of African countries have been turning their 
attention to the regulation of beneficiation and trade, as an expression of their permanent 
                                                          
12
 Reuters ‘IMF sees Zimbabwe economy weakening further in 2015’ New Zimbabwe, 9 March 2015. 
13
 Compare from sections 4.4.3 of chapter 4 and 5.4.3 of chapter 5. See also Zimbabwe’s Mines Act and DRC 
Mining Code for more detail.   
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sovereignty over mineral resources.14 In both the DRC and Zimbabwe, trade of beneficiated 
mineral and mineral products emerged as a strategic policy. However, Zimbabwe’s outdated 
Mines Act does not explicitly provide for beneficiation and value addition. Apart from a few 
incomplete beneficiation provisions in the Diamond Policy,15 there is no consolidated 
beneficiation law or policy that can be regarded as a “beneficiation law of Zimbabwe”. 
Although the Diamond Policy provides for mandatory beneficiation for diamonds, it has its 
weaknesses. The Policy does not spell out the standard for issuance of permits to those 
involved in diamond cutting and polishing sector. The Diamond Policy lacks clear 
administrative structures and procedures in the regulation of diamond beneficiation thereby 
creating loopholes for corruption and illicit dealings. Regardless of the irregularities, 
however, the government of Zimbabwe requires platinum mining companies to beneficiate 
their minerals before export or risk face heavy financial penalties.16 
 
With regard to the DRC, the Mining Code provides for prospecting, exploration and 
exploitation of mineral resources, regulation of mineral processing, transportation and trade 
of minerals substances. The last three are not provided for in Zimbabwe’s Mines Act. 
Further, the DRC Mining Code provides the Minister of Mines with unfettered jurisdiction 
and powers to decide whether to grant applications for export of unbeneficiated minerals.17 
The Minister exercises authority over the nature of mineral resource exports on behalf of the 
DRC government, this includes to derive maximum economic benefits for insisting for export 
of beneficiated minerals unless it is reasonably necessary to export raw mineral resources. 
However, there is no single and consolidated policy on beneficiation but the provisions are 
embedded in various policy documents. Failure to have a single consolidated policy 
negatively affects the operationalization of PSNR. Unlike the DRC, the government of 
Zimbabwe levies 15 percent export tariff on unbeneficiated platinum as well as related 
minerals. There are also fines that may be imposed where mining companies illegally export 
unbeneficiated minerals.  
  
                                                          
14
 See generally Lucas Moalusi, Isaac Munyuki & Fasken Martineau ‘Mineral beneficiation in Africa: The 
elephant in the room’ 2014, available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/mineral-beneficiation-in-africa-the-
elephant-in-the-room-2014-07-28 (accessed 4 March 2015); Janine Erasmus ‘Beneficiation an opportunity for 
BRICS’ 2013, available at http://www.southafrica.info/global/brics/mining-270313.htm#.VeiyPvBGR2A 
(accessed 14 December 2014). 
15
 See discussion in section 4.3.1.3 of chapter 4 above. 
16
 Lucas Moalusi et al, op cit note 14. 
17
 Refer to the discussion in section 5.4.4 of chapter 5 above. 
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Unlike the articulation of state custodianship over mineral resources and rights of access to 
mineral resources, it can be argued that Zimbabwe and the DRC are not fully operationalizing 
PSNR because the rules regarding beneficiation are uneven, sketchy and incomplete. Weak 
enforcement of “uneven, sketchy and incomplete” laws makes evading beneficiation 
requirements easy, through loopholes in the regulatory system. The loopholes are widened 
due to lack of appropriate mechanisms for beneficiation, thus adversely affecting full 
operationalization of the principle of PSNR in both states.  
 
6.2.5  Use of Mining Revenues for Development Purposes 
 
Lastly, the expression of PSNR most typically manifests in the state levying various forms of 
taxes. This is primarily operationalized by rules dealing with royalties and taxes. As 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5 above, the mining tax regime for Zimbabwe and the DRC 
includes mining duties, royalty, fees and charges payable by mining investors on the 
concessions or contracts concluded with the host state. It therefore implies that mining 
investors are legally compelled to pay mining taxes as required by the domestic mining laws 
of both countries.   
 
As discussed in section 4.4.5 of chapter 4, a mining investor in Zimbabwe pays a flat rate of 
15 percent of the total profits to the state. The fiscal regime for mining provides 5 percent for 
withholding tax charged on dividends declared by mining companies listed on the Zimbabwe 
Stock Exchange (ZSE) but unlisted mining companies pay 10 percent. The variations imply 
that Zimbabwe provides exclusive privilege to mining companies that are doing business in 
the country while listed on the ZSE than those listed elsewhere. Thus, listing on the ZSE 
provides the mining companies with an opportunity to raise capital to fund new projects or 
undertake expansion or diversification.  
 
Unlike Zimbabwe where the mining taxes are higher, the DRC rate of royalty for iron is 0.5 
percent, 2 percent for non-ferrous metals and 2.5 percent for precious metals, as well as a 
preferential 30 percent for profit-based tax for exploitation of mineral resources.18 Looking at 
the tax rates, one can argue that the percentages are lower in the DRC compared to 
Zimbabwe.19 During the period spanning 2002 and 2012 the DRC guaranteed stable mining 
                                                          
18
 See section 5.4.5 of chapter 5 above. 
19
 Generally compare from sections 4.4.5 of chapter 4 and 5.4.5 of chapter 5.  
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tax modifications. However, the stabilization clause restricted the DRC from freely altering 
the mining tax regime for 10 years. Arguably, this was a very explicit way in which the DRC 
restricted its own sovereignty. 
 
With regard to the distribution of mining revenues, Zimbabwe does not have a royalty 
distribution plan save for the Trust Funds for the provinces and the National Sovereign 
Wealth Fund established in terms of the indigenization policy. However, there is no 
transparency and accountability, as well as traceability of the revenues in these funds. This is 
thus a major weakness contributing to breakdown of the operationalization of PSNR. Unlike 
Zimbabwe, the DRC has no trust funds but has a pro rata distribution plan of royalties to all 
levels of government in order to benefit all Congolese. The distribution plan is a noble idea; 
however, weak regulation and corruption in the minerals sector and the distribution chain 
contribute to breakdown of the operationalization of PSNR.   
 
Notably, PSNR is the core principle underpinning the DRC and Zimbabwe’s mandate and the 
right to benefit from exploitation of their mineral resources. The same principle also vests the 
state (DRC) and the state President (Zimbabwe) with permanent custodianship over domestic 
mineral resources. The principle provides the executive and the legislature with authority to 
make laws in order to determine conditions of access and regulation of mineral resources, 
acquisition and cancellation of mining licences, as well as security of tenure. Further, the 
same principle provides inherent powers to choose investors and exclude others. 
Furthermore, the principle provides inalienable rights of control of economic benefits derived 
from exploitation of domestic minerals, the allocation and use of the revenues for self-
determination. Thus, PSNR is the fountainhead of state authority to control and regulate 
domestic mineral resources for self-determination.     
 
6.3 The Principle of Self-determination and its Operationalization 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the principle of self-determination manifests in the right to decide 
how the benefits of mineral resource exploitation will be used in accordance with the wishes 
of the people.  
    
It was also concluded that the principle of self-determination is operationalized primarily 
through the indigenization policy, and through provision for public participation, 
   258 
transparency and accountability, and planning for use of mineral resources. Corruption, and 
potentially illegal mining, threatens the beneficial operationalization of the principle of self-
determination. 
6.3.1 Provision for Public Participation in Mineral Resources  
Public participation is an important tool central to, and interconnected with dissemination of 
information in order to make informed decisions while opening doors to public scrutiny, 
transparency and accountability. Public participation improves community rights to access to 
information.20 This includes the possibility for availability of information to all the three 
levels, namely, national, regional and local levels. Further, public participation alongside the 
right to be informed of mining activities that can directly or indirectly affect communities is a 
way to bring awareness at levels of society. In this regard, views of a cosmopolitan 
community in a hierarchy of structures can be heard and contributing to policy formulation 
and decision-making.21 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the preamble to the Constitution of Zimbabwe recognizes the 
natural endowment of the country including mineral resources. Although the Mines Act vests 
the state President with the custodianship of mineral resources on behalf of, and for the 
benefit of Zimbabweans, however, there is no clear provision for public participation in the 
regulation of, and decision-making relating to these resources. There is no provision for a 
forum where public participation in mineral licensing can take place. In the absence of public 
participation, the executive acts in ways that do not reflect the views and collective decisions 
of the public. Arguably, the exclusion of public participation does not support the idea that 
the peoples of Zimbabwe are at the centre of mineral resources and their regulation, as well 
as that exploitation of the resources should benefit them. However, the absence of public 
participation in mineral licensing goes along with non-disclosure of information, thereby 
leading to lack of public scrutiny, transparency and accountability. Thus, the exclusion of 
public participation makes the legitimate owners of the resources (the people of Zimbabwe) 
                                                          
20
 See generally Michael Lockwooda, Julie Davidsona, Allan Curtisb, Elaine Stratforda & Rod Griffithb 
‘Governance principles for natural resource management’ (2010) 23 Society & Natural Resources Journal 986; 
Anne Larsona & Jesse Ribot ‘Democratic decentralisation through a natural resource lens: An introduction’ 
(2004) 16 The European Journal of Development Research 1; Fred Nelson & Arun Agrawal ‘Patronage or 
Participation? Community-based natural resource management reform in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2008) 39 
Development and Change 557. 
21
 Ibid. see also James L Creighton The Public Participation Handbook: Making Better Decisions through 
Citizen Involvement (2005). 
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mere viewers and listeners, yet they are supposed to be agents and champions of their own 
development. The absence of public participation is a fundamental anomaly that requires 
immediate attention to ensure exploitation of mineral resources is people-centred and locally 
responsive. 
 
Similarly, the DRC Constitution provides all Congolese with the right to enjoy national 
wealth. This should include participation in the process to realize the wealth. The DRC 
government is under a constitutional obligation to distribute the wealth equitably and 
safeguard the right to development.22 The Mining Code provides for public participation in 
mineral licensing or public tender regarding mining licensing. The Code has provisions 
around mining operators making themselves known to chiefs and local communities, thus 
creating room for public participation at a local level. Ideally, the provision for public 
participation is entrenched in the law; however, in practice little is done to ensure sound 
participation at local level. Communities at local level are not informed of their legitimate 
rights as they are the most affected by mining activities. 
 
6.3.2 The Impact of Illegal Mining and Corruption on Self-determination 
 
Both Zimbabwe and the DRC have been substantially affected by loss of mining revenues 
through corruption and illegal mining. In both countries, various players are involved in 
illegal mining of minerals and in orchestrated corruption in the mineral value chain. As 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5, both countries’ dire economic situation has forced many 
families, particularly in rural areas, into illegal mining to eke out a living. Illegal mining has 
also been driven by high demand for precious minerals such as alluvial gold and diamonds on 
local and regional markets, notably Botswana and South Africa, and abroad.  
 
One can argue that the DRC and Zimbabwe are losing substantial revenue through illegal 
mining and smuggling, and corruption owing to weak regulation. Both threats reduce the 
amount that would otherwise go to the fiscus, which means there is even less money available 
for law and enforcement – a vicious circle. Also, both threats undermine host states’ efforts to 
assert control and regulate mineral resources for self-determination in that revenues that 
could have been available for development are lost through illicit flows. Therefore, illegal 
mining and corruption impact negatively on the operationalization of the principle of self-
                                                          
22
 See generally Articles 58 & 59 of the Constitution of the DRC. 
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determination, and the mandate to exploit domestic mineral resources and use the proceeds 
for national development. 
 
With regard to corruption in Zimbabwe and the DRC’s mineral value chain, it can be argued 
that those in positions of authority take advantage of the state’s weakness. The loopholes in 
the regulatory system, lack of strong checks and balancing mechanisms influence self-serving 
decisions, evade paying mining taxes and under declare production in order to advance 
private interests. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, corruption contributes to a loss of investor 
confidence and makes the “ease of doing business” more complex owing to a myriad of 
unnecessary challenges.23 In both countries, the elite use political connections to obtain 
mining contracts, for themselves or their associates, or to benefit from mining joint ventures. 
Further, corruption may lead to conclusion of illicit mining deals, thereby debasing the good 
intentions of self-determination in that such deals advance pernicious interests at the expense 
of national interests. Against this background, however, it can be argued that the silence by 
both governments on effective public scrutiny and participation, transparency and 
accountability, as well as the establishment of strong checks and balancing mechanisms could 
be a deliberate strategy to conceal illicit mining deals and misuse of mining revenues. One 
can further argue that the development of both countries’ minerals is driven by pernicious and 
illicit private interests and these undermine national priorities that are people-oriented. 
 
A comparative analysis of the extent of corruption in the mineral value chain and illegal 
mining in the DRC and Zimbabwe shows that both countries have not been able to flex their 
sovereignty muscles in order to curb these threats and illicit financial flows associated with 
them. Although the DRC has a recent mining law, the economic effects of illegal mining are 
more far-reaching than the situation in Zimbabwe. However, the prevalence of illegal mining 
in both states undeniably is connected to weak implementation and enforcement of mining 
laws. Paradoxically, the prevalence of illegal mining and corruption in the mineral value 
chain has the effect of lowering foreign mining investment enthusiasm for both states relative 
to other African countries.24  
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 See generally sections 4.5.2 & 5.5.2 of chapters 4 & 5, respectively. 
24
 Oxford Policy Management ‘The impact of mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Performance to 
date and future challenges’ 2013 at 5, available at 
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A discussed in chapters 4 and 5 above, illegal mining and corruption in the mineral value 
chain systematically disempower and undermine self-determination.25 Both threats reduce the 
revenue base as some mining tax payers evade paying tax through loopholes in the mining 
tax collection system. Also, those involved in illegal mining do not pay tax as their activities 
are not regulated by the state. The cumulative effects of these factors inherently debase the 
outworking of self-determination and the mandate to exploit domestic mineral resources for 
national development. A comparative analysis suggests that the prevalence of corruption in 
the mineral value chain is more deeply-entrenched and orchestrated in Zimbabwe compared 
to the DRC, whereas in the DRC illegal mining appears to be a greater problem. However, 
both corruption and illegal mining are threats that negatively affect the operationalization of 
self-determination in both countries. Accordingly, both threats contribute to weakening and 
breakdown of the mandate of both states to derive maximum economic benefits from the 
exploitation of their minerals. 
 
6.3.3 Transparency and Accountability for Self-determination 
 
Transparency and accountability are important aspects for effective participation in the 
mineral value chain. If mineral resource exploitation is going to benefit the people, they need 
to have access to information so that they know what is going on and can make their wishes 
heard, as well as to determine whether mining companies and the government are playing by 
the rules. The DRC is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
while Zimbabwe is not. Therefore it can be argued that the DRC benefits from the EITI 
membership while Zimbabwe does not.   
 
The principle of PSNR cannot be realized until the revenues derived from exploitation of 
minerals are used and managed in a transparent and accountable manner for self-
determination. Unlike other transparency initiatives, revenue transparency and accountability, 
as well as traceability is fundamental in order to bridge the weaknesses and gaps in the 
administrative systems and to curb illicit flows in the mineral value chain. 
 
The fact that Zimbabwe is not a member of any transparency initiative means the government 
should be putting in its own transparency and accountability mechanisms to monitor and 
trace mineral revenues, allowing also for public scrutiny of the process. However, Zimbabwe 
                                                          
25
 See sections 4.5.1 & 4.5.2 of chapter 4, as well as sections 5.5.1 & 5.5.2 of chapter 6 above. 
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does not have policies to facilitate transparency and accountability in the use and 
management of mining revenues. Only the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, 
whose appointment is at the discretion of the state President,26 release statements on 
government spending but there is no rule compelling the government to be transparent and 
accountable. Further, neither the Mines Act nor any mining law provides for declaration of 
mineral resource payments and revenues realized from mineral exports. One can therefore 
argue that the absence of mandatory disclosure, transparency and accountability as well as 
traceability in the law create loopholes and weaknesses that contribute to breakdown in the 
operationalization of the principle of self-determination.  
 
In addition to being a member of the EITI, the DRC is a member of the International 
Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and is therefore required to meet minimum 
reporting standards on transparency and accountability, as discussed in section 5.4.10 of 
chapter 5 above. The requirement for transparency allows for public scrutiny as a check 
mechanism that can compel the government to be accountable. However, due to weak central 
authority, regulatory institutions and structures, and the prevalence of corruption in the 
mineral value chain, the effectiveness of operationalizing self-determination initiatives, 
including revenue transparency and accountability is largely unsuccessful.  
 
Like Zimbabwe, one can argue that the DRC’s opaque decisions in awarding mining 
contracts promote a culture of secrecy, and a conduit for endemic corruption.27 Due to weak 
mineral resource regulation, both the DRC and Zimbabwe are losing millions of US dollars in 
mining revenues each month through loopholes and uncollected mining taxes, as well as 
through corruption, smuggling and illegal mining.28 The activities of mining companies are 
hidden in shadowy financial management systems with limited legislative oversight, as well 
as limited or biased auditing. The terms of product-sharing contracts, reporting on signature 
bonuses for conclusion of mining agreements and trading are hardly made public.29 Through 
partnerships with foreign mining investors and product-sharing contracts, state mining 
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 See generally sections 309 – 313 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013. 
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companies occupy a pivotal role that could be used to expose opaque activities in mineral 
resource regulation.30 However, the terms on which mining contracts are concluded are even 
not disclosed. Arguably, non-disclosure can be one of the ways to conceal opaque or illicit 
deals that are used to siphon revenues from exploitation of mineral resources. Further, the 
weaknesses in the regulatory systems create opportunities for various illicit practices that 
include the use of secret offshore companies to facilitate diversions of mining revenues into 
private bank accounts.31 Accordingly, the dishonest practices in the mineral value chain 
contribute to revenue losses, thus inherently depriving Zimbabwe and the DRC of revenues 
that should have been channeled towards national development programmes.  
 
6.3.4 Strategic Planning on the Use of Mineral Resources for Development  
  
The right to development places a responsibility on the DRC and Zimbabwe to formulate 
policies, strategies and plans for national benefit. Zimbabwe’s Agenda for Sustainable Socio-
economic Transformation (ZIM-Asset)32 and the DRC’s poverty reduction and growth 
strategy papers (PRGSP)33 are blue prints and strategic policies and plans for national 
development. At the core of both Zim-Asset and, PRGSP and the review of mining contracts 
(in the DRC) is strategic exploitation of mineral resources and use of the revenues in line 
with development plans. 
 
Zimbabwe adopted Zim-Asset as a strategy that takes into account exploitation of domestic 
mineral resources, their beneficiation and value addition as an integral aspect of the 
development agenda. Further strategy affirms the need to re-evaluate the mineral resource 
endowment in order to determine how best the country can exploit them for self-
determination and development. The policy embraces the mandate to exploit domestic 
mineral resources as well as the operationalization of PSNR through self-determination and 
non-interference in the regulation, exploitation, beneficiation and trade of the resources. 
However, Zim-Asset faces critical challenges due to lack of capital and foreign direct 
investment to kick-start its implementation and enforcement; thus negatively affecting both 
the operationalization of PSNR and self-determination. 
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With regard to the DRC, strategic planning has included review of all mining contracts that 
were concluded between 1996 and 1998. Some of the contracts were prejudicial and 
renegotiating them was strategic in order to bridge the weaknesses as well as to ensure the 
DRC government did not lose revenues unnecessarily. The PRGSP was a strategy intended to 
formulate development policies and plans in order to reduce poverty, inter alia, through 
exploitation of mineral resources and to use the revenues in line with development strategies. 
Also, it is a strategy that the DRC is both a player through mining joint ventures and a 
beneficiary of mining taxes paid by mining companies. However, the effectiveness of the 
development strategies, implementation and enforcement, as well as operationalization of the 
right to development is riddled by various threats.34 Episodic and recurrent or resurgence of 
resource conflicts (armed conflicts), political tensions and instability owing to weak central 
authority, as well as lack of coordinated efforts to curb conflicts, illegal mining and 
corruption in the mineral value chain have contributed to the failure of the PRGSP. 
 
Sound strategic planning for development could enhance the operationalization of PSNR and 
self-determination. Taking into account the requirement of transparency and accountability, 
both countries ought to apply or use and manage the revenues derived from exploitation of 
domestic mineral resources in line with their strategies and development vision. Although 
there have been strategic planning and policies, however, implementation and enforcement 
fails due to weak regulation and threats to self-determination discussed in chapter 3.   
 
6.4 The Principle of Non-interference 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 above, non-interference reinforces PSNR and self-determination 
by ensuring other subjects of international law are restrained from interfering in the domestic 
affairs of host states insofar as the control and regulation of mineral resources is concerned. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that interference by a state or group of states is 
illegitimate when it uses methods of coercion regarding choices that the host state has to 
make,35 which must remain the discretion of the state through self-determination. Non-
interference can therefore said to be operationalized where states are not coerced in making 
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their executive, legislative or judicial decisions, as well as enforcement and policing their 
decisions and laws.  
 
As discussed in chapter 4,36 Zimbabwe was compelled to adopt and implement ESAP. The 
implementation of the programme required internal reforms including reducing the size of 
government ministries and public service, and amending some of the domestic laws in order 
to create a legislative environment for the new programme. However, ESAP had wide 
adverse effects including retrenchment. Accordingly, there was a disempowerment of the 
civil service. Also, the reforms restricted the government of Zimbabwe from enacting laws 
contrary to what was recommended by the IMF. The restrictions affected major sectors of the 
economy including the minerals sector and policing of mining laws. 
 
The DRC’s weak central authority, state fragility, poverty, underdevelopment and weak 
economy provide room for interference by the IMF and World Bank. As a heavily indebted 
country, the DRC requires debt relief mechanisms, in addition to relying on funding from the 
two institutions to finance its national budget and projects. The fact that the DRC is poor and 
classified under the “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)” initiative means the country 
has to meet certain criteria in order to qualify for debt relief. Among the criteria, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) discussed in chapter 5 was adopted at the behest of the 
IMF and World Bank. It therefore means sovereignty of the DRC has been interfered with in 
various ways, including through policy formulation.37 As such, the World Bank and IMF’s 
discretion for debt relief come with conditions that interfere with sovereignty. The 
conditionality policy comports with the principle of non-interference, which supposedly 
guarantees the DRC’s right to be the agent of its own development.38 
 
Taking into account the conditionality policies, one can argue that ESAP and adjustment 
programmes interfere with the regulation of the DRC and Zimbabwe’s mineral resources, by 
distorting internal state processes and well as implementation and enforcement capacity. The 
adjustments programmes also restrict formulation of domestic policies in the same areas. The 
conditionality policy interferes with the DRC and Zimbabwe internal processes to function 
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independently as would have been without them. Both states cannot flex their sovereignty 
muscles against the IMF and World Bank conditionality policy due to fear of losing funding.  
 
Apart from the conditionality policy, non-interference is threatened by resource conflicts. 
Resource conflicts distract the state from diligent regulation of mining activities, 
implementation and enforcement of mining laws. The conflicts that are experienced in the 
DRC are a threat to investment security and property rights embedded in mining licences, 
peace and security of persons and the state, as well as restricting the state’s capacity to 
formulate policy and their implementation. Further, the conflicts restrict and interfere with 
the uniform application of mining laws and regulation. Thus, the conflicts interfere with the 
outworking of, and operationalization of sovereignty over mineral resources and self-
determination. 
 
The operationalization of non-interference requires that the DRC and Zimbabwe should not 
be coerced in their mineral resource decisions. The conditionality policy interferes with both 
states in formulating domestic law and policy, implementation and enforcement in a manner 
that amounts to coercion.39 Regardless of the variations of the conditions, there was 
interference with sovereignty of both states to determine their own destiny. Regardless of 
being endowed with various mineral resources, both countries are poor and have turned into 
“beggar states”, thus denoting resource curse.  
 
6.5 Principles Facilitating Investment and Trade and their Operationalization 
 
As discussed in chapters 2, 4 and 5 above, the operationalization of principles relevant to 
investment and trade are potentially an expression of a state’s sovereignty, but also 
potentially undermine that sovereignty.40 The principles facilitating investment and trade are 
integrally related to the mandate to benefit from exploitation of domestic minerals. However, 
these principles also create tensions with what could be considered an unfettered 
operationalization of PSNR, self-determination and non-interference. The following section 
discusses how key principles associated with investment and trade focus areas have been 
operationalized in a mining context in the DRC and Zimbabwe; namely, compensation for 
expropriation, foreign exchange and repatriation of profits, and the principles of most 
favoured nation and national treatment.  
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6.5.1 Compensation for Expropriation 
As discussed in sections of the preceding chapters,41 the predominating principles associated 
with compensation for expropriation are: 
(a) A country may not expropriate alien property, whether directly or indirectly, except 
on the ground of the public interest, and the expropriation has to be non-
discriminatory and against fair compensation,42 
(b) Determination of fair compensation should be based on the fair market value of the 
expropriated property prevailing at the time of expropriation,43   
(c) In the absence of an agreement by the parties, and where business interests are 
expropriated, the amount of compensation has to be determined according to the 
“going concern-value”, and where a non-profit enterprise is expropriated, the amount 
of compensation has to be determined in terms of the monetary value of the original 
investment while taking into account appropriate adjustments,44  
(d)  The payment of compensation shall include interests in free convertible currency 
based on the market value of the existing exchange rates that is accepted by the 
affected foreign investor, and must be made prompt and without undue delays.45 
States generally operationalize these principles through expropriation laws that are not 
necessarily mining specific.  
 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for protection of property rights and in the event of 
expropriation, fair compensation must be paid. Accordingly, Zimbabwe has operationalized 
compensation for expropriation in its supreme law. Apart from the Constitution, the Mines 
Act of Zimbabwe provides compensation for expropriation of mines or mining locations. 
However, there is an exception when the government cannot pay – when the expropriated 
mining location is not functional or is under-utilized. It can be argued that Zimbabwe 
exercises its sovereignty and self-determination by enacting provisions in its principal mining 
                                                          
41
 See section 2.4.4 of chapter 2; section 4.4.7 of chapter 4 & section 5.4.7 of chapter 5. For detailed discussion 
of international law principles on compensation for expropriation; see for example, Andrew Newcombe & Lluis 
Paradell Law and Practice of investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (2009) at 321 – 398; Jeswald W 
Salacuse The Law of Investment Treaties 2nd ed (2015) at 228 – 280 & 313 – 374; R Dolzer ‘Indirect 
expropriations: New developments?’  (2003) 11 New York University Environmental Law Journal 64; A F M 
Maniruzzaman ‘Expropriation of alien property and the principle of non-discrimination in international law of 
foreign investment: An overview’ (1998) 8 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 57. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid.  
45
 Ibid. 
   268 
law justifying certain mining expropriations without compensation. However, non-payment 
of compensation on the basis that the mining location is underutilized or non-functional is 
subject to debate. One can argue that compensation should not be paid in respect of such 
mines because the minerals belong to the state, but compensation has to be paid with regard 
to the development that took place at the mining location. This could be reasonable, fair and 
just in order to balance the interests of the state and those of the investor. 
 
Like Zimbabwe, the DRC Constitution and some of its domestic laws highlighted in chapter 
5 provide that expropriation should be based on public utility. The DRC provides 
compensation for expropriation and that the compensation must be fair and just in terms of 
conditions established by law. The fact that DRC, like Zimbabwe, formulated policies to spell 
out the contours for expropriation confirms that public interest fundamentally underpins this 
legal requirement. As discussed in chapters 2, 4 and 5 above, expropriation can be a threat to 
both states where the governments fail to pay appropriate compensation,46 for example, 
where unworked or underworked mines are expropriated in terms of the Mines Act as 
discussed in chapter 4. Regardless of these issues, the operationalization of compensation for 
expropriation in both countries is an exercise of sovereignty. However, failure to pay just and 
fair compensation within a reasonable time could be an indication of lack of capital, political 
will, or both.  
 
Although the operationalization of compensation for expropriation is an assertion of 
sovereignty, however, it is almost always controversial.47 Arbitrary expropriation can be a 
barrier to investment and the requirement for compensation can restrict expropriation because 
it lessens the revenues available for development. This is an overarching issue that requires 
the DRC and Zimbabwe to strategize before engaging in the process. The section on the rules 
on expropriation, on the one hand, empowers both states to exercise PSNR, and on the other 
hand, limits the powers because unplanned expropriation can cause self-inflicted economic 
and development policy failure.  
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6.5.2 Foreign Exchange and Repatriation of Profits 
Repatriation of profits and payment of current transactions, and exchange controls are 
intrinsically some of the major factors that foreign mining investors consider before investing 
in host states. As discussed in chapters 2, 4 and 5 above,48 the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF (IMF Rules) are applicable to Zimbabwe and the DRC because both are member states 
of the IMF. As discussed in 5,49 the DRC’s Mining Code provides for repatriation of profits 
and payment of current transactions, as well as exchange controls; however, the provisions in 
the law have to comply with the IMF Rules. Unlike the DRC mining Code, Zimbabwe’s 
Mines Act does not provide for repatriation of profits, payment of current transactions or 
exchange control for the benefit of a mining investor.  
 
The operationalization of the IMF Rules is manifests through enacting provisions in domestic 
laws and policies relating to exchange controls, as well as repatriation of profits and payment 
of current transactions.50 In Zimbabwe and the DRC, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) 
and the Central Bank, respectively, are responsible for the formulation of monetary policies 
in line with IMF Rules on exchange controls, repatriation of profits as well as payment of 
current transactions. The two domestic financial institutions can exercise discretion as 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5; however, the percentage of profits that a mining investor may 
repatriate cannot be below the minimum prescribed by IMF Rules. As discussed in chapters 4 
and 5 above (in relation to the conditionality policy), it can be argued that the IMF is 
powerful enough to dictate or prescribe policies to the DRC and Zimbabwe. Accordingly, one 
can argue that the IMF Rules are superior over Zimbabwe and the DRC’s financial laws.  
 
The supremacy of IMF Rules accordingly restricts the sovereignty of Zimbabwe and the 
DRC in that both countries cannot restrict repatriation of profits in a manner that is in conflict 
with the rules, in a situation where the primary beneficiaries of the rules are mining investors. 
Regardless of a need to balance conflicting interests, one can argue that the IMF Rules are 
not benefiting citizens of Zimbabwe or the DRC regarding repatriating profits. The 
repatriation of profits restricts the quantity of revenues available for reinvestment and 
development, and this is one way in which the effectiveness of PSNR breaks down. The 
operationalization of Article XIV of the IMF Rules in domestic law restricts sovereignty and 
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the mandate to derive benefits from exploitation of mineral resources in that it dictates to 
both states what percentage of the profits foreign mining investors may repatriate regardless 
of the absolute unwillingness to grant access to financial movement out of the country. As 
such, repatriation of profits and payment of current transactions, as well as exchange controls 
restrict the ability of both states to control movement of mining investors’ capital in and out 
of the country. Accordingly, these are key and strategic areas in which the sovereignty 
muscle of the DRC and Zimbabwe is not being adequately flexed. 
 
6.5.3 Equitable Treatment of Mining Foreign Investors 
 
Non-discriminatory treatment of mining investors is fundamental in order to make the 
playing field even and create an environment conducive for investment. The national 
treatment and the most favoured nation (MFN) principles discussed in chapters 2,51 452 and 
553 restrict the sovereignty of the DRC and Zimbabwe in granting advantages to a certain 
investor(s) over another or others. 
 
It can be argued that Zimbabwe’s “look east policy” in investment and trade expresses a 
preference for a particular group of investors. Equitable treatment compels uniform 
application of laws and their enforcement, for example, the indigenization policy has to be 
applied uniformly regardless of the nationality of the investor(s). Non-discriminatory 
treatment compels the government of Zimbabwe to guarantee foreign mining investors fair 
and equitable treatment through legislative, judicial and administrative decisions, the case in 
point is the indigenization law. In this regard, however, Zimbabwe cannot pass laws giving 
investment and trade advantages to certain mining investors in the mineral value chain.  
 
Like Zimbabwe, the DRC is compelled to provide equitable, fair and non-discriminatory 
treatment to mining investors doing business in the country. When the DRC reviewed and 
renegotiated mining contracts as discussed in chapter 5,54 the Lutundula Commission which 
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represented the DRC in the reviewing process considered all mining contracts that were 
concluded during two periods of war, 1996-1997 and 1998. The basis of the review was to 
renegotiate contracts that were considered prejudicial to the DRC. The review and 
renegotiation of prejudicial contracts is a quite unusual exercise of state sovereignty that has 
never been undertaken or considered by Zimbabwe.  
 
Foreign mining investors have the privilege extended to them by foreign investment law to 
choose an arbitration forum and host states to protect their business interests. Local mining 
investors do not have such preferences, and have to exhaust all available domestic remedies 
before they can approach external forums to resolve their disputes. In this regard, it is absurd 
to claim that there is equitable treatment. From the discussion in chapters 4 and 5,55 one can 
argue that fair and equitable treatment of foreign and domestic mining investors’ claims 
cannot succeed where some investors prefers to resolve disputes in international fora instead 
of the local structures or courts. The fact governments of both the DRC and Zimbabwe were 
dragged by some mining investors to different international arbitration forums is indicative 
that equitable treatment of foreign mining and the locals mining investors is only operative on 
paper. Thus, the flexing of sovereignty muscle is weak. 
 
6.6 The Right to Development and its Operationalization 
 
As discussed in chapter 2,56 the right to development places a responsibility (at least moral) 
on Zimbabwe and the DRC to formulate development plans and policies. Since both 
countries are endowed with mineral resources, strategic planning and development policies 
underpin effective and appropriate regulation and how to exploit the resources for self-
determination. 
 
6.7 Overarching Issue: Has the DRC and Zimbabwe Managed Threats to PSNR? 
 
In this section, the overarching question is: What does the exercise of sovereignty mean in the 
mining context? How do the international law principles discussed in chapter 2 contribute to 
executing the mandate to exploit domestic mineral resources for self-determination, 
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 See sections 4.4.9 and 5.4.9 of chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
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 See section 2.3.4.3 of chapter 2 above. 
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economic growth and development? Do they help states to navigate the threats to PSNR 
discussed in chapter 3?  
 
In the context of the thesis, successfully navigating the realpolitik of mineral resource 
investment, and reducing threats to beneficial mineral exploitation, is the key to translating 
the resource endowments into economic development, as well as to escape the resource curse 
paradox. Transforming mineral resource regulation by promoting checks mechanisms and, 
strong regulatory institutions and structures can translate the good side of operationalization 
of PSNR and maximize revenues available for national development.  
 
By taking advantage of the protection offered by principles referred to in chapter 2, as well as 
international law generally, the DRC and Zimbabwe can navigate the threats and restrictions 
to sovereignty by strategic planning. However, weak and insufficient institutional reforms, 
outdated and/or inconsistent and incomplete policies, as well as poor regulation breed an 
environment for corruption and other illicit practices discussed in chapters 4 and 5. The 
synergies of malpractices facilitate illicit diversion of benefits derived from mineral resources 
into private hands. One may even suggests that the inability to effectively regulate domestic 
minerals in both states is a deliberate strategy in order to orchestrate clandestine agendas to 
loot the resources.  
 
Since the ushering in of political independence was achieved after a protracted war motivated 
not only by the denial of basic rights for the black majority in Zimbabwe and the DRC,57 but 
also extreme inequality in the distribution of resources, the same conditions are still 
prevailing. Surprisingly, Zimbabwe advocates for radical transformation but the strategy is 
only benefiting the elite.  This raises questions about the ideal operationalization of PSNR. 
 
Apart from the issues identified above: “What does the exercise of sovereignty mean in the 
mining context?” This is a critical and crucial, as well as controversial aspect, which is 
central to the thesis. In addition to sovereignty being very multifaceted and complex in the 
precise meaning, scope and content as discussed in chapter 2, sovereignty can be exercised by 
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the peoples directly or indirectly through their elected and trusted representatives.58 The DRC 
and Zimbabwe governments exercise sovereignty through the trust vested in them by their 
citizens. It is probably unrealistic to assume that governments always represent the will and 
the wishes of their citizens. Accordingly, in the process to exercise sovereignty the legitimate 
expectations of the citizens and national priorities should always be central.59 This is the 
foundation upon which the good intentions of sovereignty should be based in order to fulfil 
the economic objectives of PSNR. It is therefore a reminder to Zimbabwe and the DRC to 
take into account informed decisions, including making, executing and applying laws 
impartially, imposing and collecting taxes, entering into bilateral investment treaties (BIT), as 
well as concluding mining contracts with investors for the benefit of the citizens. Although is 
it difficult to distinguish between the legitimate exercise of sovereignty and political 
influence, however, there is always the need for transparency and accountability, as well as 
public participation. This is against the backdrop that those in government or representing 
their governments can purport to exercise sovereignty yet they use it as a shield to protect and 
further their own private interests. In order to avoid abuse, the “good intentions of 
sovereignty” require various factors such as political will, and the establishment of strong 
regulatory and implementing institutions, as well as checks and balancing mechanisms. 
However, the application of these factors ought to be done in a consistent, unambiguous, 
transparent and accountable manner. This creates a more complex relationship between host 
states and mining investors. The intricacy and the interdependent nature of the relationship 
require diligent checks on the manner in which the DRC and Zimbabwe governments 
exercise PSNR for self-determination and to escape the resource curse problem. However, 
balancing this delicate relationship is very tricky, if not controversial, since international 
investment law aims to protect the interests of foreign mining investors in both countries.60 
Therefore it can be argued that the principle of PSNR involves a complex relationship 
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between the regulator and the regulated. This is made even more complex by principles of 
international investment and trade discussed in the preceding chapters. 
 
How sovereignty is exercised in the mining context was discussed under various themes in 
sections 4.4 and 5.4 of chapters 4 and 5, respectively. However, Zimbabwe’s Mines Act is an 
outdated and prescriptive law, and was intended to address the mining challenges of the 
1960s. It is therefore reminiscent of the dark age of colonialism. The regulation of the mining 
sector and challenges of the colonial era are certainly not the same as those encountered in 
the contemporary era. The changes in modern mining laws and shifts in ideology, also mean 
the Mines Act has several loopholes that never existed in the 1960s. Accordingly, planning 
and addressing the threats to the outworking of PSNR using such an outdated principal 
mining law is disastrous to the mining sector and Zimbabwe’s prospects to use the sector as a 
springboard for economic growth and development. For example, the Mines Act does not 
provide for modern mining taxation, and has loopholes that promote tax evasion. There is no 
formalization of the role of mining police, safeguarding indigenous communities and 
environmental impact assessments, as well as social risks arising from mining operations. 
Further, the Act does not provide for avoidance of conflict of interests as in the DRC Mining 
Code, and clarity on the responsibility for fair compensation to indigenous communities. 
Such flaws are the major internal limitations that weaken the framework for regulation of 
mineral resources in Zimbabwe, thus contributing to loss of mining revenues through various 
weaknesses in the regulatory system. 
 
Unlike Zimbabwe’s Mines Act, the DRC’s Mining Code is a recent expression of the manner 
in which sovereignty over mineral resources is exercised. The Code is a modern law that 
provides a framework to regulate mining activities including prospecting, exploration, 
exploitation, processing and refinery, transportation and export of domestic mineral 
substances. Further it is a statutory requirement that the state distribute proceeds from mineral 
resources equitably to all levels of government and structures in order to benefit the public.61  
 
Comparative analysis shows that politics of patronage fundamentally debases the good 
intentions of PSNR. As indicated in chapter 4, Zimbabwe has been unable to attract much 
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foreign mining investors due to unfavourable and inconsistent policies. Arguably, investors 
have taken a wait-and-see attitude before investing as they fear the current policy on 
economic empowerment, and the scope offers no evidentiary proof to suggest that it is 
different from the much criticized land reform.62 
 
With weak regulation, come loopholes that mining companies exploit in order to under-
declare production, underpay or not to pay some of the taxes as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
Another threat to PSNR is that both Zimbabwe and the DRC are constrained to demand a 
share of ownership in mining companies because of the protection of property rights of 
foreign mining investors. Both states are constrained to declare export quotas or impose 
beneficiation requirements because of the limitations imposed by the principles of 
international investment and trade law discussed in chapter 2 above. The high costs 
associated with opaque concessions and secrecy, as well as withholding information allows 
one to question the legitimacy of the process and how best the PSNR can be operationalized 
for self-determination. 
 
When one recalls the economic and political functions of international law, one more often 
encounters gaps and weaknesses. Although international law has its weaknesses as shown in 
the thesis, the absence of the actualization of transparency and accountability in Zimbabwe 
and the DRC makes it superficial to blame international law for the ills caused by the threats 
to PSNR. The inability to appropriately regulate the minerals sector and its value chain, the 
politics of patronage and ignorance are the triple evils of greed that have debased the good 
intentions of operationalization of PSNR in both countries. Clearly, both states have thwarted 
measures aimed at promoting transparency and accountability, and at the same time they 
practice lip-service regarding corruption when the initiatives interfere with their pernicious 
interests. 
 
After obtaining political independence, Zimbabwe and the DRC did not change much of their 
mining laws and regulatory systems and structures. Both countries’ first independence 
governments inherited colonial mining laws whose major objectives were to protect the 
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economic interest of colonial governments. However, it took the DRC about 40 years to enact 
a principal mining law while Zimbabwe since 1980, has not enacted a new principal mining 
law. Efforts in Zimbabwe to enact new principal mines law culminated in the Mines Bill of 
2007 but shelved in unclear circumstances. Although the mining laws have been amended 
several times to reflect modern mining concerns, there are major weaknesses that promote 
weak regulation, as well as plunder of the resources while harbouring criminal activities. The 
core for resource plunder is negatively influenced by bad governance, as well as institutional 
failure to regulate and weak enforcement of mining legislation in both countries, thereby 
showing lack of enthusiasm to promote mineral-based linkages. 
 
While Zimbabwe and the DRC are richly endowed with an array of mineral resources, so are 
the problems relating to the regulation of the resources. Of the problems, one cannot rule out 
lack of transparency and accountability in the entire mineral value chain, as well as a record 
of poor negotiation of mining concessions resulting in skewed contracts. Such contracts and 
their execution fail to unlock maximum potential value from exploiting mineral resources in 
both countries. Also, lack of clearly defined beneficiation policies, lack of access to 
information to enable appropriate public participation and making of informed decisions 
exacerbate the problem. Further, poor management of mining revenues and non-recognition 
of the fundamental role of critical stallholders such as communities and violation of 
community rights have contributed to debasing PSNR. Although the DRC Mining Code 
recognizes the role of artisanal mining, however, regardless of its contribution to gold output 
Zimbabwe’s Mines Act does not legalize the activity.63 It can be argued that the incomplete 
mining framework, including weak central authority, weak or biased implementation and 
enforcement of the laws lies at the core of the problems affecting the DRC and Zimbabwe 
mining sectors.  
 
The focus ought to be on strengthening and empowering, as well as promoting the regulatory 
system and the institutions responsible for regulating the mineral sector in order to ensure 
Zimbabwe and the DRC navigate threats to PSNR. One can argue that the regulatory 
institutions have to be used as transformative instruments and curb corruption in the minerals 
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sector.64 However, failure to take into account these factors can lead to systematic 
disempowerment of the operationalization of PSNR due to conflict of interests and also 
corruption in the mineral value chain.  
 
One can argue that the operationalization of PSNR manifests through the indigenization 
policy in Zimbabwe in order to consolidate economic empowerment unlike the DRC that 
does not have a specific legislation dedicated to economic indigenization, apart from a few 
provisions in the Mining Code referred to in chapter 5 above. However, the implementation 
and enforcement of the indigenization provisions in the DRC were not controversial 
compared to Zimbabwe’ situation where foreign investors threatened to close their mining 
activities in protest. Arguably, Zimbabwe’s radical implementation and enforcement of “one 
size-fit-all approach” has failed completely leading to a volte-face in the approach in 2013. 
The soft-landing can be attributed to fears to lose foreign mining investors and breach of 
BITs that Zimbabwe concluded with other contracting states being adversely applied against 
the country. Although indigenization policy is a landmark strategy in operationalizing PSNR, 
however, poor planning and execution exposes the incompetence and confusion inherent in a 
policy that is not supported by coherent knowledge and capital, as well as lack of strategies 
that are designed to achieve economic growth and development.  
 
Although Zimbabwe and the DRC principal mining laws have provisions for mining 
companies to pay royalties and taxes, the mining laws of both states leave it to the discretion 
of the each government on how to use the revenues. The use of the revenues is chiefly the 
responsibility of central authority but there is no transparent and accountability in the manner 
the revenues are used and managed. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, and while 
considering the general state of affairs in both states, one can argue that the revenues are not 
all use for national benefit but diverted for self-serving interests. 
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6.8 The Challenges for Zimbabwe and the DRC Governments 
 
Zimbabwe and the DRC governments are confronted by threats that were identified and 
introduced in chapter 1, discussed in chapter 3, and contextualized in chapters 4 and 5. The 
extent to which the threats affect “good intentions” or debase the exercise of sovereignty over 
mineral resources can be severe as evidenced by the lack of notable economic growth and 
development in both states. As such, the threats are awakening and highlighting the need to 
reform regulatory system and institutions and supporting structures. However, with the 
current nature of Zimbabwe and the DRC’s weak regulatory capacity, corruption, illegal 
mining, lack of transparency and accountability, as well as resource conflicts; it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to navigate and overcome the threats and challenges easily. Both countries 
lack strong political will and the capacity to effectively take advantage of the protection 
offered by international law principles discussed in chapter 2, as well as to navigate threats to 
the outworking of sovereignty.  
 
One of the challenges is failure to reconcile major imperatives; namely, property rights in 
mining licences, transparency, traceability and accountability, impartiality in the exploitation 
mineral resources and fair and non-discriminatory treatment in the distribution of benefits. 
This failure constitutes a barrier to economic growth and development. Regardless of 
enacting the Mining Code for the DRC and the amendments to the Mines Act for Zimbabwe, 
an effective and transparent regulatory system is fundamentally lacking in both states.65 The 
inability to navigate the threats to the outworking of sovereignty over mineral resources in 
both states gives rise to skepticism toward the regulatory institutions. Arguably, the trend is 
that ‘[…] in correcting a narrow policy agenda, the new focus pushes a good point too far 
when it focuses attention only on the proximate cause […].’66 Inasmuch as both countries 
require foreign investment, most potential investors have taken a “wait and see attitude” due 
to the uncertainty caused by political fragility and uncertainty, weak regulation, lack of firm 
protection of property rights and conflicts.  
 
Zimbabwe and the DRC’s corrupt tendencies in the regulation of domestic minerals can be a 
microcosm of Africa’s challenges in translating the mineral endowment into economic 
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development. Weak economic status and dire need for mining investment put both countries 
in an awkward position; they cannot afford to flex their sovereignty muscles and dictate terms 
and conditions when negotiating mining investment agreements with investors. The inability 
is a challenge that weakens the operationalization of PSNR and the potential to obtain 
favourable terms at the conclusion of mining investment negotiations. It then becomes 
absolutely difficult for both states to freely dispose of their mineral resources without 
elements of prejudice. Thus, the principle of mutual benefit cannot apply contrary to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, which reiterate that ‘[i]n no 
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence’.67 As controversial as it may 
be, one can argue that both countries are taken advantage of, due to their inability, as well as 
the insatiable predatory practice of the political elite and their associates. 
 
With reference to mining contracts in Zimbabwe and the DRC, one can argue that illicit 
agreements are a replica of some mining investment deals that are prejudicial in nature.68 The 
fact that there are no tangible developments yet both countries are endowed with the 
resources can be a pointer of failure to operationalize international law principles governing 
state sovereignty over mineral resources discussed in chapter 2 above. In a nutshell, the 
threats and challenges facing the operationalization of PSNR in Zimbabwe and the DRC are 
exacerbated by weak economies, poor regulation of mining sectors, lack of political will of 
the leadership, corruption and abuse of the resources for self-serving interests. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 
The overarching issue is the manner in which PSNR is operationalized in the regulation and 
exploitation of mineral resources in Zimbabwe and the DRC. The chapter has discussed the 
good and bad sides of sovereignty over mineral resources. There is an antagonistic 
relationship between the two sides; the principles that support sovereignty over mineral 
resources and their exploitation, and the threats to that sovereignty. The challenges show the 
nature of the dilemma the DRC and Zimbabwe face in exercising sovereignty over mineral 
resources. Threats to state sovereignty over mineral resources in both countries have 
contributed to uncertainty in administering and interpreting mineral regulations, which has 
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significantly weakened the good side of sovereignty. Also, the threats have contributed to 
derailing the realization of economic growth and development through exploitation of 
domestic mineral resources in both countries. 
 
The overarching issue has been overshadowed by the nature of the relationship between 
sovereignty and threats to the outworking of that sovereignty, as well as how PSNR is 
operationalized in order to contribute to economic development in Zimbabwe and the DRC. 
On assumption of the “good intentions” of the operationalization of PSNR, both states can 
translate mining fortunes into development; however, the threats associated with PSNR spoil 
this realization. The threats spring from deep structural factors such as weak central authority 
and regulatory institutions and their structures, lack of effective enforcement capacity, as well 
as lack of political will of the leadership. Transparency and accountability are central twin 
issues, and both are notably lacking in the regulation of mineral resources in both states. 
 
Lack of transparency and accountability in executive decisions, as well as in the use and 
management of revenues derived from exploitation must receive attention in Zimbabwe and 
the DRC. Mere provision in legislation is not sufficient in the absence of practical actions in 
practice. Although the international law principles discussed in chapter 2 supports the 
mandate are fundamental, operationalizing them is by far full of inherent ambiguity in the 
absence of effective and strong implementing structures. The operationalization of the 
principles breaks down due to threats to the mandate to exploit mineral resources for self-
determination, as well as mismanagement of the revenues. It can be argued that when an 
elected government fails to perform, the regime and its leadership are responsible for such 
failure. As such, the citizens can demonstrate against the regime in order to express their 
displeasure, which if not addressed, should naturally translate into a civil protest.  
 
The problems facing the DRC and Zimbabwe are not necessarily of the same form and scope, 
but differ in their degree of impact. Regardless of varying nature of the problems, both 
countries surfer from the resource curse paradox. Imperatively, there is a need to promote 
strong state regulation and control of mineral resources, improve operationalization of the 
principles through effective assertion and exercise of sovereignty, and the mandate to exploit 
the resources for self-determination. The capacity to operationalize PSNR, and the ability to 
navigate threats and consolidate the mandate to exploit mineral resources, are important 
strategies to escape the resource curse. Apart from navigating the threats to the outworking of 
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sovereignty over mineral resources, political stability is the vanguard in order to realize 
economic and growth development through exploitation of the resources. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The resource curse paradox was considered through the lens of international law principles 
governing state sovereignty over mineral resources. The principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources (PSNR) was identified as the core principle governing state 
sovereignty over mineral resources. This principle assigns rights of control and regulation 
over mineral resources to host states and the mandate to exploit the resources for national 
benefit. However, PSNR is not a standalone principle; it is fundamentally supported by two 
key principles of international law, namely, self-determination and non-interference, 
alongside the right to development. These three principles predominantly provide states with 
protection against interference, as well as the mandate to exploit domestic mineral resources 
for self-determination. 
 
The right of states, including the DRC and Zimbabwe, to assert sovereignty over domestic 
mineral resources were shaped and crystalized over time, putting host states at the center of 
the politics of domestic control over the resources. This was done by defining conditions of 
access and regulating exploitation of the resources. Being former colonies, Zimbabwe and the 
DRC shaped the regulation of their mineral resources and operationalization of PSNR, self-
determination and non-interference against the backdrop of colonial subjugation. Thus, the 
ability of both states to assert sovereignty over mineral resources can dovetail sound 
strategies and economic pathways aimed to rise above their colonial histories. 
 
However, the effectiveness of operationalizing international law principles discussed in this 
thesis is dependent upon virtuous political will of host states and administration, as well as 
the ability of governments of states to control, implement and enforce mineral laws, establish 
appropriate institutional structures and appoint competent personnel who are able to shun 
corruption. These factors are crucial for Zimbabwe and the DRC in order to realize the 
mandate to exploit mineral resources for national benefit.  
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7.2 The Central Argument of the Thesis 
 
The thesis focused on the resource curse through the lens of international law principles 
supporting state sovereignty over mineral resources and how the principles protect the 
mandate that is conferred on the DRC and Zimbabwe to exploit mineral resources for 
economic development. Chapter 1 introduced the study and the research problem. Chapter 2 
discussed cardinal principles of international law governing Zimbabwe and the DRC’s 
sovereignty over domestic mineral resources. The principles fall into two key broad 
categories, namely, those that give both countries the mandate to control domestic minerals 
and those that facilitate access to investment and trade. Three cardinal principles that support 
sovereignty over mineral resources, namely, permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
(PSNR), self-determination and non-interference, alongside the right to development, are the 
major legal pillars underpinning the mandate to exploit domestic mineral resources for 
economic development. However, in asserting sovereignty over mineral resources, two kinds 
of difficulties can arise, namely, to secure investment and markets, which more often come 
with conditions that have a problematic and unclear relationship with the mandate. In 
addition to the problematic and unclear relationship with the mandate, four threats were 
identified that interfere with the mandate. Chapter 3 discussed four threats to the outworking 
of sovereignty over mineral resources and the manner in which they restrict sovereignty and 
the operationalization of PSNR. These are corruption, illegal mining, resource conflicts and 
conditionality policy of the IMF and the World Bank. On the one hand, Zimbabwe and the 
DRC are caught between the need to protect their sovereignty and the mandate to exploit 
their mineral resources, and on the other hand, to navigate threats to sovereignty over mineral 
resources.  
  
Chapters 4 and 5 discussed the manner in which Zimbabwe and the DRC assert sovereignty 
over domestic mineral resources, the operationalization of the principles governing state 
sovereignty over mineral resources, and the mandate to exploit the resources for self-
determination. The operationalization of PSNR in mining laws of both states manifests 
through key themes discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6, which include property and ownership 
rights imbedded in mining licences and tenure systems, conditions of access to mineral 
resources, policing and enforcement of mining laws, beneficiation and trade, royalties and 
mining taxes, legal obligations of mining investors towards indigenous communities, 
compensation for expropriation, exchange controls and repatriation of profits, equitable 
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treatment of mining investors, revenue transparency and strategic planning and how these can 
be used to translate the endowment into national economic growth and development. The 
discussion of these themes shows the strength and weaknesses in how Zimbabwe and the 
DRC flex or fail to flex their sovereignty muscle in operationalizing PSNR for self-
determination.  
 
Regardless of the weaknesses that were noted, however, the thesis established that the DRC 
mining laws provide a better legal environment for foreign investment and “ease of doing 
business” compared to Zimbabwe’s mining laws. Regardless of the variations, however, 
implementation and enforcement of mining laws in both countries is largely poor, a challenge 
that is characterized by weak regulatory institutions, incoherent implementing structures and 
strategies, as well as lack of skilled human resources. Also, the regulatory systems of both 
countries are fraught with loopholes and weaknesses, and corruption. This contributes to 
breakdown of the operationalization of PSNR, as well as systematically undermines prospects 
to translate mineral endowment into economic growth and development. 
 
Although international law provides a framework to control and assert sovereignty over 
mineral resources, the bottom line is that the realpolitik of mineral resources requires 
investment and trade for the DRC and Zimbabwe to benefit from their resources. Even in this 
context, IMF and World Bank conditionalities hinder rather than help these countries. How to 
navigate the threats such as the IMF and the World Bank conditionalities came to the fore. 
The thesis shows that due to financial constraints and weak economic status of the DRC and 
Zimbabwe, both require IMF and the World Bank conditional aid. Also, owing to technology 
gaps in the mineral value chain, it is often impossible for both countries to navigate the 
conditionality policies that interfere with the assertion of sovereignty, policy formulation and 
the operationalization of PSNR. In turn, state failure to navigate the threats systematically 
weakens and contributes to breakdown of the effective operationalization of PSNR. These 
adverse effects are also exacerbated by fragile political situations in both states owing to 
conflicts and endemic corruption among others.   
  
Chapter 6 provided a comparative analysis, and discussed the extent to which Zimbabwe and 
the DRC endeavour to navigate threats to the outworking of sovereignty over mineral 
resources. It was established that there is little room to manoeuvre against the backdrop of 
state fragility and absence of strong regulatory institutions and mechanisms. The chapter 
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established that in the assertion of sovereignty over domestic mineral resources, the elected 
leaders employ pernicious techniques in order to amass private economic benefits from 
exploitation of the resources. Self-serving interests are ways that do not build the long-term 
economic development in both states. The illicit practices are a threat to the mandate to 
exploit minerals and affect the legitimate intentions to operationalize PSNR and exploit 
mineral resources for self-determination and, economic growth and development. Also, the 
chapter noted that the excesses are not kept in check. Threats to sovereignty over mineral 
resources thrive because of weak monitoring institutions and policing; these factors 
contribute to the ineffectiveness of mining laws. Also, poor and inconsistent policies and 
decisions, weak implementation and enforcement of the mining laws, as well as 
incompetence and illicit revenue flows contribute to failure to derive maximum benefits from 
exploitation of domestic mineral resources in both countries. 
 
Regardless of the overarching issues and weaknesses surrounding the assertion of sovereignty 
over natural resources, however, international law recognizes the DRC and Zimbabwe’s 
mandate to control domestic mineral resources for national economic benefit. Ideally, the 
international law principles referred to in the thesis reinforce the control of domestic mineral 
resources and their exploitation for national benefit. Therefore, the DRC and Zimbabwe have 
the privilege to control and regulate, as well as exploit mineral resources and the right to 
dispose them free from interference. However, navigating the challenges that come with 
investment and trade policies remains of paramount importance in the mineral value chain. 
 
By enacting domestic mining laws, the DRC and Zimbabwe legislatures and executives have 
the power to influence the implementation of the laws and decision–making processes, 
including creating an environment conducive for mining investment. Thus, the nastiest 
detractors of genuine control and regulation of mineral resources and their exploitation are 
the central governments and the relevant regulatory authorities. Also, poorly negotiated 
mining contracts inherently contribute to poor performance of the mining sectors, thus 
undermining the legitimate intentions of PSNR and the right to development in both 
countries. 
 
The thesis established that DRC’s weak central authority and capacity deficit translate to lack 
of meaningful control and regulation of domestic minerals. Also, weak implementation and 
enforcement of mining laws and policing contribute to the inability to navigate the threats to 
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PSNR. There are varying inconsistencies between the mining regimes and the 
operationalization of PSNR in both countries. These include weak regulation, lack of 
strategic planning and skills in order to navigate the challenges and conflicts, as well as the 
challenges ton sovereignty that come with international investment and trade principles. Also, 
failure to navigate corruption, illegal mining and resource conflicts and conditionality 
policies of the IMF and the World Bank renders the effectiveness of the international law 
principles governing state sovereignty over mineral resources weak. This does not mean the 
hypocrisy associated with international law, discussed in various subsections of section 2.4 of 
chapter 2, will be eliminated completely, but minimized.   
 
The major issue raised in the thesis was how sovereignty over mineral resources and the 
mandate to exploit them can be asserted in order to guarantee the spoils of the resources 
contributes to development. The realpolitik of resource exploitation at domestic level is 
missing as well as the international law protection of weak states endowed with mineral 
resources. The principles of international investment and trade law protect foreign mining 
investors, by providing rights while the DRC and Zimbabwe as host states have 
responsibilities. For example, compelling both states to guarantee foreign mining investors 
same and fair treatment through legislative, judicial and administrative decision-making 
adversely affects the operationalization of PSNR. Thus, both countries cannot pass laws 
giving investment and trade advantages to certain investors in the mineral value chain. 
Although foreign investment is the primary vanguard to exploit mineral resources in both 
states, however, investment and trade principles interfere with, and weaken and restrict 
sovereignty over the resources. As discussed in the thesis, the negative effects of these 
principles are most notable in weak and fragile economies such as the DRC and Zimbabwe.  
 
It was concluded that although international law provides for, and supports sovereignty over 
mineral resources, it also restricts sovereignty by allowing interference. Intrinsically, 
international law has an inborn ambiguity and contradictory impact on sovereignty; on the 
one hand, it gives protection of Zimbabwe and the DRC’s mineral resources and, on the other 
hand, it takes away the protection. It is also necessary to state that both states are politically 
and economically weak; in practice, they do not benefit much from international law in the 
context of the mandate to exploit their minerals without interference.  
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The threats that were identified and discussed in chapter 3 and contextualized in chapters 4 
and 5 weaken the implementation and effectiveness of aspects of international law principles 
discussed in chapter 2, which support state sovereignty over mineral resources. Also, the 
threats to PSNR significantly hinder and interfere with the DRC and Zimbabwe’s sovereignty 
over mineral resources. This interference contributes to a breakdown of the operationalization 
of PSNR as well as the economic contribution of mineral resources to host states as 
contemplated in the AMV.    
 
In a nutshell, the DRC and Zimbabwe case studies illustrate the multi-faceted ways in which 
developing states use (and fail to use) their domestic laws in a manner that allows them to 
benefit from the international law mandate in support of self-determination and development 
through control and exploitation of domestic mineral resources. Due to the weaknesses 
politically and economically, as well as failure to navigate threats to PSNR, both countries do 
not have prospects of escaping the resource curse unless there is strategic planning, political 
will to regulate and exploit domestic mineral for self-determination and development.  
 
7.3 Recommendations 
 
Since there is competition for foreign investment in minerals sector, mining laws and tax 
regimes should ideally be competitive in order to attract investments and provide appropriate 
strategies for development. In my view, however, African countries should not participate in 
a “race to the bottom” but should help each other to implement reasonable level of tax that is 
commensurate with each mineral. Improving or reforming mining laws and regulatory 
systems or processes has the potential to significantly increase foreign investment, and 
simultaneously become a tool to market the domestic mining sector globally. The paradox of 
the resource curse in the DRC and Zimbabwe lies in historical structural and strategic 
deficiencies, the inability to navigate the threats discussed in the thesis and how to use the 
benefits from mineral resources for self-determination in order to spur economic growth and 
development. Accordingly, there is a need to pursue an investment strategy backed up by 
strategic legislative reforms. 
 
In order to improve transparency and accountability, as well as marketing the mineral 
endowment to international investors, there is a need to implement a comprehensive and 
effectively computerized mining cadaster. The need to protect property rights in the mineral 
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value chain is fundamental. In order to do so, there is need to  establish an effective system, 
namely, (i) for the registration of mining titles and (ii) for granting and monitoring mining 
licences. How such a system would protect property rights and improve transparency and 
accountability is underpinned by political will, strong regulatory institutions as well as checks 
and balancing mechanisms in order to promote transparency and accountability in the 
minerals sector. The system can also improve the sector’s reliability and processing of mining 
applications, permits and titles, leading to a better mineral licensing regime. Availability of 
mining information internationally would provide clarity on mining title systems and assist 
prospective mining investors to make informed decisions without difficulties. 
 
There is the need to introduce sound regulatory regimes, strong regulatory institutions and 
structures, as well as to capacitate them through strategic planning, provision of operational 
capital and, skilled and sufficient human resources. This is inherently necessary in order to 
ensure effective implementation, enforcement of mining laws and monitoring compliance. 
Also, this is necessary in order to enhance to mandate of Zimbabwe and the DRC to exploit 
their mineral resources and derive economic benefits for self-determination and development.  
 
Apart from indigenization provisions in the DRC’s Mining Code and Zimbabwe’s 
indigenization law, appropriate distribution of benefits from exploitation of mineral resources 
should occur at all spheres of both government and reach deserving sectors such as to 
capacitate the Ministry of Mines which is the backbone of the economy, and other 
departments such as health, education and defence and security. However, prior to the 
distribution, there is need to determine the purpose for which the funds are to be allocated. 
 
On the aspect of empowerment, there is the need to design monitoring mechanisms and 
introduce partnerships with communities and civil society focusing on mobilizing effective 
monitoring and enforcement of the mining laws. This will spur public involvement and 
participation in decision making processes. I recommend that the DRC and Zimbabwe 
undertake and adhere to non-corrupt standard of practice at all the three levels of mineral 
resource governance, namely, national, provincial and local levels, alongside transparency 
and accountability in the mineral value chain, and to publish all relevant and material 
information on revenue movements and expenditure.  
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The measures undertaken by the DRC and Zimbabwe governments and policy choices ought 
to be thoroughly examined before being implemented and enforced in order to ensure a 
people-based mineral resource regulation. This is against the backdrop that mineral 
endowment ought to serve as a platform for development with a view that they benefit the 
host states. The thesis offers the DRC and Zimbabwe an opportunity to learn how best to 
navigate the threats in order to escape the resource curse paradox. The experience of both 
states is a microcosm of the challenges facing many African states endowed with mineral 
resources. The challenges fundamentally give rise to the need to create a robust regulatory 
framework for the mining sector in Africa and the ability to strategically implement mining 
laws, by putting people at the center of the transformation in a transparent and accountable 
manner. This could be done by adopting identical regulatory standards across African states 
endowed with mineral resources. 
 
The final sections of the thesis set out recommendations specific to the DRC and Zimbabwe 
governments. This is inherently necessary for clarity and in order for each section to focus on 
each country.  
 
7.3.1 To the DRC Government  
 
There is an inherent need to put in place mechanisms to curb corruption in the mining sector. 
There is the need to improve implementation and enforcement of mining laws, and policing, 
as well as transparency and accountability. Further, there is the need to strengthen the 
political will by promoting democracy in the regulation of mineral resources and by fully 
engaging in conducting oversight mining activities to assist regulatory agencies to implement 
and enforce mining laws. Furthermore, there is the need to alleviate human resource capacity 
constraints that impede oversight and accountability. These would constitute significant steps 
towards control and transforming mineral endowment into economic growth and 
development. As discussed in chapter 5 regarding to threats to the DRC’ sovereignty over 
mineral resources and in order to overcome the resource curse, there is also the need to 
embrace a significant and sustained, as well as long-term investment in the minerals sector, 
strengthening central authority and security concerns. Regarding mining taxation and trade of 
the minerals, the DRC needs a consolidated single system responsible for the oversight of 
mining taxation and trade in mineral resources, and a coherent single entity for 
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accountability. Also, there is need to avoid duplication of responsibility and to curb loopholes 
in revenue collection system by improving efficiency. 
 
In order to address the mineral resource associated conflicts, there is the need to move away 
from the reactive ways that are ad hoc and sometimes not proportionate to the threat, by 
adopting proactive measures that are commensurate to the scale of the threats. Also, there is 
the need to strategize broadly in order to obtain the political will in the country and of 
neighbouring states. Further, there is the need for robust diplomatic dialogues and solutions 
to the resource conflict in order to rejuvenate the DRC’s mineral resource regulatory system 
and institutions seized with the obligation to control the resources. Furthermore, there is the 
need to undertake capacity building of the regulatory institutions as an aspect supporting 
resource regulation. This is imperative because the country fundamentally lacks the coherent 
and diplomatic momentum needed to revise the status quo. Transparency and accountability 
should be considered in every facet of the mineral value chain, as well as transnational co-
operation in the Great Lakes region in order to curb smuggling of minerals and illegal trade. 
 
7.3.2 To the Zimbabwean Government 
 
The Mines Act allows investors to get claims for free and it is skewed in favour of foreign 
investors for whom it provides too much protection at the expense of the state. There is the 
need to repeal the outdated Mines Act and replace it with a new principal mining law that 
brings domestic mining and regulation into line with international standards, and to assert the 
exercise of sovereignty unambiguously. There is the need to vest custody and ownership of 
all mineral resources in the state (not the state President) in order to improve transparency 
and accountability, and to empower institutions to implement checks and balancing tools, as 
well as to improve compliance. The proposed new mining law should promote security of 
tenure by avoiding provisions that threaten the tenure system, yet are aligned with the 
indigenization law. The proposed mines law should contain elaborate provisions to curb 
corruption and loopholes in tax collection as well as illicit financial flows. Further, there is 
need to repeal the Gold Act, Copper Act and Precious Stones Trade Act - these are outdated 
and do not reflex modern trends including transparency and accountability in the regulation 
of specific minerals.  
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There is need for political will to strengthen and spearhead sound policies, as well as 
transparency and accountability in the mineral value chain. These three imperatives have to 
be compulsory and help to curb corruption in the minerals sector. Against the backdrop of 
well-documented history and catalogue of corruption in the mineral value chain, illegal 
mining and smuggling of the resources, theft and incompetence; the government of 
Zimbabwe should put in place appropriate mechanisms to deal with these ills, and embrace 
transparency and accountability in every facet of the mineral value chain including setting 
national priority areas. The regulator should be held accountable in order to ensure that the 
mandate derived from PSNR is executed as a supreme state responsibility with a view to 
control and exploit domestic minerals for national economic development. Further, there is 
need to enact mandatory provisions in for imprisonment terms in mining laws for threats such 
as corruption in the mineral value chain and illegal mining, and smuggling of the resources. 
This could be a way to bring transparency and accountability in the minerals sector. There is 
also the need to capacitate the Anti-Corruption Commission in order to assist the policy to 
curb corruption in the mineral value chain.  
  
With regard to the indigenization law, there is the need to clarify the legal position in order to 
ensure consistency in the application of the law. There is the need to balance indigenization 
with attracting foreign investment in the minerals sector, simultaneously creating room for 
economic growth and development. There needs to be a clear implementation as the current 
implementation of the indigenization law is incomplete, inconsistent, and arbitrarily enforced. 
Since navigating threats and interference has been a challenge, there is the need to take 
inherent steps and measures regardless how trivial this could be, to close the gaps and 
weaknesses in the mineral resource regulatory framework, by establishing mines police and 
courts (within the current national police and courts) to specialize in investigating and dealing 
in mineral resource crimes only.  
 
7.3.3 To Africa Generally 
Mineral endowment has positive and negative consequences for host states and governments, 
as well as local communities. The competing interests and outcomes also suggest the 
fundamental importance of a shared mining vision with a view to creating mining policy that 
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protects stakeholders in the mining value chain and the interests of the citizens.1 Regardless 
of Africa’s mineral endowment, the entire continent has for far too long been characterized 
by poverty and underdevelopment, and labelled a continent of losers.2 Illicit regulatory 
practices and self-serving interests make local communities and host states and indeed the 
entire continent far from economically secure. This is exacerbated by high levels of poverty 
across the African continent. Poverty in turn contributes to Africa’s continued weak voice in 
the negotiation of mining contracts, a position which fails to support or promote the AMV.3 
 
The various legal systems in Africa, so can the challenges associated the legal terrains across 
the continent regarding control and regulation of mineral resources and investment. 
Regardless of the fact that foreign mining investors have the leverage to invest where they 
want, they turned to invest in those countries they think their investment will be protected. 
Apart from the recommendations adopted by African heads of states and governments 
contemplated in AMV, I propose that Africa should also have a mining investment code that 
can be used as a template across the continent. While this recommendation could in itself be 
seen as a form of “interference”, it would be ideal for creating a uniform legal framework for 
foreign investors intending to invest in Africa’s minerals sector in addition to helping African 
states stand together in order to ensure that their mineral resources are exploited at a rate most 
beneficial to them. It is also imperative that African states put in place a concerted effort in 
order to support the implementation of the “proposed investment code”. To this end, I suggest 
adopting of efficient and speedy reforms in mineral resource administration, and the 
institutional structures with a view to effectively regulate the sector and curb the prevalence 
of prejudicial mining contracts. It is fundamental that economically weak states such as the 
DRC and Zimbabwe address the democratic deficit in the regulation of their mineral 
resources, as well as improve transparency and accountability.  
 
I suggest the establishment of an independent office, “a kind of ombudsman function”, to 
oversee the implementation of the “mining investment code for Africa” as well as the AMV 
in order to protect host states against concluding prejudicial mining agreements with foreign 
mining investors. The proposed independent office and the code could as well be tools to 
reinforce the objectives of the AMV which African states have to consider in the regulation 
                                                          
1
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ‘Minerals and Africa’s development:  An overview of the 
report of the international study Group on Africa’s mineral regimes’ 2011 at xiii.  
2
 Ibid. 
3
 See the shared mining vision contemplated in Africa Mining Vision, 2009 at v, 13 – 29. 
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of their mineral resources. In line with the AMV, the regulatory framework for the “Africa 
minerals sector” and its value chain should be developed in a collaborative way, and to 
include civil society, the private sector and governments of host states. In light of the threats 
and interferences discussed in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the thesis,4 and the need to navigate 
them, it is important to have mutual interventions and working together by the regulators and 
the regulated in order to find a common ground that benefits both parties. Where there is 
mutual agreements and working together, there is most likely to be good partnerships and 
such a situation can ameliorate loopholes in the regulatory systems as well as curb corruption 
in the minerals sector. However, the proposal requires political will and strategic engagement 
prior to its adoption.  
 
The double standards that exist in the regulation of minerals in many African states have 
failed the mandate and operationalization of PSNR in many states. To this end, there is the 
need to establish a development forum system where all mining agreements, apart from the 
watchful eye of an independent supervisory body, are open to public scrutiny. While taking 
into account the principles of international investment and trade, international law can be 
seen as a form of organized hypocrisy.5 It epitomizes suspicion and general fear that the 
international law principles governing state sovereignty over mineral resources do not 
essentially assist politically weak and poor African countries but defend the interests of 
foreign investors, by protecting their mining rights.6 The hypocrisy fundamentally makes 
international law unresponsive and irresponsible to provide protection to vulnerable states 
and unhelpful to provide solution to their challenges. This often opens floodgates for 
prejudice and breakdown of, and undermines the objectives of PSNR, thus promoting the 
resource curse. Accordingly, the question is for how long should this hypocrisy of 
international law continue disadvantaging African states over mineral resources? 
 
Worthy of further consideration is whether Africa as a continent can create mechanisms to 
navigate the hypocrisy of international law, by compelling each state to adopt uniform rules 
and standards to regulate mineral resources, and to establish strong institutions and 
mechanisms in order to navigate threats to the mandate and operationalization of PSNR. How 
to navigate the threats requires a paradigm shift from the culture of drafting mining laws and 
                                                          
4
 See sections 3.2 – 3.7 of chapter 3; section 4.5 of chapter 4; section 5.5 of chapter 5 and section 6.3.2 of 
chapter 6. 
5
 See elements of the hypocrisy discussed in sections 2.4.1 – 2.4.4 of chapter 2 above. 
6
 Ibid.  
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policies without hands-on strategies in order operationalize the international law principles 
discussed in this thesis, namely, non-interference, self-determination and PSNR along with 
the right to development with a view to derive tangible national economic benefits. Also, 
there is the need for African states to realize that without strong political will to 
operationalize PSNR and curb the threats discussed in the thesis, economic growth and 
development through exploitation of domestic mineral resources could be far from secure.  
Therefore the realization of the objectives of the AMV hinges on strong commitment by 
African governments to develop strong regulatory institutions and enforcement agents, and 
transparency and accountability in the mineral value chain.    
 
7.4 Conclusion   
 
The thesis provides a conceptual framework to view the resource curse paradox through the 
lens of international law. The resource curse is a pragmatic challenge that many African 
states endowed with mineral resources experience as they endeavour to operationalize PSNR, 
and the mandate to exploit the resources for self-determination and development. Although it 
is important to realize that international law principles play a role by assigning states with 
rights regarding permanent ownership and custodianship over domestic mineral resources, 
there are rights and duties that come with the assignments, as well as threats to PSNR. In this 
regard the operationalization of PSNR in domestic mining laws becomes imperative. The 
case of the DRC and Zimbabwe is a microcosm of the resource curse that many African 
states are going through. The findings and the recommendations are pointers that one can 
take into consideration.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
 
6.2 Summary: How International Law Principles Governing State Sovereignty over   
            Mineral Resources are Operationalized in Zimbabwe and the DRC 
 
 
 
Principle 
  
Operationalizing International Law Principles Governing State Sovereignty over 
Mineral Resources Through Domestic Law 
 
 
Zimbabwe 
                
The DRC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Permanent 
sovereignty 
over natural 
resources 
(PSNR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Property & ownership rights: 
 
-State President is exclusively and 
absolutely vested with permanent 
custodianship over domestic mineral 
resources on behalf of the people of 
Zimbabwe. 
-State President has dominium over all 
domestic mineral resources on behalf of 
the people of Zimbabwe. 
-the state President has the right to 
alienate property rights associated with 
mining permits, exploration as well as to 
demand payment for such rights in the 
form of fees and taxes. 
-no private ownership of mineral 
resources, they are property of the state. 
-State President grants rights of access 
and use of the resources through issuing 
of mining licences. ---the rights may be 
limited depending on the nature and 
conditions under pinning the issuing of 
the permit. 
-when they are granted to an investor, 
rights to mineral resources cannot be 
transferred to another. 
-Ministry of Mines is responsible to 
oversee the granting and registration of 
mining licences. 
-property rights in mineral resources 
include rights to exploit, explore and a 
system of tenure but not ownership of 
the resources. 
-the PSNR principle empowers the 
Zimbabwe legislature and the executive 
to enact laws regarding property rights in 
mineral resources and how this comes to 
be. 
-Mines Act provides the manner to 
acquire property rights and cancellation.  
Property & ownership rights: 
 
-the DRC Constitution and the Mining Code 
provides that the state is the owner and 
custody of all mineral resources in the 
country. 
-state ownership of the resources is provided 
and guaranteed as well as protected by the 
constitution. 
-vests custodianship in the State. 
-no individual ownership of mineral 
resources – property of the state. 
-the state grants limited access and use of 
the resources to investors by way of mining 
licences that is registered by the mining 
cadastre. In this way, right to access the 
resources is confirmed.  
-state has exclusive and inalienable 
ownership rights to all Mineral resources 
found in the DRC. 
-the Mining Code provides the manner in 
which states ownership of mineral resources 
is exercised and protected by domestic law. 
-holders of exploration, mining, processing, 
transportation or trade  permits do not have 
personal rights to the resources they are 
dealing in but rights to exploit the resources 
as defined in their permits. 
 -the DRC is internationally ranked low by 
the World Bank regarding protection of 
investors due to weak property rights. 
-the Mining Code provides how one can 
acquire property rights in mineral resources 
and cancellation thereof. 
-from the above, the principle of PSNR  
provide the DRC executive and the 
legislature authority to make provisions in 
domestic mining laws regarding rights to 
mineral resources but without ownership of 
the resources.    
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Access to mineral resources: 
 
-the right to grant access to mineral 
resources in Zimbabwe and to exploit 
them the State President with the help of 
the Minister of Mines and the Cabinet 
(central arm of Government in decision-
making) decide which investor to grant 
rights of access. 
-the Mines Act provides  the acquisition 
and maintenance as well as mining 
rights, and six categories of mining 
licences (see chapter 4 section 4.4.2), 
and  each category has its requirements 
and conditions. 
-there is the need to comply with the 
requirement of indigenization law in 
terms of share ownership of the rights. 
Generally, joint mining ventures with 
indigenous partners are fundamental as 
required by the indigenization law (see 
chapter 4 section 4.3.1.6) in order for 
foreign investor to have access to 
domestic mineral resources. 
-however, the Mines Act does not 
provide and is silent on the categories of 
persons who are capable to access 
mineral resources in Zimbabwe,  
conditions and eligibility for acquisition 
of and registration of the rights. 
-there is no transparency in the process 
to decide on granting mining rights or 
rights of access. 
-the Mines Act does not provide the 
eligibility and categories of persons who 
can access the resources. 
-Mines Act is silent and does not 
provides categories of persons to be 
excluded from engaging in mining 
activities by virtue of being bearers of 
certain offices. 
-investors to meet certain financial 
requirements and to pay rehabilitation 
fees (the amounts are not provided). 
 
 Access to mineral resources: 
 
-the DRC government grants rights to access 
to its domestic mineral resources on a “first 
come, first serve basis”. (see chapter 5 
section 5.5.2). 
-Mining Code provides the conditions of 
access to domestic minerals and the Mining 
Regulations spell out the process in order to 
get rights of access to the resources.  
-foreign investors can only have rights of 
access to non-artisanal mining activities 
upon being granted rights of access to the 
resources.  
-indigenous Congolese are allows to engage 
in regulated artisanal mining activities on 
condition that a miner is a holder of artisanal 
miner’s card. The Mining Code also 
provides the eligibility of Congolese who 
can have artisanal miner’s card. 
-unregulated artisanal mining activities are 
prohibited because it is illegal mining. 
- Mining Code provides the categories of 
persons capable to have rights to mineral 
resources, and who is disqualified. 
-since the DRC is not capacitated to exploit 
its minerals, it requires joint partnerships 
with foreign investors, (Article 8 para 3 of 
the Mining Code). 
-access to DRC minerals is based on joint 
agreements with the government to exploit 
the resources. 
-the Mining Regulations (Article 17) 
provides the eligibility of who qualifies to 
access the resources. 
-provides categories of persons excluded to 
engage in mining activities by virtue of their 
offices ((article 27 of the Mining Code). 
-investors are required to meet certain 
financial requirements and to deposit 
rehabilitation fees (the amounts are not 
provided).  
 
Mineral resources policing and 
enforcement of mining laws: 
 
-the core vanguard against corruption, 
illegal mining and smuggling as well as 
to ensure compliance with domestic and 
mining laws. 
Mineral resources policing and 
enforcement of mining laws: 
 
-mining law enforcement and policing is the 
primary objective of the department 
responsible for minerals in the DRC. 
-Mining Code and Mining Regulations are 
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-the Mines Acts and the subsidiary 
mining laws provide conducts that 
contravenes intention of the legislature, 
e.g. failure to keep an up-to-date register 
of all transactions of gold and precious 
stones, dealing in any mineral without a 
licence. 
-the Mines Act criminalizes disposal of 
minerals from any location until 
outstanding royalties are paid, or 
arrangement to pay has been made. 
-mandatory sentences for contravention 
of certain mining laws, e.g. illegal 
dealing in gold and copper in terms of 
the Gold Act and Copper Control Act, 
respectively.  
-Ministry of Mines is responsible to 
enforce and police mineral resources 
regulation and its agents, e.g. mining 
commissioners empowers, mining 
inspectors, Mineral Unit and Border 
Control Officers, national police 
investigate and arrest offenders. 
-when convicted of mineral or mining 
related offences, courts can impose fine, 
custodial sentences or both. 
-however, fines and custodial terms are 
very low and short respectively 
compared to those provided in the DRC 
mining laws. Regardless of the variation, 
illegal mining activities are less than 
what the DRC is experiencing. 
- how the indigenization laws is policed 
– no clear and consistent implementation 
and enforcement, therefore this law is 
incomplete. 
  
the two key mining laws. 
-the state through its agents/institutions 
responsible for mines and mineral 
development has prime roles to regulate the 
resources (in terms of the Mining Code and 
Mining Regulations), and to implement, 
enforce and monitor compliance. 
-criminalises dealing in any mineral without 
a valid licence. 
-the DRC criminalizes dealing in or 
possession of a mineral resource without a 
valid permit. 
-the role of the state and its mining 
institutions and regulation structures are 
clearly defined compared to Zimbabwe. 
-cooperative governance and hands-on 
approach on all the mining institutions and 
structures to ensure the objectives provided 
in the Mining Code and Mining regulations 
are realized. 
-however, fines and custodial sentences are 
higher compared to those provided for in the 
Zimbabwe mining laws. Regardless of this, 
illegal mining activities in the DRC are 
common when compared to Zimbabwe.  
-weak central authority and corruption and 
resource conflicts are the challenges facing 
appropriate and effective implementation, 
enforcement and policing.  
-hard to meet all the basic requires in 
policing and enforcement of domestic 
mining laws where the state is the sole 
regulator, on the one hand, and as a partner 
in joint mining ventures, on the other hand.  
 
Beneficiation and trade: 
 
-exporting beneficiated and value 
addition is a strategic policy for 
Zimbabwe. 
-the Mines Act does not provide for 
beneficiation, outdated principal mining 
law. 
-no single and consolidated policy on 
beneficiation but the government has to 
compel mining investors to beneficiate 
their mineral produce before export. 
-higher fines or risk losing mining 
licence to export unbeneficiated 
minerals.eg 15 percent levy on export of 
unbeneficiated platinum and there are 
plans to completely ban raw platinum 
group mineral exports. 
Beneficiation and trade: 
 
-Minister of Mines unfettered jurisdiction 
and powers to decide whether allow 
application for export of unbeneficiated 
mineral resources. 
-two key reasons provided which justify 
seeking permission to export unbeneficiated 
minerals (Article 85(a) & (b) of the Mining 
Code). 
-there is no single and consolidated policy 
on beneficiation but embedded in many 
policy documents. 
-weak enforcement and monitoring make it 
easy to evade beneficiation requirement and 
illegally export unbeneficiated mineral 
resources. 
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-Diamond Policy provides for mandatory 
beneficiation and value addition of 
diamonds. 
-the Diamond Policy has a weakness, 
does not spell out the provision and 
clarity on the standard for issuance of 
permits to those in the diamond cutting 
and polishing sections. 
-lack of clear administrative procedures 
in the regulation of domestic 
beneficiation creates uncertainties and 
gaps, which harbour room for corruption 
and illicit dealings. 
-Zimbabwe asserting sovereignty by 
slowly closing the net on exports of 
unbeneficiated minerals.  
 
 
Royalties and taxes: 
 
-mining investors compelled to pay 
royalties and other taxes. 
-flat rate of 15 percent of the total profits 
is paid  
-fiscal regime for mining provides 5 
percent for withholding tax charged on 
dividends declared by companies listed 
on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
(ZSE), then unlisted companies pay the 
rate of 10 percent, and additional 5 
percent withholding tax is charged on 
interests paid to mining investors. 
-Zimbabwe does not have royalty 
distribution plan for the benefit of all 
levels of the community save the Trust 
Funds for the provinces, as well as the 
national Sovereign Wealth Fund 
established in terms of the indigenization 
law. 
-no transparency and accountability as 
well as traceability of the revenues in the 
Trust Funds and Sovereign Wealth Fund. 
Royalties and taxes: 
 
-mining investors to pay mining taxes and 
royalties to the state. 
-like Zimbabwe, DRC mining tax regime 
include mining duties, royalties and fees, 
charges and taxes payable by mining 
investors on the concessions. 
-from 2002 to 2012, the Mining Code 
provided a guarantee on stable mining taxes 
as per legislative modifications. The 
stabilization clauses restricted the DRC to 
freely alter mining tax regime. 
-rate of mining royalty for iron is 0.5 
percent; 2 percent for non-ferrous metals, 
and 2.5 percent for precious metals. Profit-
based tax for exploitation of mineral 
resources is levied at a preferential rate of 
30 percent. 
-distribution of royalty proceeds to the entire 
DRC society is provided by the Mining 
Code and the Mining Regulations.   
-the Mining Code (Article 242) provides a 
formula, that the royalty must be 
proportionally distributed to all levels of the 
government for the benefit of all Congolese 
people. 
 
Legal obligations towards indigenous 
communities: 
 
-mining contracts to include basic EIAs,  
resettlement plans, community 
development plans in the form of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), as 
well as employment of local people and 
revenue sharing percentage.  
Legal obligations towards indigenous 
communities: 
 
-mining is inherently unsustainable to the 
environment and the adjacent communities.  
-to pay compensation to affected 
communities. 
-environmental health and safety – 
requirement to undertake environmental 
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-transparency of mining agreements is 
critical for public benefits and also 
scrutiny. 
-constitution provides protection of the 
environment and the right to a clean 
environment, which is free of pollution 
and degrading activities such as mining 
that is inherently unsustainable. 
-mining companies to pay rehabilitation 
costs. 
-Mines Act provides for compensation of 
private land owners, eg compensation is 
only for the development on the land 
(property) and not compensation for the 
land, land compensation of paid to rural 
district councils (RDC).  
plans (EPs), environmental impact 
assessment (EIAs), and public consultations. 
(the major issue is the level of public 
consultation in the DRC against the 
backdrop of a government desperate for 
foreign mining investment??).  
-residual effects of some of the chemicals 
used in processing stages of production. 
Requires strict compliance, monitoring and 
to protect the indigenous communities and 
the environment. 
-mining investors are legally obliged to 
honour and fulfil their obligations towards 
the communities adjacent to the mining 
locations – corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). 
 
 
 
 
Self-
determination 
-Zimbabwe has an inherent right to 
formulate laws to support the regulation 
of its mineral resources. 
-indigenization policy and laws 
-the right to decide how benefits from 
mineral resources are used in accordance 
with the wishes of the people. 
-requirement of transparency and 
accountability in regulation of minerals, 
as well as use of the revenues and 
planning. 
-mineral resources are the anchor of the 
Zim-Asset strategic development policy. 
 
-the DRC has the prerogative to formulate 
own laws to support its sovereignty over 
mineral resources and their regulation and 
exploitation in accordance with the wishes 
of the Congolese.  
-laws or provision in mining laws that 
favour indigenization (eg regulated artisanal 
mining is reserved for local peoples in terms 
of the Mining Code). 
-revenue transparency and accountability as 
well as traceability. 
-planning for use of mineral resources for 
self-determination. 
 
Non-
interference 
-mineral resource policing 
-dispute settlement 
-policy formulation, implementation and 
enforcement as well as policing. 
-reign forces PSNR and self-
determination principles 
-non-interferences in domestic decision 
and law making processes.  
 
-mineral resource policing 
-dispute settlement 
-policy formulation, implementation and 
enforcement as well as policing. 
-reign forces the DRC’s self-determination 
and PSNR principles. 
-non-interferences in domestic decision and 
law making processes. 
 
Principles Relevant  to Investment and Trade 
 
 
 
Compensation 
for 
expropriation 
-Zimbabwe can exercise sovereignty by 
expropriating alien business interests in 
domestic mining. 
-the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides 
for protection of property, and 
compensation for expropriation 
alongside the Mines Act.  
-Zimbabwe can expropriate mines or 
mining location that is not worked or 
operational or that is underutilized – no 
compensation shall be paid, eg for loss of 
-the DRC can assert sovereignty by 
expropriating domestic mining interests of 
investors.  
-Constitution of the DRC provides security 
of and protection of property rights. 
-compensation for expropriation has to be 
fair and just in terms of conditions 
established by law. 
-arbitrary expropriation is prohibited. 
-holders of surface rights have no claims of 
mineral resources found on or under the 
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prospective revenue. 
-compensation is only for development 
made on the mining site and not for the 
minerals because they belong to the 
Zimbabweans. 
-expropriation can be on the basis of 
failure to meet the indigenization law. 
-compensation should be fair and   
-weaknesses – constitution does not 
expressly define what property is in the 
context of mineral resources, and so does 
the Mines Act. 
-expropriation is also a threat to 
sovereignty as highlighted in chapters 2 
and 4. 
surface area over which they have rights of 
control. 
-such holders are entitled for compensation 
for expropriation of their surface rights. 
-expropriation requires policy formulation, 
the policy was provided for in domestic law. 
-expropriation could be a barrier to 
investment as well as compensation can 
restrict development since the process uses 
revenues available for development   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Repatriation of 
profits and 
exchange 
controls 
 
 
-requires policy formulation and the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) 
implement, enforce and monitors 
compliance in terms of the IMF 
requirements. 
-RBZ has discretion to decision on 
repatriation of profits depending on 
availability of foreign currency. 
-Restriction on sovereignty -Zimbabwe 
cannot restrict repatriation by investors, 
and this restricts quantity of revenue 
available for reinvestment and 
development. 
-Zimbabwe Exchange Control Act 
(ZECA) is inferior to IMF Rules which 
regulate repatriation of profits and 
payment of current transactions. 
-restricts the Zimbabwe’s ability to 
control movement of investors’ capital 
into and out of the country. 
 
-requires drafting of the enabling policy – 
DRC has the exchange control regulations 
(ECR) and the Central Bank if responsible 
for implementation, enforcement and 
monitoring compliance. 
-Central Bank decides the conditions that 
must be fulfilled in order to repatriate profits 
and payment of current transactions.  
-Central Bank is entitles to a fee for every 
transaction relating to repatriation of profits 
or payment of current transactions. 
-DRC’s exchange control regulation or 
regime (ECR) is inferior to IMF Rules on 
repatriation of profits and payment of 
current transactions. 
-repatriation of profits restricts the quantity 
of revenues available for development. 
-restricts the DRC’s ability to control 
movement of investors’ capital into and out 
of the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equitable 
treatment of 
mining 
investors 
(national 
treatment & 
MFN 
principles) 
 
-Zimbabwe’s “Look–East Policy” 
preference over investors from the west.  
-uniform application and enforcement of 
indigenization law. 
-the non-discrimination treatment 
compels Zimbabwe government to 
guarantee foreign mining investors same 
and fair treatment through legislative, 
judicial and administrative decision 
making.  
-Zimbabwe government cannot pass laws 
giving investment and trade advantages 
to certain investors in the mineral value 
chain. 
-review and renegotiation of all mining 
contracts concluded during wars times. 
-some mining contracts were negotiated on 
uneven platform, and were prejudicial to the 
DRC.  
-Lutundula Commission had the prerogative 
to review the agreements on behalf of the 
DRC and make recommendations on which 
agreements were prejudicial to the state. 
-the DRC is compelled to provide same and 
fair non-discriminatory treatment to all 
foreign mining investors. 
-cannot pass laws giving investment and 
trade advantages to certain investors in the 
mineral value chain. 
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Revenue 
transparency 
& 
accountability 
-Not a member of the EITI and therefore 
does not need to meet certain minimum 
reporting conditions. 
-no room for public scrutiny and checks 
mechanisms. 
-minister of Finance and Mines only 
accountable to the Cabinet – (ruling 
party supreme law making body which is 
outside parliament), bias cannot be ruled 
out as well as corruption.  
-Zimbabwe does not have a policy on 
mandatory transparency and 
accountability- a reason one can assume 
the elites take advantage to loot the 
available mineral resources and 
revenues. 
-mines Act does not provide for 
declaration of mineral resource payment 
and revenues realized from mineral 
exports. 
-Publish What You Pay Zimbabwe 
(PWYP-Zimbabwe) a civil society 
pressure group to compel government to 
be transparent and accountable 
 
 
 
 
-Member of the EITI which require meeting 
certain minimum reporting conditions. 
-member of the International Conference on 
the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) required 
to improve transparency and traceability in 
the domestic mineral resources. 
-requirement to use revenues transparency, 
and in an accountable manner 
-allow for public scrutiny as a method of 
checks mechanism. 
-Revenue Transparency group acts as 
watchdog to ensure transparency and 
accountability in use and management of 
revenues. 
                                        
           The Right to Development 
       Zimbabwe                                                         The DRC 
 
 
Strategic 
planning on 
how to use 
mineral 
resources for 
development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable 
Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-
Asset) is a major development strategy 
policy adopted in October 2013, and 
beneficiation and value addition if a key 
component of the policy. 
-strategic agenda to develop through 
exploitation of mineral resources (among 
the broad objectives of Zim-Asset) for 
self-determination, to include mineral 
beneficiation and value addition. 
-provides for the need to re-evaluate 
domestic mineral resources in order to 
determine logical pattern to develop 
through exploitation of mineral 
resources. 
-requirement for short development plans 
which lead to the realization of Zim-
Asset in the long run. 
-Zim-Asset embraces the mandate and 
resource sovereignty, self-determination 
as well as non-interference in control of 
Zimbabwe’s mineral resources, their 
-review and renegotiation of mining 
contracts concluded during war times (1996-
97 & 1998) was a strategic plan to ensure 
state does not lose revenues through 
prejudicial mining agreements and 
irreparable harm. 
-poverty reduction and growth strategy 
papers (PRGSP) was a method to formulate 
development policies, which include 
development plans. 
-however, development plans and their 
implementation are riddled by threats such 
as episodic and recurrent or resurgences, 
political tensions and instability, as well as 
lack of coordinated efforts to curb 
corruption in the mineral value chain. 
-lack of revenues due to corruption and lack 
of firm commitment and weak central 
authority and institutionalized mistrust 
among members who are trusted with the 
obligation to enforce the laws for self-
determination. 
-weak central authority and fragility in all 
   374 
exploitation, and trade.  
-Zim-Asset reign forces the right to 
derive benefits from domestic mineral 
resources. 
-there is the need for Zimbabwe to use 
the revenue derived from exploitation of 
domestic resources in line with Zim-
Asset (development vision of 
Zimbabwe). 
-Zim-Asset faces critical challenges due 
to lack of capital due to lack of 
investment. 
 
 
 
levels of government, systematically 
weaken strategic development planning, as 
well as exploitation of mineral resources for 
self-determination.  
- DRC government should get significant 
amount of revenue from mining as it is both 
a player through joint mining ventures, eg 
Gecamines, and a beneficiary of taxes paid 
by mining companies. 
 
Threats to the Outworking of Sovereignty Over Mineral Resources 
 
 
Threat 
 
 
Effect on Zimbabwe 
 
Effect on the  DRC 
 
 
 
 
 
Conditionality 
policies of IMF 
& World Bank 
-Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) negatively affected 
Zimbabwe influencing retrenchment of 
civil service employees, reducing the 
size of state bodies and Ministries 
(especially affecting policing) – the 
executive and the legislature were 
compelled to adopt policies and political 
reforms that adversely affected state’s 
capacity to regulate.   
-basic services were cut to reduce public 
spending. 
-systematically disempowered regulation 
of mineral resources due to retrenchment 
-structural adjustments weakened 
implementation and enforcement 
capacity 
- self-determination was interfered with 
as well as the right to non-interference in 
domestic affairs of Zimbabwe 
- ESAP restricted Zimbabwe to 
formulate policies of its own; it 
interfered with state processes to 
function independently as would have 
been without it. 
 
-national budget partly relies on IMF & 
World Bank (and other donor) funding –
IMF and World Bank  demanded restoration 
of the relationship with DRC by restoring 
rule of law, investment conditions and 
democratic elections 
- argued that the IMF & World Bank 
conditions restricted the DRC government 
to formulate own policies. 
-The conditionality policy (IMF & World 
Bank demands) interferes with the DRC 
internal processes to function independently 
as would have been without them. 
-DRC government was compelled to liberate 
the economy under the influence of the IMF 
and the World Bank, thus changing and 
affecting the nature of the entity and the 
right mine mineral resources.  
-the DRC government was compelled to 
adopt political and certain policy reforms. 
-the debt relief extended to the DRC was 
conditionally upon the recipient drawing up 
sound and convincing poverty reduction 
strategy papers (PRSP).  
 
 
 
 
Illegal Mining 
-common in many parts of Zimbabwe 
due to lack of employment, poverty and 
economic decline. 
-indication of weak regulation and 
failure by state to eradicate illegal 
mining activities. 
-restricts revenue that can be available 
-illegal mining most common in the DRC 
due to weak regulation, poverty and 
economic decline. 
-about two-thirds of DRC industrial 
minerals that include diamond production 
are realised through unregulated artisanal 
diggers. This confirms illegal or unregulated 
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for development because illegal miners 
do not pay tax. 
-illegal mining put citizens against the 
authorities as they resist eviction- thus 
leading to conflicts. 
-illegal mining undermines state 
sovereignty because the activities are not 
sanctioned by law. 
 
mining activities are very common and 
rampant.   
-reduces revenue that would have been 
available to the states because illegal 
activities are not taxed. 
-illegal mining activities undermine state 
sovereignty because the activities are not 
sanctioned by the states. 
-illegal mining and transfer of revenues 
through loopholes in the regulatory system. 
-some mining corporations as well as 
individuals are linked to confiscations, 
forced monopoly and price fixing thereby 
prejudicing the state of legitimate revenues. 
-small mining companies promoting illegal 
mining as these companies buy minerals 
from illegal miners thereby buy at very low 
prices since the miners have no legitimate 
claims for better prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corruption 
-politicians use their political muscles to 
derive illegal benefits from mineral 
resources. 
-acts of corruption are against the need 
for transparency and accountability. 
-access to information is denied as a way 
to conceal illegal mining deals. 
-illicit deals conflicts with sovereignty of 
Zimbabwe over mineral resources and 
the mandate to establish and maintain 
legitimate transparent and accountable 
regulatory institutions. 
-corruption contributes to loss of investor 
confidence and lack of economic growth 
and development. 
-deliberate denying public scrutiny for 
fear to expose illicit deals which are 
prejudicial to the state. 
-deliberate avoiding tender procedures in 
order to illegally benefit from illegal 
deals, eg, awarding mining contracts. 
-cartels used to loot domestic mineral 
resources through weak and 
unaccountable regulatory system.   
-reduces and restricts revenue base 
through adverse or negative effects on 
taxable income and loopholes in tax 
collection system. 
-corruption in the DRC mining sector has 
negative effects in that it conflicts with 
sovereignty and the mandate to establish and 
maintain transparency, accountability 
regulatory institutions. 
-use and management of revenues and 
traceability is compromised. 
-contributes to slow economic growth and 
development. 
-creates classes and centralize power 
illegally. 
-politicians use their political muscles to 
derive illegal benefits from mineral 
resources.   
-leads to biased and/or weak implementation 
and enforcement of mining laws and justice 
delivery in mineral resources cases. 
-systematically disempower credibility of 
investment environment. 
-cartels used to loot domestic mineral 
resources while taking advantage of weak 
regulatory structures. 
-restricts revenue base through negative 
effects on taxable income and loopholes in 
tax collection system. 
-weak central authority and regulation, 
resource conflicts are multifaceted and 
threats and catalyst for corruption, and the 
cumulative effects of these factors restrict 
sovereignty and the mandate of the DRC to 
derive benefits from mineral resources for 
self-determination. 
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Conflicts 
-Marange diamond conflict is the most 
notable resource conflict (apart from the 
land issue). 
-the conflict between ordinary poor 
villagers and the state shows weak 
regulation and enforcement of the law 
reportedly that the state resorted to use of 
force against unarmed ordinary illegal 
miners. 
-Government of Zimbabwe was 
challenged to foster stable regulation of 
the resources, among others. 
 -investor confidence is weak due to 
recurrence of threats of expropriation. 
-internal conflicts between the DRC 
government on the one hand, and armed 
militia groups and illegal miners, on the 
other hand, threated self-determination of 
the DRC. 
-domestic affairs of the government and in 
relation to regulation of mineral resources 
are adversely affected, by the militia who 
challenge control and access to the 
resources. 
-conflicts disrupt mining activities thereby 
reducing production and intimately the 
revenues that could have been available for 
development. 
-the conflicts restrict government policy 
formulation and contrary to what other 
groups may anticipate. 
-conflicts have undermined prospects of 
development in the DRC, by threatening 
investment security and security of the state 
and persons. 
-conflicts restrict and weaken uniform 
application of the laws and regulation in 
areas affected by the conflicts. 
-conflicts challenges sovereignty of the 
DRC to foster stable environment to sustain 
economic growth and development and the 
mandate to use mineral resources for self-
determination.  
-Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe among others 
are implicated in the DRC conflict, ideally 
the interferences in the DRC domestic 
affairs regarding its minerals undermines the 
principles of non-interference and self-
determination, as well as the right of the 
DRC to develop from its resources.    
 
 
 
